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This dissertation work examines culture as a condition, as a context, and, finally, as an achievement. 
The research objectives for this examination are both historical and philosophical. The historical 
objective is to retrace the appearance of the notion of culture in the works of Paul Ricoeur (1913-
2005), and to demonstrate that Ricoeur adopts and adapts the term to his philosophical vocabulary. 
The accompanying philosophical objective, the proper task of this dissertation, is equally twofold. At the 
scholarly level this dissertation reconstructs – in the form of a hermeneutic of cultural recognition – 
Paul Ricoeur’s cultural theory, and explicates why such a theory is necessary relative to Ricoeur’s 
more openly-argued anthropological phenomenology of “being able.” I maintain that all 
anthropological thought requires the support of cultural understanding, as no comprehensive 
anthropology is possible without the philosophical elaboration of the cultural condition that 
concerns human situatedness. 
The ultimate aim of this dissertation, however, is to go beyond this scholarly analysis 
and point out a subjective cultural hermeneutic process under the peculiar “dramatic” modality of 
this dissertation. This postcritical process is what I sum up with the term re-con-naissance. The 
reception of a cultural heritage is reaffirmed in the incessant task of acquiring a notion of one’s self 
through hermeneutic reappropriation, or, as a perpetual task of freedom and the fulfillment of 
fundamental human possibilities in the interpretation of one’s culture. Put differently, the matter of 
this dissertation is to recognize (reconnaître) this level of cultural hermeneutics that is unceasingly 
present; to expose a postcritical depth structure that takes place in the reader’s own reconfigurative process 
as culturally enabled re-con-naissance. Since this hermeneutic concerns the postcritical interpretive 
reflection of a living, acting and struggling human subject – and is, therefore, not directly explainable 
– this reconfiguration can only be pointed at or suggested. In spite of its postcritical aim, therefore, 
the dissertation remains an academic work that functions at the level of critical explanation. The 
postcritical cultural hermeneutics has to be approached through the critical means that are 
exemplified by the scholarly analysis in this dissertation; our analysis stands for the critical and 
objectifying (academic) culture within which the reader reads this dissertation as a cultural and 
interpretive subject.  
After having propaedeutically explained the critical scholarly course and the ultimate 
postcritical task of this dissertation in part one, part two then breaks open the realm of cultural 
hermeneutics in the work of Paul Ricoeur by “letting it appear” through the critical analysis of the 
different perceptions concerning his last major work The Course of Recognition. This is the moment of 
“re-” or re-membering again the cultural condition. Ricoeur’s post-Hegelian notion of “cultural 
objectification” necessitates, however, examining the synthetic moment of “con.” Part three analyzes 
this “con” by pointing out a trajectory of Ricoeur’s “post-Hegelian Kantian” though in his early 
works that runs from the condition of objectivity to cultural objectivity, and furthermore to a 
poetically constituted hermeneutic of culture. In turn, part four contrasts Ricoeur’s thought with that 
of Martin Heidegger, focusing on Ricoeur’s later works that propose an etho-poetics of culture that 
is manifested in institution. Part four, which closes off the scholarly analysis of Ricoeur’s cultural 
hermeneutics, thereby displays the moment of “naissance,” or “having-been-born-as-an-ethico-
political-subject.” The last part of this dissertation, part five, distances itself from the academic or 
scholarly mode by revealing the underlying “dramatic” structure of this dissertation. As a re-reading 
of the reading of Ricoeur’s work in parts two, three, and four, part five exposes a new dimension to 
the whole of this work; namely, an experiential one that concerns the current reader of the work and 
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Introduction: Ricoeur, Culture, and Hermeneutics 
 
1 
1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005) was deeply convinced that the meaning of being is never 
immediate but always mediated in a continuous process of conflicting interpretations. This 
conviction is echoed in a statement made in Ricoeur’s 1965 essay “Existence and 
hermeneutics”: “Existence becomes a self – human and adult – only by appropriating that 
meaning which first resides ‘outside,’ in works, institutions, and cultural monuments in 
which the life of the spirit (la vie de l’esprit) is objectified.”1 For Ricoeur, existence is achieved 
only in tension with this “ontological horizon” of structured forms of life. In his words, 
existence “arrives at expression, at meaning, and at reflection only through the continual 
exegesis of all the significations that come to light in the world of culture.”2 In short, human 
existence is dependent on cultural meanings, through which a “decentered” self gains an 
understanding of itself.3 My question is how these significations come about in the first 
place.  
 Let me further introduce the general theme of my thesis in a Ricoeurian 
manner, that is, indirectly. In the 2004 Kluge Prize acceptance speech “Asserting Personal 
Capacities and Pleading for Mutual Recognition” Ricoeur enlists temporal personal identity, 
that is, personal history, as well as the capacities to say, to act, and the preeminent capacity to 
recount as constitutive human powers. In a similar manner as in his late work Parcours de la 
                                               
1 Ricoeur 1969, 26. (22). – The titles of Ricoeur’s essays that have been translated to English language will 
be given in English. Pagination to the corresponding English translation is given in brackets. Of Richard 
Kearney’s analysis of the same section in “Existence et herméneutique,” cf. Kearney 2004, 2, 28. 
2 Ricoeur 1969, 26. (22). 
3 Johann Michel captures well the essence of Ricoeur’s conception of “decentered” and “indirect” 
subjectivity: “Le rejet du subjectivisme ne se traduit chez Ricoeur par aucune proclamation de la ‘mort de 
l’homme.’ Ici, ce sont les concepts d’homme et d’humanisme qui portent à confusion. Si l’on entend, avec 
Heidegger, l’humanisme comme ‘époque du monde’ au cours de laquelle l’homme est place ‘au centre de 
l’étant,’ il faut alors attester que la philosophie de Paul Ricoeur n’est rien ‘humaniste,’ puisque son point de 
départ demeure le décentrement du sujet. Mail un tel décentrement n’implique pas réciproquement chez lui 
d’abandon des philosophies du sujet, non certes au sens d’homme abstraits,’ mais au sens d’individus reels et 
vivants,’ inscrits dans une histoire, dans des structures sociales, dans des traditions culturelles.” Michel 2006, 64. 
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reconnaissance (2004),4 Ricoeur states that these basic capacities or powers constitute “the 
primary foundation of humanity” as distinct from everything nonhuman. Saying, acting, and 
recounting can be understood respectively as the abilities to spontaneously produce 1) a 
reasoned discourse, 2) events in society and in nature, and 3) life narratives that have led up 
to self-identity. To these three it is possible to add the equally constitutive moral capacities of 
imputability and promising.5 Now, what comes to be interesting is Ricoeur’s suggestion that 
each of these capacities requires a reciprocal recognition on the part of other human beings: 
Discourse is addressed to someone capable of responding, questioning, 
entering into conversation and dialogue. Action occurs in conjunction with 
other agents, who can help or hinder. The narrative assembles multiple 
protagonists within a single plot. A life story is made up of a multitude of 
other life stories. As for imputability, frequently raised by accusation, I am 
responsible for others. More narrowly, imputability makes the powerful 
responsible for the weak and the vulnerable. Finally, promising calls for a 
witness who receives it and records it.6 
 
The primary foundation of humanity, Ricoeur maintains, can only be found in relation to 
others. This reciprocity, however, is not spontaneous; it grows out of desperate need that 
seeks recognition. In the wake of Hegel, but especially of Hobbes, Ricoeur goes as far as 
asserting that “the idea of a struggle for recognition is at the heart of modern social 
relations.”7 Even though this struggle can also be fruitful, and it can lead to reciprocal 
recognition, Ricoeur claims that genuine mutuality is achieved only when a certain “logic of 
the exchange of gifts” is applied in a social relation.8 This logic brings forward an aspect of 
human generosity: “giving remains a common gesture that escapes the objection of 
                                               
4 Trans. The Course of Recognition (by David Pellauer, 2005). From hereon the English title is used. 
5 Ricoeur 2010a, 22-23. Cf. Ricoeur 2004b, 137-166, 187-197. (89-110, 127-134). 
6 Ricoeur 2010a, 24. 
7 Ricoeur 2010a, 24. 
8 Ricoeur 2010a, 25. 
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calculated self-interests.”9 Giving, in turn, points to a common origin of both the struggle for 
recognition and the “good will” in human encounters.  
After this brief detour that prepares the reader for the subsequent ones I am 
taking in this dissertation, let us return to the main theme, that is, cultural hermeneutics. 
Although Ricoeur himself does not stress the point in his Kluge Prize acceptance speech, 
but leaves it for an attentive listener to hear, the “giving” he discusses does not need to be 
direct – in fact, it cannot be. We need to think of all mediated forms of this exchange. To be 
precise, Ricoeur insisted that his central thesis concerns “the idea of symbolic mutual 
recognition.”10 As I will later demonstrate, Ricoeur’s use of the term “symbolique” implies that 
there are cultural expressions that facilitate ethical self-understanding. All these expressions 
also count under the idea of “giving,” as they can be understood as “gestures” which invite 
us “to a similar generosity.”11 This is why Ricoeur mentions that the “ceremonial exchange of 
gifts in traditional societies” models this moment of mutual “giving.” My claim is that what is 
modeled by the “ceremonial exchange” is nothing else but the necessary condition and 
context of cultural exchange that is then manifested in “ceremonies” of all kinds. 
As I will explain later, Ricoeur’s analogy of the gift is a model of cultural 
exchange that enables mutuality. As Ricoeur also discusses the need for recognition, let me 
clarify at the outset that the symbolically mediated forms of mutual recognition do not 
remain at the level of calculated self-interests for a narcissistic and self-enclosed ego. Ricoeur 
claims that such rationalizing calculation is ultimately at the root of the Hobbesian-Hegelian 
struggle12 that cannot liberate the ego – only cultural mutuality gives the notion of the self: 
                                               
9 Ricoeur 2010a, 26. 
10 Ricoeur 2004b, 338. (233).  
11 Ricoeur 2010a, 25-26.  
12 Cf. Ricoeur 2004b, 246, 254. (167, 171-172). 
4 
Allow me to say that what we call the subject is never given at the start. Or, if 
it is, it is in danger of being reduced to the narcissistic, egoistic and stingy ego, 
from which literature, precisely, can free us. […] In place of an ego enamoured 
of itself arises a self instructed by cultural symbols, the first among which are 
narratives handed down in our literary tradition. And these narratives give us a 
unity which is not substantial but narrative.13 
 
In brief, for Ricoeur self-identification and attaining oneself as an existent being are both 
dependent on other selves that are mediately present in culture.14  
Furthermore, there are two aspects of this thought that I want to emphasize 
right away. First, this indirect mutual recognition through culture should not be taken as a 
completely unreachable utopia, or as indefinitely somewhere “there,” but instead as a 
necessary, albeit also a tensional, phase in coming ever closer to a comprehensive self-
understanding. Even though this understanding remains a task, as Ricoeur frequently 
emphasizes, the process of attaining it is already an achievement. In sum, a self is, by 
necessity, “instructed by cultural symbols.” Second, mutual recognition is guided by cultural 
objects such as literary works, “the narratives handed down in our literary tradition.” Ricoeur 
means by those objects, however, not simply “things” in the sense of the goods, 
commodities or services, or public institutions as expressions of power. Cultural objects, 
which frame the intersubjectively attainable and yet mediated self-understanding, are “true 
monuments” instead. They are not reducible to reification, that is, they are not all primarily 
material objects, since they include works of law, art, literature and philosophy. Their “true” 
monumentality relates rather to them being fundamentally poetic creations in broad sense, 
and as such exalted expressions of human capacities.15 According to Ricoeur, such 
monuments of human creativity both manifest and enable the mutualizing cultural exchange.  
                                               
13 Ricoeur 1991b, 33. 
14 Ricoeur 1965a, 502. (523). 
15 Ricoeur 1960a, 139. (123).; Ricoeur 1965a, 502-503. (522-523). Cf. Gadamer 1989, 163. 
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Bringing in Ricoeur’s assertion of poetic works and narrations as true 
monuments at the very beginning of this dissertation could seem quite sudden. The poetic 
“monuments,” however, clarify the direction that I will undertake in this work. With poetic 
works, their “objectival” character – their material “monumentality” – is only secondary 
compared to their function of promoting human ideas, most notably by language. This 
capacity to express is the very source of them being truly monumental. It could be helpful to 
remember Hans-Georg Gadamer’s famous line in Truth and Method: “The remnants of past 
life – what is left of buildings, tools, the contents of graves – are weather-beaten by the 
storms of time that have swept over them, whereas a written tradition, once deciphered and 
read, is to such an extent pure mind that it speaks to us as if in the present.”16 The material 
monuments, and politic as well as economic structures expressed in institutions, are 
important objects of a culture. For Ricoeur, the exalted expressions of human spirit (les 
oeuvres de l’esprit), such as poetic works of all sorts, still capture best the idea of humanity in an 
ideal sense.17 
In sum, Ricoeur argues that a human being becomes him- or herself and sees 
himself as a capable being through these cultural objects, which are “correlates of 
sublimation.”18 Cultural objects, therefore, also describe human possibilities that were 
introduced here by means of the 2004 Kluge Prize acceptance speech. The exploration of 
these possibilities, in turn, should thus extend into the works or “proper” poetico-cultural 
objects described above. These objects become “images of being human,” or figurations of 
human existence. Recognition, or reconnaissance, takes place in the signs deployed by human 
subjects. Ricoeur maintains that it is through the “images of being human” that “a certain 
                                               
16 Gadamer 1989, 163. 
17 Ricoeur 1960a, 139. 123). 
18 Ricoeur 1965a, 499. (519). 
6 
dignity of human beings is formed, which is the instrument and the trace of a process of 
reduplicated consciousness, of recognition of the self in another self.”19 It is here that the 
cultural reconnaissance is also encountered, precisely as reconnaissance du soi dans un autre soi.  
Guided by Ricoeur, this dissertation argues that the process of attaining self-
consciousness strongly relates to the term reconnaissance, understood in the subjectifying sense 
that includes the notions of “again” (re-), and “through and with others” (con-). Furthermore, 
self-consciousness is a birth (naissance) by this culturally facilitated recognition.20 A human 
being becomes a true human being, finds him- or herself “again” as rational in relation to 
humanity expressed as culture.  
This humanity or “humaneness” is, however, bound to that which is 
involuntary. Already in his very early works Ricoeur insists that a philosophical anthropology 
must face a mutually restricting contest of nature (nature or essence) and liberté (freedom).21 In 
the wake of both Kant’s critical philosophy22 and Hegel’s philosophy of the self-realization 
of the Spirit, it can be understood, however, that cultural expression, and culture itself, 
brings voluntary “freedom” to the framework set by involuntary “nature,” and that this 
process can be then described even as liberating sublimation in its deepest sense. Using 
Freudian terms familiar to Ricoeur, this is to say that cultural sublimation is another way of 
seeing a human being overcoming oneself, being “more” than might be surmised by one’s 
                                               
19 Ricoeur 1965a, 503. (523). 
20 I will discuss Paul Claudel’s term co-naissance and its relation to re-con-naissance in Appendix 4 of this 
dissertation. 
21 Ricoeur 1949, 7, 18. (3-4, 14-15). 
22 John Sallis points out that “there are grounds for regarding the problem of antinomies as ‘the cradle of 
the critical philosophy’,” and that “the question whether the soul is an indivisible unity, whether there is 
freedom, whether a supreme cause of the world exists – there are questions of ultimate human concern.” It is 
especially the third antinomy, that of the possibility of freedom, which is thought of here as it points to the 
question of morality discussed in the second as well as in the third Critique. Sallis 1980, 102, 112-113, 125-127. 
Cf. Kant 1999, V.427-433, 435-436, 447-450. (KdU). 
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nature.23 I maintain, therefore, that culture becomes a concept with a tensional double 
meaning. On one hand, it expresses the possibility of universal freedom, as well as 
potentiality, and on the other hand, it describes human dependence and boundness, the 
ontological bond of being situated that cannot be by-passed.24 As such, I maintain, the 
concept of culture has the crucial function of signifying and safe-guarding human freedom 
and autonomy in the face of this involuntary, expressing the freedom of the will in 
manifestations of des possibilités de l’homme.25  
 
* 
Even though I will readdress the question of research objectives, a word to briefly describe 
the general task of this dissertation. There are two levels of objectives in this dissertation, 
one historical and the other philosophical. The historical objective is to retrace the appearance 
of the notion of culture in the works of Paul Ricoeur, and to demonstrate that Ricoeur 
adopts and adapts the term to his philosophical vocabulary. The accompanying philosophical 
objective, the proper task of this dissertation, is to reconstruct – in the form of a hermeneutic 
of cultural recognition – Paul Ricoeur’s cultural theory. I maintain that such a theory is 
necessary for Ricoeur’s “phenomenology of being able.”  
While focusing on the philosophical task, I propose that the model of 
threefold mimesis Ricoeur introduces in Time and Narrative I – the process of reconfiguration – 
functions as a clue for analyzing the conditions for remembering, judging, and ethico-
political being respectively. In parts two, three, and four I trace concomitantly Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutic of recognition, and in particular his hermeneutic of cultural recognition, to 
                                               
23 Ricoeur 1965a, 499, 502-503. (519, 523-524). 
24 Cf. Ricoeur 1960b, 25-30. (19-24). 
25 Cf. Ricoeur 1949, 7. (3). 
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which the three moments of remembering, judging, and ethico-political being relate. Based 
on a detailed analysis of Ricoeur’s major works I will maintain that Ricoeur’s oeuvre as a 
whole constitutes a course of cultural recognition. Finally, I will argue in part five that the 
critical moments of reconfiguration, or Ricoeur’s “threefold mimesis,” are translatable to – 
or readable as – the postcritical moments of re-, con-, and naissance. 
 Let me also summarize in an introductory manner the main tenets of the 
following analysis, that is, clarify the ultimate focus of my analytical reading of Ricoeur in 
parts two, three, and four of this dissertation. As I will continuously remind us later, I will 
emphasize that the essentially etho-poetic culture that is manifested in ethico-political 
institution sums up Ricoeur’s hermeneutic of culture in the appearing of a cultural and 
ethical subject, or, in the moment of “having-been-born-as-an-ethico-political-subject.”  
There are three sides to this issue: the moment of institution that is problematized in part 
two in terms of assumed ethico-cultural life (viz. prefiguration) and particularly in part three 
of this dissertation in the light of objectification that captures the idea of humanity in those 
institutions that Ricoeur calls the true human “monuments” (viz. configuration). The 
subsequent moment of the unceasing becoming a human self in the reappropriation of these 
monuments or institutions (viz. refiguration) is analyzed in our part four of this dissertation. 
In brief, the etho-poetic nucleus of culture is approachable only through 
institution, but not reducible to it. As I will maintain, the varying concrete forms of 
sociocultural entities, their institutionalized settings, are not beyond criticism, but the general 
need for such cultural forms as contexts for life is incontestable. The cultural, in other 
words, includes ethics as well as politics, since for Ricoeur there is no culture absent 
institutions that are also political in nature. When Ricoeur reads Freud, for example, the 
analysis of culture begins with aesthetics and then moves to socio-political institutions. Put 
9 
differently, the structural level – economical, political, and juridical systems among others – 
of communal life has to be acknowledged as the needed form for the manifestation of 
essentially etho-poetic culture. 
As I have already maintained above, for Ricoeur human beings are 
fundamentally ethico-political beings. According to him, an individual becomes human only 
under the condition of the above mentioned institutions, through which the etho-poetic 
creativity is brought about and reappropriated. Institutional mediation of ethical intentions, 
for example, is indispensable. As indicated above, the same applies to political institution as 
well as law, art, and literature; the ethical life of a people is governed, for example, by a 
system of justice. All these institutions manifest etho-poetic cultural discourse that facilitates 
the becoming of a cultural, or ethico-political, self.  
 
* 
Having now described the general task of this dissertation and outlined some of its main 
themes, let me also make some reservations with regard to the scope of investigation, and 
the manner of approach. As I am proposing a style of reading Ricoeur’s work that so far has 
not been widely recognized, this dissertation will, therefore, avoid jumping to conclusions. 
Perhaps slightly at the expense of the reader’s willingness to understand the whole of my 
argument sooner than factually enabled by this text, I will proceed very cautiously. This 
means that I will let the main theme appear indirectly, through an analysis that covers the 
most recent discussion in the field of Ricoeur scholarship: recognition.  
The reader should, also for certain methodological reasons, be prepared to an 
experience that resembles a marathon rather than a sprint. After the extended introductory 
remarks in part one (whose value will become fully apparent only in part fife), the “letting 
10 
appear” of Ricoeur’s cultural hermeneutics at the analytical level will take place in part two in 
particular. The rest of the dissertation serves as verification that this hermeneutic is not 
unfounded in terms of Ricoeur’s work as a whole. For this reason, I will – when needed – 
also cover other themes that help understand the main question. I emphasize, however, that 
in the final analysis I will not fully elaborate Ricoeur’s ethics, politics, legal hermeneutics, 
poetic ontology, philosophy of religion, or any other theme that would require a complete 
investigation of its own. Put differently, in spite of the necessary detours that support my 
main thesis, this dissertation focuses, in the whole course of its argument, on Ricoeur’s 
cultural hermeneutics. 
To reiterate, my question concerns Ricoeur’s hermeneutic of culture that I 
claim is underdeveloped and underestimated in terms of Ricoeur’s critics. This leads me to 
another limitation of this work, as important as it is intended. Ricoeur’s passing and 
somewhat reserved allusions in some of his later texts to the “American” discussion of 
multiculturalism do not allow this thesis to constitute a direct response to, or a reflection of, 
the continuing multiculturalism discussion that was largely initiated by Charles Taylor’s 1992 
celebrated essay “The Politics of Recognition.”26 This thesis confines itself to the question of 
                                               
26 Ricoeur 2004b, 310-315. (212-216).; Ricoeur, Azouvi, & de Launay 1995, 84-97. (52-61). Cf. Ricoeur 
2004c, 53-63. (30-36).; Ricoeur 2004a. – Charles Taylor’s seminal 1992 essay on multiculturalism was 
republished in 1994 along with an English translation of “Kampf um Anerkennung im demokratischen 
Rechtsstaat” by Jürgen Habermas (1993). Even though the original publication already included a number of 
commentaries by Taylor’s critics - such as Susan Wolf, Steven C. Rockefeller, and Michael Walzer - Habermas’s 
comments on Taylor’s essay, soon to be followed by Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship (1995), helped to 
ensure that the theme of multiculturalism was to become one of the key terms in the contemporary (political) 
philosophy. Rudi Visker even goes as far as stating that “the word ‘multiculturalism’ itself has begun to take 
over from that other key word which fascinates us for so many years: we no longer expect ‘postmodernism’ to 
provide the answers to all our enigmas, but rather multiculturalism.” (Visker 2003, 91.) Of the multitude of 
recent texts on multiculturalism, cf. e.g. Murphy 2012.; Wise & Velayutham 2009.; Headley 2012.; Phillips 
2009.; May & Sleeter 2010.; and Wren 2012. Many of these works not only discuss multiculturalism from the 
points of view of cultural pluralism, diversity and equality, cultural identity, multi-ethnicity, structural racism, 
everyday multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism, cultural interaction, or intercultural communication, but also 
take into account the so-called “critical multiculturalism” as a form of “critical pedagogy” that aims at an 
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how a human subject is able to recognize him or herself as a capable – albeit also fallible – 
human being through culture as a condition and a context.  
Apart from few passing allusions to multiculturalism in chapter 7, this 
dissertation does not, therefore, engage in the discussion that in its own way responds 
critically to the 19th century conceptions of nation states with their respective cultural-
linguistic and ethnic profiles, or Herderian-Hegelian Volksgeisten. As Ricouer’s latest work 
and the resultant discussion in Ricoeur scholarship reflects the theme of recognition, 
however, and as this work analyzes Ricoeur’s cultural hermeneutics, it can be admitted that 
this dissertation implies a certain level of interest in the multiculturalism discussion, but only 
from a distance. To restate, therefore, the task of this dissertation, I maintain that the focus 
of this work is on Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutic of cultural recognition, but from a point of 
view that addresses culture in general as a condition, a context, and, finally, as an 
achievement. 
 For the same reason this dissertation does not take part in the recent debate 
on recognition that extends the “politics of recognition” discussion in the sphere of social 
justice. Even though I will indicate the points of connection in this direction by including 
some extended commentaries in footnotes, particularly in chapter 15, my aim differs from 
the philosophical concerns debated, for example, by Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth in 
their joint publication Redistribution or Recognition?.27 This dissertation constrains itself to 
                                                                                                                                            
educational reform – the philosophical discussion has already had far-reaching political and educational 
consequences. Of multiculturalism and Ricoeur’s Course of Recognition, cf. Moyaert 2011. 
27 In their debate, which brings together John Rawls’s conception of disctibutive justice and Charles 
Taylor’s theorizing about recognition, Nancy Fraser stresses the primacy of redistribution over recognition as 
well as their irreducibility to each other, whereas Axel Honneth emphasizes recognition and understands the 
question of distribution as a connected derivative of this foundational point of view. I do acknowledge, 
however, that Fraser and Honneth extend their discussion in the direction that, broadly understood, has a 
connection to the core theme of my dissertation: Fraser and Honneth take into account the “cultural turn” in 
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proposing another angle of reading the work of Paul Ricoeur, a task that itself will prove to 
be quite daunting for the reader. I am firmly convinced, nevertheless, that in spite of its 
obvious limitations and, perhaps, even frustrating minuteness, this dissertation work 
functions as a corrective to those views that approach Ricoeur’s thought from the mere 
anthropological viewpoint, or merely as a philosophy of the human subject. Ricoeur’s 
cultural understanding deserves to be recognized. 
                                                                                                                                            
social theory when debating their respective views about it. Fraser & Honneth 2003, 50-59, 160-170, 211-222, 
248-256. 
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2. RICOEUR AND THE QUESTION OF CULTURE 
Let me begin my extended preparatory remarks by pointing out that the concept of culture 
itself is pivotal when any anthropological question – such as human nature, human action or 
expression of being – is examined.28 The importance of the culture concept does not mean 
that in many cases the anthropological aspect wouldn’t prevail. This is relevant also to Paul 
Ricoeur, for whom human capability and freedom were the major themes in philosophy 
from the very beginning.29 There are, however, different readings of what Ricoeur’s work 
was ultimately about. In their A Passion for the Possible (2010) Brian Treanor and Henry Isaac 
Venema argue that the question of the possible captures the essence of Ricoeur’s oeuvre:  
If we look at the path that Ricoeur’s work has taken, it is fair to say that his 
entire project narrates a ‘passion for the possible’ expressed in the hope that 
‘in spite of’ death, closure, and sedimentation, life is opened by the how much 
more than possible of superabundance. This narrative of the more than possible is 
particularly evident in Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology and his religious 
thought.30 
 
Despite their inclination toward the possible and Ricoeur’s religious thought, Treanor and 
Venema acknowledge that the theme of l’homme capable is indeed the most compelling: 
“Alternatively, we can say that there is a narrative unity to Ricoeur’s work that tells a story of 
the capable man, beginning with original goodness held captive by a ‘servile will,’ and ending 
with the possibility of liberation and regeneration of the heart.”31 In their book, this second 
aspect, capable human being, actually outshines the first one (what is possible) – for a good 
reason. 
                                               
28 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952.; Geertz 2000. 
29 Ricoeur 1949. 
30 Treanor & Venema 2010, 2. 
31 Treanor & Venema 2010, 2. 
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Towards the end of his life Ricoeur himself affirmed that the anthropological 
question of being able and not being able (puissance et impuissance) was the ultimate purpose 
and goal for his philosophical explorations.32 In one of his very last interviews (2003) with 
his friend and former doctoral student Richard Kearney,33 Ricoeur mentions that the goal of 
hermeneutic reflection is to reveal a capable human being:  
The ultimate purpose of hermeneutic reflection and attestation, as I see it, is to 
try to retrace the line of intentional capacity and action behind mere objects 
(which we tend to focus on exclusively in our natural attitude) so that we may 
recover the hidden truth of our operative acts, of being capable, of being un 
homme capable. So if hermeneutics is right, in the wake of Kant and Gadamer, to 
stress the finitude and limits of consciousness, it is also wise to remind 
ourselves of the tacit potencies and acts of our lived existence. My bottom line 
is a phenomenology of being able. 34 
 
David Pellauer, another one of Ricoeur’s friends and co-workers, confirms this focus on 
l’homme capable when stating that “philosophical anthropology [that was begun with the early 
works] will later become the question of what Ricoeur will call the capable human being who 
is a social being and lives in a world organized by social institutions.”35 Pellauer thus 
professes a certain unity in diversity – concordant discordance – in Ricoeur’s not always 
thematically aligned works; philosophical anthropology and its implicit ontology are always 
present in his work.36 
In spite of – or, perhaps, because of – this well-established idea of an 
underlying thematic unity, the question of situating the capable human subject in terms of its 
cultural situation and engagement has not drawn the attention that it also clearly merits from 
Ricoeur’s works. In particular, explicit questions of the concept of culture as well as the 
                                               
32 Ricoeur & Kearney 2004, 168. 
33 Cf. Treanor 2006, 222-225. 
34 Ricoeur & Kearney 2004, 167. 
35 Pellauer 2007, 27. 
36 Pellauer 2007, 120. 
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question of cultural recognition have been neglected. It is somewhat encouraging, however, 
that in the Spanish speaking world Ricoeur’s work has been understood to discuss these 
themes as well; some of his essays have been compiled and published in 1986 under the title 
Ética y Cultura.37 The late Clark professor of philosophy at Yale University, John E. Smith, 
also supports – in the 1995 volume of the Library of Living Philosophers dedicated to Paul 
Ricoeur – the idea that Ricoeur’s final end is the hermeneutic of culture: 
Although it is clear that Ricoeur wishes to be identified with the linguistic 
approach to philosophy, in fairness it must be said that he has a far broader 
understanding of what this means than many philosophers at present. This 
stems from the fact that, while Ricoeur’s proximate subject is language, his 
ultimate subject is culture or the meaningful substance of human experience 
and activity.38  
 
Smith, in other words, places Ricoeur’s work primarily to the field of cultural hermeneutics. 
Behind all the particular hermeneutics of symbols, language, and narratives, it is possible to 
detect a hermeneutic of culture that maps Ricoeur’s works onto the same trajectory. 
 John E. Smith’s assertion of the aim of Ricoeur’s work as a whole stands out, 
however, as a lone cry. In the same compilation of twenty-five scholastic articles and 
Ricoeur’s personal replies to each one of them, only Joseph Bien briefly discusses Ricoeur’s 
dialectics of culture and nature – along with Ricoeur’s notion of “cultural objects” – using 
the 1962 article “Nature and Freedom.”39 In addition to Smith’s and Bien’s remarks, Gary B. 
Madison merely alludes to a subject’s participation “in the realm of culture,” without which 
                                               
37 Ética y cultura (El baquiano 10), Docencia: Buenos Aires, 1986. – Margit Eckholt’s 1999 essay takes use 
of this collection of Ricoeur’s texts (cf. Eckholt 1999, 105.). It appears that the Spanish speaking scholars, and 
especially those interested in “liberation philosophy,” have been the most open-minded in reading Ricoeur’s 
work from the viewpoint of cultural philosophy. Cf. e.g. Fornari 1973.; Wallton 1973.; Fornari 1983.; 
Scannonne 1987.; Beuchot 1992.; Dussel 1996, viii-x, 74-79, 205-239.; Prado 2000. 
38 J. E. Smith 1995, 148-149. 
39 Bien 1995, 300-301. – Ricoeur’s article “Nature et liberté” was later published in English in Political and 
Social Essays (1974), which is a collection of Ricoeur’s articles edited by David Stewart and Joseph Bien. 
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one “would not exist as such,”40 whereas Peter Kemp refers to “the works of culture” in 
connection with a self that applies these works to itself.41 Domenico Jervolino affirms this 
idea of mediated self-understanding in passing when he states that one’s notion of the self is 
grounded in “the inheritance of cultures and traditions where our roots are sunk.”42 When 
David Pellauer then mentions a “cultural tradition which we find ourselves either a member 
of or related to,”43 Thelma Z. Lavine wonders “where in the historical currents of twentieth-
century intellectual culture” could Ricoeur be located.44 Hans Rudnick, in his brief text, goes 
on, therefore, to depict Ricoeur’s philosophy as “conscious of cultural responsibility,”45 or, in 
words of Stephen Tyman, attentive to the historical “pulsations” that require thinking of 
them anew “from under the turns and twists of culture.”46  
The disturbing vagueness of all these scattered allusions indicate that the 
question of culture, and Ricoeur’s philosophical work as a hermeneutic of culture, does not 
seem to have been a relevant viewpoint for the scholars contributing to the Ricoeur edition 
of “the philosophers’ Nobel.”47 While not being able to fully express the importance of a 
hermeneutic of culture for Ricoeur’s thought or systematize it, these Ricoeur scholars, 
nevertheless, indicate that such a level of Ricoeur’s thought exists. But then we come to the 
other front of the issue, and it potentially is an equally troubling one. 
                                               
40 Madison 1995, 78-79. 
41 Kemp 1995, 386. 
42 Jervolino 1995, 539. 
43 Pellauer 1995, 105, 111, 115. 
44 Lavine 1995, 169-171, 182. – Lavine discusses in the same essay Freud’s psychoanalysis that, according 
to her, presents “the archeology of Western culture and the vicissitudes of its teleology […] with such a ‘surplus 
of meaning.’” Lavine does not, however, discuss Ricoeur’s hermeneutic of culture but merely reflects his Freud 
interpretation. Cf. Lavine 1995, 174, 176. 
45 Rudnick 1995, 145. 
46 Tyman 1995, 451. 
47 The Library of Living Philosophers is a series of works published by OpenCourt, and since there is no Nobel 
Prize for philosophy, it is being considered as an honor for a professional philosopher to be selected in this 
series. 
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The silence Ricoeur keeps in his replies to these scholarly contributions is 
nothing but disconcerting. If Ricoeur’s distinction between “distant” and “nearby” cultures – 
that he makes in passing when responding to Bernard Stevens48 – and his reference to the 
“Freudian philosophy of culture” in his reply to Lavine are set aside,49 the term “culture” 
appears only in his reply to Joseph Bien:  
It is the entire debate between freedom and nature that has to be transposed 
onto the social plane, inasmuch as nature is at once corporal and social, 
biological and cultural. Freedom will then acquire a political dimension, while 
necessity will unfold on the economic, social, and cultural plane. The dialectic 
of freedom and nature will be played out on the level of work and of all the 
institutions in which human desire is objectivized.50  
 
Here, Ricoeur pairs freedom with the political (which is not to be equated with the quotidian 
“politics” of political parties), whereas culture is paired with unfolding necessity. The 
dialectic of freedom and nature is transformed into another dialectic at the social plane, that 
is, on the level of work and institutions.  
Despite the overall silence in his 1995 replies to his critics, I should emphasize, 
Ricoeur nevertheless admits that culture has a role in the dialectics of objectified human 
desire. I argue that this dialectics of objectified desire describes a human being who is both 
creative and capable. In it there opens a possibility for him or her to recognize himself or 
herself as a capable human being (un homme capable). Agreeing with José Gama and his 
judging that Ricoeur’s work comprises a “hermenêutica da cultura,”51 I maintain that 
understanding the meaning of the concept of culture as a part of this dialectics is, therefore, 
essential.  
                                               
48 Ricoeur 1995e, 509. 
49 Ricoeur 1995m, 191. 
50 Ricoeur 1995i, 307. 
51 Gama 1996, 386-392. 
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A relating claim that I also pursue is that making Ricoeur’s cultural 
hermeneutics explicit is necessary for the comprehension of what Ricoeur wanted to express 
with his works; after all they form a series of analyses of various cultural aspects. To stress 
this point further, I read Ricoeur’s work in toto as a course of cultural recognition – and not 
only as an unfinished and unfinishable work on recognition as Jean Greisch asserts.52 I argue 
that there is a cultural hermeneutic “parcours de la reconnaissance” which makes recognition 
possible in the first place. To draw support from other Ricoeur scholars, let me point out 
that Richard Kearney, for example, maintains that there is a steady cultural progress taking 
place in Ricoeur’s work: “We find Ricoeur’s hermeneutic trajectory progressing consequently 
as a series of reflections upon the primary sources of cultural interpretation.”53 Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics, in other words, is as much cultural hermeneutics as hermeneutical 
anthropology; it provides a cultural understanding.54 My conviction is that Ricoeur’s work as 
a whole – that can in itself be described, as Margit Eckholt argues, mirroring an 
Inkulturationsprozess to major contemporary philosophies55 – is better understood when this 
trajectory of cultural reflections is brought to the forefront. 
 
2.1 The Culture/Civilization Confusion 
I have already made strong assertions concerning Ricoeur’s cultural hermeneutics. Let me 
continue, however, by questioning the validity of this cultural investigation of Ricoeur’s work 
so as to pre-emptively respond to the possible criticism by acknowledging certain challenges 
his texts present us at the outset. As demonstrated by Ricoeur’s essays in Histoire et vérité 
                                               
52 Greisch 2010, 90. 
53 Kearney 2004, 14. 
54 Eckholt 2002, 11-19. 
55 Eckholt 2002, 9. 
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(1955),56 along with his other essays from the 1950s,57 the notion of culture has a firm role in 
Ricoeur’s work from very early on. The question remains, however, as to its propaedeutic 
meaning. Ricoeur’s 1960 conference presentation, which became the essay “Universal 
Civilization and National Cultures” (that was included in the 1964 and 1967 editions of 
History and Truth) appears promising for the search for a definition of the concept of culture. 
This is perhaps the reason why, for example, Manuel Sumares, Margit Eckholt, David M. 
Kaplan, and Jens Mattern use it as a source for drawing out Ricoeur’s cultural philosophy.58  
Despite the fact that Ricoeur scholars have formulated their respective 
interpretations of Ricoeur’s cultural hermeneutics on the basis of this text, the actual essay, 
however, is philosophically ambiguous and conceptually confusing. As also in the other 
essays included in History and Truth, the concepts “civilization” and “culture” are at times 
seen as different,59 and at times they seem to be interchangeable at least at the level of 
Ricoeur’s rhetoric.60 Similarly, Ricoeur discusses “nations” (une nation, un peuple) but 
apparently takes this term on some occasions as synonymous with “states” (l’état) or 
“countries” (un pays, la patrie).61 Moreover, every so often Ricoeur also conflates the meanings 
                                               
56 The enlarged 1964 edition of Histoire et vérité (originally published in 1955) was translated as History and 
Truth (by Charles A. Kelbley, 1965). The third, yet enlarged edition was published in 1967, and I will in this 
dissertation refer to this third edition. I will also include references to the English translation where possible, 
however. From hereon the English title of this work is used. 
57 Ricoeur 1991a, 315-367. 
58 According to Frans D. Vansina’s extensive 1935-2008 primary and secondary bibliography of Ricoeur 
texts, there are only two dissertation works (written by Kelton Cobb and Marcel Madila-Basanguka) and three 
monographs (by Pawel Ozdowski, Manuel Sumares, and Jens Mattern) which indicate with their titles that they 
deal with the question of culture. For a brief analysis of each of these, see the Appendix 2. (Cf. Vansina & 
Vandecasteele 2008, 343-431.) Margit Eckholt’s 1999 essay “Kultur – Zwischen Universalität und Partikularität. 
Annäherung an eine kulturphilosophische interpretation Paul Ricoeurs” as well as David M. Kaplan’s analysis 
of Ricoeur’s critical theory also utilize Ricoeur’s 1961 essay in their respective discussions of Ricoeur’s 
Kulturphilosophie. Cf. Eckholt 1999, 103.; Kaplan 2003, 173-187. 
59 Ricoeur 1961, 446, 450. (277, 281). Cf. Ricoeur 1967a, 7, 13-16, 20, 87-90, 166-170, 176-180, 189-191, 
210-211, 220-221, 223-233. (3, 8-11, 15, 86-89, 166-170, 175-179, 187-190, 197-198, 206-207, 210-219). 
60 Ricoeur 1961, 445-447, 452-453. (277-278, 283).  
61 Ricoeur 1961, 440-442, 447, 449-451. (272-274, 277-279, 281-282).  
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of the words “country” (or “nation”) and “culture” (or “civilization”).62 One can therefore 
legitimately ask what the “certain privileged civilizations” would be, and what is their 
relationship to cultures, countries, or nations – or for that matter to the “universal 
civilization,” mentioned in the context of the very same essay, and characterized by rational-
scientific attitude, utilization of tools and techniques, and the existence of rational politics.63 
Clearly, as the detailed analysis in Appendix 3 of this dissertation explains, the text cannot be 
considered as one of Ricoeur’s best in terms of clarity, or insight. 
This confusion is not easily overcome, partially due to Ricoeur’s intentional 
avoidance of analytic-style philosophizing which he sees as leading to endless vicious circles 
rather than any positive outcomes.64 In his 1965 essay in Esprit, “The Tasks of the Political 
Educator,” Ricoeur avoids the question of his conceptual arbitrariness simply by announcing 
that he “will not engage in the debate – as academic as sterile – on ‘civilization and 
culture.’”65 This avoidance or neglect seems to be his strategy later as well, as in his late work 
Course of Recognition he also informs his readers that there is no reason to oppose the word 
culture to that of civilization.66 Ricoeur, however, lets the reader of his 1965 essay know that 
he is aware of the different original meanings of these terms: 
In German sociology, the word Kultur tends to take on a restricted sense which 
covers only the third reality – the exercise of values – whereas the word 
Civilization has very rapidly taken on a much broader meaning which covers 
the three realities already mentioned [i.e., industries, institutions, and values]. 
But one also speaks of acculturation in order to indicate the growth of 
civilization in all its aspects. There is therefore no reason to linger over this 
debate.67  
                                               
62 Ricoeur 1961, 440-441, 447. (272, 278). 
63 Ricoeur 1961, 439-442, 444. (271-273, 275). 
64 Ricoeur 1973a, 165. 
65 Ricoeur 1965c, 79. (Ricoeur 1974, 272.). Cf. Appendix 1. 
66 Ricoeur 2004b, 201. (135-136). Cf. Ricoeur 1965a, 243-244. (248-249). – Despite the ambiguity in the 
essay “Civilisation universelle et cultures nationales” Ricoeur does not, contrary to what Eckholt argues, in the 
end differentiate culture and civilization. Cf. Eckholt 2002, 22-23. 
67 Ricoeur 1965c, 79. (Ricoeur 1974, 272.). 
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In principle, then, Ricoeur has it all together: he knows the meaning of the word Kultur and 
its distinction from Civilization. As long as he distances himself from the centuries-long 
Kultur-Civilization discussion – examined in Appendix 1 of this dissertation – Ricoeur risks, 
however, sounding philosophically arrogant. In addition, this distanciation does not 
overcome the conceptual problem that has not been sufficiently addressed in the reception 
of Ricoeur’s work. 
I should point out, nevertheless, that there are good historical reasons for 
Ricoeur’s perplexity. According to Alfred L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, in the French 
context the words “la civilization” and “social” were still predominant in the 1950s over that of 
German-originating “la culture.”68 Then again, Ricoeur’s wavering between “culture” and 
“civilization” could perhaps help us to “hear anew,” or to understand. Our question 
concerns objectified human reality, which provides a matrix of meaning for the individual 
interpreting his or her own being in the view of this articulated reality. Whether we call this 
objectivity civilization or culture, thus makes no difference in the final analysis. This does 
not, however, absolve us from the task of searching for clarity at the terminological level of 
Ricoeur’s philosophy. 
 Our difficulty is that there is no clear conception or definition of the concept 
of culture in “Universal Civilization and National Cultures” and, as I point out earlier, 
Ricoeur intentionally leaves the definition in the shadows even in Course of Recognition.69 This 
confusion leads us to the matter that the basic background problems of a thesis, namely 
those of definition, relevance, comments, and sources, are then still unclear for us. Although 
the detailed analysis of Ricoeur’s essay in Appendix 3 of this dissertation allows us to 
                                               
68 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 28-29, 147. Cf. Appendix 1. 
69 Ricoeur 2004b, 201. (135-136). 
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understand a culture to have an “ethico-mythical nucleus” – Manuel Sumares, Kelton Cobb, 
Marcel Madila-Basanguka, Margit Eckholt, and Jens Mattern all highlight this in their 
respective texts on Ricoeur’s cultural hermeneutics70 – a reader is still left in a state of 
perplexity. The question of the validity of existing scholarly comments is also disconcerting, 
since Ricoeur’s essay has been rather widely used as a source in explicating his cultural 
philosophy. The lack of a precise definition is alarming, however, and it indirectly opens the 
question of the appropriate sources: there are no explicit references in the 1961 essay – nor 
in the 1965 essay – to Ricoeur’s other works that could possibly clarify his argumentation.  
Lastly, the question of the relevance of the culture concept to Ricoeur’s work 
in general becomes problematic in relation to possible source materials. In his 1961 essay 
Ricoeur actually seems to tackle more the anthropological issue of the creative human being 
and his or her self-understanding than anything else: “In order to confront a self other than 
one’s own self, one must first have a self.”71 Ricoeur’s approach could, therefore, be 
described as more anthropological than cultural. The very last statement of Ricoeur’s 1961 
essay reveals that he, in fact, is not keen on studying the notion of cultural being:  
Every philosophy of history is inside one of [the] cycles of civilizations. That is 
why we have not the wherewithal to imagine the coexistence of these manifold 
styles; we do not possess a philosophy of history which is able to resolve the 
problems of coexistence. Thus if we do see the problem, we are not in a 
condition to anticipate the human totality, for this will be the fruit of the very 
history of the men who will take part in this formidable debate.72 
 
                                               
70 Cf. Appendix 2. – Margit Eckholt indicates in her 1999 essay “Kultur – Zwischen Universalität und 
Partikularität: Annäherung an eine kulturphilosophische interpretation Paul Ricoeurs” that Madila-Basanguka’s 
work is familiar to her. Her brief pamphlet (2002) on Ricoeur’s cultural understanding, which applies Ricoeur 
cultural philosophy in the direction of a theology of culture (just as the 1999 essay does), is not included in the 
Appendix 2 that discusses dissertation works and monographs. Eckholt’s pamphlet, nevertheless, also includes 
the idea of a creative ethico-mythical nucleus of culture. Eckholt 1999, 99-100, 104-105.; Eckholt 2002, 16-17.  
71 Ricoeur 1961, 452. (283). 
72 Ricoeur 1961, 453. (284). 
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Ricoeur implies that although a cultural condition can be acknowledged, it is not possible to 
philosophically investigate the fundamental nature of this condition because we are all 
“within” and there is no “wherewithal.” This perhaps forecloses for us the effort of 
reconstructing Ricoeur’s cultural philosophy. 
Although one could easily be suspicious of the relevance of this inquiry – 
especially on the basis of our analysis in Appendix 3 – one should not, however, leave aside 
the observation that Ricoeur does discuss culture and its characteristics. His preface to the 
first edition of History and Truth (1955) basically begins by acknowledging that “the 
philosophical way of being present to my time seems to be linked to a capacity for 
reachieving the remote intentions and the radical cultural presuppositions which underlie 
what I earlier called the civilizing drives of our era.”73 This inclusion of cultural thematics is 
also evident in the light of Ricoeur’s rather late conference presentation “Fragile Identity: 
Respect for the Other and Cultural Identity” (2000), in which Ricoeur acknowledges a need 
to examine the notion of collective identity and cultural integration.74 Moreover, Frans D. 
Vansina’s extensive bibliography mentions some twenty articles and chapters by Ricoeur 
which clearly address the question of cultural being, or being cultural.75 These texts vary 
from the very early “Le chrétien et la civilisation occidentale” (1946) to the very late 
“Cultures, du deuil à la traduction” (2004). Ricoeur does, therefore, indeed provide explicit 
material for a reconstruction of his cultural theory.  
 
                                               
73 Ricoeur 1967a, 8. (4). 
74 Ricoeur 2000a. (Ricoeur 2011.) Cf. Ricoeur 1986b, 254-255. 
75 Vansina & Vandecasteele 2008. 
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2.2 Between Philosophical Anthropology and Cultural Hermeneutics 
It is the task of this dissertation to show that Ricoeur’s work not only implies but 
necessitates a cultural theory. There are two levels at which the research objectives of this 
dissertation can be worked out. The first level is historical. Even though approaching the issue 
of culture with the question of recognition – that is, from the point of view of a recent 
scholarly discussion initiated by Ricoeur’s last major work – this dissertation will in part 
retrace the appearance of the notion of culture in the works of Paul Ricoeur. The underlying 
assumption is that in the context of French philosophy the attitude towards using the term 
“culture” was still “resistive” in the 1950s.76 It is evident, however, that Ricoeur utilizes the 
term in its modern sense in his texts in the 1960s and 1970s; let us take Ricoeur’s 1975 
lecture on Clifford Geertz’s The Interpretation of Cultures as an example.77 The question thus is, 
does Ricoeur use the term “culture” throughout his career or can one detect a change in his 
philosophical vocabulary? A reformulation of this question is, are Kroeber and Kluckhohn 
correct in their proposal that there was such “resistance” in French language? These 
questions do not, however, constitute a proper philosophical analysis. 
The second, more elaborate level of the research objectives is philosophical. The 
task for this dissertation is to reconstruct – in the form of a hermeneutics of cultural 
recognition – Paul Ricoeur’s cultural theory. The hypothesis that lies at the heart of this 
question is that such a theory is necessary for any anthropological interpretation of the 
question of the situated subject. As Roy Wagner admits, the concept of culture is now 
commonly associated with cultural anthropology.78 In contrast to the suggestion that 
Wagner’s assertion implies – that the concept of culture is approachable and understandable 
                                               
76 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 28-29, 147. Cf. Appendix 1. 
77 Ricoeur 1986b, 255-257.  
78 Wagner 1981, 1. 
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exclusively by the methods of cultural anthropology – this dissertation demonstrates that a 
philosophy of culture is relevant and even necessary for both philosophical and cultural 
anthropology.  
The proper task for this dissertation is, therefore, to show that although 
perhaps not systematically presented, Ricoeur’s “phenomenology of being able” requires the 
support of an underlying cultural hermeneutics. “Culture,” Ricoeur argues in his essay “What 
Does ‘Humanism’ Mean?” (1956), “appears as a ‘great detour’ between man and his 
powers.”79 There can be no comprehensive anthropology without a sufficiently satisfying 
elaboration of the cultural condition that locates the human being by providing him or her 
with the possibility of self-recognition. To use a term well-known to both Hegel and 
Heidegger, it is the Da of Da-sein and the reflection arising from facing this condition that 
animates this dissertation work.80  
As an indication of the need to take into account the human situatedness, 
Ricoeur’s three-step analysis of traditionality-traditions-tradition in Time and Narrative III 
should also not be forgotten. Even at the risk of letting Ricoeur appear as too Gadamerian,81 
let me point out that this analysis leads him to state that “we are never at the beginning of 
the process of truth; […] we belong, before any critical gesture, to a domain of presumed 
truth.”82 Traditionality as a human condition, or being-here (Da-sein) in culture, precedes any 
                                               
79 Ricoeur 1956, 86. (Ricoeur 1974, 73.). 
80 Hegel 2008, 458-459. (§508). – It is noteworthy that Heidegger points out in Being and Time that Da-
sein’s self-understanding is dependent on its relation to beings that are not it itself: “Da-sein understands itself 
– and that means also its being-in-the-world – ontologically in terms of those beings and their being which it 
itself is not, but which it encounters ‘within’ its world.” Heidegger 1967, 58. (55). 
81 Cf. G. H. Taylor & Mootz III 2011, 3-5. 
82 Ricoeur 1985, 318-332. (219-227). – Ricoeur quite obviously criticizes Gadamer’s conception of 
tradition as partially too narrow while also bringing in Habermas’s critique of ideology. This aspect pertains, 
however, only to the third analyzed notion, namely, that of “tradition.” It should be clear that Gadamer’s take 
on “tradition” (Überlegung) is to be conceived not only as “a process that experience teaches us to know and 
govern,” but especially as language, for “it is language.” In furthermore defining the truth of tradition Gadamer 
asserts that it is “like the present that lies immediately open to the senses. The mode of being of tradition is, of 
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phenomenology of being able, and it cannot therefore be avoided as a question awaiting 
explication. 
To briefly explain myself in a propaedeutic manner, the condition of 
traditionality relates closely to the notion of culture in Ricoeur’s texts. His 1973 essay “Ethics 
and Culture: Habermas and Gadamer in Dialogue,” for example, insists that “every culture 
comes to us as a received heritage, therefore as transmitted and carried by a tradition.”83 The 
essay also brings forth the idea of historicity and implies the presence of collective memory. 
According to Ricoeur, culture is “one modality of the replacement of human generations by 
one another, by instituting the continuity of an historical memory across the biological 
discontinuity of the generations.”84 The essay preserves, however, an institutional aspect as 
well. The historical continuity, Ricoeur writes, “is assured through institutions, whether 
formal as in teaching and education, or informal as in custom and usage.”85 The institutional 
level of our with-being is part of our traditionality as its preservation in human 3ραξις. 
Not all the institutions, however, have initially an equal weight. Amid the 
cultural institutions mentioned in Ricoeur’s essay, language is the primary one. Ricoeur 
argues in the wake of Wilhelm Dilthey that language is “the first of these institutions, above 
                                                                                                                                            
course, not sensible immediacy. It is language, and in interpreting its texts, the hearer who understands it relates 
its truth to his own linguistic orientation to the world. This linguistic communication between present and 
tradition is […] the event that takes place in all understanding.” This conviction of an appropriative-
interpretative event (Ereignis) of “coming into language of what has been said in the tradition” - which as 
disclosure comes near to Heidegger’s Ereignis - is the reason why Gadamer announced that “the guiding idea [of 
the concluding part III of Truth and Method which brings forth the ontological shift of hermeneutics guided by 
language] is that the fusion of horizons that takes place in understanding is actually the achievement of 
language.” In other words, “the linguisticality of understanding is the concretion of historically effected 
consciousness.” This means that “language is a medium where I and world meet or, rather, manifest their 
original belonging together. […] Being that can be understood is language.” (Gadamer 1989, 358, 378, 389, 
401-402, 463, 474.) Of Ricoeur’s debate with Gadamer, cf. Brown 1978, 54-55.; Ricoeur & Gadamer 1991. 
83 Ricoeur 1973a, 153. 
84 Ricoeur 1973a, 153. 
85 Ricoeur 1973a, 153. 
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all because it is fixed through writing.”86 Dilthey had noted that “fixation through writing 
and by all comparable procedures of the inscription of human discourse is the major cultural 
event which conditions all transmission of cultural heritages and every constitution of a 
tradition.”87 I do not want to pass over lightly this notion of being “fixed.” For Ricoeur it 
carries a certain objectivity that gives stability to the reception of a cultural heritage: 
“Transmission is thereby assured by the ‘documents’ of culture – works of art and of 
discourse – offered to the interpretation of the following generations.”88 Paradoxically, 
transmission implies therefore also distanciation, temporal and conceptual, from the initial 
situation. As argued later in the same essay, “the communication of past heritages takes place 
under the condition of distanciation and objectification.”89 Still, objectification as 
distanciation takes place in language, in a living discourse. 
The condition of traditionality points to the “living circle” of reception and 
invention, tradition and freedom, cultural situation and productive imagination. Ricoeur 
explains that “none of us finds himself placed in the radical position of creating the ethical 
world ex nihilo.”90 In reference to Nietzsche, Ricoeur seems to be arguing that transvaluation 
is perhaps possible but not genuinely creative evaluation. One aspect of our human 
condition is that “we are born into a world already qualified in an ethical manner by the 
decisions of our predecessors, by the living culture which Hegel called the [objectifiable] 
ethical life (Sittlichkeit), and by the reflection of the wise and the experienced.”91 The other 
side of the story, however, is equally true: “we never receive values as we find things or as we 
                                               
86 Ricoeur 1973a, 153. 
87 Ricoeur 1973a, 160. 
88 Ricoeur 1973a, 154. 
89 Ricoeur 1973a, 163. 
90 Ricoeur 1973a, 164. 
91 Ricoeur 1973a, 164. 
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find ourselves existing in a world of phenomena.”92 Again, a tradition is an unavoidable 
context in which I live, but I have to reaffirm this tradition with my own choices and acts. 
The dialectics of tradition and freedom implies critical distanciation. The 
“interest in emancipation” opens a productive realm that Ricoeur calls “ethical distance.” 
There is no ethical naïveté for us anymore: “Nothing survives from the past except through 
a reinterpretation in the present which takes hold of the objectification and the distanciation 
which have elevated previously living values to the rank of a text.”93 This re-interpretation 
does not mean simple adoption, however, since it takes on “a project of freedom,” a project 
of re-establishing the values freely. From this point of view the past heritage is nothing but a 
trait of previous attempts, “past conquests,” in the mutual project of freedom. All this points 
to human creativity, which takes place while held captive by the cultural situation: “Ethical 
distance thus becomes a productive distance, a positive factor in reinterpretation.”94 
Creativity is only possible by contesting the living tradition in which I live. 
To conclude, Ricoeur’s 1973 essay speaks the same language as my hypothesis: 
a theory of culture is necessary for any anthropology of the situated subject. After all, it is 
clear for Ricoeur that only by a “detour through the theory of culture” are we able “to catch 
sight of the process of mediation by which this antinomy [of the theory of attaining values] 
is ceaselessly overcome.”95 Ricoeur emphasizes, in fact, that “there are no other paths, in 
effect, for carrying out our interest in emancipation than by incarnating it within cultural 
                                               
92 Ricoeur 1973a, 165. 
93 Ricoeur 1973a, 165. 
94 Ricoeur 1973a, 165. – George H. Taylor correctly emphasizes the difference between objectification and 
reification, and resists characterizing an institution “as purely formal and procedural with an internal logic 
only.” Institution itself is a creative act that rests on productive imagination, even though the various 
institutions then assume a quasi-material “objectivity” in the cultural reality within which they are 
reappropriated through critical distance (Darstellung or positing rather than Vorstellung or representation). G. H. 
Taylor 2010a, 9-12, 18-19. 
95 Ricoeur 1973a, 165. 
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acquisitions.”96 Indeed, then, the phenomenology of being able requires the support of an 
underlying cultural hermeneutics. Even if some of Ricoeur’s texts – such as his 1961 essay 
discussed above and more closely in Appendix 3 – would cast doubt on the idea of tracing 
such a hermeneutics in Ricoeur’s work, I have now shown that the task itself is in place. The 
goal of explicating Ricoeur’s theory of culture is, therefore, necessary because of both 
Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology and the reception of his work. 
 
2.3 Ricoeur, Cassirer, and Geertz 
My introductory remarks have already been lengthy. Our preceding discussion necessitates, 
however, the further clarification of Ricoeur’s relation to cultural anthropology. The idea of 
“a detour through the theory of culture” leads me, nevertheless, first to point out that 
Ricoeur stands firmly in the reflexive philosophical tradition that stresses self-awareness and 
self-knowledge. It is also true, however, that Ricoeur adjusts the philosophical tradition that 
has a Cartesian basis, and maintains that human self-knowledge is never direct or immediate. 
In terms of Ricoeur’s approach to cultural recognition this means that “we know ourselves 
only indirectly in terms of the objective world and our actions in it,” as David Pellauer 
affirms.97 Self-understanding is always only mediated by objects of corporeal and cultural 
world that function as symbols awaiting for interpretation. 
This essential feature of the cultural-objective detour in becoming reflectively 
self-aware is discussed in Time and Narrative I. Ricoeur maintains in this 1983 work that 
human action “is already articulated by signs, rules, and norms: it has always been symbolically 
                                               
96 Ricoeur 1973a, 165. 
97 Pellauer 2007, 12. 
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mediated.”98 Mark I. Wallace pays attention to the same idea. According to Wallace, Ricoeur 
maintains that “the subject enters consciousness already formed by the symbolic systems 
within one’s culture. […] The journey to selfhood commences with the exegesis of the 
imaginary symbols and stories constitutive of one’s cultural inheritance, in order to equip the 
subject to become an integrated self by means of appropriating these symbols and stories as 
her own.”99 The notion of symbolic mediation indicates that Ricoeur possibly has close ties 
to thinkers such as Ernst Cassirer and Clifford Geertz, and it leads us therefore to consider 
the implications of these relations at the hermeneutical level. First, however, these 
relationships need to be established, which is not too difficult a task.  
Ricoeur acknowledges in Time and Narrative I that the “anthropologists who in 
various ways make use of Verstehen sociology, including Clifford Geertz,”100 have had some 
influence on the way he thinks about symbolic mediation. Furthermore, Ricoeur admits that 
he understands the word “symbol” in a Cassirerian manner: “I have opted for one close to 
that of Cassirer, in his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, inasmuch as, for him, symbolic forms are 
cultural processes that articulate experience.”101 The challenge for Ricoeur then is to maintain 
a philosophical attitude and not to slip into sociologically inclined cultural anthropology that 
merely constitutes only another “detour.”102 Before getting deeper into Ricoeur’s relation to 
                                               
98 Ricoeur 1983, 91. (57). 
99 Wallace 2003, 161. 
100 Ricoeur 1983, 91. (57). – The term “Verstehen sociology” is provided by Ricoeur’s translator as an 
explanation. Ricoeur himself uses the term “sociologie comprehensive,” the sociology of knowledge - which, in 
Ricoeur’s Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, is equated with the sociology of culture (Ricoeur 1986b, 11.). All of 
these, however, allude to the German sociological tradition which maintained that the method for the human 
sciences to understand (Verstehen) rather than to explain (Erklären) by using the methods of natural sciences - 
because everyone who aims to analyze the human condition necessarily interprets his or her own condition as 
well. Ricoeur is very familiar with this tradition because of his continued interest in this distinction that was 
originally made by Wilhelm Dilthey. 
101 Ricoeur 1983, 91. (57). 
102 Cf. Lavine 1995, 172. 
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these two prominent scholars of culture, it is necessary to briefly introduce Ricoeur’s 
understanding of the mediating function that the cultural symbols have. 
 
Ricoeur and Cultural-Symbolic Mediation 
Both Cassirer and Geertz place symbols at the epicenter of their respective cultural 
anthropologies: Cassirer considers symbolic forms as the necessary conditioning element in 
culture, and Geertz considers symbols essential in his definition of culture as a “thick” 
context. In Time and Narrative I Ricoeur utilizes the term in like manner when referring to 
“the symbols of a cultural nature.”103 Ricoeur understands by these cultural symbols 
meanings which are “incorporated into action and decipherable from it by other actors in 
the social interplay.”104 Now, according to Ricoeur, all these cultural symbols mediate 
significations but in different manners. Paralleling Clyde Kluckhohn’s distinction of implicit 
culture (that is, only indirectly analyzable cultural substance) and explicit culture (the 
observable forms of culture), Ricoeur distinguishes between implicit or immanent 
symbolism, and explicit or autonomous symbolism.105 
Ricoeur’s earlier distinction between constitutive and representative 
symbolisms – which are very understandable terms – can still be said to hold at some level in 
the later distinction between implicit and explicit symbolisms.106 There are, first of all, those 
                                               
103 Ricoeur 1983, 92. (57). 
104 Ricoeur 1983, 92. (57). 
105 Ricoeur 1983, 92. (57).; Gilkeson 2010, 170-173.; Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 166-171, 181. Cf. 
Appendix 1. 
106 Despite Ricoeur’s sentiment that the distinction he himself had proposed earlier between “constitutive” 
and “representative” symbolisms is inadequate, I maintain that Ricoeur deplores only the vocabulary, his choice 
of terms, and does not refute the distinction between two complementing functions of symbolism itself. 
Ricoeur 1983, 92. n 1. (243, n 5). 
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immanent symbols “which underlie action and that constitute its first signification.”107 
Secondly, there are the explicit “autonomous symbolic wholes dependent upon speaking or 
writing” which are detached from “the practical level” – supposedly as the products of 
reflection on practical action.108 These two levels of symbolisms are then not totally 
separable but complement each other. Ricoeur argues that “before being a text, symbolic 
mediation has a texture.”109 In other words, an explicit symbolism rests on implicit symbolic 
meaning, incorporated in symbolizing action, by which the “autonomous” explicit symbols 
become meaningful in the first place. The explicit rests on the implicit, and the implicit 
provides the condition as the possibility of the explicit. Put differently, the implicit 
constitutes the explicit symbolism that is representative of the implicit one. 
 Now, getting back to the notion of symbolic mediation, Ricoeur argues that 
besides being internally related to action – because human action “is always already 
symbolically mediated,”110 and the implicit symbolism both underlie action and constitute its 
primary meaning – the term “symbolic mediation” indicates that the symbolic systems have 
a structured character.  “To understand a ritual act,” Ricoeur explains, “is to situate it within 
a ritual, set within a cultic system, and by degrees within the whole set of conventions, 
beliefs, and institutions that make up the symbolic framework of a culture.”111 
Understanding an action requires that it become situated in its particular cultural context. As 
a result, culturally based symbolic system enables the understability or “readability” of an 
action. It “furnishes the context of description for particular actions” as Ricoeur maintains.112  
                                               
107 Ricoeur 1983, 91. (57). 
108 Ricoeur 1983, 91. (57). 
109 Ricoeur 1983, 92. (58). 
110 Ricoeur 1983, 91. (57). 
111 Ricoeur 1983, 92. (58). 
112 Ricoeur 1983, 92-93. (58). 
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In turn, action itself can be taken as a “quasi-text,” but only to the extent that 
it is based on the symbolic system as a function, that is, on the symbolic system as the “rules 
of meaning” (les règles de signification) in interpreting particular actions such as gestures. The 
example given by Ricoeur is highly illuminative in this respect: “The same gesture of raising 
one’s arm, depending on the context, may be understood as a way of greeting someone, of 
hailing a taxi, or of voting.”113 The symbolic system as a context instructs our interpretation. 
This regulative function extends well beyond the implicit symbolisms. 
 In addition to descriptive regulation, there is also the level of prescriptive 
regulation. In contrast to the “rules of meaning,” that is, the implicit regulative function of 
symbolic systems, Ricoeur asserts that it is possible to introduce an extension to the “idea of 
a rule” that has an explicit functionality. The notion of symbolic mediation leads us to 
proceed “from the idea of an immanent meaning to that of a rule, taken in the sense of a 
rule for description, then to that of a norm, which is equivalent to the idea of a rule taken in 
the prescriptive sense of this term.”114 Symbols, in other words, extend to norms (l’idée de règle 
au sens de norme). In sum, the difference between a rule and a norm is that the first is the 
function of regulation in interpretation, whereas Ricoeur defines the second as the “function 
of social regulation.”115  
To somewhat sum up the preceding discussion, I emphasize that both forms 
of regulation, descriptive and prescriptive, relate to action. Cultural codes such as manners 
and customs are, according to Ricoeur, “‘programs’ for behavior; they give form, order, and 
direction to life.”116 Behavior, that is, human action, is also evaluable, however, because the 
                                               
113 Ricoeur 1983, 92. (58). 
114 Ricoeur 1983, 93. (58). 
115 Ricoeur 1983, 93. (58). 
116 Ricoeur 1983, 93. (58). 
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immanent cultural norms also have that function.117 Ricoeur argues that actions receive a 
value that places them into a hierarchical relationship with each other according to moral-
cultural preferences.  
Another extension brings us then back to the level of philosophical 
anthropology. Based on our moral judgments, actions receive a relative value. “These 
degrees of value, first attributed to actions” can, according to Ricoeur, “be extended to the 
agents themselves.”118 It is then, as Ricoeur requires, “by way of cultural anthropology” that 
the ethical presuppositions of human character can be pointed out.119 The notion of cultural-
symbolic mediation, in other words, has brought us back to the question of Ricoeur’s 
relations to cultural anthropologists. 
 
Ricoeur and Clifford Geertz 
In spite of Ricoeur’s infamous detours – religion, psychoanalysis, language, identity, political 
philosophy, and the philosophy of history among others – there seems to be a consensus of 
sorts among his critics that a clear tone of philosophical anthropology is detectable in his 
work. That there is a course from l’homme faillible to l’homme capable is a foregone 
conclusion.120 Although it could be said that cultural anthropology merges in some of 
Ricoeur’s texts with his interest in philosophical anthropology, perhaps most prominently in 
The Symbolism of Evil, this cultural anthropologic aspect of Ricoeur’s work has not been 
discussed very often.121 Still, silence does not render such an aspect non-existent. This, 
                                               
117 Ricoeur 1983, 93. (58). 
118 Ricoeur 1983, 93. (58). 
119 Ricoeur 1983, 93-94. (58-59). 
120 Fiasse 2008, 9-10. 
121 Laurence L. Alexander’s 1976 essay “Ricoeur's Symbolism of Evil and Cross-Cultural Comparison: The 
Representation of Evil in Maya Indian Culture” is worth of interest because of its cultural anthropologic 
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hopefully, is already clear on the basis of Ricoeur’s views on cultural heritage and 
symbolically mediated action.  
 Perhaps a good place to continue the task of searching for Ricoeur’s point of 
connection with cultural anthropology is La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli (2000).122 In this work 
Ricoeur repeats his indebtedness to one of the most prominent scholars in that field: 
Clifford Geertz. As an indication of important connections at the theoretical level of their 
respective work, Ricoeur acknowledges that he owes to Geertz “the concept of mediated 
symbolic action.”123 In doing this, Ricoeur refers to two earlier compilations of his texts. Du 
texte à l’action (1986)124 examines the hermeneutics of texts as a model for a hermeneutics of 
human actions as well as actions as meaning-bearing, and it, therefore, relates to Geertz. So 
does another collection of Ricoeur’s essays: Lectures on Ideology and Utopia (1986). Ricoeur’s 
1975 lecture on Clifford Geertz’s seminal The Interpretation of Cultures (1973) was published in 
this later mentioned selection of his essays.  
These texts enable us to discuss Ricoeur’s own assessment of Geertz’s 
influential work – which is further discussed in Appendix 1 of this dissertation. Ricoeur’s 
Geertz lecture focuses on The Interpretation of Cultures while examining the concept of 
ideology. Similarly as in his 1976 essay “Ideology and Utopia as Cultural Imagination,” 
Ricoeur claims in Lectures on Ideology and Utopia that Geertz helps in building the concept of 
                                                                                                                                            
approach. The essay does not, however, present Ricoeur’s symbol theory in a manner that would, presumably, 
be completely acceptable for Ricoeur himself. Cf. Alexander 1976. 
122 Trans. Memory, History, Forgetting (by Kathleen Blamey & David Pellauer, 2004). From hereon the 
English title is used. 
123 Ricoeur 2000b, 279. n 71. (546. n 76). – The indebtedness Ricoeur acknowledges in his own text 
doesn’t by any means work in only one direction. In the famous opening study of Geertz’s Interpretation of 
Cultures a philosopher called Paul Ricoeur is credited with providing an idea of “inscribing” action. While 
Geertz clearly points to himself when mentioning that “the ethnographer ‘inscribes’ social discourse; he writes it 
down,” he also notes that it is “Paul Ricoeur from whom this whole idea of the inscription of action is borrowed 
and somewhat twisted.” Geertz 2000, 19. 
124 Trans. From Text to Action (by Kathleen Blamey & J.B. Thompson, 1991). From hereon the English title 
is used. 
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ideology as a cultural system that helps organizing social and psychological processes in 
forms of integration or identity.125 Ideology, Ricoeur argues, is both an integrating rhetoric of 
basic communication, and an identity-building class structure.126 As will be seen later, the 
notion of identity will have a major role in part four of this dissertation. The notion of 
integration, however, is equally important – for both Ricoeur and Geertz – since 
symbolization as the means for integration is also the key term in Geertz’s well-known 
“thick” description of culture. Ricoeur opens his own discussion of Geertz’s symbolic 
anthropology with this same definition: 
As interworked systems of construable signs (what, ignoring provincial usages, 
I would call symbols), culture is not a power, something to which social 
events, behaviors, institutions, or processes can be causally attributed; it is a 
context, something within which they can be intelligibly – that is, thickly – 
described.127  
 
This provisional definition of culture rests completely on the idea of culture as a semiotic 
process, that is, ethnography understood as a conversation, which implies having “an 
interpretive attitude.”128 In short, ethnography is an interpretive science in search of 
meaning.129  
The shift from symbolic action to Geertz’s definition, and furthermore to the 
idea of ethnography and interpretation, is already an indication that my claim – that 
anthropology as the phenomenology of being able requires the support of cultural 
hermeneutics – is well founded. This is also indicated when Ricoeur points out that Geertz 
describes the task of anthropology as “the enlargement of the universe of human 
                                               
125 Ricoeur 1986b, 254-255.; Ricoeur 1976a, 22-23. – Of Geertz and his conception of culture, cf. 
Appendix 1. 
126 Ricoeur 1986b, 259, 261, 264. 
127 Ricoeur 1986b, 255.; Geertz 2000, 14. – The term “thick description” is borrowed from Gilbert Ryle, 
cf. Geertz 2000, 6. 
128 Ricoeur 1986b, 255. 
129 Ricoeur 1986b, 255. 
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discourse.”130 The concept of culture Geertz espouses “is essentially a semiotic one,” and 
this in particular interests Ricoeur.131 It is precisely “because culture is understood as a 
semiotic process [that] the concept of symbolic action is central for Geertz” as an 
anthropologist. “Action,” summarizes Ricoeur, “is symbolic just like language,”132 and they 
both attain their signification by interpretation within a cultural context. 
 Here, however, Ricoeur insists on a clarification. It is not so much that action 
in a social setting would necessarily be symbolic for Ricoeur, but that it is always 
symbolically mediated, as seen earlier.133 To be sure, there can also be “symbolic action,” and 
this is the task of literary works, for example. “Literature is symbolic action,” Ricoeur asserts, 
“whereas here we want to say that action itself is symbolic in the sense that it is construed on 
the basis of fundamental symbols.”134 In pushing his point, Ricoeur stresses that there is a 
fundamental “infrastructure” of being a human being, its “basic constitution,” and that 
symbolic systems already belong to it. This is why Ricoeur deplores Geertz’s choice of terms, 
when Geertz uses the term “extrinsic symbol” with reference to immanent cultural 
regulation – although this takes place in highlighting the contrast to natural regulative models 
such as genetic codes.135 
 Above, the gist of Ricoeur’s take on Geertz has been approached from the 
point of view of their concurrent interests. There is another, supplementary level of this 
discussion, however, which deserves a brief note especially in this context. Quite evidently, 
Ricoeur persistently uses the concept of culture in his analysis of Geertz’s symbolic 
anthropology. Ricoeur mentions, for example, the “non-modern cultures” as well as the 
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post-Enlightenment “modern cultures.” In addition, Ricoeur refers to the “different cultural 
situations,” and points out that besides using “the tools of the crisis of the developed 
countries” the people in the developing countries “are educated […] with the intellectual 
tools of their own culture.” Ricoeur even frequently uses the term “subcultures.”136  
 This use of the culture concept, however, does not mean that Ricoeur’s task 
would be the same as Geertz’s – or vice versa. Although culture is “a way of talking about 
man,”137 as another American anthropologist claims, philosophy and cultural anthropology 
are distinct approaches and comprehensions of it. Anthropologist Roy Wagner, nevertheless, 
underlines that culture is specifically a human phenomenon. Furthermore, if culture is 
“man’s general control, refinement, and improvement of himself,” then “the word also 
carries strong connotations of Locke’s and Rousseau’s conception of the ‘social contract,’ of 
the tempering of man’s ‘natural’ instincts and desires by an arbitrary imposition of will.”138 
This much is probably shared between a philosopher and an anthropologist. Whereas 
cultural and social anthropologists like Wagner and Geertz approach the notion of culture 
from the point of view of the multitude of particular cultures and their possible common 
structures and other denominators,139 however, a philosopher like Ricoeur aims at examining 
culture as a condition of human existence in general.  
The cultural anthropologists could well be correct in that there is not any real 
universal culture or any corresponding “superorganism” of culture. There still can be a 
universal cultural condition, however. Unlike an anthropologist who “invents ‘a culture’ for 
                                               
136 Ricoeur 1986b, 259, 262-263, 265. 
137 Wagner 1981, 1-2. 
138 Wagner 1981, 21. – Of the discussion of the dialectics of nature and culture, cf. Wagner 1981, 140-151. 
139 Wagner’s brief assessment on the history and main trends of cultural anthropology, cf. Wagner 1981, 
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people, while they invent ‘culture’ for him,”140 a philosopher is, therefore, interested in 
explicating questions such as “how is it that we are human in the first place?,” “what are the 
necessary conditions of being human if there should be any?,” and “how can the collective 
mode of being human be described if there is such a modus?” In contrast to an 
anthropologist, I argue, a philosopher does not seek primarily to witness the prevalent forms 
or manifestations of a culture, but to question the cultural condition itself.  
To summarize these remarks that have briefly evaluated the philosopher 
Ricoeur’s relation to the anthropologist Geertz, let me only mention that in his 1975 Geertz 
lecture Ricoeur not only shows profound interest in the work of the most influential 
contemporary cultural anthropologist, but also engages in the discussion and utilizes the 
concept of culture in a manner that most significantly differs from any “resistant” attitude 
that might have prevailed in the French intellectual and conceptual setting.141 And to reiterate 
Ricoeur’s relation to cultural anthropology, Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan argue that 
Ricoeur – among Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, Clifford Geertz, 
Robert Bellah, and others – contributed to the whole “interpretive turn” of the social 
sciences.142 From this point of view, an analysis of Ricoeur’s cultural hermeneutics is more 
than needed. Any further significance of this evaluation will become evident in the course of 
our later discussion.  
 
                                               
140 Wagner 1981, 11. 
141 Ricoeur 1986b, 254-266.; Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 28-29, 147. Cf. Appendix 1. 
142 Rabinow & Sullivan 1987, 1, 6-9, 19. – Of Ricoeur’s overall role and effect in the field of human 
sciences, cf. Boltanski, Dosse, Foessel, Hartok, Pharo, Quéré, & Thévenot 2006. 
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Ricoeur and Ernst Cassirer 
Before rushing ahead with the reasons why Ricoeur’s hermeneutics lent to the hermeneutic 
turn in the social sciences, let us take a further step back. In terms of the whole dissertation, 
it is necessary for us to also consider Ricoeur’s relation to another major, albeit an earlier, 
figure in the modern scholarship on culture: Ernst Cassirer. Before getting to the notion of 
symbolic forms for which Cassirer is most well-known, let me mention that for him culture, 
concrete human life, and self-knowledge are profoundly tied up together in symbolisms. In 
Essay on Man (1944), for example, Cassirer announces that his objective as a modern 
philosopher is “a phenomenology of human culture.”143 This implies that the question of 
culture is both illustrated and elucidated “by concrete examples taken from man’s cultural 
life,”144 and this phenomenological method is how Cassirer then proceeds. 
In order to base the claims that I will make with regard to Ricoeur’s relation to 
Cassirer and Ricoeur’s subsequent understanding of culture, which includes a Kantian 
moment, I will open this brief analysis with a few remarks of Cassirer’s famous theory. Even 
though for Cassirer, as a well-known neo-Kantian, “space and time are the framework in 
which all reality is concerned,”145 that framework is also approached indirectly. Instead of 
reopening Kant’s question of the transcendental forms of sense intuition, Cassirer insists 
that “we must analyze the forms of human culture in order to discover the true character of 
space and time in our human world.”146 This leads him, in the end, to reformulate the notion 
of space altogether. Instead of discussing of aesthetic “perceptual space” to which Kant refers 
                                               
143 Cassirer 1974, 52. 
144 Cassirer 1974, 52. 
145 Cassirer 1974, 42. 
146 Cassirer 1974, 42. 
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in Transcendental Aesthetics,147 Cassirer directs our attention to the “symbolic space,” which then 
by a “complex and difficult process of thought” takes us to “the idea of abstract space.”148 This 
idea is a gift given to human beings, Cassirer argues, which distinguishes them from all the 
other creatures of “organic space, the space of action.”149 “It is this idea [of abstract or 
intellectual space],” Cassirer maintains, however, “which clears the way for man not only to a 
new field of knowledge but to an entirely new direction of his cultural life.”150 As this 
dissertation is not only interested in those questions which relate to the concept of culture, 
but also of those of recognition – especially of those of self-recognition in culture – it is 
important to pay attention to this expanded notion of “knowledge.” This will also have 
importance later in this dissertation that focuses specifically on the Kantian elements of 
Ricoeur’s cultural philosophy. 
For Cassirer, this new kind of “knowledge” is not any type of knowledge of 
things or affairs, but of the person knowing – Cassirer refers to self-knowledge. The Essay on 
Man opens by affirming that “self-knowledge is the highest aim of philosophical inquiry.”151 
“Self-knowledge,” Cassirer writes while elevating the phrase “know thyself” to the role of a 
categorical imperative, “is not simply a subject of curiosity or speculation; it is declared to be 
the fundamental obligation of man.”152 Self-knowledge is, however, tied to the symbolic 
forms as processes of culture, which articulate the human experience while providing means 
of its expression in human action. This conviction is echoed with Cassirer’s conclusion: 
“Human culture taken as a whole may be described as the process of man’s progressive self-
liberation. Language, art, religion, science, are various phases in this process. In all of them 
                                               
147 Kant 1999, III.A27/B43. (KrV). 
148 Cassirer 1974, 43. 
149 Cassirer 1974, 43. 
150 Cassirer 1974, 43. 
151 Cassirer 1974, 1. 
152 Cassirer 1974, 3. 
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man discovers and proves a new power – the power to build up a world of his own, an 
‘ideal’ world.”153 These “phases” or “functions,” which all “complete and complement each 
other,” reopen the question of action.154 
Like for many philosophers, Ricoeur included, action is an essential part of 
being a human being for Cassirer. A human being should be considered as “an animal of 
superior species which produces philosophies and poems in the same way as silkworm 
produce their cocoons or bees build their cells.”155 There is, however, one fundamental 
difference between the action of human beings and that of all the other animals. Cassirer 
argues that a human being has adapted to his or her environment in a truly novel way. 
Between the receptor system and the effector system, which are to be found in 
all animal species, we find in man a third link which we may describe as the 
symbolic system. This new acquisition transforms the whole of human life. As 
compared with the other animals man lives not merely in a broader reality; he 
lives, so to speak, in a new dimension of reality. […] No longer in a merely 
physical universe, man lives in a symbolic universe. Language, myth, art, and 
religion are parts of this universe. They are the varied threads which weave the 
symbolic net, the tangled web of human experience. All human progress in 
thought and experience refines upon and strengthens this net. No longer can 
man confront reality immediately; he cannot see it, as it were, face to face. 
Physical reality seems to recede in proportion as man’s symbolic activity 
advances. Instead of dealing with the things themselves man is in a sense 
constantly conversing with himself. He has so enveloped himself in linguistic 
forms, in artistic images, in mythical symbols or religious rites that he cannot 
see or know anything except by the interposition of this artificial medium.156 
 
This argument, which insists that living in a symbolic universe is the human condition, leads 
Cassirer to require that the “classical definition” of human beings should be revised. 
“Instead of defining man as an animal rationale,” he writes, “we should define him as an 
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155 Cassirer 1974, 20. 
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animal symbolicum.”157 The knowledge of which Cassirer writes “is by its very nature symbolic 
knowledge.”158 A human being lives in a thoroughly symbolic world, which is his advantage 
but also his loss – “no longer can man confront reality immediately.”159 
To reconnect with our Ricoeur discussion, I maintain that Cassirer’s 
conviction, that the human being is distinguished from all the other animals by the necessary 
use of symbolic significations, conforms to Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of symbols, as developed 
in The Symbolism of Evil and De l’interprétation: essai sur Freud (1965).160 First, The Symbolism of 
Evil makes evident the shift of methodological emphasis that Ricoeur undertakes. The 
essence of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic “wager,” that is, Ricoeur’s turn to the hermeneutics of 
symbols, is captured in the well-known idea that Ricoeur imports from Kant’s third Critique: 
“the symbol gives rise to thought.”161 Ricoeur commits himself to a view which leads him to 
change the overall methodological approach from onto-existentially inspired 
phenomenology to hermeneutical phenomenology of symbols.  
The reason for this change will be explained later in more detail in relation to 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of postcritical innocence. Let me mention, however, that it is 
comparable to Cassirer’s conviction that anthropological “knowledge” is attainable only with 
the idea of symbolic forms. Ricoeur writes: “I wager that I shall have a better understanding 
of man and of the bond between the being of man and the being of all beings if I follow the 
indication of symbolic thought.”162 For this reason, as Laurence L. Alexander mentions in his 
1976 essay “Ricoeur’s ‘Symbolism of Evil’ and Cross-Cultural Comparison,” Ricoeur focuses 
                                               
157 Cassirer 1974, 26.  
158 Cassirer 1974, 57. 
159 Cassirer 1974, 25. 
160 Trans. Freud and Philosophy: On Interpretation (by Denis Savage, 1970). From hereon the title On 
Interpretation is used. 
161 Ricoeur 1960b, 324, 330. (348, 355). Cf. Ricoeur 1965a, 46.; Kant 1999, V.351-353. (KdU). 
162 Ricoeur 1960b, 330. (355). 
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on “revealing the formative processes of symbolization in man and in culture at large.”163 
David Rasmussen, for his part, had already summarized the implications of Ricoeur’s wager 
by mentioning that “mythic-symbolic language is necessary for a global understanding of 
man.”164 Both Cassirer and Ricoeur argue that human self-knowledge is not possible without 
restoring the cultural system of symbols. 
The mythic-symbolic language, however, is not quite enough in itself for 
Ricoeur. The philosophy based on “the wager,” Ricoeur asserts, “starts from the symbols, 
and endeavors to promote the meaning, to form it, by a creative interpretation.”165 To be 
able to think along the “symbols of the self”166 requires that “the original enigma of the 
symbol” – maintaining a mediated immediacy167 – should be preserved and respected while 
having been subjected at the same time to critical investigation. Here the notion of 
hermeneutics is worked out. “In short,” Ricoeur argues, “it is by interpreting that we can hear 
anew; it is thus in hermeneutics that the symbol’s gift of meaning and the endeavor to 
understand by deciphering are knotted together.”168 As much as man “remains speech” 
Ricoeur’s “wager” poses no problems for philosophy – “there exists nowhere a symbolic 
language without hermeneutics,” he argues.169 Language works as a medium for elaborating 
the onto-existential meaning of symbolic expressions, in the process of interpretation: 
A meditation on symbols starts from language that has already taken place, and 
in which everything has already been said in some fashion; it wishes to be 
thought with its presuppositions. For it, the first task is not to begin but, from 
the midst of speech, to remember itself again; to remember with a view to 
beginning.170 
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Both the conviction of the possible “fullness” of language, and the conviction of a human 
being’s foundational relation to such language open Ricoeur’s hermeneutics from the level of 
primary symbols and myths to a broader understanding of symbolic forms. 
To remind us, Ricoeur does not, in Time and Narrative I, take the term 
“symbol” in the sense of a sign that has a double-intentional structure, but more precisely in 
a Cassirerian manner “inasmuch as […] symbolic forms are cultural processes that articulate 
experience.”171 It is this sense of “symbol” which “Cassirer made classic,” and which cultural 
anthropology adopted, that Ricoeur wishes to follow when discussing the symbolic 
mediation of human action.172 Ricoeur then repositions himself dramatically. Almost two 
decades earlier in On Interpretation Ricoeur held that Cassirer’s position provides “too broad a 
definition” by making “the ‘symbolic function’ the general function of mediation by which 
the mind or consciousness constructs all its universes of perception and discourse.”173 At the 
time of On Interpretation Ricoeur maintained that Cassirer’s notion of symbolic function is all-
encompassing and therefore problematic, since this single mediating function subsumes all 
ways of giving meaning to reality under one notion. Time and Narrative I, in contrast, 
approves the Cassirerian standpoint.  
Put differently, the later Ricoeur adopted more fully the implications of the 
praise he offers in the context of On Interpretation. In “doing justice to Cassirer” and 
explaining why the general signifying function has been called “symbolic,” Ricoeur 
acknowledges in On Interpretation that the term “seems well suited to designate the cultural 
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instruments of our apprehension of reality: language, religion, art, science.”174 It is Ricoeur’s 
conviction that Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms helps in arbitrating these cultural 
forms – that include cultural institutions175 – thus safeguarding against taking any of these as 
absolutes by their own right. Furthermore, according to Ricoeur the term “symbol” pushes 
beyond Kantian transcendental epistemology “and moves from a critique of reason to a 
critique of culture,”176 which is yet another indicator that Ricoeur was not indifferent to 
cultural hermeneutics in On Interpretation either. 
A terminological problem remains, however. Where Ricoeur would like to see 
the term “signifying function” be used, Cassirer utilizes the term “symbolic function.” “By 
unifying all the functions of mediation under the title of ‘the symbolic,’” Ricoeur criticizes, 
“Cassirer gives this concept an amplitude that is equal to that of the concept of reality and 
that of culture.”177 This critique is understandable in the context of On Interpretation, which 
focuses on the symbolic uses of language. What really disturbs Ricoeur is the idea that by 
making the notion of “symbolic” too broad, Cassirer also wipes out “a fundamental 
distinction […] which constitutes, as I see it, a true dividing line: the distinction between 
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univocal and plurivocal expressions.”178 Ricoeur’s concern is that the idea of rich symbolic 
meanings would be lost.  
Although already approaching the notion of language as a whole, Ricoeur was 
still in his 1965 work very much in line with the “criteriology of symbols” elaborated in The 
Symbolism of Evil.179 The “criteriology” is echoed with Ricoeur’s “deliberate restriction” that 
symbols should only be taken as “double- or multiple-meaning expressions whose semantic 
texture is correlative to the work of interpretation that explicates their second or multiple 
meanings.”180 Here, however, Ricoeur’s later distinction between implicit and explicit 
symbolisms comes into play. Those symbols “which underlie action and that constitute its 
first signification”181 Ricoeur understands in the Cassirerian sense as testifying to the 
universal functionality of symbolic forms. The “autonomous symbolic wholes dependent 
upon speaking or writing” can, in turn, be understood in the specific double-intentional 
sense as defined in both The Symbolism of Evil and On Interpretation, that is, as double-
intentional signs.182  
It is evident, however, that in spite of its misgivings, Cassirer’s theory appears 
quite attractive for Ricoeur. John E. Smith and David Pellauer also point to this in their 
respective readings on Ricoeur.183 Having approached the notion of symbols as multiple-
meaning expressions in a cultural context, Ricoeur later finds himself needing explication of 
how this context comes about, as well as pointing out that this symbolic context – that is, its 
implicit and pre-signifying form – brings about a certain “readability” needed for 
understanding. Ernst Cassirer, the philosopher who most significantly provided conceptual 
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means for modern cultural anthropology, also provokes Ricoeur to ponder the role of 
symbolisms in relation to human action and in understanding its meaning. It is also in this 
sense that I claim that “symbol gives rise to thought.”184 
 
* 
To sum up this brief introductory analysis that responded to the need of clarifying Ricoeur’s 
relation to cultural anthropology, I maintain that we have now both sufficiently explained 
the nature of these relations – especially between Ricoeur, Cassirer, and Geertz – and further 
assured us of the necessity to examine Ricoeur’s cultural hermeneutics. There is “an 
unavoidably ‘hermeneutical’ component in the sciences of man,” Charler Taylor states when 
arguing that Ricoeur’s On Interpretation helped to bring this hermeneutic question “again to 
the fore.”185 At the risk of frustrating the reader, I will not yet move into that discussion, 
however. What I have yet to explain is the overall nature of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, before 
then showing that it is cultural from the beginning to the end. I am firmly convinced, 
nevertheless, that the next introductory discussion also affirms that the question of Ricoeur’s 
cultural hermeneutics is, indeed, well-founded. 
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3. RICOEUR AND POSTCRITICAL HERMENEUTICS 
This dissertation focuses on Ricoeur’s cultural hermeneutics. It is, therefore, also necessary 
to explain how I understand Ricoeur’s hermeneutics in the first place, before making any 
further claims about it. There are two basic models that can be used to describe Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutical approach: phenomenologico-symbolic and linguistic-practical. The first is 
guided by Ricoeur’s so-called “wager” from phenomenology to hermeneutics in 1960, the 
other by his accompanying emphasis on the problem of language that gradually became to 
the forefront in Ricoeur’s thought, and which then bloomed full in the works published in 
the mid-1970s and after.186 This later model was subsequently expanded, in his works in the 
1980s and 1990s, to cover practical action.187 
Both of these models, however, are not only interlinked by their threefold 
structures – very common to Ricoeur’s thought in general – but also by their common, 
although indirect, interest in the question of being. My claim is that this onto-existential 
interest includes the notion of cultural being, through which the question of being is worked 
out. In addition, as I will argue at the end of this chapter, the multi-triadic model of 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics provides a clue for us for the explication of his cultural 
                                               
186 Ricoeur 1960b, 324-326, 330. (348-351, 355).; Ricoeur 1965a, 13. (3).; Ricoeur 1975d.; Ricoeur 1976b.; 
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187 In order to avoid confusions, let me add that Ricoeur, already in his early work, approached the 
question of being a human subject in such a manner that it included the idea of human praxis. This inclusion is 
very explicit, for example, in The Voluntary and the Involuntary and in Fallible Man. 
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hermeneutics. The importance of these preparatory comments is also highlighted by the fact 
that I will return to this discussion at the very end of this dissertation. 
 
3.1 Hermeneutic of Postcritical Innocence 
Let me begin this brief introduction to Ricoeur’s hermeneutics with the phenomenologico-
symbolic approach that Ricoeur adopted in the 1960s. I maintain that this earlier 
hermeneutic model emphasizes the ontological aspects of Ricoeur’s thought. Ricoeur’s 
symbol theory highlights the process of precritical, critical, and postcritical aspects of being. 
These three can be read as 1) primary naïveté that marks spontaneous, “innocent” existence in 
the presence of being, 2) distanciation in critical objectivism, and 3) secondary naïveté describing 
the postcritical, that is, critically informed existence. In brief, this threefold structure aims at 
a certain “re-gaining” of participated presence. This idea of regained ontological 
participation was already expressed in Le volontaire et l’involontaire (1949),188 in which Ricoeur 
maintained that “if life begins beyond anxiety, there is a way back from there to here, to a 
naïveté, albeit a naïveté which has matured in the experience of anxiety.”189 On this basis 
Ricoeur then stated in La symbolique du mal (1960)190 that “it is by interpreting that we can hear 
anew”191 – it is “hearing,” or understanding our rootedness in being, which Ricoeur is 
                                               
188 Trans. Freedom and Nature (by Erazim V. Kohák, 1966). From hereon the title The Voluntary and the 
Involuntary is used. As a supplementary note it should be mentioned that Frans D. Vansina’s well known 
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190 Trans. The Symbolism of Evil (by Emerson Buchanan, 1969). From hereon the English title is used. 
191 Ricoeur 1960b, 326. (351). – Ricoeur’s phrase “nouveau entendre” has been referred to in English as “hear 
again.” 
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interested in, but in the mode of hearing “anew” in a postcritical fashion that resorts to 
interpretation. 
Furthermore, for the early Ricoeur the primordial experience of being-in-being 
is our “genesis,” an existential-experiential starting point beyond our reach. This is the “first 
innocence” (la naïveté ontologique or la naïveté première), in which the ontological aspect of life is 
directly experienced. This innocence is, however, lost in the critical state – “oblivion” or 
“forgetfulness” in distanciation – which, in a manner similar to Rousseau, can be associated 
with culture and the cultural mode of being.192 Ricoeur’s thesis is that a philosophy that is 
“instructed” by symbolic meanings – which bring language to its fullness and “recharge it” 
by taking us back to the origins of our speaking being – wishes to answer to this “situation 
of modern culture,” or alienation. In The Symbolism of Evil Ricoeur describes this cultural 
“situation” in a manner that resembles “the profane man” of Mircea Éliade. Our modern 
culture is oblivious forgetfulness (l’oubli) that results in “the loss of man himself insofar as he 
                                               
192 Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s critique of the demoralizing and corrupting effect of cultivation in the famous 
1750 essay “A Discourse on the Moral Effects of the Arts and Sciences” is summarized in the opening phrase 
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supreme authority of the common-wealth (or the Leviathan) over the subjects, and the more “democratic” one 
proposed by Rousseau himself that stressed that the authority, even as supreme, is never anything else but the 
general will of the people manifested in laws. (Rousseau 1947, 5-19, 24-27, 31-35.)  
Furthernore, in our reading of Ricoeur, I will have to point out that Ricoeur does not consider a human 
being as “free” at his or her birth – Ricoeur is not a liberalist. According to Ricoeur, a human being is bound by 
the cultural condition that is a given already at the moment of birth: “My birth is the beginning of my life: in it I 
was placed, once and for all, into the world, and posed in being before I was able to posit any act voluntarily. 
[…] My birth does not mean only the beginning of my life, but also expresses its dependence with respect to 
two other lives: I do not posit myself, I have been posited by others. […] To be born means to receive from 
another the capital of heredity. […] In beginning as an ‘I,’ I participate in a lineage. […] Anything I can decide 
comes after the beginning, and before the end. […] I am always in the process of beginning to be free, I have 
always begun to live when I say ‘I am.’ As birth, all necessity is prior to any actual act of the ‘I’ which reflects 
on itself.” Ricoeur 1949, 407-416. (433-443). 
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belongs to the sacred.”193 This phase of forgetfulness is the antithetic moment of Ricoeur’s 
early hermeneutics, or the moment of modern alienation. 
In one of his 1975 lectures Ricoeur explains this post-enlightenment situation 
further when commenting that “all modern cultures are now involved in a process not only 
of secularization but of fundamental confrontation about basic ideals.”194 Forgetfulness thus 
conforms both to human hubris and to critical and reductive questioning. To understand 
this phase better, one could think of the reductive shift described by Heidegger from the 
ontological level of being to the ontic level of beings or Hegel’s description of cultural world 
as self-worked alienation.195 Oblivious forgetfulness embodies a thought of a delusional 
understanding of the essence and the fundament of being, that is, a kind of culturally 
produced illusion of the ground of being. But this is not yet a satisfying description for 
Ricoeur. The ontological richness of “the first innocence” and the state of forgetfulness 
form a dialectic pair that calls for “understanding interpretation.”196  
 Even though for Ricoeur – in the wake of Karl Jaspers and Gabriel Marcel197 – 
the fundamental structure of being is mysterious, it can be discerned through mytho-poetic 
language. This emphasis on mytho-poetics draws Ricoeur close to the later Heidegger or 
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Kearney, for his part, mentions “such German hermeneutic thinkers as Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer” 
when finding predecessors and possible contributors to Ricoeur’s hermeneutic thought. (Kearney 2004, 1.) Any 
such list however, as Kearney notices, can easily be enlarged to include a vast number of major figures in 
philosophy - beginning with Plato and Aristotle - and thus no further “mapping” will be given in this 
introductory part of the dissertation, as the question of placing Ricoeur’s philosophy of cultural recognition will 
be dealt with the discussion below. Cf. Kearney 2004, 3-4. 
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“Heidegger II.”198 Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism, for example, states that even though a 
human being stands “in the lighting of Being,” it is so that “Being remains concealed.”199 
According to Heidegger, it is only possible to approach this Whole by means of poetic 
language: “the world’s destiny is heralded in poetry”200 as “poetic composition is truer than 
exploration of beings.”201 As will be shown in part four of this dissertation, for Ricoeur it is 
this poetic aspect that forms the very core of our cultural being-here. This reopens the 
question of achieving a kind of new innocence.  
The moment of cultural forgetfulness or alienation is not, therefore, the final 
phase for Ricoeur’s early hermeneutics, but the moment of possibly overcoming it. Second, 
yet “another,” innocence (naïveté seconde) describes the synthetic, “postcritical” outcome of 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of being. This synthetic phase compounds both the open presence 
of the “first innocence” (the experience of being-in-being) and the oblivious forgetfulness in 
distanciation (culture). This secondary innocence is thus a state of postcritical interpretative 
“wondering” at the “ciphers” of nature and the experience of cultural being.202 This 
postcritical innocence is achieved only in interpretation, that is, in hearing “anew” in 
interpretation. As I will argue in the last part of this dissertation, this moment of 
“postcritical” understanding, according to Ricoeur, remains a task for a human subject, but it 
also designates the possibility of achiving an authentic notion of being a human being. 
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201 Heidegger 1976, 363. (Heidegger 1977b, 240.) 
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3.2 Hermeneutic of Reconfiguration 
In Ricoeur’s later work the threefold structure of primary naïveté, forgetfulness, and 
secondary naïveté – which parallels the structure proposed by Marcel203 – was replaced or, 
rather, supplemented by the “threefold mimesis,” or the process of reconfiguration. Ricoeur 
argues in his trilogy Temps et récit204 that this hermeneutic process of pre-, con-, and 
refiguration is described by mimesis 1, 2 and 3, or the threefold process of 
imitation/representation that I will explain in this section.205 In short, the open-ended and 
recurring mimetic process begins with pre-figuration at the stage of the conditions of 
practical experience (such as the necessity of symbolization), is unified in con-figuration that 
takes place in the emplotment as a synthesis, and results in re-figuration that returns to the 
                                               
203 Throughout his career, Ricoeur was open about his indebtedness to his mentor Gabriel Marcel, who 
provides a threefold structure of reflection that can be seen as a model for Ricoeur’s threefold structure of 
hermeneutics of being-here: 1) the unity of experience, i.e., the immediacy of situation, 2) primary reflection, i.e., 
retreat from existence due to objectifying, and 3) secondary reflection, that is, recalling the unity of experience by 
recognizing the categories of the primary reflection to be insufficient. Kenneth T. Gallagher (who for Marcel is 
the same as William Richardson to Martin Heidegger) explains Marcel’s account on this threefold structure: 
“[Marcel] agrees that reflection is integral to human existence, and his own thought should not be classified 
with those philosophies of life which exalt raw, uncriticized experience over wisdom. Reflection is part of life, 
not opposed to it, but it operates at more than one level: ‘Roughly we can say that where primary reflection 
tends to dissolve the unity of experience which is first put before us, the function of secondary reflection is 
essentially recuperative; it reconquers that unity.’ It is primary reflection which severs man from the immediacy 
of his situation; in the same breath that it sets up the world of objectivity it also isolates the subject as an 
element over against this world. For both subject and object, this stage represents a retreat from participation, 
and therefore a retreat from existence. […] Secondary reflection, then comes on the scene in the role of a 
reflection upon a reflection. It is not so much of a denial of primary reflection as a refusal of any claim to 
finality and exclusiveness inherent in the latter. Secondary reflection, says Marcel, is reflection squared, 
reflection raised to the second power. Specifically, it is a recognition of the insufficiency of the categories which 
make primary reflection possible.” (Gallagher 1962, 41-42.) As The Voluntary and the Involuntary indicates, 
Ricoeur was, based on his earlier work on Marcel (cf. Gabriel Marcel et Karl Jaspers: philosophie du mystère et 
philosophie du paradoxe, 1947), well aware of Marcel’s structure of reflection. Ricoeur also discusses Marcel’s 
conception of reflection later in his career, in the 1984 essay “Réflexion primaire et réflexion secondaire chez 
Gabriel Marcel.” Ricoeur 1949, 440. (468).; Ricoeur 1992, 49-67. Cf. Treanor 2006, 217-222.; Blundell 2010, 58-
62, 77-80. 
204 Trans. Time and Narrative I-III (by Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer, 1984-1988). From hereon the 
English title is used. My heartfelt thanks to Professor Tuomo Mannermaa for donating the English translations 
to me. 
205 Ricoeur 1983, 85-129. (52-87). 
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thus enriched practical experience of the “reader.” In this tensional process of 
reconfiguration a creative subject discovers him- or herself as a creative interpreter.206  
Drawing on Aristotle’s Poetics and especially from the term µίµησις 3ράξεως – an 
imitation or representation of action by the medium of metrical language207 – Ricoeur argues 
that mimesis draws together the practical world and the imaginary world:  
That the praxis belongs at the same time to the real domain, covered by ethics, 
and the imaginary one, covered by poetics, suggests that mimesis functions not 
just as a break but also as a connection, one which establishes precisely the 
status of the “metaphorical” transposition of the practical field by the 
mythos.208 
 
This then means that the term mimesis has several different, albeit connected, meanings. 
First of all, “a reference to the first side of poetic composition,” that is, to the actual world 
of the author, would have to be preserved. Ricoeur calls this reference mimesis1 and 
distinguishes it from mimesis2, namely, “the mimesis of creation” – a world opened up by the 
text. These two have their complement in mimesis3, which means mimesis as an activity that 
requires “a spectator or reader,” who with his or her world of action represents “the other 
side of poetic composition.”209 The three worlds – the world of action, of text, and of action 
– translates to those of ethico-politics, poetics, and ethico-politics again. Ricoeur then 
concludes that mimetic activity, reconfiguration, bridges 3οίησις and 3ραξις, which by 
themselves are distinct realms of action.210  
The whole of mimetic action can be better understood taking into account 
Ricoeur’s assertion that mimesis3 is fundamentally about the reader appropriating the world 
                                               
206 Cf. Michel 2006, 80-83. 
207 Aristotle 1984, 1449b.24. (Poetics).  
208 Ricoeur 1983, 76. (46). 
209 Ricoeur 1983, 77. (46). 
210 Ricoeur 1983, 78. (47). 
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deployed by the poetic work.211 Here, as we now try to understand the proceeds of the whole 
mimetic arc, the notion of culture comes into play. For Ricoeur, it is the cultural world that 
constitutes the possibility for mimesis3, or the refigurative reception of a work: 
This world [deployed by the poetic work] is a cultural world. The principal axis 
of a theory of reference on the second side of the work passes therefore 
through the relationship between poetry and culture. As James Redfield so 
forcefully puts it in his book Nature and Culture in the Iliad, the two relations, 
each the converse of the other, that we can establish between these two terms 
“must be interpreted … in the light of a third relation: the poet as a maker of 
culture” (p. xi). Aristotle’s Poetics makes no incursion into this domain. It sets 
up the ideal spectator, and even more so the ideal reader, with his intelligence, 
his “purged” emotions, and his pleasure, at the junction of the work and the 
culture it creates.212  
 
For Ricoeur, the threefold mimesis not only represents combining different worlds but also 
the processual mediation in culture between “the prefiguration of the practical field [mimesis1] 
and its refiguration [mimesis3] through the reception of the work [which in itself represents 
configuration, mimesis2].”
213 According to Ricoeur, therefore, the threefold mimesis is 
ultimately a description of cultural mediation. To explain this claim in further detail, I will 
focus briefly on each of the three phases of reconfiguration in what follows below. 
 
Mimesis1 
Ricoeur argues that prefiguration, mimesis1, has three “anchorages” that essentially echo his 
earlier hermeneutics of symbols. The “preunderstanding of the world of action” includes the 
meaningful structure of action, symbolic structures, and the temporal character of that world 
of action.214 The first anchorage, the semantics of action, leads us to understand that 
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212 Ricoeur 1983, 83-84. (50-51). 
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214 Ricoeur 1983, 87-88, 100. (54, 64). 
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narrative and praxis are interdependent, because plot (mythos) is “the literary equivalent of the 
syntagmatic order that narrative introduces into the practical field.” Ricoeur asserts that “to 
understand a story (une histoire) is to understand both the language of ‘doing something’ and 
the cultural tradition from which proceeds the typology of the plots.”215 Narrative conveys 
its meaning only in a structured context of action. 
 The second anchorage, symbolic structures, represents the implicit or 
immanent symbolism of the first one. Ricoeur reminds us that human action can be narrated 
because it is “always already” both symbolically mediated and articulated in signs, rules, and 
norms. In applying Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms, Ricoeur therefore defines 
the symbolic forms he himself discusses as “cultural processes that articulate experience.”216  
This symbolic mediation, however, is distinguishable from symbolic wholes, which Ricoeur 
understands as autonomous contexts of meaning; a symbolic whole is “a meaning 
incorporated into action and decipherable from it by other actors in the social interplay.” 
This is a direct result of affirming Clifford Geertz’s assertion that “culture is public because 
meaning is.”217 There are then two sides to symbolic structures: they are necessary conditions 
and contexts of meaning. 
Symbolic mediation is a necessary function, and a symbolic whole a context of 
meaning. Symbolic mediation signals “the structured character of a symbolic system,” 
whereas symbolic systems, in turn, furnish “a descriptive context for particular actions.” 
Furthermore, “symbolism confers an initial readability on action”, and for this reason the 
term “symbol” introduces the idea of a rule – as a norm connected to social regulation. In 
explicating this regulation Ricoeur alludes to Hegel’s term Sittlichkeit, historico-ethical 
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situatedness in social structures he calls “ethical life.” This prereflective stance includes the 
ethical substance as well as other manners and customs, and therefore defines the “cultural 
code,” which, in its turn, conditions social regulation.218 
 Culturally immanent norms thus imbue actions with value, but not only 
actions. Ricoeur mentions that the degrees of value are extended, beyond the actions, to 
their agents. Here a link to Aristotle’s Poetics is apparent: “The Poetics presupposes not just 
‘doers’ but characters endowed with ethical qualities that make them noble or vile.”219 The 
heroes and the villains in a story, however, become such only due to the practical 
understanding shared by the author and the audience. Every action is evaluated by the 
cultural context in which it is undertaken. Ricoeur maintains that “this ethical quality is itself 
only a corollary of the major characteristic of action, that it is always symbolically 
mediated.”220 Symbolic mediation and symbolic wholes are then interdependent forms of 
symbolic structures. 
 Finally, the third anchorage Ricoeur introduces of the world of action is its 
temporal character, which is linked to human experience that has a prenarrative structure. 
Ricoeur examines this as “within-time-ness,” that is, as Heidegger’s Innerzeitlichkeit, or 
intratemporality. Within-time-ness abstracts both from existential temporality of constantly 
projecting ourselves “ahead” (Zeitlichkeit), and from acknowledging this primordial 
experience as historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) which, as an extension between birth and death, 
calls for narration. In the first place, Innerzeitlichkeit highlights therefore the duality of being 
in time, that being-here is historical because it is temporal.221 
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Being-here is not only temporal, however, but also being-with and care – being 
preoccupied in the world. The description of temporality is dependent on the description of 
this preoccupation. This means that within-time-ness reveals being-here in the present, by 
way of “making-present” the world. The temporal manner of being-in-the-world therefore 
“crosses over” from time and history to being preoccupied. This is decisive for Ricoeur, who 
argues straightforwardly that the narrative order and being preoccupied in the world are then 
bridged – “for the first time.”  His conclusion is that “narrative configurations and the most 
elaborated forms of temporality corresponding to them share the same foundation of 
within-time-ness.”222 This conclusion seems also to summarize mimesis1, the necessary 
preunderstanding of the world of human action that is “common to both poets and their 
readers,”223 by implicitly drawing together its semantics, symbolic structure, and temporality 
as cultural prerequisites. 
 
Mimesis2 
Ricoeur locates mimesis2 between prefiguration and refiguration – or, in Ricoeur’s terms, 
between “preunderstanding” and “postunderstanding.”224 Briefly put, the configurating 
operation is nothing but “grasping together.” As we have seen, this means for Ricoeur 
emplotment in an Aristotelian manner.225 Ultimately, however, it has a Kantian meaning as a 
“function of unity among our representations,” that is, judging.226 According to Ricoeur, the 
kinship between the configurational act – that of organizing an intelligible whole as 
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“concordant discordance” – and the operation of judging as described by Kant cannot be 
overemphasized. Ricoeur argues that this is most apparent in the case of reflective judgments 
– distinguishable from the determinate ones.227  
Here, however, Ricoeur seems to be of two minds. Instead of following Kant’s 
third Critique and the notion of reflective judgments, Ricoeur requires that the 
configurational act should be compared to the work of the productive imagination in a sense 
familiar to the first Critique. When elaborating his understanding of configuration Ricoeur 
refers to the schematizing power and the synthesizing function of the productive 
imagination. “We may speak of a schematism of the narrative function,” says Ricoeur.228 But 
what distinguishes Ricoeur from Kant is his claim that the schematism he discusses be 
culturally bound, it “is constituted within a history that has all the characteristics of a 
tradition.”229 Besides weaving between Kant’s first and the third Critique, Ricoeur seems to 
think in a post-Hegelian manner. 
The notion of culture appears again in relation to traditionality, which 
according to Ricoeur is the second feature of configurational action.230 Taken from the point 
of view of traditionality, the Western narrative paradigm – “our culture” as Ricoeur calls it – 
is based on the genre of Greek tragedy but also “several narrative traditions: Hebrew and 
Christian, but also Celtic, Germanic, Icelandic, and Slavic.”231 Our cultural paradigm is heir 
(l’héritière) to all of these, “issuing from” previous traditions, but still not uniform with any 
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one of them. This disjointed continuity points to a dialectic between innovation and 
sedimentation, by which new works and original productions come about – Ricoeur uses the 
term “rule-governed deformation” when he explains how the changes of paradigm take 
place.232 “It is the variety of applications,” he writes, “that confers a history on the 
productive imagination and that, in counterpoint to sedimentation, makes a narrative 
tradition possible.”233 Once again, then, the lived experience finds itself articulated in cultural 
products that capture the essence of the configurational operation. 
 
Mimesis3 
Prefiguration concerns the preunderstanding of the cultural world of action, and 
configuration the world of the text, that is, cultural schematization. Refiguration, or mimesis3, 
marks then “the intersection of the world of the text and the world of the hearer or 
reader.”234 The intersection is thus akin to Gadamer’s “fusion of horizons” 
(Horizontverschmelzung),235 since it concerns both “the world configured by the poem” and 
“the world wherein effective action unfurls and unfolds its specific temporality.”236 
Generally, therefore, mimesis3 “corresponds to what Gadamer, in his philosophical 
hermeneutics, calls ‘application.’”237 This hermeneutic activity is, according to Ricoeur, both 
unending and recurring. It is an “endless spiral,” or a “healthy circle,” which carries “the 
                                               
232 Ricoeur 1983, 109. (70). 
233 Ricoeur 1983, 109. (70). 
234 Ricoeur 1983, 109. (71). 
235 Ricoeur 1983, 117-118. (77-78).; Gadamer 1989, 302-307. 
236 Ricoeur 1983, 109. (71). 
237 Ricoeur 1983, 109. (70). – In Truth and Method Gadamer first pays attention to the fact that philogical, 
legal, and theological hermeneutics recognized application “as an integral element of all understanding.” He 
then proposes that “our thesis is that historical hermeneutics too has a task of application to perform, because 
it too serves applicable meaning, in that it explicitly and consciously bridges the temporal distance that 
separates the interpreter from the text and overcomes the alienation of meaning that the text has undergone.” 
Gadamer 1989, 308-311. 
62 
meditation past the same point a number of times, but at different altitudes.”238 The reader 
or hearer ultimately constructs both the narration and its meaning, and thus refigures the 
world of action in the light of that narration. The act of reading or that of hearing, the 
aesthetic reception, connects mimesis3 to mimesis2.
239  
For Ricoeur, then, the reader’s world – the cultural world “in front of the text” 
– is far more important than that “behind the text” to which the author’s intentions and the 
ontological unnameable belong. Re-figuration as both re-description and re-signification 
should therefore be comprehended properly. “In La métaphore vive,”240 Ricoeur writes, “I held 
that poetry, through its mythos, re-describes the world. In the same way, in this work I will say 
that a narrative act (le faire narratif) re-signifies the world in its temporal dimension, to the 
extent that recounting a story (raconter), reciting, is to remake the action following the poem’s 
invitation.”241 In other words, Ricoeur understands interpreting a text as “the proposing of 
the world that I might inhabit and into which I might project my ownmost powers.”242 
Refiguration is therefore ultimately about human creativity – “doing something” in a cultural 
tradition. The proposing and the projecting of the world, which sums up the whole process 
of reconfiguration, lead to apprehending the world itself “from the angle of human 
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praxis.”243 Interpreting a text makes the world of action anew for the reader, that is, re-
establishes the reader’s cultural world. 
This re-establishing the cultural world needs to be explained in more detail. 
Based on his earlier work on polysemy and onto-metaphorical reference of figurative 
language – its “iconic augmentation” – Ricoeur maintains that “we owe a large part of the 
enlarging of our horizon of existence to fictional [i.e. poetic] works.”244 Here, he is not too 
far from Gadamer and his notion of an ontological function of Bild, which contains “an 
indissoluable connection with its world,” and is an increase in being.245 Ricoeur is quick to 
point out, however, that the onto-existential refiguration is guided by prefiguration at the 
level of practical world of action, or, put differently, it is conditioned by the structures of 
cultural formation. In short, refiguration presupposes the preunderstanding of the 
meaningful structure of action, of symbolic structures, and of temporality. Ricoeur therefore 
clarifies the refigurative moment by arguing that “being-in-the-world according to narrativity 
is a being-in-the-world already marked by the linguistic practice leading back to this 
preunderstanding [of the world of action under the governance of mimesis1].”
246 The horizon 
of our existence can be enlarged only when a certain readability is granted by shared 
preunderstanding, that is, by shared cultural condition of all the readers who then 
reconfigure their respective beings-in-the-world. With this remark our path from pre- to 
con- and further to refiguration makes a leap back to prefiguration. 
This brief explication of the threefold mimesis must be closed by returning to 
the thought that the world presupposed and proposed by the poetic work is a cultural 
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world.247 In particular, it is a cultural world that describes at the same time, as Ricoeur 
maintains, my ownmost powers. In fact, I can recognize myself as having these powers only 
in this cultural world, because the human experience is articulated only in symbolically 
mediated cultural processes.248 These closing remarks, however, lead us away from the 
immediate description of Ricoeur’s conception of threefold mimesis, to the question of 
connecting these two hermeneutical models that have been introduced above. The following 
connecting the two hermeneutics will help us, in the end, clarify the hermeneutics of cultural 
re-con-naissance. 
 
3.3 Hermeneutics of Postcritical Understanding 
We have now briefly studied Ricoeur’s hermeneutical approach in form of the two basic 
models he proposes in his work. In order to map these two hermeneutical triads onto each 
other – which Ricoeur himself did not do explicitly – I follow the model proposed by Dan 
Stiver.249 Stiver suggests folding the later hermeneutics of threefold mimesis (which he calls 
“the mimetic arc”) into the earlier one, that of postcritical innocence (“the hermeneutical 
arc”).250 When thought together, this results in a revised threefold arc “in which each 
moment of the hermeneutical arc includes a mimetic arc.”251 In other words, Stiver connects 
the two threefold hermeneutics, and reads them together as a triad of 1) a naïve 
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understanding, 2) a critical understanding (explanation), and 3) a postcritical understanding. 
It is in each of these phases of the “revised arc” that the full “mimetic arc” takes place, 
showing how refiguration is a new prefiguration in an open-ended hermeneutical process of 
reconfiguration.252  
 As Stiver mentions, this “revised arc” has the advantage of bringing in a 
“holistic ‘understanding,’ even in the middle momentum of explanation.”253 Stiver explains 
that the model he proposes “retains Ricoeur’s emphasis on critique, but it recognizes that 
critical evaluation of the configured and refigured world of the text demands synthetic 
imagination.”254 Stiver is thus able to conclude that “we have therefore a nuanced and 
inseparable interweaving of the configuration and refiguration of the text that nevertheless 
allows us to make a relative distinction between the text and our interpretation of it.”255 
Stiver’s model seems indeed to bring the two hermeneutics together in a sound manner. 
 Stiver’s suggestion and especially the actual figure of the “re-figured arc” in his 
book,256 must not be accepted uncritically, however. For Stiver, it seems, the realm of 
“postcritical understanding” includes not only the “postcritical possibilities” (configuration), 
but also the refigurative moment of “appropriative understanding.” This refiguration then 
leads to, or is already, a “postcritical application.”257 In brief, it remains quite unclear what 
this postcritical application would be. I argue – keeping in mind that the secondary naïveté is 
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not a given, but a task258 – that this postcritical application is perhaps something that could 
be hoped for, but not anything that would be realizable in full in terms of human 
understanding. It is a horizon that always withdraws. Still, the path toward it is worth 
working for itself, even if the task will never be completely fulfilled. 
 It is quite true that, according to Ricoeur, refiguration corresponds to 
application in its Gadamerian sense.259 As mentioned above, however, hermeneutic activity is 
for Ricoeur an endless spiral in search of meaning. When the world “into which I might 
project my ownmost powers” is reconfiguratively formed, it is still never a totality, it never 
reaches its fullest manifestation. Instead, this cultural world of possibilities needs to be 
continuously renewed “from the angle of human praxis.”260 The impression of a possible 
closure that one gets from Stiver’s proposal must therefore be shunned: there is no 
“finality,” no ultimate end in this hermeneutic activity, which would go beyond the idea of 
“trying to live” in the light of the text’s “truth for me.”261  
 Although Stiver does not, and would not, come anywhere close to suggesting 
that such a stagnant finality – an ultimate application – is likely to take place,262 it is best to be 
clear about this: there is no total escape for us from the critical phase. According to Ricoeur, 
if there is “another immediacy,” it is possible only as a critically informed continuous 
attempt to understand, or to “hear anew.” It is perhaps good to remind ourselves about the 
other option by bringing in Martin Heidegger’s hermeneutics as a point of comparison. It 
can be said in a Ricoeurian vein that Heidegger’s problem was that he wanted to “listen” to 
Being but affiliated this listening directly with thinking. When Heidegger argues that 
                                               
258 Ricoeur 1960b, 331-332. (356-357). 
259 Ricoeur 1983, 109. (70). Cf. Gadamer 1989, 308-311. 
260 Ricoeur 1983, 122. (81). 
261 Cf. Stiver 2001, 76. 
262 Cf. Stiver 2001, 76.; Ricoeur 1973a, 164-165. 
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“thinking is of Being insofar as thinking belonging to Being, listens to Being,”263 for Ricoeur, 
thinking is not “listening to Being,” whereas interpretive reflection provides hope for 
“hearing again.” Ricoeur is always quick to note that the nature of hermeneutics is not 
“spontaneous” listening anymore but “critical” reflection instead.  
Even though Ricoeur aspired to the ontological level of analysis suggested by 
Heidegger, he criticized Heidegger’s fundamental ontology as too “direct” – its striving for 
pure description could never be achieved.264 The primitive naïveté, “the sunken Atlantides,” 
has been lost in modernity, but through critical hermeneutics – and in interpreting – a 
second immediacy, “the postcritical equivalent of the precritical hierophany,” is still within 
our reach.265 It is in interpreting that this postcritical understanding takes place, and it is only in 
interpreting that we can have a possibility of appropriative understanding. This interpretative 
appropriation, having detached itself from the immediate experience of being, cannot in turn 
detach itself from the distanced, cultural mode of being-here, and return to pure immediacy. 
As Dan Stiver finally admits, the postcritical phase leads to “further critical reflection and 
then to further postcritical appropriation, in a hermeneutical spiral rather than an arc.”266 
There is no stagnant finality for a cultural subject. 
 
* 
As also André Stanguennec maintains in his brief essay on Ricoeur’s cultural hermeneutics, 
appropriation through reconfiguration is always bound to culture.267 The three “anchorages” 
                                               
263 Heidegger 1976, 316. (Heidegger 1977b, 196.)  
264 Ricoeur 1969, 10-11. (6-7). Cf. Pellauer 2007, 9. 
265 Ricoeur 1960b, 325, 327. (349, 352). 
266 Stiver 2001, 76. 
267 Stanguennec 2010, 142-143. – Stanguennec identifies, as I do, three moments or phases in Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutic of culture: 1) “transcendental” conditions of practical anthropology, 2) the dialectics of internal 
freedom and cultural systems, and 3) the moment of appropriation that serves as the teleological goal for 
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of mimesis1, the demand for both schematization and traditionality of mimesis2, and the very 
moment of refiguration of mimesis3 all indicate this boundedness. This is why I propose that 
the model of the threefold mimesis we have introduced above – the process of re-con-
figuration – can be taken as a clue for analyzing respectively the cultural conditions of 
remembering, judging, and ethico-political being in the three middle parts of this 
dissertation. Ricoeur’s initial stand, however, will be modified by Stiver’s reading of it.  
As I will repeatedly remind the reader of this dissertation, the threefold 
mimesis is placed here on the level of critical understanding. In parts two, three, and four I 
trace Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of recognition, and in particular his hermeneutics of cultural 
recognition. Part two portrays the prefigurative critical moment, part three the configurative 
critical moment, and part four the refigurative critical moment. As the hermeneutics of 
cultural recognition becomes a focus of our attention, these moments are approached 
through the very term reconnaissance. It is only in part five that I suggest a path beyond the 
critical understanding, in explicating how the moments of re-, con-, and naissance – parts two, 
three, and four – can be taken as a guide for a postcritical hermeneutics of intra-cultural 
recognition. In other words, I will propose that the critical moments of reconfiguration are 
transferable to, or readable as, the postcritical moments of re-, con-, and naissance. For the 
reasons explained, this is only suggestive, however, because in the ultimate analysis it is 
indeed a task for the reader to drive this point home: “it is the reader who completes the 
work inasmuch as […] the written work is a sketch for reading.”268 The spiraling towards a 
                                                                                                                                            
becoming an authentic human subject. Stanguennec emphasizes, however, structural anthropology in such a 
manner that is foreign to Ricoeur’s work (Stanguennec 2010, 140-142.) In addition, Stanguennec’s analysis of 
Ricoeur’s cultural hermeneutics is materially limited to Ricoeur’s philosophical interpretation of Freud’s cultural 
analysis. 
268 Ricoeur 1983, 117. (77). 
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postcritical understanding is achievable only by appropriating a text, so also this text, which 




I maintain that understanding the human subject and his or her cultural being can be seen as 
key questions in Ricoeur’s thought. But there is, nevertheless, a difference between 
philosophical anthropology and a quest for the meaning of culture. Although it is quite true 
that in many ways these two are inseparable, because they parallel each other – culture can 
be seen as an outward expression of human condition, or its manifestation – it is also true 
that philosophical anthropology opens only one approach to the question of culture. 
Considering Ricoeur’s overall approach, however, it will be necessary to refer to a “general” 
human condition as cultural.  
To differentiate between the two aspects, the focus in this dissertation is more 
about the question of situating the human subject – of a cultural situation and engagement – 
and not of the subject per se. It is the meaning-giving condition and context, also in the sense 
of providing the possibility for self-understanding, in which this dissertation is interested. To 
use the terminology of Ricoeur’s early work, philosophical anthropology is therefore the 
“involuntary,” meaning unavoidable, for this dissertation that focuses on tracing the idea of 
cultural self-recognition. The anthropological question is a necessary one, and it relates 
closely to the theme of this dissertation, but it still is not the question I elaborate in this 
work.  
In sum, I trace in this dissertation Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of cultural self-
recognition and, generally, his cultural hermeneutics. To be more explicit about this task, let 
me formulate my aims in the form of specific research objectives to which I will respond in 
this dissertation. By making an extended excursion – or a “detour” – to Ricoeur’s early work, 
I aspire to demonstrate that these nine theses hold: 
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1) The theme of recognition is developed and discussed by Ricoeur well before the 
2004 work Parcours de la reconnaissance, translated as The Course of Recognition. 
 
2) Although the subject-centered progress from identity to self-recognition and 
furthermore to mutual recognition is important (cf. Course of Recognition), the “course” 
of recognition should be approached at the level of Ricoeur’s work as a whole, and 
consequently at the level of cultural formation or figuration. 
 
3) Ricoeur’s “phenomenology of being able” – which culminates in the notion of 
l’homme capable (de faillir) – necessarily requires the support of a cultural hermeneutics. 
 
4) This hermeneutic of culture recasts Ricoeur’s relations to such thinkers as Hegel, 
Kant, and Heidegger. 
 
5) The notions of “cultural objectivity” and “cultural objects” have a major role for 
both Ricoeur’s hermeneutic of culture and his anthropological phenomenology, since 
the possibility of recognition is fundamentally grounded in them. 
 
6) The foundational etho-poetic nucleus of human culture, which Ricoeur mentions in his 
texts, is found only indirectly in and by these cultural objects. 
 
7) This poetic nucleus, as an opening up of a language of the possible ήθος, is a 
necessary condition for the possibility of an ethico-political self-understanding. 
 
8) In summing up the course of recognition, the term “reconnaissance” should be literally 
understood as “re-con-naissance,” that is, as “having-been-born-as-an-ethico-political-
subject.” 
 
9) The term “re-con-naissance” should be understood as a model of the hermeneutic of 
culture.269 
 
These nine theses are worked out in the four subsequent parts. I will first examine, in part 
two, the notion of recognition as analyzed in the 2004 work Course of Recognition. This leads us 
to Hegel and to the idea of culture as figuration or formation. Part three responds to this by 
bringing in Ricoeur’s analysis of Kant’s critical philosophy, which Ricoeur holds essential 
insofar as cultural objectivity is thought. This discussion of cultural objectivity and cultural 
                                               
269 Let me mention again that I have reserved a discussion of Paul Claudel’s term co-naissance in Appendix 4 
of this dissertation.  
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objects opens the problematics of part four, in which the notion of the etho-poetic nucleus 
of culture is analyzed by contrasting it with Martin Heidegger’s philosophy.  
All these themes are brought together in the concluding part five under the 
notion of re-con-naissance. The suggestion that is opened with this “dramatic” act five is that 
this critical analysis can be read in a postcritical manner, thus subjecting the reader to a 
culturally enhanced process of recognizing him- or herself more properly in a process of 
ever becoming an ethico-political human being. If I maintain a close connection to Ricoeur’s 
works in the course of reading them, this is done only with the purpose of demonstrating 












The Cultural Course of Recognition 
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The very first of the nine theses I introduced at the end of the previous part – that Ricoeur 
develops the theme of recognition well before Course of Recognition – presupposes that we are 
already familiar with the content of this work. The task of tracing the earlier notions of 
reconnaissance is therefore postponed until parts three and four. The aim of the present part is 
to understand the Course of Recognition itself, and more importantly, its major implications. It 
is these implications that necessitate the subsequent reading of Ricoeur’s work, in parts three 
and four of this dissertation, as a hermeneutic of culture. I therefore begin the analysis by 
affirming that Ricoeur’s explication of the subject-centered progress from identity to self-
recognition and furthermore to reciprocity, gratitude and mutual recognition is indeed 
important. I argue, however, that this course of recognition hardly satisfies the whole of 
another level of recognition that Ricoeur’s discussion of Hegel opens up in the very same 
work.  
What Ricoeur proposes in terms of a hermeneutic of culture recasts his 
relation to Hegel by pointing out that despite “renouncing” Hegel at some point of his 
career, Ricoeur returns to Hegel’s ideas – especially that of “being recognized.” Ricoeur’s 
pairing of Hegel’s terms Anerkennung and Sittlichkeit, recognition and politico-ethical life that 
entails situatedness in history, leads us to the threshold of this complex issue. According to 
Ricoeur recognition implies some objectifying, which is itself an essential part of the process 
of cultural formation described by Hegel. The subject-centered aspect that is most evident in 
Course of Recognition cannot be set completely aside, but the process in which the subject is in 
the focus, is only made possible by a contrast to another subject – who, despite its 
representing the other, still speaks the language of a figure of humanity in which I become 
recognized. What I argue, then, arises directly from Ricoeur’s explanation that his own 
investigation is guided by “a reversal” from the active to the passive sense of recognition: “I 
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actively recognize things, persons, myself; I ask, even demand, to be recognized by 
others.”270 The passive sense of recognition, being recognized, will eventually overtake the 
active one.  
 Ricoeur plays with the idea of a passive understanding of recognition when 
describing his own project in Course of Recognition. As he maintains, “there can be a 
philosophical discourse about recognition that is, in fact, that of recognition.”271 Ricoeur 
indicates that for having a philosophical discussion of recognition, another level of 
recognition is needed that makes the discussion possible in the first place: the notion of 
being recognized as an author, as a reader, or as a commentator, in a word, as an intelligent 
human subject. The idea of recognizing another aspect, position, viewpoint, and ultimately 
that of another human being therefore presents itself necessarily.  
This implied multitude of perspectives is why I begin this part by discussing 
some recent interpretations of Ricoeur’s 2004 work, Course of Recognition, but I should point 
out that I also do this for methodological reasons. First, this indirect approach to the work 
stresses the point of critical reading and re-reading (la relecture) that will eventually become an 
important theme in this dissertation. Second, my intention is to recognize these scholarly 
interpretations as attempts to recognize in turn the work done by Ricoeur through the 
conflictual reality of interpretations, and only then I move on to provide a reading of my 
own as an additional perspective in this “liebenden Kampf.” Third, this “passive” approach to 
the core theme of this dissertation – culture – provides a scholarly horizon, or an 
intellectual-cultural background, in contrast to which I formulate my own attempt to 
understand Ricoeur’s work by recognizing its cultural hermeneutic dimension. Put 
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differently, this dissertation is situated in a scholarly culture within which it functions, as a 
critical reading of this particular culture of reading Ricoeur’s work, as a corrective to those 
interpretations that have adopted a different, more anthropological orientation. 
In my own reading of Ricoeur’s Course of Recognition the notion of recognition 
as rediscovering brings forth the role of Hegel’s philosophy especially in relation to Hegel’s 
term Anerkennung. The course of recognition, I argue, appears as cultural in the light of this 
term, which Ricoeur also uses as an essential part of his argument. Put differently, I maintain 
that when reading Ricoeur’s work on recognition, his cultural hermeneutics presents itself as 
necessary – this is the “letting appear” of Ricoeur’s cultural hermeneutics that I mentioned in 
the general introduction to this dissertation. In fact, the course of recognition that Ricoeur 
discusses will then be approached precisely as An-erkennung, as re-cognition that gathers itself 
amidst cultural-symbolic expressions. This discussion leads us, through the section on “a 
Ricoeurian An-erkennung,” to consider how Ricoeur will eventually define the role and 
function of culture in Course of Recognition. In terms of the theses laid out at the end of the 




5. HERMENEUTICS, CONFLICT, AND REFLECTION 
In the preceding introduction to the present part, I have maintained that the reading of 
Ricoeur’s Course of Recognition will lead us to notice that a hermeneutic of culture is 
necessitated by the work. This assertion, however, can be set against a multitude of 
interpretations that do not recognize such necessity at all. For this reason, I have chosen to 
approach the implicit cultural hermeneutics cautiously, that is, by way of “letting it appear” 
in its own right. To maintain scholarly rigor and discipline, I will, therefore, also take into 
account some recent interpretations that place their respective emphases differently, so as to 
contest the hypothesis that Course of Recognition is, in fact, nothing else but a cultural course of 
recognition. In other words, for methodological reasons that become fully apparent only 
later in this dissertation, it is through this critical approach that Ricoeur’s cultural 
hermeneutics will be presented. 
This willingness to acknowledge rival readings of Ricoeur’s late work, 
however, results in the difficulty of incorporating the cultural reality of conflicting 
interpretations in this dissertation. It seems that the way to the culture concept is indeed a 
winding path. I am convinced, however, that there is a prize at the end of it, “the prize won 
through much struggle and effort” as Hegel would say.272 Let me continue, therefore, with a 
further explanation of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics that, theoretically speaking, begins by 
admitting the ineluctable condition of conflicting interpretations. It is through this polyvocal 
reality of interpretations that the necessity of cultural hermeneutics becomes evident. 
 
                                               
272 Hegel 2008, 11. (§12). 
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5.1 A Conflict of Interpretations 
A number of Ricoeur scholars have characterized Ricoeur’s hermeneutics with the phrase 
“the conflict of interpretations,” a notion rooted in Ricoeur’s texts written in the 1960s.273 
The Symbolism of Evil, published in 1960, introduced the idea of manifold “expressivity” of 
symbols. Whereas cosmic and oneiric (that is, religious and psychic) symbolisms are “the two 
poles” of this expressivity, a foundational “third modality of symbols” underlies this “double 
expressivity.” Ricoeur calls this foundational modality the poetic mode of symbols. Despite 
the polarity between cosmic and psychic modalities, all three symbolisms are mutually 
complementary in relation to each other.274 The idea of tension – that will became a 
trademark of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics in its “discordant concordance” and “concordant 
discordance”275 – between the cosmic and the psychic, however, has now been introduced. 
 The thematic of dialectical complementarity continues in On Interpretation, 
published five years later. First of all, Ricoeur reaffirms a certain confidence in language 
when he claims that “language, which bears symbols, is not so much spoken by men as 
spoken to men.”276 Individuals do not invent the language as a whole, but rather they apply 
what they have found in language. Ricoeur thus emphasizes that “men are born into 
language, into the light of the logos ‘who enlightens every man who comes into the 
world.’”277 This conviction, which Ricoeur says animates all his research, includes the idea of 
the “revealing power of symbols,” which in turn invites philosophic reflection.278 Reflection, 
while aiming at clarifying what the symbols reveal, struggles between “two interpretations of 
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interpretations,” that is, between the restorative (or holistic) and the reductive (or critical, 
demythicizing) models of interpretation.279  
According to Ricoeur, this overwhelming internal tension and the struggle of 
hermeneutics can be overcome by showing that reflection requires interpretation. “One can 
then justify,” writes Ricoeur, “the detour through the contingency of cultures, through an 
incurably equivocal language, and through the conflict of interpretations.”280 Cultural 
contingency and the non-univocity of language result from a multiplicity of non-coherent 
interpretations which all, however, are rooted in reflection. The notion of reflection must 
therefore be also clarified in order to rise above the inevitable conflict.  
Ricoeur’s comprehension of reflection follows the tradition of indirectness set 
forth by Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Jean Nabert.281 In opposition to understanding this 
reflection as self-reflection, where the conscious self is immediately given, Ricoeur argues in 
On Interpretation that the Cartesian formula cogito ergo sum cannot be posited directly but is 
achievable only indirectly. Self is in need of being “‘mediated’ by the representations, actions, 
works, institutions, and monuments that objectify it.”282 This mediation means that reflection 
is not intuition, immediate self-consciousness, and also that reflection is not reducible to 
simple epistemology, since it concerns a living subject. For Ricoeur reflection is “a 
                                               
279 Ricoeur 1965a, 40. (32). – Applying the distinction between cosmic and psychic symbolisms, Ricoeur 
understands the restorative interpretation model as a theologico-holistic, and the reductive as a psychoanalytic 
model. He argues that two schools dominate the field of interpretation: the “school of reminiscence” and the 
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280 Ricoeur 1965a, 50. (42). 
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282 Ricoeur 1965a, 51. (43). 
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reappropriation of our effort to exist,”283 that is, a recovering of the notion of “I” as the 
subject of all my actions in my actions. “The act of existing, the positing of the self,” Ricoeur 
claims, is recovered, re-appropriated “in all the density of its works.”284 The positing of self is 
therefore not “given” (donnée), whereas “it is a [reflective] task.”285 Put differently, I do not 
understand myself from the beginning but only gradually begin to understand as a living, 
acting and also suffering subject. 
In sum, then, Ricoeur maintains that reflection is a task of reappropriation. As 
such, it also “calls for an interpretation and tends to move into hermeneutics.”286 The 
meaning of the works, which “bear witness” to our effort and desire to exist, “remains 
doubtful and revocable.”287 Rather than actions having immediately clear meanings, Ricoeur 
argues in favor of understanding actions as signs of one’s existence open to interpretation. 
This is why he maintains that “reflection must become interpretation because I cannot grasp 
the act of existing except in signs scattered in the world.”288 It follows that reflection turns 
into interpretation that concerns my place in the world of cultural objects. 
The first of the two important conclusions Ricoeur draws from being-related 
to the world of objects connects the demand of interpretation to hermeneutics as science. 
Ricoeur argues that “a reflective philosophy must include the results, methods, and 
presuppositions of all the sciences that try to decipher and interpret the signs of man.”289 
The second conclusion highlights, yet again, the indirect and culturally bound nature of 
reflection. It also points out, however, that reflection does not begin as a science, but that a 
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self must recover itself from the midst of the contingent cultural manifestations which are 
only then analyzed and deciphered. Ricoeur writes: 
In positing itself, reflection understands its own inability to transcend the vain 
and empty abstraction of the I think and the necessity to recover itself by 
deciphering its own signs lost in the world of culture. Thus reflection realizes 
it does not begin as science; in order to operate it must take to itself the 
opaque, contingent, and equivocal signs scattered in the cultures in which our 
language is rooted.290 
 
This conclusion, that reflection requires cultural-linguistic support, leads Ricoeur to assert 
that not only does reflection not begin as a science, but it cannot become abstract at all. To 
retain its connection to living experience, that is, to its onto-existential re-appropriation, 
reflection must remain “concrete.” In order to “become concrete,” however, “reflection 
must lose its immediate pretension to universality, to the extent of fusing together its 
essential necessity and the contingency of the signs through which it recognizes itself (dans lesquels 
elle se reconnaît).”291 Reflection begins from particular signs, cultural objects, and not 
abstractions. The contingency and equivocity of these signs, the doubtful and revocable 
meaning of our works, indicates that hermeneutics is in itself internally inconsistent in that it 
must both claim and relinquish mere objectivity without subjectivity.  
Ricoeur claims that when taking all of this into account, there cannot be a 
general, all-encompassing, reconciled hermeneutics but only a tensional one that is almost 
torn apart by rival interpretations. “Not one but several interpretations have to be integrated 
                                               
290 Ricoeur 1965a, 54. (47). 
291 Ricoeur 1965a, 55. (48). Italics added. – In addition to similarities with reflexive tradition, Ricoeur’s 
though has a Christian existential undertone. Even though Gabriel Marcel is, most convincingly, his mentor in 
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example, in his Concluding Unscientific Postscript that “instead of understanding the concrete abstractly, as the task 
of abstract thinking has it, the subjective thinker has the opposite task of understanding the abstract concretely. 
Abstract thinking looks away from concrete human beings in order to consider pure human being; the 
subjective thinker understands what is to be the abstract human concretely, in terms of being this particular 
existing human being.” Kierkegaard 2009, 295. Cf. Ricoeur 1992, 43-45. 
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into reflection,” Ricoeur insists.292 This rivalry, however, should not be understood as a 
deficiency that destroys the possibility of a regained self-understanding. The internal 
dynamics of hermeneutics, the “war” within it, rather, resists the temptation of accepting the 
immediacy of ego, or immediate consciousness. “The hermeneutic conflict itself is what 
nourishes the process of reflection and governs the movement from abstract to concrete 
reflection.”293 The reflection, which leads us to self-understanding, is dynamized by the 
multiplicity of possible interpretations in the many particular sciences. “To let ourselves be 
torn by the contradiction between these divergent hermeneutics is to give ourselves up to 
the wonder that puts reflection in motion,” Ricoeur argues, “it is no doubt necessary for us 
to be separated from ourselves, to be set off center, in order finally to know what is signified 
by the I think, I am.”294 The erasure of immediate consciousness both results from the 
conflict of interpretations, and opens an arduous path of self-recognition, or the “primary 
analogate of being,”295 by means of that same multiplicity of interpretations. Insofar as there 
is an indirect course of self-recognition, there is then also the curse of self-recognition: the 
need of self-recognition that is not immediate but always in the making. 
 
5.2 Reading Ricoeur’s Course of Recognition 
Having opened this part with a brief recourse to Ricoeur’s view on the necessary internal 
conflict in hermeneutics, we must now reconnect with the original theme for this part – an 
analysis of Ricoeur’s Course of Recognition. My intention is to provide next the gist of some 
recent interpretations of this 2004 work, or to give the phrase “the conflict of 
                                               
292 Ricoeur 1965a, 61. (54). 
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interpretations” a concrete and contextual meaning, before moving on to a reading of our 
own that I have already outlined in my introductory remarks to this part two. By analyzing 
three different attempts to clarify the central message of Course of Recognition, I will show that 
the reception of this work does not recognize the necessity of cultural hermeneutics, even 
though the theme comes through loud and clear as we will see in chapter 7 in particular. As I 
have pointed out earlier, this discussion functions as a platform for the ensuing “letting 
appear” of Ricoeur’s cultural understanding. 
I welcome those readers already familiar with the scholarly discussion 
concerning Ricoeur’s work on recognition to move directly to chapter 6, in which I respond 
to these readings in a more unique and constructive manner. To the readers not quite 
familiar with the discussion, let me mention that as in the case of Ricoeur’s larger oeuvre, 
there are likewise many interpretations of his last work that focuses on the theme of 
recognition. These interpretations commonly accept – and correctly so – a “course” in 
Ricoeur’s argument that runs from the state of perplexity to that of identification, self-
recognition, intersubjective reciprocity, and finally to mutual recognition and gratitude. In 
the grand scheme of things, a certain intellectual course or a path of Ricoeur’s line of 
reasoning has therefore been rather widely recognized. 
Similarly, as Ricoeur is clear on these, the two major shifts he makes in Course 
of Recognition have been quite well noted.296 First, Ricoeur argues for a shift from “active” to 
“passive” recognition, that is, from recognizing to being recognized. Although his analysis 
might begin by asking about recognizing in an active sense, it will soon become clear that the 
                                               
296 David Pellauer, for example, provides a brief summary of the internal dynamics of Course of Recognition, 
which can be of help in getting the basics of this work. Pellauer 2007, 126-133. 
84 
need for recognition, that is, of “being recognized” prevails.297 Ricoeur maintains that from a 
structured point of view this quest for passive recognition reaches to reciprocity as an 
intersubjective struggle to be recognized, but not to mutuality that implies ethical 
involvement between persons. Ricoeur thus terminologically distinguishes mutuality from 
reciprocity; being recognized as a legal person by the judicial system, for example, is not yet 
full mutual recognition. Second, the paralleling shift from epistemological recognition to the 
ethical one is well spotted. Clearly, being merely capable of identifying things or entities does 
not exhaust the meaning of the word recognition. What Ricoeur draws out from the term 
“recognition” is reflected in the French language and in its use of the term reconnaissance. 
Besides a variety of commonplace significations, an element of gratitude is found among its 
meanings. Recognition arises from ethical mutuality, and therefore from taking αγά3η into 
account, that is, the incommensurable value of love in all its forms.298 Again, according to 
Ricoeur, recognition guided by gratitude must be distinguished from the normative and 
structural reciprocal recognition. 
Beyond this initial consensus regarding the proposed interpretations of the 
meaning, or the message, of Course of Recognition vary. As I next introduce three of these 
approaches, it will soon become clear that a sense – if not of a direct conflict, then at least – 
of a discordance is evident when these readings are contrasted with each other. First, an 
analytic attempt proposed by Arto Laitinen functions as a conceptual approach to Ricoeur’s 
work. The second example, Gonçalo Marcelo’s interpretation, diverges from this conceptual 
endeavor as it promotes a vision that Ricoeur proposes a kind of “pure ethics” of 
recognition. The third approach, by Jean-Luc Amalric, brings us much closer to the themes 
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elaborated above when opening the question of reflection in relation to recognition, but also 
restricts itself to an anthropological point of view that does not take into account the cultural 
approach necessitated by Ricoeur’s work. Again, those readers with an understanding of this 
scholarly cultural background, in contrast to which I propose my own attempt, are 
welcomed to move directly to chapter 6 that opens the elaboration of my cultural approach 
to Ricoeur’s work. I should point out, however, that some themes that will become of some 
importance later in this dissertation – such as re-reading, human life as “with-being” and 
“being-among,” the tensional achieving of mutuality, passive recognition, and the narrative 
identity of a reflective self – are both discussed and indirectly shown to be essential in 
Ricoeur’s thought in the following critical discussion. 
 
The Analytic Attempt 
Course of Recognition opens with a confession that yet another “conflict” remains to confuse 
Ricoeur. He acknowledges that the whole work arises “from a sense of perplexity” which 
results from “the apparently haphazard scattering of occurrences of the word [recognition] 
on the plane of philosophical discourse.”299 In brief, the semantic status of the word is not 
clear. This confusion leads Ricoeur to a lexicographical survey, since lexicons imply that it is 
possible to consider the term “recognition” as a single lexical unit.300 By maintaining its place 
in a dictionary, the word “recognition” indicates that at least a minimal level of coherence 
remains among its meanings. 
Starting from this lexical stability, Ricoeur asserts that a philosopher can 
benefit, “find some encouragement,” in surveying some basic lexical conceptions of 
                                               
299 Ricoeur 2004b, 9. (ix). 
300 Ricoeur 2004b, 9. (ix). 
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recognition.301 Ricoeur is equally convinced, however, that “philosophy does not advance by 
a lexical improvement.”302 Precise lexical definitions do not abolish philosophical problems, 
and seeing them as such was neglected even by Wittgenstein in his later writings. Moreover, 
this is in fact the first time during his career that Ricoeur resorts to dictionaries to this extent 
as his guide.303 In the strongest of terms, Ricoeur also renounces any attempt at harmonizing 
the discordance in the “rule-governed polysemy of the word recognition” by making the 
partial lexical definitions more coherent with each other by adding new meanings and by 
rewriting.304 He could not be much clearer on this: “Such an effort leads nowhere.”305  
If there is a kind of “bridging of gaps” in the whole course of the work, I 
propose that it takes place only in the process of reconfiguration.306 Ricoeur enables this 
assertion by emphasizing the notion of re-reading, la relecture, that for Ricoeur means not 
only reading again but the necessity of recurring “reading” or interpretation.307 It is, 
therefore, rather surprising to find an analysis that aims to enumerate all the aspects of “the 
full course of recognition,” as if Ricoeur suggested it be read in such a disconnected and 
totalizing way. This is all the more surprising, as an analysis like this appears in a journal 
focusing on Course of Recognition. A special issue of Études Ricoeuriennes/Ricoeur Studies (2011:1) 
was dedicated to the theme of recognition, and the article written by Arto Laitinen is perhaps 
the most unique in this lexicalist sense. He proposes a kind of analytic pathology for 
Ricoeur’s Course of Recognition. Although Laitinen refers to Ricoeur’s ultimate meaning of 
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mutual recognition – experienced generosity that is modeled on the ritual of gift-giving308 – 
he does not conceive it as central to the message of Ricoeur’s work, but only as a 
“substantial contribution” instead.309 Laitinen also concludes with a dictionary-style 
approach, which indeed seems foreign to Ricoeur’s philosophy that, instead of fully 
completed course of recognition, emphasizes being always in the path of recognition:  
Together with the consulted dictionaries and contemporary debates, as well as 
Ricoeur’s earlier work, the full course of recognition might be something like 
the following: i) recognition-identification of something as ‘a something’ at all, 
or as this particular thing, or a thing with these and these particular features, or 
as a thing of this generic kind; ii) recognition-adhesion in accepting a 
proposition as true; iii) recognition-adhesion in accepting a norm as valid; iv) 
recognition-attestation of oneself as a capable agent, a person (‘what am I?’) or 
as this kind of person (“who am I?,” “what am I like?,” “what kind of person 
am I?,” “where do I stand?”), as being this irreplaceable, singular person (“who 
am I?,” “which person am I?”); v) recognition of others in the sense of esteem, 
respect or approbation or love. And perhaps one should add the following: vi) 
recognition of collective agents, institutions, organizations, groups.310 
 
This conclusion functions as a crude summary of the mere surface of Ricoeur’s argument. 
As seen earlier, however, Ricoeur himself does not aim to bring together all the meanings 
mentioned in the dictionaries. Lexical survey only served Ricoeur as a basis of finding “some 
encouragement,” not as an exhaustive list of accepted meanings to be reconciled with each 
other.311 It is then perhaps the case that Laitinen has expectations different from those of 
other Ricoeur readers, as well as Ricoeur himself.312 Furthermore, Laitinen repeatedly tells us 
that Ricoeur has included the idea of the recognition of self in his own work without it being 
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listed in the dictionaries.313 How could there be human agency, however, in the full sense – a 
person recognizing – without this aspect of recognition taking place? In Laitinen’s own 
words: “agency and agentic capacities are crucial.”314 As we will see, Laitinen’s reading of 
Ricoeur is truly unique in its lack of discernment. 
 Even though Laitinen claims that Ricoeur has a “surprising take on 
recognition,” it is we who are surprised by Laitinen’s analysis. The angle chosen by Laitinen 
seems encyclopedic: not only does he suggest that a concise listing of all the possible aspects 
of the “full course” is important, but in the main body of his own text he analyzes Ricoeur’s 
work on the basis of a kind skeleton model, one merely listing the different steps taken by 
Ricoeur.315 The “full course of recognition” Laitinen writes about is thus very far from the 
reflective course of reconnaissance Ricoeur intended. Maybe this is why Laitinen comments on 
Ricoeur’s unwillingness to fully engage in analytic philosophizing: “Ricoeur does not 
thematize the change from ‘ideas of objects’ to ‘propositionally structured thoughts’ which is 
crucial for analytical philosophy from Frege onwards (which Ricoeur more or less bypasses 
in silence, in contrast to the dialogue with analytical philosophy in his Oneself as Another).”316 
Laitinen seems to take Ricoeur’s argumentation both as ambiguous and limited at the same 
time. Quite clearly, however, Ricoeur’s work is not an analytic attempt to formally clarify a 
concept, which seems to be the expectation of his commentator, but to philosophically 
understand certain fundamental constituents of recognition as a necessary phenomenon of 
human life. 
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 Laitinen emphasizes the analytic mode of philosophizing to such an extent 
that he also misstates the notion of “being true” as laid out in hermeneutic philosophy. Even 
though the notion of semantic truth is well grounded in itself, it would be a serious mistake 
to limit the meaning of ontological “being true” to that perspective, and to forget, for 
example, the remark made by Heidegger in the opening paragraphs of Being and Time, in 
which he argues that the ontological significance of αλήθεια as apophantic unconcealment 
must not be set aside. Fundamentally, Heidegger maintains, truth is dis-covering, letting 
beings “be seen as something unconcealed (αληθες).”317 This hermeneutic conception appears 
to be quite unfamiliar to Laitinen, whose notion of truth is exclusively formal and semantic. 
When Ricoeur uses the phrase “accepting as true,” Laitinen interprets that truth “is primarily 
propositions, statements, and beliefs that are true.”318 This is not, however, a shared 
conviction with Laitinen and Ricoeur. 
To be sure, Ricoeur brings up the notion of truth in the context of analyzing 
Descartes’ Meditations and especially the Cartesian theory of judgment.319 Still, Ricoeur 
advances the idea that in the light of Cartesian philosophy “the act of ‘accepting an idea as 
true’ mobilizes a subject” who “attests to the first truth: I am, I exist.”320 Ricoeur 
comprehends this attestation as an indication that a strictly epistemological position, the 
absolute certainty of “I am,” moves towards an ontological one. The Cartesian idea of 
recognition as “the affirmation of the impossibility of being mistaken” – now formulated 
against the threat of error – is therefore according to Ricoeur already “on the way to its 
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dissociation from the simple idea of knowing.”321 Ricoeur suggests that epistemology 
necessarily opens itself up to the ontology of the first truth. Even Descartes’ Meditations allow 
and demand “a place for a subject responsible for its errors and hence for 
‘accepting/recognizing as true.”322 In other words, the very positing of the phrase “I am, I 
exist” by one’s own acts leads us to affirm that there can be a living subject who is the one 
“accepting the idea as true.”  
Ricoeur is dissatisfied, however, with the simplistic interpretation of res cogitans; 
he points out that besides this openness to the living subject, an element of passive 
recognition, of being recognized, is already present for Descartes as well. The author of the 
Meditations, for example, quite obviously “calls out to his reader.”323 This sense of “calling 
out” reframes Ricoeur’s assertion that “it is this same subject of recognition [who 
accepts/recognizes as true] that later in our inquiry will demand to be recognized.”324 Calling 
out, in other words, is demanding to be recognized. As a result, Laitinen’s analysis faces yet 
another challenge. It indeed “sounds wrong to say that the subject of ‘accepting as true’ is 
‘the same subject that later in our inquiry will demand to be recognized’” – but for reasons 
very different from those Laitinen suggests.325 When Ricoeur writes that “the act of 
‘accepting an idea as true’ mobilizes a subject,”326 Laitinen responds: “Typically, persons can 
be recognized as worthy of respect, as meriting esteem and so on, but rarely as true.”327 
Laitinen is thus misled on two accounts: First, Ricoeur does not claim that the subject would 
be semantically true, but that the subject accepts an idea as true. Second, even though the 
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first condition holds, the very subject appears, or is alethically discovered, by his calling out to 
the reader. Laitinen does not account for this distinction. 
Laitinen’s comments on Ricoeur’s notion of peace serve us as another example 
of his confusion. Ricoeur points to the possibility of achieving the generously harmonious 
state of mutuality under the aegis of αγά3η. Laitinen, in turn, discusses normative as well as 
justified demands, and boils the question down to the reciprocal level of intersubjectivity 
where “all parties may rest content” insofar as “the demands for respect, social esteem and 
so on are being adequately met.”328 Laitinen’s allusion to the living human experience – 
figured in the struggle for recognition – is quickly by-passed: “Of course, things are messy in 
practice.”329 Laitinen argues, however, that “conceptually speaking the issue seems clear.”330 
Even at the risk of contesting Laitinen’s satisfaction with his own conceptual analysis, I 
cannot agree with him on the clarity of his own exposition. 
In terms of Laitinen’s own analysis of Course of Recognition, the conceptual 
clarity seems not to hold. What else could be said of his final “recap”; that there are “areas 
where public recognition could be detrimental (such as private life)”?331 Laitinen bypasses 
not only by the notion of recognition, but also the Marcelian-Arendtian notion of life 
Ricoeur supports. Laitinen’s surprising notion of “areas of life that should be protected from 
public recognition”332 – explained as privacy and perhaps intended as a “practical” 
supplement to his analysis – indicates that Laitinen is ultimately not clear of Ricoeur’s 
meaning of recognized life. Unlike Ricoeur, Laitinen sets aside the much deeper 
philosophical notion of human life as “with-being” and “being-among,” co-esse and inter-
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esse.333 For Ricoeur, human life takes form only “in one’s lineage,” in a living tradition, or in a 
hereditary connection with other persons that is both diachronic and synchronic. According 
to Ricoeur, self-recognition is also anchored to the fact that “we find ourselves already 
situated in an order of meaning.”334 Following Ricoeur, I argue, therefore, that it is this with-
being in an order of meaning where “being recognized” takes place, and where the state of 
peace is hoped to prevail. 
 
The Pure Vision 
After having pointed out the dangers of reading Ricoeur simply from an analytic or lexicalist 
point of view, I will now turn to consider an interpretation that acknowledges Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutic standpoint. Let me begin, however, with a quick clarification by mentioning 
that Course of Recognition extends and somewhat reconsiders the outcome of an earlier gift-
analysis in Ricoeur’s Memory, History, Forgetting.335 In spite of the apparent thematic continuity, 
Ricoeur emphasizes in the later work – in the wake of Marcel Mauss, Claude Lévi-Strauss, 
and especially Marcel Hénaff – that gift-exchange implies mutuality between individuals, that 
there is a pledge of personal commitment (l’engagement) involved in this gesture.336 Ricoeur 
therefore distinguishes mutuality from structure-oriented reciprocity, that is, mutuality differs 
from merely pointing out the relation between social agents. As Ricoeur asserts, implicitly 
criticizing Axel Honneth, he places reciprocity “above social agents and their transactions”337 
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and understands it as cultural life reduced to its structures, whereas mutuality concerns 
persons and their experienced interconnectedness in life that is cultural.  
The conceptual distinction that Ricoeur makes between mutuality and 
reciprocity is not “pure” in terms of practical life, however. This tensional shadiness between 
the two will become an issue for Gonçalo Marcelo. In his essay “Paul Ricoeur and the 
Utopia of Mutual Recognition,” Marcelo argues that the notion of agapeic generosity is the 
culmination point of Ricoeur’s work on mutual recognition. The “unilateral character of the 
generosity peculiar to αγά3η”338 poses, however, a question Marcelo’s text examines: this kind 
of mutuality does not seem achievable for human beings. The notion of αγά3η, Marcelo 
argues, suggests a utopia precisely because “it knows nothing of comparison and 
calculation,”339 as Ricoeur maintains. More precisely, Marcelo suggests that Ricoeur proposes 
a utopia of “pure ethics,”340 or that Ricoeur’s recognition theory is “a sort of ethical 
utopia.”341 Mutuality, Marcelo argues, rests on generosity which implies an ethical utopia that 
can only be hoped for. 
It is this idea of “pure” mutuality as a utopia that I will contest in Marcelo’s 
reading of Ricoeur’s work. First, the idea of “pure ethics” is already countered in Marcelo’s 
own text by the idea of graduality. In the concluding section of his essay Marcelo asserts that 
Ricoeur’s “utopia is anchored in the hope that step by step, individuals will start acting more 
ethically.”342 Marcelo’s claim means either that 1) the state of pure ethics is achievable by the 
growth of ethical understanding, but since the pure state only lies ahead of us, we must 
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consider it as a utopia, or that 2) it can only be hoped for, indefinitely, that such a state of 
pure ethics would one day prevail and it should, therefore, be called as a utopia. In terms of 
agapeic generosity, this duality converts to the question: do we have the possibility of 
experiencing this kind of generosity, or do we only hope that such a generosity would be 
possible? It is not immediately clear what the nature of Marcelo’s ethical utopia is. 
Explicating his reading, Marcelo argues that Ricoeur’s notion of “clearings” – 
which Ricoeur defines as intellectual glades “where the meaning of action emerges from the 
fog of doubt”343 – explains the corresponding idea of ethical utopia. Marcelo claims that 
these “clearings” indicate a “horizon of reconciliation.”344 Whereas the struggle for 
recognition leads to a capitalism-like ideological stranglehold, to a “kind of ‘bad infinity’” of 
requiring and bargaining of recognition,345 this proposed utopia of reconciled mutuality 
would, according to Marcelo, be “built upon a noncommercial good: recognition.”346 
Marcelo’s pure ethical utopia is about recognition in a sense that knows no rivalry or no 
notion of commercial value; it would be “clear” and pure of such defects. Although 
repeating the idea of the difference between mutuality and reciprocity, this outcome still 
leaves the meaning of the term utopia in the fog – if not of doubt, then of unclarity. 
There is one possible explanation to Marcelo’s claims, however. The term 
utopia, in the sense Marcelo uses it, is drawn from Ricoeur’s 1986 texts Lectures on Ideology and 
Utopia and From Text to Action.347 Marcelo restates Ricoeur’s conviction that “utopia is 
productive imagination at work,” and argues that Ricoeur’s take on recognition proposes 
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one, because Course of Recognition “gives new meaning to the concept of recognition [and] also 
because it projects a possible alternative social order.”348 In other words, Marcelo suggests 
that productive imagination is at work in Ricoeur’s 2004 work as it refigures the social 
imaginary.349 Clarifying his explication of social imagination, Marcelo also claims that in 
Course of Recognition Ricoeur’s aim “is to enlarge the spheres of mutual recognition”350 – 
supposedly in connection with projecting the social order anew in ever wider horizons. 
According to Marcelo, these spheres of mutuality are the “horizontal, mutual experiences of 
gift-giving and symbolic gestures.”351 In sum, the utopia of recognition that Marcelo 
proposes establishes a new socio-ethical configuration in gift-exchange and gestures. 
 I will later return to Marcelo’s emphasis on the social gestures, so let me now 
discuss his conception of the utopian element in Ricoeur’s discussion of recognition. Even 
though the utopia Marcelo suggests could be understood as this new social configuration 
that breaks into reality, or clears it up, the notion of “pure ethics” is still discorcerting. In 
terms of ceremonial gift exchange that Ricoeur uses as his heuristic example, for instance, 
Ricoeur differentiates the first gift from the “second gift” that is given in return. Marcelo, 
however, reads Ricoeur as suggesting that in this festive-ceremonial exchange of gifts “every 
gift being as if it were a first gift – that is, a moral gift – is what grants symbolic, ceremonial 
gift-giving the nature of a transcultural symbol.”352 Guided by the notion of αγά3η, and 
Boltanski’s analysis of the utopia of “perfectly coordinated state of peace,” Marcelo goes 
even deeper in his analysis of this festive gift-giving. He claims that in his “depiction of a 
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state of αγά3η” Ricoeur requires that “the dialectic of love and justice can be mediated by the 
symbolic gift-exchange.”353 The social utopia is possible, Marcelo states, since gift-exchange 
also pertains to festive recognition and αγά3η.  
Now, based on the idea of recognition as a noncommercial good, Marcelo 
concludes that Ricoeur’s “utopia of mutual recognition,” or the festive experience of 
exchange, is also “a utopia of the redistribution of recognition.”354 In his argument Marcelo 
then comes close to stressing the festive-ceremonial gift-giving as “pure,” that is, as if it 
would outshine that of a commercial exchange, or a kind of reciprocity without mutuality. In 
his own text, however, Ricoeur is more complex as he merely wishes to “sort out good 
reciprocity from bad” for the sake of his own argument, and uses the idea of gift only as an 
example.355 The fact that these two must be analyzed at different levels – as Marcelo also 
does356 – does not mean that in the final analysis there is no obligation “to give back” in the 
so-called festive approach.357 Put differently, Marcelo’s emphasis leads one to approach the 
issue of recognition from a dichotomical rather than a dialectical point of view. Ricoeur, 
even though making a distinction between mutuality and reciprocity, does not ultimately cut 
them off from one another. 
Let me continue this critical reading, that tries to make a very refined point in 
terms of Marcelo’s interpretation of Ricoeur, by affirming that in spite of its ultimately 
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“unpure” nature in practice, aγά3η does, however, have a role in Ricoeur’s later form of 
mutual recognition in gift-exchange. Ricoeur asserts that “gratitude [reconnaissance] lightens the 
weight of obligation to give in return and reorients this toward a generosity equal to the one 
that led to the first gift.”358 With the possibility of indefinitely postponing the expectation of 
a gift in return, “something of the ‘giving without return’ of αγά3η can be retained in the 
practice of a gift in return.”359 This does not imply, nevertheless, that the second gift, given 
out of justice, is ethically equal to the first given out of αγά3η. Ricoeur does not claim that the 
obligation to give in return is completely abolished. Αγά3η, even if “lightening” the 
obligation, can only reorient the sharers attention to the notion that something has been 
given, although in return.  
Moreover, taken to the plane of recognition, there is no “peaceful recognition” 
or “pure” ethicality apart from the struggle. Ricoeur maintains from the outset that there is 
no pure mutuality, but that recognition always remains tensional. “The experiences of 
peaceful recognition cannot take the place of a resolution for the perplexities raised by the 
very concept of a struggle, still less of a resolution of the conflicts in question,” he stresses.360 
The struggle is inevitable, as are the “orders of recognition,”361 but this does not render the 
peaceful experiences impossible. Ricoeur argues, in fact, that these experiences offer “a 
confirmation that the moral motivation for struggles for recognition is not illusory.”362 In 
brief, the experiential certainty affirms mutual ethicality in the structures of reciprocity. Even 
though these “sunny breaks” (l’éclaircies) of the peaceful moments of recognition are 
experientially genuine, Ricoeur nevertheless explicitly warns us not to forget “the original 
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asymmetry in the relation between the self and others, which even the experience of peaceful 
states does not manage to abolish.”363 We face, therefore, the question of whether the 
confirmed moral motivation is enough for Marcelo to maintain that Ricoeur’s notion of 
mutual recognition is a realizable utopia of “pure ethics.” 
Ricoeur himself verbalizes his doubt that the question could be easily settled 
by admitting that “we must not expect from this investigation of recognition through the gift 
more than a suspension of the dispute.”364 The gift is only a model at the level of social 
practices. It is an example, which illustrates that recognition is not only about a struggle or 
structures, even though they both remain integral parts of it. “The experience of a gift,” 
therefore, “is inseparable from its burden of potential conflicts, tied to the creative tension 
between generosity and obligation.”365 By alluding to conflicts and tension, Ricoeur indicates 
that a paradox lies at the heart of his example. Gift-exchange in itself is not pure in 
generosity, but potentially leads to stressing the moral obligation. Taken again to the level of 
recognition, the example then reveals that pure mutuality is not experienced either. “The 
struggle for recognition,” Ricoeur admits, “perhaps remains endless.”366 The resulting 
“aporia of gift,” however, does not render Ricoeur’s gift-analysis meaningless.  
Even though having pressed the notion of utopia, it seems that eventually 
Marcelo himself admits that the utopian element does not by itself amount to the claim that 
such a “pure ethics” would be central to Ricoeur’s work. Marcelo tries to shift the burden of 
indecisiveness back on Ricoeur. “Ricoeur is prudent enough,” Marcelo comments, “not to 
state that this horizon of reconciliation shall be definitive. He only speaks about the 
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‘clearings’ of recognition.”367 Marcelo now conceives the “‘clearings’ in the forest of 
perplexities”368 as “provisional states of conciliation amidst the conflict.”369 While getting 
close to the notion of the struggle again, Marcelo fleshes out his earlier remark that “any 
volitional act of recognition has a process of reciprocal recognition as a sine qua non.”370 In 
the end, mutuality and reciprocity seem to be two sides of the same coin, the one inseparable 
from the other.371 
 Based on Marcelo’s admission that Ricoeur does not argue for a pure 
generosity, or “pure ethics,” but rather for rare glimpses of it, Marcelo’s “hopeful utopia” is 
therefore a bit less hopeful than he might have wanted it. The same could be said of 
Marcelo’s elaboration on the idea of dissymmetry between human beings. In his conclusions 
in Course of Recognition Ricoeur admittedly reaffirms something like “the gap between people” 
that Marcelo points out.372 Ricoeur argues that alterity, “the original asymmetry between the 
self and the other,” confines people to reciprocity.373 This notion of the alterity of others – 
affirmed both by Husserl and Lévinas374 – leads us to reiterate the idea of mutuality. Where 
Marcelo sees altruism, Ricoeur sees in the expression “before others” (meaning that the 
others stand over and against a subject) an anticipation of mutuality.375 Only by suppressing 
or damping – as if “forgetting” – this dissymmetry can a possibility open up for “a just 
distance,” in which one is, nevertheless, still not the other. Applying George H. Taylor’s 
summation of “metaphoric relationship,” the dissymmetry can be set aside in the mode of 
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“as if,” but it cannot be annulled.376 Ricoeur states that “we exchange gifts but not places.”377 
Even in the act of receiving and in the gratitude it gives rise to, a “twofold alterity is 
preserved.”378 This discussion of alterity is where, perhaps with an aim to strengthen his 
interpretation of the hopeful configuration of social order, Marcelo takes an unfortunate 
sidestep.  
For his own part, Marcelo opens the final section of his essay – on “hopeful 
utopia” – by completely inverting the notion of passive recognition and, consequently, 
downplaying the idea of unsurpassable alterity. Instead of “being recognized,” Marcelo now 
proposes an aggressively active and altruist standpoint: “I must recognize the other first.”379 
In brief, Marcelo reads Ricoeur as arguing that “before demanding recognition, we should 
happily grant it.”380 This reiterated conception of “pure mutuality” – that cancels out the idea 
of a utopia because of “a new figure in Ricoeur’s anthropology: that of the altruistic 
subject”381 – is highlighted best by Marcelo’s provocative claim: “Want recognition? So 
recognize. […] Instead of striving for the recognition of my identity, what I should do is 
simply recognize others.”382 In contrast to Marcelo’s accentuation that is on the way of 
nullifying the “original asymmetry” by indicating that granting recognition can be pure and 
free from the struggles of reciprocity, however, in his triad “give, receive, give in return” 
Ricoeur places “a special emphasis” on the second term, and not the first.  
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To use Jean-Luc Marion’s terminology of gift-phenomenon, “givenness,” or 
Gegebenheit,383 is the condition for receiving, and it is the correlating passive receiving, or 
being recognized, that in Ricoeur’s concept of recognition comes before active giving, that 
is, recognizing the other. Put differently, by stressing the importance of the “second term,” 
or receiving, Ricoeur maintains that, because of the human reality that is “always already 
fallen,”384 we are always in the mode of “give in return.” As Jacques Derrida also clarifies, 
“when phenomenologists in the broad sense say Gegebenheit, something is given, they refer 
simply to the passivity of intuition [and signification]; something is there.”385 Conceptually, 
identification as active identifying remains for Ricoeur as “the hard core of the idea of 
recognition,”386 but this presumes the condition of givenness, or “the given” that is to be 
identified. This is the reason for Ricoeur’s “reversal” from active to passive recognition.387 
Ricoeur is very insistent on this: “Receiving then becomes the pivotal category,” he stresses, 
“everything depends on the middle term of [this] threefold structure.”388 In brief – for those 
“who hath ears to hear” – no receiving results in no giving (in return). Even though I admit 
that Marcelo refers to Ricoeur’s notion of receiving, he does not maintain that being-
recognized, or receiving that correlates with givenness, holds the first place.389 The “pure 
ethics” of always giving the first gift, or “simply recognizing others,” is not realizable, 
however, since there is always something that has been received to begin with. 
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 Ricoeur’s conviction that the mode of receiving is the most important one 
leads us to the final remarks in terms of this brief commentary of Marcelo’s interpretation. 
Ricoeur maintains, in line with the ideas of dissymmetry and of being recognized, that 
“being-recognized, should it occur [full in the human world], would for everyone be to 
receive the full assurance of his or her identity, thanks to the [direct] recognition by others of 
each person’s range of capacities.”390 Let me briefly explain only three of the many points 
that can be made in relation to this claim that seems to relativize Ricoeur’s – and my – 
emphasis on receiving.  
First, Ricoeur maintains that one can never give or receive the “full” 
recognition as a homme capable. The “sense of mutual recognition” that Ricoeur mentions in 
his conclusions is only a “complement” he believes he had to “add to the idea of a struggle 
for recognition.”391 Furthermore, even though the moment of receiving is the pivotal one, it 
is still the case that pure recognition – also in its passive sense of being recognized – is 
beyond the human capabilities because of the original asymmetry, or our “fallenness.” 
Ricoeur maintains, however, that even in the case that such recognition would occur, it is 
first “for everyone to receive the full assurance of his or her identity” through being 
recognized by the others.392 I cannot “give” without first gaining a notion, even an imperfect 
one, of being a person who then gives (in return). The idea that emphasizes “pure ethics” by 
maintaining that “I should simply recognize others” is, therefore, doubly dismissive in terms 
of this limitation. 
Second, we are called to examine the same issue from the viewpoint of l’homme 
capable. Ricoeur’s notion of personal capacities points to a capable subject – a subject 
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perhaps even capable of self-recognition. In that case recognition by others would not be 
necessary at all. For Ricoeur, however, even the primal self-assertion rests on the anticipation 
of mutuality, that is, it implies the notion of an “other.” In brief, “self-assertion does not 
signify solipsism.”393 Not only reflective self-assertion must be distinguished from all the 
attempts to ground a solitary subject, but “each modality of the ‘I can’” implies an 
“alterity.”394 Reduced to the theoretical level of the “I,” the notion of being a person with 
capabilities is still formed, at least, in the anticipation of mutuality, that is, under the mode of 
“being recognized.” 
Third, it is in this mode of “between” the same and the other, or becoming a 
self in the presence of others, that the ethical thought presents itself; this sphere is what 
Marcelo attempts to examine in his essay. Using Ricoeur’s example of a capable subject, “to 
speak – in effect, to say something – presupposes an expectation of being heard.”395 Such 
intelligible human actions presuppose the breaking off from the Cartesian solipsism, or from 
one’s fourneau, that is, they presuppose a relationship that actualizes an ethical quality of 
sharing amid all asymmetry. This implied theme of recognition as the dynamics of 
anticipation and reception in the intertwining of mutuality and reciprocity – that sets 
Marcelo’s model of “pure” activity in contrast to Ricoeur’s “mixed” model of receiving – 
leads us to the third interpretation of Course of Recognition. 
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The Anthropological Journey 
In contrast to the two previous readings of Course of Recognition, Jean-Luc Amalric’s analysis is 
more well-balanced as it takes a bird’s-eye view of the whole course of Ricoeur’s thought: 
the methodological, the problematical, and the conceptual. As a matter of fact, I generally 
agree with Amalric’s exposition of Ricoeur. I have, therefore, placed Amalric’s reading of 
Ricoeur after that of Marcelo, as it – in its emphasis on reflection – strengthens the idea that 
receiving is the pivotal moment for Ricoeur in terms of recognition. There is one major 
deficiency in Amalric’s analysis, however: instead of bringing in the notion of culturally 
mediated recognition – or culturally facilitated reflection – Amalric deliberately places Course 
of Recognition on the path of Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology, more precisely as its “third 
phase.” In spite of this precise viewpoint that proves to be a limitation, let us focus on 
Amalric’s contribution on reading Ricoeur’s work. 
Making a claim similar to that of Jean Greisch in his seminal review of 
Ricoeur’s 2004 work, Amalric relates the first of the three anthropological phases to 
Ricoeur’s very early works and especially to L’homme faillible (1960),396 whereas the second 
phase connects to Soi-même comme un autre (1990).397 Although the “third phase” of Course of 
Recognition, Amalric argues, is in direct continuity with the earlier ones, it is distinguished 
from them by exploring the rule-governed polysemy of the word recognition.398 In other 
words, although the theme of recognition is not totally absent in Ricoeur’s earlier 
philosophical anthropology, it is explored especially in this third “phase.” The idea of 
recognition-attestation, however, binds Course of Recognition more closely to Oneself as Another 
than to the even earlier works. In contrast to the earlier anthropology of “fallible man” 
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(l’homme faillible), Amalric notes, this later anthropology – which, again, consists of “phases” 
two and three – focuses on the “capable man” (l’homme capable) through “different modalities 
of the experience of ‘I can’.”399 To reiterate, Amalric maintains that in contrast to the earlier 
anthropology of fallible human being, Ricoeur’s later philosophical anthropology concerns 
the capable human being.  
Despite the shift from fallibility to capability, Amalric argues for a fundamental 
continuity within Ricoeur’s anthropological project. Amalric’s main thesis is that Ricoeur was 
influenced by Jean Nabert’s reflexive philosophy, which shows itself in Ricoeur’s work, not 
only in concepts such as original affirmation, attestation, and recognition,400 but also in its 
main task as a “reflective reappropriation of our efforts to exist.”401 Amalric maintains that 
this Nabertian influence is set to work in the key ideas of Ricoeur’s anthropology, that is, in 
the movement from the “shattered ego” to the reflective “fragile mediation” of the self by 
productive imagination. The self is attained and even constituted poetico-practically in 
Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology. 
In order to understand this claim, and all that Amalric draws out of it, let us 
briefly summarize the course of his thought. I focus first on the shattered ego, cogito brisé. 
Drawing on Ricoeur’s works from The Voluntary and the Involuntary to The Symbolism of Evil, 
Amalric correctly summarizes Ricoeur’s conviction of the human position as internally torn: 
“our experience is internally shattered, because the cogito is always in the holds of an irreducible 
alterity such as that of my body (corps propre), of desire, and of life.”402 The immediately given 
Cartesian cogito is inconceivable as the cogito is in a state of primordial conflict. The “living 
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tension” between the infinitude of discourse and the finitude of perspective, the human 
disproportion as non-coincidence of self to self, makes a human being “a fragile mediation,” 
and thus also a task for himself.403  
The task of retrieving the cogito calls for reflection, but this reflection, in turn, is 
based on an originating affirmation, the “vehemence of Yes” as the early Ricoeur calls it.404 
Although the originating affirmation is only the beginning of dialectics – in which the other 
pole is “existential difference,” and their fragile synthesis is “human mediation”405 – Amalric 
argues quite convincingly that Ricoeur places this Nabertian notion of affirmation at the 
heart of his earlier anthropology.406 “Originating affirmation,” Amalric summarizes, “is this 
power of affirmation which dynamizes our knowing, our acting, and our inner sense of 
infinity.”407 It is never directly accessible, and never submits to intellectual insight. 
Nevertheless, it furnishes for a human being “the horizon of the possible unification of his 
experience.”408 This unification, put differently, is not given but achieved only in a conflict 
requiring reflection.  
Amalric’s three remarks on Ricoeur’s early anthropology of fallible human 
being focus, therefore, on the reflective “fragile mediation.” First, whether we speak of a 
human being at the theoretical, the practical, or at the affective level, he is “a being whose 
whole existence consists in mediation.” A human self is not a substance or a pre-given ego, 
but a tensional “relational self” that is rooted both in βίος (bios, life) and λόγος (logos, 
discourse).409 Second, the halfway point between desire and intellect is productive 
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imagination, which dynamizes all the mediating processes between these two by prompting 
spontaneous primal reflection of the self. A mythico-poetic nucleus therefore resides at the 
heart of human subjectivity.410 Third, imagination is a capability but also a “false” 
imagination, because the possibility of both fault and illusion is indistinguishable from it. A 
human self is indeed a fragile mediation. Le cogito est brisé, Amalric correctly concludes his 
Ricoeur summation411 – the self is nothing but torn and shattered.412  
 Amalric maintains that in contrast to this earlier anthropology, the later 
anthropology of the capable human being is placed between shattered cogito and self-
posited ego – or even “beyond the alternative of the cogito and of the anticogito” as Ricoeur 
himself asserts.413 Amalric points out that despite maintaining the idea of discordant 
concordancy, Ricoeur later examines the conditions of the possibility of human identity.414 
According to Amalric, this later anthropology represents a new phase of Ricoeur’s 
philosophical reflection, which is “precisely a constructive phase of the regrouping 
(remembrement) of the philosophy of self.”415 This new phase – based first on attestation and 
secondly on recognition – does not, however, disconnect from the earlier anthropology, 
thanks to the one and same reflective mode of philosophizing in all three stages.416 
Additionally, Amalric suggests that attestation and recognition are two successive ways of 
articulating further the philosophy of imagination, which now aims at “an idea of poetico-
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practical constitution of self in the ontological horizon of acting and capability,” as Amalric 
argues.417 
In brief, Amalric’s argument is that the later approach cannot be understood 
without the earlier one, which explains how Ricoeur arrives at the question of ipseity, the 
narrative identity of self, and further to the question of the indirect constitution of the self in 
memories.418 This assertion leads Amalric to reconsider the notions of originating 
affirmation, epistemic-ontological attestation, and recognition. There is no need for us to 
repeat his analysis, which finds both a thematic continuity and conceptual-theoretic 
disruptions. Essentially, Amalric maintains that the dimension of intersubjective relations – 
which in reference to Levinas also opens the ethical side of the question – fills in a deficiency 
in Ricoeur’s earlier anthropology, and that the notion of originating affirmation connects 
Ricoeur’s different elaborations of his hermeneutics of the self to Nabert’s reflexive 
philosophy.419  
The enriching aspect of thought that Amalric draws, like many of Ricoeur’s 
critics, from Course of Recognition is that the work strives to get beyond reciprocity to include 
the peaceful experiences of mutuality. Mutual recognition, being “a condition of the 
possibility of the recognition-attestation of self,” relativizes reciprocal intersubjectivity, 
which in turn cannot anymore be understood as an absolute constitution but one still 
necessary in terms of authentic human experience.420 Based on this mutual-reciprocal duality 
of human experience, Amalric proposes that Ricoeur’s idea of “communicating personal 
testimonies capable of carrying the attestation of self” amount to thinking of mutual 
                                               
417 Amalric 2011, 19, 25. Cf. Amalric 2012, 116-118. 
418 Amalric 2011, 21, 23-25. 
419 Amalric 2011, 23, 25. 
420 Amalric 2011, 27. 
109 
recognition as “mutual testimony.”421 According to Ricoeur’s Memory, History, Forgetting, 
testimony presupposes both the self-designation of the testifying subject (“j’y étais”), and a 
dialogical structure which is enabled by the dimension of trust. The process of accreditation 
– which Amalric clearly reads as a process of being recognized – settles the struggle between 
confidence and suspicion.422 As we have pointed out in our previous analysis, Amalric infers 
that Ricoeur, therefore, searches for a “tensional balance” of recognition.423 
 To bring this brief summation of Amalric’s reading to a close, let me reaffirm 
that I agree much of what he draws out from Ricoeur’s works in terms of their continuation 
in the reflexive tradition and of the resulting conception of the internal tension and 
shatteredness of the human self. The “Ricoeurian self” is a relational self, Amalric concludes, 
but the relation between the self and its other is dissymmetric. The goal of Ricoeur’s 
philosophy of “being-in-the-world and of the ‘passive synthesis’,” as Amalric describes it, 
was to “reveal the prepredicative foundation of the poetico-practical constitution of the 
self.”424 De-centralization of subjectivity, in other words, does not result in fully eclipsing the 
initial locus of the self which, according to Amalric, is in Ricoeur’s philosophy rooted in 
recognition-attestation and originating affirmation. To re-emphasize, “we exchange gifts but 
not places” as Ricoeur explains the self’s relation to the other self; the self remains in its own 
place without becoming to an other.425 Amalric maintains that even if Ricoeur’s philosophy 
moves conceptually to attestation and furthermore to recognition, the Nabertian notion of 
originating affirmation remains at the heart of Ricoeur’s anthropology. Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics of mutual recognition, therefore, gives, according to Amalric, an access to the 
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fundamental meaning of human moral experience as returning to this notion of original 
“Yes!” or affirmation in concrete reflection.426 As such Ricoeur’s reflexive anthropology 
enriches the notion of the poetico-practical constitution of the self that necessitates, 
nevertheless, a hermeneutic of culture, of which Amalric remains silent.  
As I have already pointed out, this cultural hermeneutic silence is the 
unfortunate shortcoming of Amalric’s otherwise concise explication of Ricoeur’s position. It 
is now our task to graft out such a hermeneutic, in contrast to the scholarly horizon of 
expectation set forth by these three conflicting interpretations. Following discussion will take 
us back to the notion of cultural-symbolic expressivity discussed in the beginning of this 
chapter. 
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6. A HERMENEUTIC OF SYMBOLIC RECOGNITION 
I have sketched above three different approaches to Ricoeur’s last major work, all of which 
in their own way inform us about the contents and the reception of Course of Recognition. Our 
critical reading reveals, however, that the three accounts on Ricoeur’s work are also limited 
perceptions of it. The analytic attempt seems quite foreign to Ricoeur’s overall approach, the 
vision of pure recognition pushes too far to the side of gratitude and generosity actively 
understood, and the one focused on Nabertian reflexive tradition takes the question of 
recognition as a complementary part of Ricoeur’s anthropological project and only as such. 
In spite of the fact that all these accounts stress recognition between individuals, a conflict of 
interpretations indeed prevails. After having taken this indirect route to the core of Course of 
Recognition, a clarification is necessary to explain the complementing angle from which I will 
read it. This reading will not deny the process of recognition as between human selves, but 
functions as a corrective by emphasizing recognition as facilitated by the cultural. 
 As I will demonstrate in parts three and four of this dissertation, Ricoeur 
discusses recognition in many of his texts that precede his 2004 work Course of Recognition. 
Ricoeur’s preface to L'esprit de société: vers une anthropologie sociale du sens (1993) is one of them; 
in it Ricoeur maintains that since “interaction effectively supposes a mutual relation,”427 the 
act of speaking implies “a circle of recognition,” un circuit de reconnaissance.428 Ricoeur’s 
anthology Le Juste 2, published in 2001, continues this thematics of recognition.429 It includes 
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a brief “meditation” that I adopt as a guide for reading the work that specifically focuses on 
recognition, published only a few years later.  
While focusing his attention on the fragility of human autonomity, Ricoeur 
also examines in Le Juste 2 – in line with his “older work on the symbolic function and the 
more recent work on the social imagination as expressed in the ideas of ideology and utopia” 
– symbols as signs of recognition.430 The symbolic order (l’ordre symbolique), Ricoeur argues, 
figures obligation, and these poetic images function “as signs of recognition (comme des signes de 
reconnaissance) among the members of a community.”431 The question of recognition, in other 
words, is a question of “situating oneself in relation to a symbolic order” that bases the 
shared socio-politico-moral realm of practical action as Ricoeur also maintains in the same 
work.432 As I will maintain, recognition and the cultural are so profoundly intertwined that 
discussing recognition between individuals is simply not feasible without taking this 
communal aspect into account. 
The theme of recognition, in other words, is connected with that of 
symbolization, which establishes the vertical dimension of authority replayed in ethico-
political institution: “We might in this regard take up again the Hegelian concept of 
recognition to speak of this communalization of moral experience,” Ricoeur suggests. “To 
be capable of entering into a symbolic order is to be capable of entering into an order of 
recognition, of inscribing oneself in a ‘we’ that distributes and apportions the authority of 
the symbolic order.”433 This dual theme of symbols as tokens of Anerkennung in and through 
Sittlichkeit will be the guiding thread of the rest of this part two. I will first examine the idea 
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of symbolic recognition, and move then into examining Ricoeur’s relation to Hegel and his 
dialectical conception of recognition. These two steps will, finally, get us to the proper realm 
of cultural hermeneutics after “letting it appear” in its own right. 
 
6.1 The Idea of Symbolic Recognition 
Based on the preceding critical analyses of Ricoeur interpretations, the general structure and 
contents of Ricoeur’s argument in Course of Recognition is already clear. Ricoeur himself helps 
us to recall – by describing “in broad strokes how the dynamic I could begin to call a ‘course’ 
of recognition becomes apparent”434 – that there is a steady path from recognition as 
identification to ethico-political mutual recognition: 
I mean the passage from recognition-identification, where the thinking subject 
claims to master meaning, to mutual recognition, where the subject places 
him- or herself under the tutelage of a relationship of reciprocity, in passing 
through self-recognition in the variety of capacities that modulate one’s ability 
to act, one’s “agency.”435 
 
The most apparent “course” of recognition concerns the multiphase progress from the state 
of confusion to that of mutual recognition. Furthermore, Ricoeur affirms that this threefold 
index of identity, self-recognition, and mutual recognition – drawn from French lexicons in 
the beginning of Course of Recognition – has been taken as a guide in organizing the work. 
Based on these three ideas of recognition, Ricoeur derives three corresponding lines of 
inquiry. It is in the “interweaving” of these phases that a certain interconnectedness is found, 
which in turn leads Ricoeur and his readers to notice a course or a path of recognition. The 
outcome, however, is nothing but a dialectical progress: “I put in first place the progression 
of the theme of identity, then passing beyond it, that of otherness (alterité), and finally, in a 
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more hidden background, that of the dialectics between recognition and misrecognition.”436 
The course of recognition finds its limits when set in contrast to failing to fully recognize 
correctly. 
Drawing on the discussion above, it should be clear that Ricoeur does not 
merely enumerate the different aspects of recognition and explain their formal structure, but 
aims to hermeneutically understand how these aspects complement each other. It is the 
hermeneutics of recognition that is at stake and not a mere formal clarification of 
recognition. Furthermore, as Ricoeur insisted that in the triad “give, receive, give in return” 
the emphasis is on the second term, it is not primarily the active sense, to recognize, but the 
passive sense of recognition that is the most important: being recognized. Otherness might not 
be totally overcome in this dialectics of recognition, but the hermeneutic approach reveals 
that in the mode of “being recognized” I am reconciled with this otherness in such a manner 
that – despite the primal dissymmetry between me and the other – I can pay tribute to the 
“sunny breaks” (l’éclaircies) of mutuality. 
The question of how a living, capable human being becomes recognized 
persists, however. I am convinced that this is the leading question of Course of Recognition, as it 
grounds Ricoeur’s discussion of “recognizing oneself in one’s lineage,” understood as 
approbation, the first model of recognition.437 Moreover, Ricoeur begins this discussion 
explicitly from the point of view of être-avec, or “being-with” others.438 As I have argued 
earlier in this text, “being recognized” takes place only as with-being (co-esse) in an order of 
meaning. Culture, for this reason, functions as the platform of loving “recognition of others” 
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(Anerkennung des Anderen) in the mode of gift as Margit Eckholt summarizes.439 As I have 
noted, Ricoeur is quick to point out that the model of gift-exchange indicates concrete and 
manifold hereditary connection with others – mutuality that precedes us as individuals. Being 
recognized depends on this cultural mutuality that is still not without tensions. 
One of these tensions concers “recognizing oneself in one’s lineage,” that is, 
being an individual in a tradition. The pledge of personal commitment (l’engagement), 
however, is involved in recognition since, once again, the discussion is about living 
subjects.440 The notion of committing oneself as a person – or rather, being bound to 
commit oneself – pries open the idea of being-with in a living tradition, in a hereditary 
connection with other persons. This engagement, therefore, already calls for human values 
and ethical being-here. Following Ricoeur, I maintain, therefore, that the middle term of 
“receiving” is the most important one, it is truly “the pivotal category” as Ricoeur defines 
it.441 This position will be modified later on by bringing in the element of critical 
reappropriation, but for the time being, let us focus on this notion of received heritage that 
facilitates recognition. 
Here, then, a crucial extension presents itself for us. I will show that Ricoeur 
understands the symbolic gift-exchange to take place in recognition at two different levels: 
social and linguistic. This distinction has not been well noted in the reception of Ricoeur’s 
work. Gonçalo Marcelo, for example, seems to be following Marcel Hénaff’s social 
understanding of symbolic gift-exchange: it indicates the relation between those exchanging 
the gifts in a social setting.442 It appears that the figure of social exchange is so compelling 
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that it also captures Marcelo’s attention. Despite mentioning that for Ricoeur “recognition is 
of the order of the symbolic gesture,”443 and acknowledging that he is “always talking about 
symbolic gift-giving and not necessarily the exchange of actual goods or commodities,”444 
Marcelo conceives the “Ricoeurian recognition” as highlighted in the idea of “mutual gift-
giving as a process of symbolic recognition.”445 In spite of his emphasis on “pure ethics” that 
is distinct from any economic approach, Marcelo apparently stresses the socio-phenomenal 
rather than linguistic-symbolic aspect of gift-giving, just as Hénaff and Marcel Mauss did 
before him.446 
Using the words of Jean-Luc Marion – when he also criticizes Mauss while 
responding to Jacques Derrida – “the failure to explain the gift was due to the fact that the 
analysis remained in the horizon of the economy.”447 Marion’s claim that in the final analysis 
“the gift does not coincide with the object of the gift” but rather with its “symbolic 
support,” that is, with the values unrelated with the gift-object, is, perhaps, not fully 
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acceptable as it downplays the “objectival support” of a gift and threatens to turn it into an 
obscure non-phenomenal phenomenon. Marion’s account, nevertheless, points out that the 
gift is not reducible to a mere social phenomenon at the level of exchange.448 Marcelo’s view, 
I argue, needs to be challenged for this same reason.  
Instead of fully considering the implications of the linguistic aspect, Marcelo 
emphasizes that gift-giving is a gesture, that is, a social phenomenon.449 It is true that Ricoeur 
includes the social view as an essential part of his own argument – this is clear already on the 
basis of his previous analysis of gift-exchange in Memory, History, Forgetting.450 The meaning of 
the term “symbolic” in Ricoeur’s sense, however, is far from exhausted by Hénaff’s and 
Marcelo’s accounts that merely reiterate the social setting of ceremonial exchange. Marcelo 
himself, however, points out this Ricoeurian extension to the idea of “symbolic gift” when 
he refers to Jean Greisch’s influential essay on Course of Recognition in the opening lines of his 
own text: “[in] Ricoeur’s initial anthropology, the one whose main works are Freedom and 
Nature [i.e. The Voluntary and the Involuntary] and The Symbolism of Evil, one can already find a 
connection with recognition, because every symbol is always already a symbol of 
recognition.”451 Evidently, Marcelo’s summation of Greisch’s article does not, however, lead 
him to reflect upon the very idea of symbolic expressions as the basis of the act of recognition, 
rather than of social gestures.  
Although many of Ricoeur’s commentators leave it in the shadows, the idea of 
symbols per se has a pivotal role in Course of Recognition. Ricoeur explicitly states that he 
resolves Hénaff’s “enigma of ceremonial reciprocal gift giving” by “resorting to the idea of 
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symbolic mutual recognition.”452 This notion of “resorting” – par recours – unlocks Ricoeur’s 
intentions. To be sure, in the 2004 Kluge Prize acceptance speech, Ricoeur maintains that 
gift-giving offers a model of what happens at the symbolic level of every human society; 
already in his Lectures on Ideology and Utopia Ricoeur had argued that social life necessarily has a 
symbolic structure.453 Course of Recognition is also very clear on this. There is “an actual, albeit 
symbolic, experience of mutual recognition,” which Ricoeur examines philosophically by 
“following the model of the reciprocal ceremonial gift.”454 Furthermore, this ceremonial 
reciprocal gift offers “an actual experience of mutual recognition in a symbolic mode.”455 
This “symbolic character of recognition,” Ricoeur acknowledges, is, however, “unaware of 
itself, insofar as it clothes itself and conveys itself in the exchange.”456 This unwittingness 
necessitates the example of exchanging gifts for a philosophical clarification of the issue. In 
itself, however, the figure of gift-giving is only a heuristic tool to explain those exchanges 
that are symbolic in their nature, and which require openness to the idea of mutual 
recognition. 
 Ricoeur’s notion of symbol will be in our focus in the next section. In the light 
of the cultural hermeneutic task of this dissertation, however, it would be philosophically 
inconvenient not to already emphasize the connection Ricoeur makes in Lectures on Ideology 
and Utopia between a cultural-symbolic structure and social life – this is an important 
moment of “letting appear” this cultural hermeneutic. The connection between symbolic 
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culture and social community, I argue, enables Ricoeur’s later idea of symbolic mutual 
recognition. He insists that social processes are constituted by a necessary cultural system 
that utilizes symbolic communication:   
We have to articulate our social existence in the same way that we have to 
articulate our perceptual existence. Just as models in scientific language allow 
us to see how things look, allow us to see things as this or that, in the same 
way our social templates articulate our social roles, articulate our position in 
society as this or that. And perhaps it is not possible to go behind or below 
this primitive structuration. The very flexibility of our biological existence 
makes necessary another kind of informational system, the cultural system. 
Because we have no genetic system of information for human behavior, we 
need a cultural system. No culture exists without such a system. The 
hypothesis, therefore, is that where human beings exist, a nonsymbolic mode 
of existence, and even less, a nonsymbolic kind of action, can no longer 
obtain. Action is immediately ruled by cultural patterns which provide 
templates or blueprints for the organization of social and psychological 
processes, perhaps just as genetic codes – I am not certain – provide such 
templates for the organization of organic processes.457 
 
In sum, Ricoeur argues both that nonsymbolic existence and action is not human existence 
and action, and that the cultural system, which patterns and guides the symbolically mediated 
being-here, is necessitated by the fact that life itself – and as a result also its social forms – 
would otherwise remain obscure and unorganized. Life and social life gain meaning only if 
structured cultural-symbolically. 
In contrast to the socio-practically accenting interpretations of Course of 
Recognition, I thus propose that gift-giving is not only a symbol of mutual recognition at the 
social level, but that the very “gift-giving” takes place at the cultural-symbolic level. Instead 
of focusing on the gesture or phenomenon of gift-giving, I emphasize that linguistic-
symbolic practices themselves are gift-giving. Although the social aspect is an irreducible 
one, the cultural-linguistic aspect is for Ricoeur more fundamental. In his conversation with 
George H. Taylor, Ricoeur maintained that in contrast to the social and the political, which 
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focus on different aspects of varying institutions, the cultural focuses on language, 
intellectual life, and works produced by these: “the cultural has more to do with the medium 
of language and the creation of ideas.”458 The ritual of gift-exchange, which is used by 
Ricoeur as an example to clarify his argument, only models an intellectual exchange that is 
wholly and utterly symbolic in itself. In other words, the symbolic exchange on which I will 
focus is made “visible” by the ritual, but it is not by any means limited to it. Instead of 
thinking of the gift-exchange example as a social phenomenon, as some commentators do, I 
claim that Ricoeur’s critics should have had the symbolically mediated forms of gift-
exchange, or intellectual transactions, in their focus.  
Ricoeur explicitly states that the central thesis of Course of Recognition concerns 
“the idea of symbolic mutual recognition.”459 He could not be much clearer that the 
symbolic aspect of gift-giving is for him more important than the gestural one: 
The thesis I want to argue for can be summed up as follows: The alternative to 
the idea of struggle in the process of mutual recognition is to be sought in 
peaceful experiences of mutual recognition, based on symbolic mediations as 
exempt from the juridical as from the commercial order of exchange.460 
 
To repeat, the symbolic mediations ground the “sunny breaks” of the experiences of 
mutuality. Analyzing the “paradox of the gift and the gift in return” provides a space to 
notice that αγά3η – overwhelming generosity – transcends the “autonomous circularity” 
attached to reciprocity. “In this way,” Ricoeur explains, “the ground will be clearer for an 
interpretation of the mutuality of the gift founded on the idea of symbolic recognition.”461 The 
“symbolic character of recognition”462 is, therefore, also in our focus, since “the theme of 
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symbolic recognition” is relevant for the search for Ricoeur’s cultural hermeneutics through 
the hermeneutic of recognition.463 Ricoeur indeed emphasizes the cultural-linguistic-symbolic 
rather than the gestural aspect of recognition. As we will see later in this dissertation, 
Ricoeur’s emphasis becomes more understandable taken together with his cultural 
hermeneutics. 
 
6.2 The Gift of Symbolic Language 
Let us now consider the idea of gift from a symbolic point of view. Ricoeur suggests in 
Memory, History, Forgetting that the discussion of gift-exchange is opened by certain dilemmas 
of speech acts as well as by a linguistic comparison between don-pardon, that is, “gift and 
forgiving.”464 I have also brought up, however, Ricoeur’s idea of committing oneself, 
engaging oneself in recognition. These two sets of ideas are not foreign to each other, since 
Ricoeur maintains that the above-mentioned commitment manifests itself first in language 
that is inherently symbolic. When winding his argument down in the concluding section of 
Course of Recognition, as if he was retracing his steps in reverse order, Ricoeur then connects 
the ideas of commitment and our uses of language: “Taken as an act of language,” he argues, 
“the assertion invested in the act of judgment requires the commitment (l’engagement) of the 
speaker just as much as do specific performatory locutions, for which the promise remains a 
key example.”465 Interestingly enough, it is this linguistic commitment which, according to 
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Ricoeur, “includes an expectation of the approbation of others.”466 In other words, 
commitment takes place in language. 
A relating comment that I will have to make concerns Ricoeur’s notion of love 
as discourse. Ricoeur’s claim, in the so-called course of recognition of his 2004 work, 
namely, that “αγά3η speaks,” has not so far been sufficiently highlighted by his critics.467 
Ricoeur argues quite deliberately that αγά3η, the form of love that corresponds to generosity 
and therefore also to mutuality, enters “into language” – it is linguistically manifested.468 This 
makes it, as Ricoeur also maintains in his 1989 lecture “Amour et justice,” first of all “in 
some ways commensurable with talk about justice,” despite the fact that “the discourse of 
αγά3η is above all else one of praise.”469 The linguistic-symbolic manifestations of αγά3η 
escape the notion of a struggle or a search for justice, but they are, nevertheless, comparable 
to the discourse of justice. Both discourses, even if in contrast to each other by their contents, 
are discourses, and therefore to that extent tantamount to each other. “It is again on the 
level of language,” Ricoeur continues in Course of Recognition, “that this discordant dialectic 
[between ethical love and moral-juridical justice] can be apprehended: αγά3η declares itself, 
proclaims itself.”470 Αγά3η articulates itself in language as praise. Ricoeur reintroduces 
therefore the notion of “the poetics of αγά3η” as well.471 Insofar as Ricoeur is concerned, 
there is then indeed a direct path from the theme of symbolic recognition to the discourse on 
αγά3η. 
 In sum, Ricoeur argues that the figure of social gift-giving models gift-giving at 
the linguistic plane. “The festive aspect of the gift, as a gesture,” he explains, “is like the 
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hymn on the verbal plane, or, more generally, all those uses of language I like to place under 
the grammatical patronage of the optative, which is neither a descriptive not a normative 
mode of speech.”472 A hymn, like praise, wishfully points to its signification without 
explaining it. To repeat, gift-giving models what takes place at this verbal level. Another 
clarification, however, is needed to explain the style of this language to which Ricoeur refers. 
In contrast to the scientific, reductive language of explanations, Ricoeur refers to language 
that extends to the “poetic usage of the imperative, close to that of the hymn and the 
benediction.”473 The rich, equivocal uses of language, including “the power of 
metaphorization that attaches to expressions of αγά3η,”474 are therefore the ones in which 
Ricoeur is interested. The idea of generous giving, I emphasize, is most apparent in these 
linguistic forms. The religious discourses model how generosity and the good will of 
mutuality underlie human relations. 
Even though a different manner of approaching the whole issue of “symbolic 
gifts” has already been opened, I will now steadfastly ground this reading to Ricoeur’s early 
work. The idea of giving and equivocal language calls for restating Ricoeur’s idea that should 
already be clear on the basis of part one of this dissertation. At this point, I will re-introduce 
the “wager” of the Symbolism of Evil. The essence of this wager, it was said, is captured with 
the phrase le symbole donne à penser. In short, the symbol gives a “gift” for thought, but also 
gives rise to thinking.475 Here, after Ricoeur’s gift-analyses, the aphorism opens itself to us 
richly: the linguistic symbol gives, the linguistic symbol donates. In The Symbolism of Evil 
Ricoeur claims that the counterpart to this giving is “a creative interpretation of meaning” – 
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that is, the hermeneutics of symbols – “faithful to the impulsion, to the gift of meaning from the 
symbol, and faithful also to the philosopher’s oath to seek understanding.”476 The symbolic 
language itself is gift-giving, thanks to the wager that interpretation opens up, in contrast to 
scientific explaining, the generous gift of meaning mediated by symbolic language.  
In terms of reading Course of Recognition, Arto Laitinen does not in any way 
indicate such an understanding of the notion of “symbolic gift.” Gonçalo Marcelo, even 
though discussing at length “symbolic recognition,” also seems to have left aside this 
meaning of symbolic mediation in Ricoeur. Jean-Luc Amalric at least points in this direction. 
Amalric argues that if Ricoeur’s anthropology is both reflexive and hermeneutic, “it is 
precisely because of the task it assigns to itself, that is, that of a reappropriation of our acts 
of existing, which requires fundamentally an interpretation of those signs, symbols, and 
actions in which this act of existing objectifies itself.”477 Amalric, in other words, 
acknowledges the need for the hermeneutics of symbolic recognition in the Ricoeurian 
rather than Honnethian sense. To be fair, Amalric also mentions Ricoeur’s conviction that 
the self is mythico-poetically constituted.478 None of these three scholars, however, take 
seriously the challenge presented by The Symbolism of Evil about how to understand the 
symbolic nature of recognition. 
The idea of symbolic recognition, in the sense I propose, can only be found in 
Jean Greisch’s seminal analysis of Ricoeur’s last work. Greisch’s first hypothesis in reading 
Course of Recognition – “in the spirit of recognition-exploration”479 – penetrates the heart of the 
matter when stating that the fundamental function of symbol is a function of recognition. 
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“If the ‘symbol gives rise to thought,’” Greisch argues, “it is because it is, by definition, a 
symbol of recognition.”480 Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of symbols seems, therefore, to contain at 
least “the seed of the problem of recognition.”481 Greisch himself, however, turns back to 
the idea of the symbolic effect and the value of the phenomenomenon of gift exchange, 
rather than examining the gift-like recognition in symbols themselves any further.482 This is 
unfortunate, since he clearly holds the key to unlocking the Ricoeurian idea of symbolic 
recognition, but does not expand on it fully.  
 To explain more fully the approach that I have adopted, let me elaborate 
briefly on Ricoeur’s ideas of symbolic recognition in The Symbolism of Evil. First, Ricoeur 
affirms the connection between symbolic language and the consciousness of self. To be sure, 
the “symbols of the self” Ricoeur analyzes are “primary in comparison with the elaborated 
and intellectualized formations of the consciousness of self.”483 Symbols are rudimentary 
explicitations of being conscious. Still, these spoken symbols “reach into reflective 
consciousness,” and in them “one can catch sight of the most fundamental and stable 
symbolisms of humanity.”484 The rudimentary symbolic explanations of being-here do not 
exclude reflection, but rather call for it instead. Second, a symbol gives, it is “donative,” only 
because we are in a certain way committed to it. A symbol, a double-intentional sign, cannot 
be considered only from the outside, but internally existential. It is “the movement of the 
primary meaning which makes us participate in the latent meaning and thus assimilates us to 
that which is symbolized without our being able to master the similitude intellectually.”485 
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The experience of being-here unconceals the symbolic meaning, rather than any rational 
speculation. Third, this existential-expressive archaism is why symbols precede hermeneutics, 
because symbolic language is “essentially bound to its content.”486 Put differently, symbols 
truly express what they refer to, because they do not merely refer but participate in that 
reality. As stated already above, however, symbols inevitably lead us to their interpretation 
which opens up the depth of symbolic meanings. These three characterizations from 
Ricoeur’s “criteriology of symbols,” I assert, are enough to understand the connection 
between symbolic language and recognition.  
It would be a mistake, however, to infer from The Symbolism of Evil that the 
idea of symbolic recognition could be restricted to only the lexical meanings enlisted in the 
beginning of Course of Recognition. It is true, nevertheless, that in The Symbolism of Evil Ricoeur 
develops a philosophical anthropology “under the guidance of the symbols and myths of 
human evil.”487 In short, symbolic language is taken as a means for self-recognition. In other 
words, an indirect understanding of being human is achievable through symbols. They speak 
of nothing else but human reality. The Adamic myth, for example, “is the anthropological 
myth par excellence,” because Adam – as the name signals – is an archetype of a human 
being.488 In the myth, Ricoeur suggests, even “the serpent would be a part of ourselves,” 
albeit that part “which we do not recognize.” Ricoeur argues that the serpent is the “pseudo-
outer,” quasi-other, which represents our own bad faith.489 To conclude this analysis of the 
relation between mythic-symbolic language and self-recognition, we should say that the idea 
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of recognizing oneself, becoming more aware of one’s own being by naming the unknown, 
is clearly present in The Symbolism of Evil.  
In addition to correcting the comprehension of “symbolic recognition,” The 
Symbolism of Evil also enriches our reading of Course of Recognition by guiding our 
understanding of the “other.” Besides the pseudo-other that I mentioned just above, The 
Symbolism of Evil introduces the notion of the Other, which leads us here to the idea of 
“being recognized.” The notion of being “before other,” for example, draws its significance 
from being “before God” that Ricoeur discusses in The Symbolism of Evil. In relation to Old 
Testament symbolisms and their later elaboration, Ricoeur maintains that “the initial 
situation of man as God’s prey can enter into the universe of discourse because it is itself 
analyzable into an utterance of God and an utterance of man, into the reciprocity of a 
vocation and an invocation.”490 God holds human beings answerable to his commands. The 
idea of the Covenant based on these commands, however, encourages us to “never lose 
sight of the fact that all these imperatives [of the Law] are motivated by the recognition of 
the gratuitous and merciful election of Israel by its God, who loved it first.”491 Ricoeur’s 
statement implies that while God loved us first, the movement towards self-understanding, 
therefore, flows primordially from the Other. 
This recognition in the mode of “being recognized” is not limited to humanity 
in general, or to the chosen nation, since it covers each individual at the personal level. The 
“absolute Seeing” of the omnipercipient God gives us symbolic grounds to understand the 
recognition coming from the Other as “the foundation of truth for the view that I have of 
                                               
490 Ricoeur 1960b, 55. (51-52). 
491 Ricoeur 1960b, 63-64. n15. (61). Cf. Ricoeur 1994, 358-366. 
128 
myself.”492 In accordance with the Pauline interpretation of the role of the Law – that it 
merely tells me what I am not capable of – Ricoeur summarizes that “there is the I that 
acknowledges itself.”493 But symbolic language works in a similar manner also outside of 
Judeo-Christian context. The Greek tragedy of Oedipus – while revealing the truth “in the 
pain of identification” – is a tragedy of “the recognition of self in an alien past.”494 Symbolic 
language makes us recognize ourselves as individuals while revealing aspects of our being 
that are not directly accessible to each of us.  
 Besides these two notions of symbolic recognition in the face of the Other, 
there is yet another sense of recognition to which The Symbolism of Evil alludes. The cultural-
religious ritualization of ethics, most notably present in the different models of 
ceremonialization of the divine law, including its juridization, quite obviously maintains a 
connection to the idea of the Other, but it also highlights the social aspect of being 
recognized. “Of course,” Ricoeur affirms, “rites bind together a community to which they 
furnish symbols as rallying points and as signs of mutual recognition (reconnaissance 
mutuelle).”495 This symbolically maintained mutuality between the observants, the “internal 
bond” among them, is made possible by reflection that is turned to ritualization. All this 
flows, however, from cultural symbols that “give” or “donate” grounds for thought (donne à 
penser). Culturally rooted symbolic language thus provides the means also for those types of 
recognition which surpass plain self-recognition. 
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 It is clear, therefore, that the symbol gives, or donates. It should not be 
forgotten, however, that “what it gives is occasion for thought, something to think about.”496 
The immediacy, characteristic of symbol, asks to be posited, that is, it asks to be taken as the 
mediation of thought. This is why Ricoeur furthermore argues in The Symbolism of Evil that a 
human being “remains language through and through” in virtue of symbols, meaning that 
interpretative explication is already on its way as “there exists nowhere a symbolic language 
without hermeneutics.”497 Appreciating the gift of meaning given by the symbol is to 
interpret it. “It is in hermeneutics that the symbol’s gift of meaning and the endeavor to 
understand by deciphering are knotted together.”498 While conjoining the gift of meaning 
and interpretation together Ricoeur insists, however, that the word “to understand” must 
guide our endeavors. It is in a creative and understanding interpretation, approached with “a 
hope for re-creation of language,”499 as Ricoeur mentions in The Symbolism of Evil, that the 
gift of meaning is given.500 This modern, critically attuned hermeneutics does not think in 
symbols anymore but takes them as a starting-point. The aim is, nevertheless, to re-charge 
our modern language, to remember. This remembrance, I will argue, is ultimately the gift 
that is given by the cultural symbol. 
 
6.3 From Forgetfulness to Re-membering 
As many of Ricoeur’s critics seem to have forgotten the above discussed ideas pertaining to 
symbolic recognition that Ricoeur’s elaborates in The Symbolism of Evil, it was necessary to 
                                               
496 Ricoeur 1960b, 324. (348). 
497 Ricoeur 1960b, 325. (350). 
498 Ricoeur 1960b, 326. (351). 
499 Ricoeur 1960b, 325. (349). 
500 Ricoeur 1960b, 326-330. (351-355). 
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pause for a moment to consider the gift of symbolic language. The gift of meaning that is 
given by symbolic language calls for interpretation, however. Properly understood, this task 
of interpretation is not an easy one. In The Symbolism of Evil Ricoeur claims – perhaps 
prophetically for us – that the philosophy of symbols must begin in the moment of 
forgetfulness.501 Interpretation, or restoration as Ricoeur calls it, must regain its “view” back 
to its beginning. If this is to be reached, Ricoeur asserts, “it is first necessary for thought to 
inhabit the fullness of language.”502 In a way, regained presence is then not impossible. “In 
being born I enter into the world of language that precedes me and envelops me,” says 
Ricoeur elsewhere.503 The matter is to accept the full expressivity of language which is then 
articulated in interpretation. 
In brief, Ricoeur insists that we have already been placed in language, which in 
itself is pregnant with onto-existential meaning. “I believe that being can still speak to me,” 
he maintains in the Symbolism of Evil.504 What was, perhaps unintentionally, de-symbolized 
must now be re-symbolized505 – or rather, “remembered” in interpretation. Ricoeur asserts: 
A meditation on symbols starts from speech that has already taken place, and 
in which everything has already been said in some fashion; it wishes to be 
thought with its presuppositions. For it, the first task is not to begin but, from 
the midst of speech, to remember (se ressouvenir); to remember with a view to 
beginning.506 
 
Discourse, language in use, refers to the fullness of being in a symbolic mode: everything is 
and has already been said. As argued in The Symbolism of Evil, remembering is, therefore, our 
first task, to gather oneself from the midst of the world that is primordially verbal for us.  
                                               
501 Ricoeur 1960b, 325. (349). 
502 Ricoeur 1960b, 324. (348). 
503 Ricoeur 1960a, 45. (27). 
504 Ricoeur 1960b, 327. (352). 
505 Cf. Ricoeur 1983, 124. (83). 
506 Ricoeur 1960b, 324. (348-349). 
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 After having reminded us of the idea of interpretation as onto-existential 
remembering, let me get back to the Course of Recognition. Ricoeur’s “phenomenology of the 
capable human being,” which by no means is the final point of analysis in the 2004 work, 
culminates in the idea that the living subject, or “the ‘acting and suffering’ human being,”507 
recognizes itself as “a person capable of different accomplishments.”508 This reflection which 
results in self-designation not only connects with our actions, but also our capacity to 
remember. Ricoeur admits in Course of Recognition that personal pronouns, among other 
similar expressions of ordinary language, are “means of designation from which the self-
designation of the speaking subject follows.”509 Language directs self-designation. This 
primal consciousness, however, would have no significance if a subject was not able to 
remember. Ricoeur attributes therefore the capacity to remember to “all the subjects that 
find lexical expression in one or the other of the personal pronouns.”510 Personal pronouns, 
in other words, allow memory, but – paradoxically – memory makes personal pronouns 
mean. Put in a semi-Kantian manner, the “I” in the “I can” must be the selfsame “I” who, 
according to Ricoeur, finds itself in “the living present of self-recognition” of his or her own 
life-story.511 My self resorts to remembering that I am I even if my circumstances change. 
 The notion of recognition we have now achieved in this chapter as 
remembering calls for noticing its counterpart: forgetting. “One would need to be able to 
‘name forgetfulness’ to be able to speak of recognition,” as Ricoeur puts it in Memory, History, 
                                               
507 Ricoeur 2004b, 109. (69). 
508 Ricoeur 2004b, 109. (69). Cf. Ricoeur 2000b, 31-32. (26). 
509 Ricoeur 2004b, 145. (95). 
510 Ricoeur 2004b, 156. (104). 
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Forgetting.512 The problem of forgetting (l’oubli) reconnects also with the Symbolism of Evil, 
where Ricoeur argues that we “moderns” dwell in the age of forgetfulness513 – and 
“forgetting is indeed the enemy of memory.”514 We therefore think about the active moment 
of remembering, argues Ricoeur, as “the struggle against forgetting.”515 Henry Bergson’s 
understanding of recognition as reconstructive recollection, which Ricoeur applies in Course 
of Recognition, makes clear how this struggle of recollection516 contributes to the recognition of 
the past, and furthermore to self-recognition: forgetting is powerlessness or inability 
(impuissance) to recognize.517 
 Remembering and recognizing find themselves close neighbors from the 
viewpoint of the present representation of something absent. The certitude accompanying 
recognition “makes recognition the mnemonic act par excellence,” Ricoeur asserts.518 
Bergson’s analysis of the recognition of images underlines this vivid connection between the 
past and the present. Ricoeur calls him therefore “the philosopher of la durée,” or of 
duration.519 “In short,” Ricoeur quotes, “the ‘concrete process by which we grasp the past in 
the present is recognition.’”520 There must still be something present of the “original virtuality,” 
otherwise recognition and remembering would not be possible at all.521 “Here the enigma of 
the presence of the absent is reaffirmed,” Ricoeur summarizes, “occurring in the present, 
                                               
512 Ricoeur 2000b, 119. (99). Memory, History, Forgetting is opened with a lengthy discussion of recognition as 
recollection, as well as closed with an even longer discussion of forgetting and forgiveness. Cf. Ricoeur 2000b, 
536-589, 593-656. (412-456, 457-506). 
513 Ricoeur 1960b, 324-325. (349). 
514 Ricoeur 2004b, 169. (112). 
515 Ricoeur 2004b, 169. (112-113). 
516 Ricoeur elaborates Bergson’s distinction between spontaneous and “laborious” recollection in Memory, 
History, Forgetting. Both of these are, however, analyzed under the notion of intellectual effort. The “dynamic 
scheme” requires reconstructing the memories, and indicates therefore both our effort and the experienced 
resistance in reworking (remaniement) the images. Cf. Ricoeur 2000b, 34-36. (28-30). 
517 Ricoeur 2000b, 562-563, 570, 576-577. (434, 440, 445-446, 592 n.16). 
518 Ricoeur 2004b, 185. (125).  
519 Ricoeur 2000b, 192. (154). 
520 Ricoeur 2004b, 185. (125). 
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recognized as memory.”522 According to Ricoeur on Bergson, recognition refers to the 
original experience through the image of this impression in the present.  
 Read in the light of The Symbolism of Evil and its insistence on onto-existential 
remembering, the Bergsonian idea of recognizing the “original virtuality” in the present is 
truly thought-provoking, as is Ricoeur’s further move in Course of Recognition to connect 
recognition and remembering to rediscovery: Ricoeur brings forth an aspect of thought that 
goes beyond the sense of mere regaining and recovering. Recollection can be arduous and 
take effort; this is why Ricoeur had followed Bergson in stating that the effort of recollection 
is completed in the moment of recognition.523 This arduousness, however, has its uplifting 
counterpart. “Reconnaître un souvenir, c’est le retrouver,” Ricoeur argues in Course of Recognition: 
“To recognize a memory is to rediscover it.”524 In the age of modern forgetfulness it is 
precisely re-discovering that characterizes our task “to remember with a view to 
beginning.”525 The Symbolism of Evil complements the analyses of Course of Recognition, as it 
launches – by challenging us “moderns” to remember fully – a whole new way of reading the 
later work. 
Course of Recognition is clear on the connection between recognition and 
rediscovering. “To rediscover is to recognize what one once – previously – learned,” Ricoeur 
states.526 The theme of recognizing as rediscovering highlights that Ricoeur focuses on 
ανάµνησις, recollection of persistent memories, and not some mimetic εικών, or an iconic copy 
                                               
522 Ricoeur 2004b, 186. (125). – Despite underlining the present moment, Ricoeur refers to Bergson’s 
thematization of memory as a distinct representation (mémoire-souvenir) in contrast to memory as a habit (mémoire-
habitude). “It is the privilege of representation-memory to allow us ‘in the search for a particular image to 
remount the slope of our past’ - - man alone is capable of such an effort,” Ricoeur writes in Memory, History, 
Forgetting. Ricoeur 2000b, 30-32, 50, 61-66. (24-26, 41-42, 50-55). 
523 Ricoeur 2000b, 66. (55). 
524 Ricoeur 2004b, 186. (126). 
525 Ricoeur 1960b, 324. (349). 
526 Ricoeur 2004b, 186. (126).; Ricoeur 2000b, 563. (435). 
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of an absent thing.527 Re-cognition, re-connaissance, in the sense of re-discovering occupies 
Ricoeur’s thoughts, and not the “simple evocation” of a memory-image. Ανά-µνησις refers to 
µνήµη, however, to the basic, simple memory-imprint.528 In other words, Ricoeur pairs the 
“survival from the past” and the effort to recall with recognizing images. Bergson’s theory, 
which emphasizes both the effort and particular “images” in recollection, has therefore been 
useful indeed for Ricoeur.529 This pairing of memory that repeats and imagines is self-
confessedly “projected into the center” of Ricoeur’s last work.530 
Let me make here another pause for reflection. To counter possible objections 
for giving too much weight on the idea of recognition as rediscovery, it is necessary to point 
out that recognition/rediscovery is a frequently recurring theme in Ricoeur’s work. Time as 
“lost-rediscovered” (perdu-retrouvé) and “crowned with a recognition” (couronné par une 
reconnaissance) – all this “in life,” in the living presence of being – is precisely how Ricoeur 
reads Marcel Proust’s Remembrance of Things Past in his own Time and Narrative II.531 “The small 
miracle of recognition,” writes Ricoeur also in Memory, History, Forgetting, “is to coat with 
presence the otherness of that which is over and gone. Here, memory is re-presentation, in 
                                               
527 Ricoeur 2004b, 167-170. (111-113).; Ricoeur 2000b, 8-25. (7-21). 
528 Ricoeur 2000b, 22. (17-18). 
529 Ricoeur 2004b, 182-183. (123). 
530 Ricoeur 2004b, 182-183. (123). Cf. Ricoeur 2000b, 61-64, 541. (50-53, 416-417). 
531 Ricoeur 1984, 217-223. (147-151). – In terms of understanding time, it should be noted that in Time and 
Narrative II Ricoeur contrasts Proust’s Remembrance of Things Past to Bergson’s philosophy of duration. 
“Remembrance,” Ricoeur comments, “is far from a Bergsonian vision of a duration free of all extension; instead it 
confirms the dimensional character of time. The itinerary of Remembrance moves from the idea of a distance that 
separates to that of a [metaphorical !] distance that joins together.” (Ricoeur 1984, 224. (151).) In both cases, 
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“lost”) and the present (the moment and the way by which rediscovery takes place). This is affirmed by Ricoeur 
himself in Memory, History, Forgetting, when he writes about the transition from “corporeal memory” to the 
“memory of places and things”: “The moment of awakening, so magnificently described by Proust at the 
beginning of Remembrance of Things Past, is especially favorable for returning things and beings to the place 
assigned to them in space and in time the previous evening. The moment of recollection (rappel) is then the 
moment of recognition (reconnaissance).” Ricoeur 2000b, 49. (40-41). 
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the twofold sense of re-: turning back and anew.”532 While taking place in the present, the 
phenomenon of recognition “throws us back” (renvoyer) to the “enigma of memory as 
presence of the absent encountered previously.”533 The “profound truth of Greek ανάµνησις,” 
Ricoeur argues further, is that “seeking is hoping to find.”534 Literally, then, in rediscovery we 
are finding again (retrouver),535 perhaps even “recharging” ourselves again as Ricoeur writes in 
The Symbolism of Evil,536 while re-cognizing ourselves as living subjects with a past and a 
probable future. 
 I should also mention that I am not completely alone in reading Course of 
Recognition from the viewpoint of remembering. Jean-Luc Amalric, for example, argues that 
Ricoeur’s later anthropology – that of Oneself as Another and Course of Recognition – represents a 
new phase of Ricoeur’s philosophical reflection, “a constructive phase of the regrouping 
(remembrement) of the philosophy of self.”537 Following Amalric’s lead I maintain that if our 
“first task” is to remember,538 it is in re-membering that we are able to recollect ourselves as 
being related to being. To repeat, the first task for a living subject is to re-member. As Amalric 
states, the “reflective reappropriation of our effort to exist” is placed at the center of 
Ricoeur’s anthropological enterprise.539  
 The re-membering that I propose, however, has another, equally important 
sense that perhaps goes beyond Amalric’s suggestion; this another sense is in line with the 
cultural approach, implying communality, that I have adopted. Memory, History, Forgetting – 
                                               
532 Ricoeur 2000b, 47. (39). Cf. Ricoeur 2004b, 100, 184. (65, 124). 
533 Ricoeur 2000b, 47. (39). 
534 Ricoeur 2000b, 563. (435). 
535 Ricoeur 2004b, 186. (126). 
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published after Oneself as Another and before Course of Recognition – fits into Amalric’s 
description when extending “the idea of appropriation [that is: ascription, attribution] from 
the theory of action to a theory of memory.”540 Self-designation, an action itself, by personal 
pronouns and other similarly functioning expressions of ordinary language is connected to 
our capacity to remember.541 Memory, History, Forgetting repeats this conviction by arguing that 
ordinary language with its possessive forms “such as ‘my,’ ‘mine,’ and all the rest […] offers 
valuable assistance here with the notion of ascribing psychical operations to someone.”542 
Psychical operations, for example remembrance, are also acts that are attributable to a 
subject. In particular, Ricoeur argues that “asserting the possession of memories as one’s 
own constitutes in linguistic practice a model of mineness for all psychical phenomena.”543 
The act of self-designation, therefore, is linked to the capacity to remember through 
linguistic mediation – the notion of my self is gathered in the midst of language that clarifies 
my relation to my acts by ascribing those very acts to me as their agent. Our “first task” is 
then, again, “not to begin but, from the midst of speech, to remember; to remember with a 
view to beginning” as Ricoeur states in The Symbolism of Evil.544 To repeat again, our task as 
self-searching human subjects is therefore truly to remember what was “learned.” I maintain 
that this all necessitates a public, or socio-cultural, understanding of re-membering. 
Jean-Luc Amalric leaves between the lines that the step from appropriation to 
reappropriation is taken through the public sphere of ordinary language in all its fullness.545 
This step – that I emphasize – from private to public, from solitude to being-with, is perhaps 
surprising but not unprecedented. Referring to Peter Strawson and Edmund Husserl, 
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Ricoeur argues in Memory, History, Forgetting that first of all “it is this capacity to designate 
oneself as the possessor of one’s own memories that leads to attributing to others the same 
mnemonic phenomena as to oneself, whether by the path of Paarung, of Einfühlung, of other-
ascription, or something else.”546 Put differently, the phenomenology of remembering opens 
itself towards the social. A suggestion that presents itself here lets us in a way “see afresh,” as 
called for by the “first task” of remembrance: remembering is not restricted to an individual 
but includes the public, social sphere as well. In the wake of Aristotle’s double definition of 
human being as both ζώον λόγoν έχων and ζώον 3ολιτικόν – both speaking and communal 
animal547 – I see no reason why this reappropriation of the public discourse should not also 
be called re-membering, that is, reconnecting with the fellow members of human society by 
linguistic mediation. 
To clarify what I mean by re-membering as socio-cultural reconnecting – the 
idea that fundamentally I am a member of a culture that speaks – I follow Ricoeur’s 
argumentation a bit further. In their “declarative phase,” Ricoeur argues, memories 
themselves enter “into the region of language”: as pronounced they are “already a kind of 
discourse.”548 Ricoeur’s plea, or his other wager, not only places us again at “the origin of our 
speaking being,” but reinforces how we reappropriate reflectively our effort to exist.549 
Ricoeur argues already in The Voluntary and the Involuntary that “to think is to speak to myself, 
to will is to command myself.”550 Later in Time and Narrative he maintains that ordinary 
language is the treasury of expressions of authentic human experience.551 His voice in 
Memory, History, Forgetting is then loud and clear: “What is pronounced in this discourse 
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occurs in the common language, most often in the mother tongue, which, it must be said, is 
the language of others.”552 The language of others, I emphasize, hovers all over remembering, 
because it is the treasury of mediated human experience. 
Language is indisputably cultural, it is common and social. Even my proper 
name, that which seems most unique and proper to me, opens me to this cultural sphere – 
my proper name is a mediation that is given to me by someone else, other than myself. “This 
word of the other, placed upon an entire life,” Ricoeur argues, “confers a linguistic support, 
a decidedly self-referential turn, to all the operations of personal appropriation gravitating 
around the mnemonic nucleus.”553 In other words, remembering requires cultural-linguistic 
support that ultimately refers to others. Perhaps not the memories themselves then, but my 
capacity to remember has been given to me by others as a cultural collective, especially in the 
consideration of Ricoeur’s explications that emphasize others and the language to which I 
am born – which precedes my existence.  
To solidify my case that has already brought us close to affirming Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutic of culture, let me remind us that the argument from memory to the language of 
others leads Ricoeur to the notion of “the ones close by” (les proches). For the purposes of 
this text, I have called this a movement from forgetfulness to re-membering. The 
“phenomenology of the capable human being” is not understandable without this detour 
into the social and historical other of linguistic conditions. Simplifying just enough for the 
benefit of crystallizing the line of Ricoeur’s thought, I maintain that self-recognition opens 
itself to – and conversely is opened by – what Ricoeur calls the “multiple orders of 
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belonging or respective orders of standing.”554 In brief, memories of a situation occur within 
a situation: “it is always in historically limited cultural forms that the capacity to remember can be 
apprehended.”555 Ricoeur maintains that this is a “legitimate supposition.”556 In conclusion, 
there is no capacity to remember without a socio-cultural-linguistic situation with a self-
affirmed historical trajectory. 
Remembering – that is, rediscovering our cultural situatedness – becomes then 
re-membering by which self-attestation is made possible. There is more to this idea, 
however, since “the ones close by” are those to whom I have already related at birth and 
before I was given my name, and also those to whom I will relate after my death in their 
memories of me – and who, between birth and death, acknowledge my being in the mode of 
being-with.557 Ricoeur argues in Memory, History, Forgetting very clearly that the “I can” rests 
on this mutual recognition of a person’s capabilities in the relations with those “close by”: 
My close ones are those who approve of my existence and whose existence I 
approve of in the reciprocity and equality of esteem. This mutual approbation 
expresses the shared assertion that each one makes regarding his or her 
powers and lack of powers, what I termed attestation in Oneself as Another. 
What I expect from my close ones is that they approve of what I attest: that I 
am able to speak, act, recount, impute to myself the responsibility of my 
actions.558  
 
In connection with the idea of necessary sociality, recognition is in recollection set on the 
path of mutuality as contextuality. This is why Course of Recognition pairs remembering and 
promising, which “need to be considered together within the living present of self-
recognition” because of their many common features,559 only to find out that “the relation to 
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557 Ricoeur 2000b, 162. (132). 
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the other is so strong in the case of promises that this feature can serve to mark the 
transition between the present chapter and the one that will follow, on mutual 
recognition.”560 To make a note about the path of our analysis, I will certainly to some extent 
follow the same transition, but emphasizing Ricoeur’s conviction that the act of promising 
presupposes mutuality, and that the same mutuality holds for remembering as well. It also 
has a “strong” relation to “the other.” 
The case of promising highlights the underlying reference to the other in 
remembering. More evidently than in remembering, however, promising is linguistic and 
includes a presumption of ethical conduct.561 This makes promising-acts, the prime examples 
of speech-acts,562 more manifestly akin to social practices that rest on symbolic mediations – 
which, for their part, “contribute to the instituting of the social bond” by the exercise of 
“representations which human beings make of themselves and their place in society.”563 As 
Ricoeur points out, promises then are also on the way to social justice, rights, and liberty, 
which are less evidently inherent in the case of remembering. This move towards mutuality, 
however, marks a decisive shift in Ricoeur’s argument from the level of individuality to that 
of cultural collectivity: the path of recognition leads us from forgetfulness to the threshold 
of re-membering.564 For us, this is the moment of “letting appear” Ricoeur’s cultural 
hermeneutics. Put differently, the question of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic of culture cannot be 
avoided anymore. 
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7. THE COURSE OF CULTURAL FORMATION 
As we have seen in the preceding chapter of this dissertation, Ricoeur understands 
recognition as re-membering in the sense of re-collecting contextualized mutuality. This 
crucial shift toward a hermeneutic of culture, which is the main aim of this dissertation, is 
made explicit with Ricoeur’s rhetorical question in Memory, History, Forgetting. In it Ricoeur 
calls for a fresh start by insisting on focusing on a community rather than on an individual. 
“There is a moment when one has to move from I to we,” he writes, “but is this moment not 
original, in the manner of a new beginning?”565 Ricoeur indicates that the foundation for the 
possibility of recognition is the shared condition and the context of meaning, that is, culture. 
The shift to the fundamental shared level of meaning is, however, a difficult 
one for Ricoeur. Puzzled by the aporia of first person constitution in the case of individual 
consciousness and communalization in that of collective consciousness, Ricoeur resorts in 
Memory, History, Forgetting to ordinary language “to identify the linguistic region where the two 
discourses [of individual and communal] may be made to intersect.”566 The ordinary language 
in its fullness – the language of “others” and of the “ones close by” – is once again at the 
epicenter of Ricoeur’s thoughts.567 Collective consciousness, Ricoeur argues, “can result only 
from a process of objectification on the level of intersubjective exchanges.”568 Language 
both objectifies and gathers together by explaining and retaining common memories that 
ground “holidays, rites, and public celebrations” which Ricoeur uses as examples of 
instances when written history anchors the collective existence.569 In sum, Ricoeur maintains 
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that a collective memory is a part of my meaning-giving context as a collection of traces of 
common experiences. In the final analysis, this context is nothing but one’s culture. 
 This path from individual memory to collective memory opens for Ricoeur 
anew a whole set of questions: those of history and of historiography.570 Traversing the 
epistemology of history and the critical philosophy of history, Ricoeur reaches the 
ontological hermeneutics of our historical condition. Although Ricoeur intends to discuss 
with Martin Heidegger the structure of within-time-ness, Innerzeitigkeit, he cannot do this 
without a reference to historicity, Geschichtlichkeit: “It is around the theme of Geschichtlichkeit 
that the debate between ontology and historiography tightens.”571 In other words, historicity 
means critically conceived situatedness in human history. 
It comes as no surprise that philosophical descriptions of historical 
situatedness vary. The notion of historicity leads Ricoeur also to consider Hegel’s 
contribution to the philosophy of history, since “Heidegger’s use of the term is inscribed 
within a semantic history inaugurated by Hegel.”572 Hegel’s introduction to the Philosophy of 
History, “Reason in History,” crowns the “conceptual epic” of equating history and reason, 
Ricoeur writes. “It is under the aegis of the dialectic of the objective Spirit that the pact 
between the rational and the real is sealed, the pact that is said to be an expression of the 
highest idea of philosophy.”573 The idea of the objectifying dialectics of historical reason, 
which is only found in a philosophical analysis concerning being, is unmissable. As many of 
his critics and Ricoeur himself maintain, for us, “after Hegel,” the notion of historicity – to 
which we were lead quickly after having made the shift “from I to we” – requires that we 
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take into account Hegel’s History of Philosophy as well as his broader work.574 This discussion 
that examines Ricoeur’s relation to Hegel will show us the implicit cultural hermeneutics on 
which Ricoeur bases the whole 2004 work on recognition. Put differently, this chapter – 
even though not yet fully explaining it – finalizes the “letting appear” of Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics of culture. 
Let me again begin with some problematizations, however. Even if I have 
been critical of some aspects of Gonçalo Marcelo’s analysis of Course of Recognition, I 
acknowledge that he is correct in pointing out that Ricoeur situates himself also within a trail 
of thought “after Hegel.”575 The emphasis on “after” comes from explaining – as Ricoeur 
does himself in Time and Narrative III – that he does not think against Hegel, nor like Hegel. 
Ricoeur’s own philosophical course is carried out in the wake of Hegel’s philosophy, that is, 
after him.576 The important question for us as Ricoeur’s readers is, whether Ricoeur’s 
philosophizing “after Hegel” also means philosophizing in the wake of Hegel’s philosophy 
of cultural formation.  
At the first sight, Ricoeur’s philosophy as “after Hegel” seems only to have a 
critical meaning. Despite maintaining a post-Hegelian attitude, Ricoeur’s hermeneutics is 
irrevocably influenced by Kant’s critical philosophy. Consequently, for Ricoeur 
interpretation is a function of finitude rather than that of totality. Ricoeur’s admission, that 
“the finitude of the philosophical act that makes up the self-understanding of the historical 
consciousness,” proves a Kantian as well as a Hegelian influence.577 Even in philosophy, 
there are no methods capable of total, absolutizing mediation. Hegel’s absolute history, the 
                                               
574 Ricoeur 2000b, 482-491. (370-376). 
575 Marcelo 2011, 114. 
576 Ricoeur 1985, 298. (206). 
577 Ricoeur 1985, 298. (206). Ricoeur, quite obviously, also refers to Gadamer’s wirkungsgeschichtliches 
Bewußtsein. Cf. Ricoeur 2000b, 388. n1. (569. n2).; Ricoeur 1985, 300-346. (207-240). 
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realization of freedom as the supreme narrative, is therefore an impossible totalization.578 In 
this sense, “after Hegel” means for Ricoeur an “exodus from Hegelianism,” leaving Hegel 
behind, “quitting Hegelianism.”579 While admitting that the notion of mediation is important 
for his own philosophical enquiry, Ricoeur announces in Time and Narrative his deep mistrust 
in Hegel’s totalizing philosophy of history. 
Ricoeur maintains, nevertheless, that he is still drawn to Hegel’s philosophy, 
arguing that he philosophizes “in that post-Hegelian Kantian style I favor.”580 Actually, 
before renouncing Hegel in Time and Narrative III, Ricoeur even confesses that he is tempted 
by Hegel’s philosophy of history, that he has been “seduced by the power of Hegel’s 
thought.”581 The self-actualization of the Spirit advocates, in its “hard and obstinate struggle 
with itself,” a unitary historical consciousness – in the face of which human time becomes a 
singular collective unity. “History of the world,” as Ricoeur summarizes Hegel’s position, “is 
in essence ‘the expression (die Auslegung) of the Spirit in time.’”582 In the view of this 
totalization, the reciprocal “interweaving of history and fiction in the refiguration of time” 
that is proposed in Time and Narrative would be rendered unproblematic, and is therefore 
tempting as a philosophical idea.583 
 Despite the appeal, Ricoeur does not fully answer the call of Hegel’s 
philosophy. Ricoeur’s insistence on maintaining an “open-ended, incomplete, imperfect 
mediation” as well as his early expressed fondness of “Kantian sobriety”584 leads Ricoeur to 
                                               
578 Ricoeur 1985, 292-299. (202-206). 
579 Ricoeur 1985, 298, 300. (206, 207). 
580 Ricoeur 1985, 312. (215). – Ricoeur acknowledges that the expression is borrowed from Eric Weil. Cf. 
Ricoeur 1969, 402-405. (412-414).; Ricoeur 1986a, 251. (200). 
581 Ricoeur 1985, 280-292, 298. (193-202, 206). Cf. Ricoeur 2006, 185-189. 
582 Ricoeur 1985, 290. (200). 
583 Ricoeur 1985, 279. (192). 
584 Ricoeur criticizes both Kant and Hegel but places himself “after” them, however. In his texts the 
emphasis is, occasionally, closer to either one, depending on the argument. The 1955 essay “Retour à Hegel” 
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abandon Hegel, to “leave him behind.”585 In this sense I am empathetic when David 
Rasmussen writes that “Ricoeur was always somewhat uncomfortable” with the Hegelian 
tradition.586 It appears, however, that Ricoeur renounces la tentation hégélienne587 far too hastily; 
perhaps just to deny its seducing power and its irresistible call. Jean Greisch, for example, 
cannot but comment that “despite everything that separates Ricoeur and Hegel, the two 
thinkers share the conviction that ‘the way of the spirit is primarily mediation, it is 
detour.’”588 Insofar as Ricoeur’s own philosophy – a philosophy of “the long route” to 
Dasein589 – is concerned, his recurring comments on Hegel are perhaps necessary detours 
themselves. 
 
7.1 The Course of Recognition and Anerkennung 
Let us move next into discussing Ricoeur’s ambivalent relation to Hegel. Despite the fact 
that Ricoeur “renounced” Hegel in Time and Narrative III, my claim is that the “Hegelian 
temptation” remained intact for him. Some twenty years later the whole third study of Course 
of Recognition, which focuses on mutual recognition, grounds itself in Hegel’s concept of 
reciprocal recognition, Anerkennung.590 Jean Greisch even suggests that “the translation that 
                                                                                                                                            
provides a rhetoric image of this dynamic undecidedness: “Je me demande, ici, si la sobriété kantienne n’est pas 
plus vraie que l’ébriété hégélienne.” Ricoeur 1992, 178. 
585 Ricoeur 1985, 300. (207). 
586 Rasmussen 2010, 192. 
587 Cf. Ricoeur 1986a, 251-259. (200-207). 
588 Greisch 2010, 91. 
589 Ricoeur 1969, 10. (6). 
590 Ricoeur 2004b, 223. (150). – The question of the importance of Hegel’s thought is also decisive in 
terms of distinguishing Ricoeur’s philosophy from some other proponents of hermeneutics, such as Hans-
Georg Gadamer. David Vessel’s essay “Paul Ricoeur’s and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Diverging Reflections on 
Recognition,” for example, points out that in spite of its relevance in Truth and Method, the concept of 
Anerkennung was not decisive for Gadamer, but that he “abandoned” the term instead. According to Vessel, 
Gadamer thus lacks an account of mutuality based on recognition; Gadamer’s focus is on the Aristotelian philia 
as the exalted form of miteinandersein instead. From Ricoeur’s point of view, this amounts to “the recognition of 
superiority” instead of the culturally facilitated and yet agapaeic mutual recognition. Cf. Vessel 2011. 
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would best do justice to the work of thought to which Ricoeur invites his readers would be 
Unterwegs zum Anerkennen.”591 Well before Greisch, however, Morny Joy had already argued 
that Ricoeur theorizes recognition “within a specific Hegelian context.”592 Naturally, the 
possibility of Ricoeur’s Hegelianism leads us to proceed cautiously, since we also need to 
find out to what extent Ricoeur gives in to the Hegelian temptation regarding Anerkennung or 
reconnaissance.  
 We need to take into account two major restrictions when we begin the 
analysis of Ricoeur and Anerkennung. First of all, in the context of Course of Recognition, 
Ricoeur’s reading of Hegel is placed between the “Hobbesian challenge” to the notion of 
recognition as the violent state of nature – by which the theme of searching for peace under 
the sign of fear-motivated calculation and contract becomes apparent593 – and Axel 
Honneth’s “systematic renewal” of Hegel’s argument on the struggle for recognition in 
terms of love, personal rights and social esteem.594 Ricoeur maintains that Hegel’s 
Anerkennung constitutes both a historical and conceptual link between these two thematics of 
recognition.595  
Second, Ricoeur does not focus on The Phenomenology of Spirit, even though that 
would be expected on the basis of the well-known master-slave dialectics Alexandre Kojève 
emphasizes as a basic analysis of the process of recognition, and on the basis of Ricoeur’s 
familiarity with the Phenomenology itself.596 In all the “surprises” Arto Laitinen draws out of 
                                               
591 Greisch 2010, 90. 
592 Joy 2003, 518. Cf. Michel 2006, 363-370. 
593 Ricoeur 2004b, 246-247. (167). 
594 Cf. Honneth 1995, 1-2, 69, 92-130. – Honneth’s “renewal” of Jena-Hegel’s model of recognition is 
heavily influenced by G. H. Mead’s social psychology. (Honneth 1995, 71-91, 175-179.) I should also point out 
that Honneth, in his The Struggle for Recognition, also discusses the philosophical relation between Hobbes and 
Hegel. Honneth 1995, 7-11, 16-18. 
595 Ricoeur 2004b, 226, 253. (152, 171). 
596 Ricoeur 2006, 175-180. 
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Ricoeur’s Course of Recognition, he is correct in pointing out that Ricoeur hardly mentions 
Hegel’s Phenomenology.597 For Laitinen, this lack is philosophically striking: “Ricoeur does not 
discuss the most famous passages on recognition in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, but 
focuses solely on Hegel’s earlier texts.”598 Our analysis needs to explore, therefore, why 
Ricoeur avoids taking up the theme of recognition in the context of the Phenomenology, even 
though the analysis – especially in its Kojèvean sense – is well-known for him, as we will see 
later in this chapter. Since the first restriction of placing Ricoeur’s reading of Hegel between 
Hobbes and Honneth merely concerns the flow and genealogical tone of Ricoeur’s overall 
argument, I open my own examination from the second, Ricoeur’s relation to Hegel’s major 
works.  
According to Ricoeur, the three functions of Anerkennung – Hegel’s concept of 
recognition – are found in its entire conceptual development.599 Ricoeur argues that the 
concept of Anerkennung 1) guarantees a “duplication of subjectivity” by establishing a relation 
between self-reflection and intersubjectivity, 2) maintains a dynamism that is found in a 
process from the negativity of disdain to the positivity of reciprocity, and 3) makes possible a 
systematization of the theory of recognition in the articulation of the concept’s hierarchical 
instantiations in largely socio-political institutions.600 The concept’s formative maturation 
from reciprocity to more specific hierarchizations in form of ethical life witnesses, in fact, its 
proper meaning. 
Ricoeur’s admission, that the conceptual development of Anerkennung is 
significant, would lead us to mainly consider Hegel’s philosophy from the Phenomenology of 
                                               
597 Laitinen 2011, 37. 
598 Laitinen 2011, 39. 
599 Ricoeur 2004b, 253. (171). 
600 Ricoeur 2004b, 253-254. (171-172). 
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Spirit (1807) to the Philosophy of Right (1820/21). Ricoeur argues himself that the Phenomenology 
“closes the period at Jena with a bang,” after which there opens a process of the 
diversification of institutionalization up to the Philosophy of Right.601 Despite these “successive 
elaborations of Anerkennung,” Ricoeur insists that he needs to resort to the texts of Hegel’s 
Jena period in order to maintain a “hope of seeing resources of meaning disclosed that were 
not exhausted in Hegel’s later, more accomplished books, up to and including Principles of the 
Philosophy of Right.”602 Without directly mentioning Axel Honneth’s possible influence to his 
decision, Ricoeur, once again, bets on a “wager,” that is, he leaves the shift of his argument 
philosophically unjustified.603 Despite having acknowledged the importance of the whole 
conceptual development of the concept, Ricoeur turns to argue that an incipient stage of 
Hegel’s Anerkennung is, allegedly, more fruitful.604 
Ricoeur’s position is doubtful at best. Leaving aside, for example, his 1974 
essay “Hegel aujourd’hui” that demonstrates good overall comprehension of Hegel’s 
philosophy,605 Ricoeur tries to convince his reader at the outset of Course of Recognition that he 
is not a Hegel specialist. Instead of acknowledging his own merits, Ricoeur merely 
announces that he follows the path of Hegel-scholarship set by both Jacques Taminiaux and 
Axel Honneth.606 While claiming that he tries to avoid Alexander Kojève’s influential Hegel 
interpretation – that places the master-slave dialectics of recognition and therefore also the 
                                               
601 Ricoeur 2004b, 254. (172). – Interestingly, however, Ricoeur implies in his Lectures on Ideology and Utopia 
that in spite of certain differences in emphasis, some key themes of Hegel’s 1805-06 Jena lectures - such as 
Anerkennung and Sittlichkeit - are later developed, for example, in the Phenomenology. Ricoeur 1986b, 227-228. 
602 Ricoeur 2004b, 256-257. (173-174). 
603 Honneth maintains in The Struggle for Recognition that Hegel’s Jena texts outline an “extraordinary” social 
philosophy, to which he “never returned” in his post-Jena writings. Honneth 1995, 5-6, 62-63, 67-68, 175-176. 
604 Ricoeur 2004b, 253, 256. (171, 173-174). 
605 Ricoeur 2006. – The 1974 essay was republished in a special Ricoeur edition of Esprit (2006: mars-avril). 
Ricoeur maintains in the essay that despite of his critical assessment of Hegel’s absolute Spiritualism, he is also 
fascinated by Hegel’s philosophy. In addition, Ricoeur characterizes himself as “un historien de Hegel.” 
606 Ricoeur 2004b, 256-257, 264. (174, 180). 
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Phenomenology at the epicenter of Hegel’s thought607 – Ricoeur explains, in a manner 
resembling to Honneth’s terminology, that there is a connection between the Jena-Hegel’s 
“intellectual situation” and that of our own.608 In brief, Ricoeur argues rather vaguely that 
Hegel’s position during his years in Jena “can be characterized by the major heritages that are 
honored and that are still in many ways ours today.”609 Ricoeur wishes, in other words, to 
sketch a matrix of philosophies that would be somewhat shared between Hegel of Jena and 
present-day philosophers.610 This broad outline, however, does not explain the reasons why 
Ricoeur feels it justified to set aside, for example, the Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Right.  
Rushing directly to Hegel’s System of Ethical Life (System der Sittlichkeit, 1802/03) 
and “Realphilosophie II” (Jenenser Philosophie des Geistes, 1805/06), much like Axel Honneth in 
his own reading of Hegel,611 Ricoeur moves on to discuss Hegel’s theory of reciprocal 
recognition in these early texts. The seed of the struggle for recognition, Ricoeur claims, is 
found in the System of Ethical Life in the form of a natural drive to return to the Absolute – by 
the detour of work and the consequent exchange of goods – and subsequently to the formal 
recognition of the person as a free being in the real relations of domination and servitude.612 
The drive-guided realization of natural human potentialities, culminating in the child of a 
                                               
607 The anthology of Kojève’s Hegel-lectures, Introduction à la lecture de Hegel: Leçons sur la Phénoménologie de 
l'esprit professées de 1933 à 1939 à l'École des Hautes Études (Paris: Gallimard, 1947), begins with a commented 
translation of the section on master-slave dialectics. This “introduction” sets the tone of the whole work. Cf. 
Kojève 1969, 3-30. 
608 Honneth connects Mead’s thought to his examination in The Struggle for Recognition by stating that “One 
of the theories that forms a bridge between Hegel’s original insight and our intellectual situation can be found 
in the social psychology of George Herbert Mead.” Honneth 1995, 70. 
609 Ricoeur 2004b, 257. (174). 
610 Ricoeur 2004b, 257-258. (174-175). – Ricoeur alludes to Kant’s idea of individual autonomy, to the 
confrontation of the political philosophies of Machiavelli and Hobbes - from which Ricoeur draws the idea of 
the struggle for reciprocal recognition - and also to the Greek preference of 3όλις over an individual as well as 
Fichte’s influence on Hegel. He leaves out, however, Hegel’s 1801 and 1802/03 texts on Schelling and Jacobi, 
which, again, is quite surprising. 
611 Honneth’s explication and renewal of the “struggle of recognition” begins by analyzing Hegel’s System of 
Ethical Life (Honneth 1995, 16, 18-30.) and Realphilosophie II (Honneth 1995, 31-63.). 
612 Ricoeur 2004b, 259-260. (176-177). 
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family, bring about the threshold of the absolute ethical life of “the people” (Volk) and its 
governance by the system of justice, through which reciprocal recognition takes place. 
Mutual trust has then the final say over servitude.613 Still, Ricoeur insists that Hegel’s model 
in System of Ethical Life is speculative rather than concrete and it therefore differs from 
Ricoeur’s own problem of recognition.614  
 Hegel’s Realphilosophie II, in contrast, leads Ricoeur to focus on the idea of the 
self-recognition of the Spirit (der Geist) in its reality. “It will therefore be a matter of the 
coming – or rather the return – of the Spirit to itself,” Ricoeur summarizes, “under the 
heading of the major distinction between Ideality and Reality.”615 The realization of the Spirit 
in its “outward” expressions and the Spirit’s subsequent return to itself through this detour 
through the “other” are now again in Ricoeur’s abstract conceptual palette. Hegel maintains 
in Realphilosophie II that recognized being (anerkanntes Seyn) is enabled not only by the Spirit’s 
concept of itself (Begriff),616 but precisely by its self-objectification in labor (Arbeit),617 since 
works individualize the Spirit in a “self-propelling formation or education” (ein sichbewegende 
Bilden), and also results in exchange by which this individual then becomes recognized:  “All 
that I have, I have through work and exchange, that is, in being recognized,” Hegel argues.618 
In brief, the movement of externalization in reality is complemented by the Spirit’s 
corresponding re-internalization.  
                                               
613 Ricoeur 2004b, 261-263. (177-179). 
614 Ricoeur 2004b, 263-264. (179). 
615 Ricoeur 2004b, 264. (180). 
616 The relations between the Spirit and its object (Gegenstand), Being and concept (Begriff), are stated in the 
first sentence of Realphilosophie II by which Hegel opens his analysis of the Spirit “according to its concept.” 
Hegel connects later in the section “Subjective Spirit” the notion of concept to cognition as self-objectification: 
“Cognition (Erkennen) means to know the objective in its objectivity as [one’s] Self (das Gegenständliche in seiner 
Gegenständlichkeit als Selbst): [that is, the] conceptualized content [of the self] (begriffner Inhalt), the concept (Begriff), 
is the object (Gegenstand) [of the self].” Hegel 1969, 179, 201. 
617 Hegel 1969, 197. – Hegel argues that work is self-objectification (sich-zum-Gegenstande-machen) in reality 
because it is “one’s making oneself into a thing (sich-zum-Dinge-machen).” Work is therefore also mediation, 
Vermittlung, by which the Spirit reflects its contents. 
618 Hegel 1969, 213, 217. 
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I emphasize that in Course of Recognition Ricoeur acknowledges Hegel’s passive-
active sense of being recognized through re-internalized externalization. Ricoeur maintains 
that Hegel’s model of recognition requires the “long detour” of “the course (parcours) of 
moments of the realization of the Spirit and the description of the return of the Spirit to 
itself in its ipseity.”619 First of all, then, Ricoeur indicates that his understanding follows 
Hegel’s dialectical model of recognition. The significance of Ricoeur’s allusion to the Spirit’s 
“ipseity,” which reconnects with Ricoeur’s own work, is not immediately evident, however. 
The ipse-self – which Ricoeur defines in Oneself as Another as the narratively formed selfhood 
in contrast to an idem-identity, that is, the mere permanence of self-identity as “same”620 – is 
according to Ricoeur only formed in the dialectics between the self and its other. Otherness, 
Ricoeur argues in Oneself as Another, is constitutive to selfhood: “the selfhood of oneself 
implies otherness to such an intimate degree that one cannot be thought without the other, 
that instead one passes into the other, as we might say in Hegelian terms.”621 Ricoeur, 
therefore, also stresses the detour through the other, and he echoes this conviction in Course 
of Recognition. In brief, the subject’s self-recognition is dependent on being recognized in 
reality by the other-than-the-self. 
Course of Recognition points out that during the Spirit’s threefold passage of 
formation from universalization to actualization – that is, to alienating externalization 
(Entäußerung) – and furthermore to subsequent re-internalization (Erinnerung), the tone of 
Hegel’s vocabulary in Realphilosophie II changes from recognition to reconciliation. First, at 
the level of universalization, where the Spirit stands against its concept (Begriff), the totality of 
ethical life in general (Sittlichkeit überhaupt) is formed by the idea of right at the loving state of 
                                               
619 Ricoeur 2004b, 265. (180). 
620 Ricoeur 1990, 2-4. (2-3) 
621 Ricoeur 1990, 14. (3). 
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being recognized, where the universal and individual coincide.622 Second, in actualization, the 
universal state of “being-recognized,” Anerkanntsein as abstraction, is surpassed by the Spirit 
at the level of universal Self in terms of the contract (which presupposes language, work, and 
exchange), and furthermore as the self-certain Spirit in the constitution of the State which 
objectifies the Spirit in the various ways of governing (Regierung) the absolute individuality of 
a people (des Volks).623 Finally, in re-internalization, the Spirit is “freedom fulfilled” ultimately 
as the absolutely free Spirit that already as self-certain further creates its own content in art, 
religion, and philosophy, which as the Spirit’s work are means of alienating self-
objectification but also mediations of the Spirit’s most proper essence. As such they lead the 
Spirit to its full self-knowing in re-internalizing reflection. In sum, freedom is gradually 
achieved in the Spirit’s cultural formation (Bildung).624 
While taking this mediated course of self-realization through work, the Spirit 
figures itself and so also finds itself. “The absolutely free Spirit, which has taken back into 
itself its determinations,” Ricoeur summarizes the last section of the Realphilosophie II, “will 
henceforth produce a new world, a world that has the figure [Gestalt] of itself, where its work 
lies within itself, and where it accedes to intuition of the self as itself.”625 Inasmuch as being-
recognized is the Spirit’s own movement and natural to it, this self-recognition takes place in 
the cultural detour which for the Spirit is its “other.” In Hegel’s words, in this other – “in 
the form of something existent” – the Spirit becomes “its own calming (ruhendes) work of art, 
the existing universe, and world history.”626 The externalizing-reinternalizing movement of 
                                               
622 Ricoeur 2004b, 268. (182-183). Cf. Hegel 1969, 179-212.  
623 Ricoeur 2004b, 268-271. (183-185). Cf. Hegel 1969, 182-183, 213-263. – For Hegel, speech (Sprache) 
posits as being (seyendes) that which is internal to the Spirit, and speech is therefore the true being of the Spirit as 
the Spirit in general (Geist überhaupt). 
624 Ricoeur 2004b, 270-271. (184-185). Cf. Hegel 1969, 263-273. 
625 Ricoeur 2004b, 271. (185). Cf. Hegel 1969, 263. 
626 Hegel 1969, 273. 
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the Spirit, or remembering, is fixed in its objectifying concept, it is laid to rest in a 
“reobtained immediacy” (wiederhergestellte Unmittelbarkeit).627 The Spirit both determines and 
understands itself when finding itself in its figure. 
Recognition, the Spirit’s articulated knowing of itself as its unity, is at all its 
levels dependent on the Spirit’s free creation and self-formative enunciation of itself in its 
concept, that is, dependent on mediation which in the final analysis is always cultural and 
objectifying – der sich entfremdete Geist. Still, Ricoeur argues that the Realphilosophie II with its 
ontotheology of “the Spirit in its Idea” is merely “a speculative source for contemporary 
reflections” dedicated to the theme of recognition.628 In other words, Ricoeur maintains that 
Hegel’s Realphilosophie II is speculative and not “concrete” because of the very fact that the 
Spirit articulates itself.  
Course of Recognition thus dismisses Hegel’s philosophy as metaphysical 
speculation; Ricoeur maintains that Jena-Hegel’s thought is a mere “powerful speculative 
instrument, one that puts the resources of the negative at the service of a process of the 
actual realization of consciousness or of Spirit.”629 Thanks to this “militant, conflictual” 
approach which according to Ricoeur holds the negativity of struggle and contestation in a 
key place, Ricoeur asks rhetorically – alluding at the same time to Hegel’s terminology in the 
Phenomenology – whether Hegel ends up having “an infinite demand” of recognition, “a kind 
of ‘bad infinity’” of an unceasing search for recognition.630 If the Spirit needs to recognize 
itself in its labor and its works, when does this process reach its proper end? The Spirit’s 
total self-recognition appears as an “insatiable quest” which, Ricoeur argues, will only result 
                                               
627 Hegel 1969, 272. 
628 Ricoeur 2004b, 265. (180-181). 
629 Ricoeur 2004b, 316. (217). 
630 Ricoeur 2004b, 317. (218). 
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in an “unhappy consciousness” – because in its movement the Spirit has doubled itself and 




It is now clear for us that Ricoeur reads his Hegel from a precise point of view, that is, from 
the viewpoint of negativity. I would have to admit, however, that this approach to Hegel’s 
Jena texts is confusing. Rather than with Hegel’s texts of the Jena period, I propose, Ricoeur 
seems to have a problem with Hegel’s later works and their interpretations. While making 
final comments on the forms of social recognition Ricoeur refers to the Philosophy of Right,632 
but he also makes a quick transfer to its corollary text – on “Objective Spirit” – in Hegel’s 
Encyclopaedia: “Our doubt has to do […] with this region of Objective Spirit and the models 
of recognition that arise within it.”633 Hegel’s later, major texts become then enmeshed with 
System of Ethical Life and Realphilosophie II.  
Ricoeur introduces another such intertextual link when he transfers the notion 
of the Objective Spirit back to the context of the Phenomenology. Ricoeur locates the problem 
of the “unhappy consciousness” from the Phenomenology “within these limits” of “this region 
of Objective Spirit.”634 Even though Ricoeur insisted on focusing on texts from Hegel’s 
years in Jena, and to set aside Hegel’s “later, more accomplished books,”635 he is indeed 
                                               
631 Ricoeur 2004b, 318. (218).; Hegel 2008, 187. (§206, §207). – According to Hegel the unhappy 
consciousness (das unglückliche Bewußtsein) is the consciousness which has “doubled” itself because it desires and 
works. Just when the unhappy consciousness “thinks itself to have achieved victory and to have achieved 
restful unity with [its] other consciousness, each must once again be immediately expelled from the unity.” 
Hegel 2008, 187, 196. (§207, §218). 
632 Ricoeur 2004b, 316-317. (217-218). 
633 Ricoeur 2004b, 317. (218). Cf. Ricoeur 2006, 180-184. 
634 Ricoeur 2004b, 317-318. (218). Cf. Ricoeur 1986a, 284. (230). 
635 Ricoeur 2004b, 256-257. (173-174). 
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steering Course of Recognition back to both the Phenomenology and to The Philosophy of Right. 
Ricoeur’s language also implies that he, in fact, analyzes in Course of Recognition the concept of 
Anerkennung in its entire conceptual development, despite the efforts to restrict the scope of 
his analysis only to Hegel’s texts written in Jena.636  
It would be, perhaps, too harsh a criticism to state that Ricoeur’s reading of 
Jena-Hegel’s texts fails, as that would imply that Ricoeur did not know what he was doing. In 
contrast to such claims, I maintain that Ricoeur’s emphasis of negativity, both in the sense of 
a “struggle” or “conflict” and as Hegel’s unhappy “speculation,” was an intentional choice 
for the sake of his own argument. When Hegel is portrayed as a straw man, it is easier for 
Ricoeur to take distance from the German philosopher of Kultur, with whom he shares more 
than he cares to openly acknowledge in the lines of Course of Recognition.  
 
7.2 Re-cognition: A Ricoeurian An-erkennung 
Ricoeur’s relation to Hegel’s post-Jena works is still for us an unresolved problem that must 
be addressed; it is this analysis that affirms the claims I have made with regard to Ricoeur’s 
way of reading Hegel. Ricoeur’s conceptual-historical undecidedness in applying Hegel’s 
term Anerkennung leads us to consider Alexandre Kojève’s role in the later French reception 
of Hegel’s ideas, particularly with regard to the dialectics of recognition. Ricoeur’s Hegel 
analysis, in which he highlights the aspect of negativity, or the struggle, even in its muted 
forms such as misrecognition, would have benefited greatly if Ricoeur had examined those 
few famous passages from the Phenomenology on which Kojève focuses his attention: §185-
§188 on the struggle for recognition and §189-§196 on master-slave dialectics. Similarly, the 
                                               
636 Ricoeur 2004b, 256-257. (173-174). 
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politically more elaborated Philosophy of Right would have been an appropriate source for 
Ricoeur, especially in the light of its last and the most extensive part that concerns the 
structures of ethical life, Sittlichkeit.637 Ricoeur’s own argument takes on this kind of tone 
particularly when analyzing the notions of just peace and “suitable action” (l’action qui 
convient).638 Even though Ricoeur claims to limit the examination in Course of Recognition to 
Hegel’s Jena texts, the temptation of Hegel’s masterpieces – the Phenomenology and the 
Philosophy of Right – appears irresistible to Ricoeur.  
 Insofar as the notions of struggle and ethical life are concerned, let me also 
point out that Ricoeur could have focused on both the Phenomenology and the Philosophy of 
Right. I have argued above that Ricoeur’s own analysis, however, brings forth “our actual 
experience of what I [that is, Ricoeur] shall call states of peace.”639 Instead of examining the 
never-ending conflict, Ricoeur wishes to “turn to truces, sunny breaks (l’éclaircies),” that is, to 
our experiences of peaceful recognition that are conceptualized by αγά3η and represented 
symbolically by mutual gift-exchange.640 This wish, however, connects to a body of material 
that Hegel provides for us in his above-mentioned major works.  
 I would like, at this point, to emphasize that the notion of loving peace 
becomes a challenge for Ricoeur’s Hegel-interpretation. Hegel, after all, does not 
philosophize only the negative moment, even though Ricoeur already maintains in History 
and Truth that Hegel opened the path for philosophies that “made negation the spring of 
reflection, or which even identify the human reality with negativity.”641 The Kojèvean 
approach, which places the dialectical struggle for recognition at the core of the 
                                               
637 Cf. Ricoeur 2004b, 294, 316-317. (201, 217). 
638 Ricoeur 2004b, 318-319. (218-219). 
639 Ricoeur 2004b, 318. (218). 
640 Ricoeur 2004b, 318. (218). 
641 Ricoeur 1967a, 336. (305). 
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Phenomenology, is only one possible interpretation to Hegel’s work.642 The phenomenology of 
the Spirit, as Hegel’s philosophico-metaphysical science, aims at the restoration of the truth 
of “what is,”643 but, as Hegel states in the preface, “the true exists only in what, or rather 
exists only as what, is at one time called intuition and at another time called either the 
immediate knowledge of the absolute, or religion, or being – not at the center of the divine 
love, but the being of divine love itself.”644 All epistemologico-metaphysical models 
presented in the history of philosophy ultimately speak of divine and gracious being.  
Hegel argues that this truth-giving love, Liebe, is necessarily active, since “an 
inactive love has no being and is for that reason surely not what one has in mind here.”645 
Love, as active, has only a particular task: it aims at “removing an evil from someone and 
imposing some good for him.”646 Instead of objectifying, love subjectifies – it reconciles and 
renders meaningless the struggle for recognition in which the other is a threat to my 
subjectivity. In brief, love forgives, and forgiving, in turn, is “to recognize as good (als gut 
anerkennt) what had been determined in thought to be bad.”647 Instead of conceiving the 
other as an object, the other is another subject. Even when taking into account Hegel’s 
distinction between sentimental and the “spiritual” love, it is, nevertheless, possible for us to 
maintain that this loving model of recognition in the Phenomenology does not draw its essence 
from the struggle for recognition as Kojève maintains but from love as recognition that does 
not “see” differences but sets them aside instead. 
The triad of love, forgiveness, and recognition brings us then to the Absolute 
Spirit, the crux of Hegel’s Phenomenology. An extraordinarily important passage from this work 
                                               
642 Cf. Ricoeur 2004b, 256. (173). 
643 Hegel 2008, 7. (§7). 
644 Hegel 2008, 6. (§6). 
645 Hegel 2008, 380. (§424). 
646 Hegel 2008, 380. (§424). 
647 Hegel 2008, 611. (§670). 
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expresses Hegel’s ultimate conviction that in a forgiving act of recognition of love (ein 
Anerkennen der Liebe) the opposition between the self and its other becomes insignificant: 
“The word of reconciliation,” Hegel writes, “is the existing spirit which immediately intuits in 
its opposite the pure knowledge of itself as the universal essence, intuits it in the pure 
knowledge of itself as singularity existing absolutely inwardly – a mutual recognition which is 
the absolute Spirit (ein gegenseitiges Anerkennen, welches der absolute Geist ist).”648 The Absolute 
Spirit is mutual recognition under the concept of loving reconciliation that turns back from 
objective differences to the substantially there-being of subjects who only in their “being-
for-another” (Sein für Anderes) become self-standing “beings-for-themselves” (Für-sich-seins).649  
It is my conviction that this loving model of recognition resembles the one 
proposed by Ricoeur under the sign of αγά3η, which “knows nothing of comparison and 
calculation.”650 When Ricoeur insists that the “states of peace, with αγά3η at their head, are 
[not only] globally opposed to states of struggle that are not summed up by the violence of 
vengeance […], but also and principally […] those struggles having to do with justice,”651 he 
could be merely echoing Hegel’s understanding that the loving word of reconciliation, das 
Wort der Versöhnung, opens the realm of true mutual recognition. Again, Ricoeur also 
maintains that “αγά3η speaks,” that love enters into language and proclaims itself in 
language.652 Were it not for the fact that Ricoeur insisted in only reading Hegel’s early work, 
we could think that Ricoeur is simply following Hegel’s insight in his Phenomenology when 
arguing for loving mutuality. 
                                               
648 Hegel 2008, 611. (§670). 
649 Hegel 2008, 696-703. (§772-779). 
650 Ricoeur 2004b, 321. (220). 
651 Ricoeur 2004b, 321. (220). 
652 Ricoeur 2004b, 323-324. (222-223). 
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This daring suggestion of Ricoeur’s remodeling of Hegel is strengthened by 
Ricoeur’s brief note in Memory, History, Forgetting. While discussing forgiveness and forgetting 
in the very last section of the work, Ricoeur admits that the essence of Hegel’s work is not in 
the struggle. In the Phenomenology, for example, “forgiveness rests on a reciprocal standing 
down of the parties, on each side giving up its partiality.”653 To restate, Ricoeur 
acknowledges in Memory, History, Forgetting that the struggle is not the last word in Hegel’s 
analysis, which in the final phase culminates in mutual recognition based on forgiveness in 
the transition from Spirit to Religion. In sum, Hegel’s idea of forgiving love that recognizes 
is not unknown for Ricoeur.  
 In an attempt at self-critique, it might be objected that once having introduced 
the alternative model of “clearings” or “sunny breaks” with the notion of love, Ricoeur 
particularizes mutual recognition in Course of Recognition by reducing it to social gestures in 
exchanges. This section that precedes Ricoeur’s conclusions, it could be argued, captures the 
essence of Ricoeur’s own gift-symbol model of recognition and, therefore, the alleged 
affinity with Hegel’s loving model of recognition appears to be a deviant interpretation. In 
other words, Ricoeur moves on from the idea of love and focuses the theme of mutual 
recognition on gift exchanges. “From here on,” Ricoeur states as he makes way to this new 
analysis, “I shall compare the exchange of gifts to commercial exchange,” meaning that true 
mutual recognition is constituted by gifts, and mere reciprocity between social agents making 
transactions follows from commercial exchange.654 The same distinction Ricoeur makes 
between exchanging gifts and commercial exchanges, however, leads me to question this 
attempted self-criticism.  
                                               
653 Ricoeur 2000b, 653. n52. (606. n52). 
654 Ricoeur 2004b, 337-338. (232-233). 
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Ricoeur’s affinity with Hegel cannot be questioned by focusing on exchanges, 
as the notion of gift and the idea of their exchange – even in a ceremonial setting – are also 
familiar to Hegel’s Phenomenology.655 Hegel, in other words, does not exclude these kinds of 
non-commercial relations between the self and its other. I turn next, however, to the 
Philosophy of Right, which would have been another potential source for Ricoeur to advance 
his argument on the struggle for recognition. As it appears, the notion of gift is also well-
known in the Philosophy of Right.  
When analyzing Hegel’s System of Ethical Life, Ricoeur indicates that contracts – 
administered by the system of justice – imply an indirect recognition of individual subjects.656 
The same indirect recognition, however, is also affirmed by the Philosophy of Right which 
defines the concept of contract (Vertrag) as “the means whereby one identical will can persist 
within the absolute difference between independent property owners.”657 A person remains 
as one independently of ownership, and therefore the contracting parties are to each other 
“immediate self-subsistent persons.”658 Because the contract retains and depends on 
individuality, contractual relationship implies recognition in the contract. 
Let me press this point further. Hegel makes a connection – which Ricoeur 
ignores – between the indirect recognition of one’s person through contract and gift-giving 
in sections §76 and §80 of the Philosophy of Right, where he distinguishes gifts from trade-off. 
“Contract is formal,” Hegel writes, “when the double consent whereby the common will is 
brought into existence is apportioned between the two contracting parties so that one of 
them has the negative moment – the alienation of a thing – and the other the positive 
                                               
655 Hegel 2008, 203-204, 390, 650-651. (§229, §463, §719). 
656 Ricoeur 2004b, 262-263. (178-179).  
657 Hegel 1967, 58. (§74).; Ricoeur 2004b, 260. (176-177). 
658 Hegel 1967, 58. (§75). 
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moment – the appropriation of the thing. Such a contract is gift (Schenkungsvertrag).”659 In 
contrast to this gift, which is based on contract-like exchange where one agrees to give and 
another agrees to receive, there is another type of contract-based exchange, which relates to 
property and its commercial value. According to Hegel a contract “may be called real when 
each of the two contracting wills is the sum of these mediating moments [that is, both the 
alienation and the appropriation of a thing] and therefore in such a contract becomes a 
property owner and remains so.”660 Hegel calls this second style of contract a trade-off 
(Tauschvertrag).661 In other words, if a contract includes the exchange that is reciprocal, then it 
is mere trade-off, but if the exchange is willingly initiated from each side individually, then 
this form of exchange fulfills the formal requirement of contract but must still be considered 
different from commercial exchange. It is therefore a gift by which the other subject is 
recognized; it is love at the level of exchange. 
Hegel, as also Ricoeur, draws a clear line among the kinds of contractual 
relationships, gifts or trade-offs, in which the persons are recognized. In short, a gift-giver 
does not expect something in return whereas in trade-off he does. This idea parallels that of 
Ricoeur in Course of Recognition: “the generous practice of gift giving, at least in its ‘pure’ form, 
                                               
659 Hegel 1967, 59. (§76). 
660 Hegel 1967, 59. (§76). 
661 Hegel 1967, 59. (§76). – Knox translates the German word “Tausch” as “exchange” but trade-off is 
evidently much clearer as it correctly indicates a commercial-style exchange. As a more philosophical remark, 
let me mention that the typology of contracts which Hegel presents in §80 follows this distinction between a 
gift and a trade-off. Hegel stresses that this classification is not based on “external circumstances” but is 
derived “from distinctions lying in the very nature of contract.” Hegel then catalogues gift-style contracts as a 
proper gift of a thing (eigentlich Schenkung), a free loan of a thing (das Leihen als Verschenkung), and a testament-
style “gift of service” (Schenkung einer Dienstleistung überhaupt), a kind of safe-keeping of a conditionally donated 
property. The trade-off style contracts differ from these gifts according to Hegel, because they include the 
notion of exchange value: it is either a simple exchange of a thing for a similar one, or purchase or sale (Kauf 
oder Verkauf). To these Hegel adds letting or leasing (Vermietung), and also the contract for wages (Lohnvertrag), 
that is, productive capability or services provided in exchange of a pay (Lohn). In contrast to gifts, all these 
trade-offs take their reference in commercial value. Hegel 1967, 62. (§80). 
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neither requires nor expects a gift in return.”662 For his part Ricoeur then distinguishes the 
exchange of gifts from commercial exchange, as noted above, and argues that the 
relationship between those who exchange gifts is mutual whereas in the case of commercial 
exchange the relationship is reciprocal.663 I cannot stress enough that Ricoeur defines this 
contrast between mutuality and reciprocity “as a fundamental presupposition of my central 
thesis concerning the idea of symbolic mutual recognition.”664 In other words, Ricoeur 
introduces the crucial distinction between mutuality and reciprocity by using an example of 
gift-giving that is in opposition to trade-off (that can be understood as a reduction of love to 
justice). This distinction resembles very much the one proposed by Hegel.  
I maintain, therefore, that the example of gift-exchange through which 
Ricoeur examines the notion of mutuality could have been adopted from Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right rather than, through Axel Honneth, from Marcel Mauss’s work The Gift (that Julian 
Pefanis holds as Kojèvean).665 In his struggle against the Hegelian temptation, Ricoeur clearly 
has an urge to distance himself from Hegel with whom he feels perhaps too close an affinity. 
This could be why, for example, David Rasmussen pays attention to Ricoeur’s discomfort 
with the Hegelian tradition.666 If approached from an empathetic point of view, however, 
                                               
662 Ricoeur 2004b, 320. (219). 
663 Ricoeur 2004b, 338. (233). 
664 Ricoeur 2004b, 338. (232-233). 
665 Cf. Ricoeur 2004b, 327-328. (225); Ricoeur 2000b, 622. (480). – Julian Pefanis makes an interesting 
remark in Heterology and the Postmodern with regard to certain interconnections between Kojève’s Hegel-
interpretation and some French contemporary thinkers: “Mauss’s gift is phenomenological - notwithstanding 
the structuralist gloss it has received - a mediator of inter-human relationships governed by a (Hegelian) desire 
for recognition, negation, and mastery; the phenomenology of the gift is indeed akin to certain propositions in 
Hegel. Whilst there is no specific reference to Hegel in Mauss, Lyotard claims that there is a ‘condensation’ of 
the phenomenological Mauss and the structuralist Lacan in the concept of symbolic exchange as employed by 
Baudrillard, and that this condensation can be traced back to a common source, chapter 4 of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Mind. The mediator here is surely Georges Bataille in his reading of Kojève’s Hegel, even as 
Lacan himself condensed Hegel and Freud in his early psychoanalytic studies.” (Pefanis 1991, 30.) Let me 
mention, however, that in our discussions Richard Kearney has expressed his reservations to Pefanis’s claim. 
666 Rasmussen 2010, 192. 
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Hegel offers a backbone even for Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of mutual recognition, showing 
Ricoeur’s deep debt to Hegel underneath his discomfort.  
It is not always evident with which Hegel Ricoeur takes an issue – Hegel 
himself or perhaps Kojève’s or Honneth’s later interpretation of him. Ricoeur admits 
adopting a precisely negative reading: the notion of being-recognized is read “with a strong 
emphasis being given to the negative forms of refusal of recognition, to disrespect,”667 in 
other words, as a struggle for recognition leading to the master/slave relation. Ricoeur 
admits of reducing Hegel’s argument and Honneth’s later interpretation of it to the struggle 
which does not grant subjectivity to the other but denies it, negativizes it in objectifying it. 
“The following section,” Ricoeur writes when opening the Honneth-analysis, “will be a 
discussion centered on the very idea of struggle, coming from Hegel.”668 If it is the case after 
all that Ricoeur reads Hegel with Kojève’s struggle-oriented eyes, then his discomfort is 
understandable, but still not acceptable if taken to the level of internal need to renounce 
Hegel.  
It is now important to stress that I do not equate Ricoeur’s philosophy with 
that of Hegel. On the contrary, I acknowledge that there are severe philosophical differences 
between them. The general problem for Ricoeur clearly is Hegel’s “monological approach,” 
that the Spirit itself is “set over against itself in differentiating itself,” that is, the Spirit 
objectifies itself and becomes the other to itself.669 In spite of his conception of dialectical 
formation, Hegel emphasizes the Spirit’s unity of subsistence, whereas Ricoeur stresses the 
unceasing and tensional plurality of relations in the sense of with-being and being-among. In 
                                               
667 Ricoeur 2004b, 316. (217). 
668 Ricoeur 2004b, 276. (188). 
669 Ricoeur 2004b, 273. (186). – Ricoeur utilizes the expression that Honneth repeatedly uses in his The 
Struggle for Recognition; “a monologically self-developing Spirit.” Honneth 1995, 36, 48, 61, 97. 
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Course of Recognition this pre-existing cultural sociality draws, therefore, Ricoeur to examine 
Axel Honneth’s “systematic renewal” of Anerkennung as love, law, and the social respect; 
Ricoeur shares with Honneth the dislike of the metaphysics of the Absolute.670 Even though 
Honneth’s reading of Hegel is – according to Ricoeur – not totally free from the 
metaphysical influence, it is at least “half-speculative, half-empirical” and therefore, Ricoeur 
claims, closer to his own approach.671 Ricoeur, let me re-emphasize, is not totally Hegelian. 
To make a distinction between Ricoeur and Hegel, whose similarity I have 
stressed so far, let me turn now to consider briefly Axel Honneth’s stance in all this. It is, 
after all, the case that Ricoeur admits being influenced by Honneth’s Hegel-renewal. In turn 
being influenced by Hegel’s Jena texts and George Herbert Mead’s “postmetaphysical” social 
psychology, Honneth develops in The Struggle for Recognition a threefold model of reciprocal 
recognition – love, rights or justice, and solidarity or social esteem.672 This course of social 
recognition, Ricoeur points out, very much resembles that of Hegel’s System of Ethical Life; a 
text that Honneth analyzes before presenting his own social philosophical “renewal.”673 Still, 
Ricoeur expresses his indebtedness to Honneth rather than to Hegel as he follows the same 
structure in Course of Recognition.674 This structural similarity, however, can easily deceive 
Ricoeur’s readers. Even though Ricoeur explicitly adopts more than a clue from Honneth to 
his own critical Hegel-interpretation, his course of social recognition675 does not completely 
match up with Honneth’s. While Honneth emphasizes the political aspect of “value-
                                               
670 Ricoeur 2004b, 274-275. (186). – Despite the fact that Hegel and Honneth differ from each other in 
their respective relations to metaphysics - Hegel’s model is ontotheological whereas Ricoeur labels Honneth’s 
model as postmetaphysical - Ricoeur acknowledges, however, that Hegel’s course of recognition in System of 
Ethical Life is “similar to the one proposed by Axel Honneth.” Furthermore, Ricoeur also connects Honneth to 
Hegel at the level of the Realphilosophie II. Ricoeur 2004b, 264, 266. (180-182). Cf. Honneth 1995, 16-63. 
671 Ricoeur 2004b, 275. (187). 
672 Honneth 1995, 71-130. 
673 Ricoeur 2004b, 264. (180).; Honneth 1995, 16-30. 
674 Ricoeur 2004b, 273-275. (186-187). 
675 Cf. Ricoeur 2004b, 296. (203). 
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communities” in the end of his triad,676 Ricoeur highlights the ethicality of political life, “the 
Hegelian concept of Sittlichkeit in its broadest sense.”677 Despite maintaining a similar 
structure, Ricoeur’s application of Hegel’s Jena texts then deviates from that of Honneth – 
most notably when distinguishing mutuality from reciprocity (that concerns merely social 
relations instead of persons), and pointing out those “sunny breaks” of social recognition 
also. 
 In searching for those “clearings” of good will under the aegis of αγά3η,678 I 
maintain, Ricoeur does not follow Honneth, but he, in a way, revitalizes Hegel in his own 
way by his very “broadening” of the scope of Sittlichkeit. Ricoeur also indicates this in the 
closing of the so-called little ethics in Oneself as Another. His conception of “critical φρόνησις” 
both “repeats” and “mediates” Sittlichkeit stripped of its Spiritualism.679 I argue that this 
“broadening” shows Ricoeur’s return to Hegel’s initial insight. Ricoeur even confesses his 
affinity to Hegel at the level of the Philosophy of Right. Despite certain metaphysical 
restrictions, “Hegel’s philosophical project in the Philosophy of Right remains very close to my 
own views,” Ricoeur admits in Oneself as Another.680 The focus of Ricoeur’s interest is 
precisely in Sittlichkeit: 
We then admitted [in the seventh study of Oneself as Another] that it was only in 
a specific institutional milieu that the capacities and predispositions that 
distinguish human action can blossom; the individual, we said then, becomes 
                                               
676 Honneth 1995, 121-130. 
677 Ricoeur 2004b, 294. (201). – Ricoeur, actually, acknowledges that he has “stopped at the threshold of 
politics in the precise sense of a theory of the state,” and excuses this shortcoming by referring to Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right in which the notion of the state is related directly to the ethical Idea and also to recognition. 
(Ricoeur 2004b, 316-317. (217).) This does not, however, prevent, for example, Antoine Garapon from 
discussing Ricoeur’s philosophy of recognition from a precise political point of view, as Ricoeur incorporates 
the political aspect to his conception of recognition through institution. In terms of Course of Recognition, 
however, Garapon’s emphasis on “reconstructive justice” that is exercised “in the political sphere” appears 
more as an application rather than an inclusion justified by Ricoeur’s earlier works such as Oneself as Another, The 
Just, and Reflections on the Just. Cf. Garapon 2006, 231, 246-248. 
678 Ricoeur 2004b, 318. (218). 
679 Ricoeur 1990, 337. (290-291).  
680 Ricoeur 1990, 290, 296. (249, 254). Cf. Michel 2006, 363-370. 
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human only under the condition of certain institutions; and we added: if this is 
so, the obligation to serve these institutions is itself a condition for the human 
agent to continue to develop. These are all reasons to feel indebted to Hegel’s 
work of hierarchizing the modalities of the actualization of freedom in the 
Philosophy of Right [that is, family, civil society, and state]. To this extent, and to 
this extent alone, the notion of Sittlichkeit […] has never ceased to instruct 
us.681 
 
Hegel’s notion of ethical life is unquestionably in Ricoeur’s philosophical interests. 
Admittedly, then, Ricoeur not only criticizes Hegel but adopts a substantial body of thought 
from him as well.  
The notion of Sittlichkeit, or ethico-political situatedness in living history, 
opens a path for Ricoeur to search for the agapeic “clearings” of freedom and good will. 
Ricoeur is well aware, however, that Hegel’s System of Ethical Life, for example, argues that 
mutual trust overcomes servitude, and that in ethical life – which has its absolute truth as the 
system of the modern constitutional State – “the individual exists in an eternal mode.”682 
This ethico-political reality surpasses the individual in its systems of need, administration of 
justice, and disciplining cultivation, all of which – despite a certain “empirical oscillation” – 
highlight ethicality beyond mere calculative reciprocity.683 From this point of view Hegel 
appears to confirm rather than to denounce that the moral motivation, or ethicality, Ricoeur 
searches for in the midst of struggle is indeed real and not illusory at all.684 
Ricoeur’s apparent Hegelianism runs even deeper than already explicated, 
however. Besides System of Ethical Life and its “sunny break” of Sittlichkeit, another such 
“clearing” is found in the Realphilosophie II. In it recognition takes place with reference to love 
(Liebe) because – Ricoeur himself quotes Hegel – “the individuals are love,” and their being-
                                               
681 Ricoeur 1990, 296-297. (254-255). Cf. Ricoeur 1990, 396-397. n3. (344-345. n51) 
682 Hegel 1979, 143, 150.; Ricoeur 2004b, 262. (178). 
683 Hegel 1979, 151, 167, 173, 176. 
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for-another (füreinander sein) is therefore the beginning of being-recognized.685 Love, as self-
negated being-for-another in which “each knows itself immediately in the other,” is 
according to Hegel elementary to Sittlichkeit.686 Even though Hegel describes a movement 
from love to struggle, from immediate cognition to proper recognition687 – from erkennen to 
an-erkennen – this movement does not abolish the claim that the movement itself towards 
Anerkennung and Sittlichkeit überhaupt springs forth from love that facilitates the movement 
from natürliche to bürgerliche Sittlichkeit, or from the natural condition to societal being.688 
The concept of love, I maintain, annuls the struggle even between Ricoeur and 
Hegel. Hegel’s concept of Anerkennung appears surprisingly expansive, at least in comparison 
to the struggle-focused and therefore reductive Kojèvean interpretation. While Kojève and 
Ricoeur reduce in their respective interpretations the Hegelian recognition to struggle, 
Hegel’s Anerkennung has a wider scope of meaning: loving recognition that grounds 
                                               
685 Ricoeur 2004b, 267. (182). 
686 Hegel 1969, 201-202. 
687 Assefa 1987, 61. 
688 Hegel 1969, 209, 212. – In contrast to Axel Honneth’s struggle-oriented reading (Honneth 1995, 5, 33, 
37-49, 52, 56, 62.), Hegel scholar and translator Leo Rauch, for example, is firmly convinced that Hegel’s 
Realphilosophie II is a philosophy of loving mutuality, and not of pervasive conflict. “In the 1806 Jena lectures,” 
Rauch points out, “the interrelation of selves is not struggle but love, wherein recognition occurs not in a 
reciprocal and conscious bestowal of selfhood, but in the fact that each party knows itself immediately in the 
other (i.e., without consciously affirming it), and makes this real in the interrelation.” According to Rauch, for 
the Hegel of Realphilosophie II recognition takes place “in implicit mutuality, not in conflict.” Recognition, then, 
is fundamentally social, and there is no need for the struggle for recognition – except perhaps to some extent in 
the movement of externalization, that is, self-objectification through labor. Furthermore, the social setting of 
recognition is then all-pervasive, and the only real threat to being recognized is in dehumanization by alienated 
labor. As Rauch summarizes, in the Realphilosophie II “one’s very being is a recognized being (anerkanntes Seyn) 
[…] individuality is then itself the product of social existence.” The notion of socializing love, therefore, 
culminates the whole of Realphilosophie II. (Rauch 1987, 51-52.) 
On the other hand, Samuel Assefa criticizes Rauch’s Hegel interpretation by arguing that in the 
Realphilosophie II the struggle and recognition are equiprimordial whereas in the Phenomenology the notion of 
struggle argumentatively precedes the dialectics of recognition. Even if I agree with Assefa that there is a 
difference between the models of recognition in Realphilosophie II and in the Phenomenology, his criticism does not 
do away with Rauch’s contribution of the notion of love to Hegel reception. Rauch’s interpretation illuminates 
another whole kind of approach to Hegel not entirely clouded by the Kojèvean emphasis on the struggle. Hegel 
indeed integrates love, and the mutuality based on it. In addition, as pointed out earlier in this dissertation, the 
Phenomenology favors the idea that the loving model of recognition prefers no struggling opposition but 
recognition - after being forgiven - which overcomes distinction. I therefore ask again, is this not what Ricoeur 
discusses under the notion of αγά3η-love which “knows nothing of comparison and calculation”? Assefa 1987, 
62.; Hegel 2008, 696. (§772).; Ricoeur 2004b, 321. (220). 
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mutuality. Put differently, this is reconciliation between the Spirit and its other under ein 
Anerkennen der Liebe, “loving recognition” or “recognition by love.”689  
All the more strikingly, Ricoeur is well aware of this model of recognition that 
has set all opposing distinctions aside. Unlike Course of Recognition, which is quite guarded with 
respect to Hegel’s post-Jena texts,690 Oneself as Another echoes the conviction that Hegel’s 
notion of recognition is not limited to the struggle. Discussing Hegel’s analysis of moral 
conflict within Sophocles’ Antigone,691 Ricoeur admits that in the Phenomenology Hegel achieves 
a notion of recognition that surpasses mere reciprocity. Instead of retaining the idea of 
many-sided struggle, as in Antigone, according to Ricoeur, Hegel overcomes it by introducing 
the notion of forgiveness: 
If one must, at some point, “renounce Hegel,” his treatment of tragedy is not 
the place to do so; if Hegel is reproached with having imposed a “synthesis” 
upon all the divisions that his philosophy displays the genius for discovering or 
inventing, this synthesis is certainly not drawn from tragedy [i.e., the fiction 
forged by Sophocles that is one of conflicts]. And if some fragile reconciliation 
is announced, it finds its meaning solely in the genuine reconciliations that the 
Phenomenology of Spirit will encounter only at a much more advanced stage of the 
dialectic. We cannot fail to note, in this connection, that tragedy is mentioned 
only at the start of the vast itinerary that occupies all of chapter 6, entitled 
“Geist” (indicating that this chapter is homologous with the work as a whole): 
the genuine reconciliation occurs only at the very end of this itinerary, at the 
outcome of the conflict between judging consciousness and acting 
consciousness; this reconciliation rests on an actual renunciation by each party 
of his partiality and has the value of a pardon in which each is truly recognized 
by the other (véritablement reconnu par l’autre). Now it is precisely this 
reconciliation through renouncement, this pardon through recognition (pardon 
par reconnaissance), that tragedy – at least the tragedy Antigone – is incapable of 
producing.692 
 
The struggle exemplified by the tragedy is not the last word in Hegel’s analysis any more 
than the struggle of the master and slave; it is reserved for forgiveness and reconciliation. 
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690 Ricoeur 2004b, 253-256. (171-174). 
691 Ricoeur 1990, 281, 284. (241, 243). 
692 Ricoeur 1990, 288. (247-248). Cf. Ricoeur 1990, 395. (343).; Fisher 2011, 163-166. 
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Recognition, Ricoeur summarizes, is achieved when partiality is renounced, when the 
struggle is surpassed by mutuality – particularity by universality.693 According to Ricoeur’s 
reading of Hegel in Oneself as Another, I argue, the act of forgiving recognition of love is the 
crux of the matter. Ricoeur’s notion of Anerkennung in Course of Recognition as pertaining only 
to conflictual recognition becomes then severely disputed.694 
 Both Hegel and Ricoeur achieve the notion of recognition as ethical life in the 
light of love: the Hegelian Anerkennung includes the moment of Sittlichkeit that, in turn, 
facilitates Anerkennung under the thematics of the Objective Spirit. Furthermore, Hegel’s 
progression in the Phenomenology from consciousness to being self-conscious (Selbsbewußtsein) 
requires that the subject becomes recognized. Hegel famously argues in the Phenomenology that 
“self-consciousness is in and for itself because and by way of its being in and for itself for an 
other; that is, it is only as recognized (ein Anerkanntes).”695 The path from consciousness to 
self-consciousness requires this mutuality, which ultimately sets the subjects free from the 
struggle,696 as the consciousnesses “recognize themselves as mutually recognizing each 
other.”697 For Hegel, this is the “pure concept of recognition” that is then set to play in the 
actualization of the various historical shapes of consciousness, in ethical life as politico-
                                               
693 As Ricoeur’s 1951 essay “Pour la coexistence pacifique des civilisations” demonstrates, in political 
reality the question of partiality is a difficult one; a peaceful co-existence between “civilizations” such as the 
“American” and the “Soviet” political system can only be based on a cultural critique (“une critique de civilisation”) 
that recognizes the idea that all socio-political systems are only modes of “human becoming” and “becoming 
human” – l’avènement humain. Cf. Ricoeur 1951, 408-419. 
694 Ricoeur 2004b, 276. (188). 
695 Hegel 2008, 164. (§178). Cf. Hegel 2008, 162. (§175). 
696 Hegel 2008, 165. (§181). “- - aber gibt es das andere Selbsbewußtsein ihm wieder ebenso zurück, denn 
es war sich im Andern, es hebt dies sein Sein im Andern auf, entläßt also das andere wieder frei.” – The 
“struggle unto death” quite obviously poses a challenge to this reading of Hegel. It should not be left 
unnoticed, however, that it is precisely the passing the test of the struggle that is important for Hegel. It is through 
the struggle that each proves his worth to himself, and that both prove their worth to each other, but this aims to 
freedom: “it is solely by staking one’s life that freedom is proven to be the essence.” Cf. Hegel 2008, 168-169. 
(§187-§188).  
697 Hegel 2008, 167. (§184). “Sie anerkennen sich als gegenseitig sich anerkennend.” 
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ethical situatedness in living history.698 Ricoeur’s emphasis is the same, ethico-politically – or, 
culturally – facilitated An-erkennung.  
For Ricoeur and in the end also for Hegel, recognition is returning to realize 
the sunny breaks of good will upon which my being-here depends.699 Recognition is, 
therefore, about remembering, both in the sense of socially re-membering oneself to one’s 
communal situatedness in which one is recognized, and in the sense of fully remembering 
again our politico-ethical situation that calls for a loving attitude towards other members of 
the cultural community. For Ricoeur also, Anerkennung and Sittlichkeit become discernible 
through each other.700 To maintain an argumentative distance to Hegel, that is, to give an 
impression of avoiding the “Hegelian temptation,” Ricoeur adopts in Course of Recognition an 
unnecessary Kojèvean approach – even when claiming to avoid Kojève’s interpretation 
altogether. In sum, the sunny break of Ricoeur’s good will is clouded by misrecognition. 
 
7.3 Ricoeur and Cultural Formation 
Enabled by our preceding analysis of Ricoeur’s relation to Hegel, it is now time to make 
explicit Ricoeur’s presuppositions with regard to the notion of culture, or Bildung. This 
discussion will connect the earlier idea of re-membering with our Ricoeur-Hegel analysis 
from a cultural point of view. Put differently, this section completes the “letting appear” of 
Ricoeur’s cultural hermeneutics in the context of his last work. Let me continue, therefore, 
our reading of Course of Recognition, in which Ricoeur focuses on Hegel’s concept of Sittlichkeit 
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699 Morny Joy maintains in her 2003 essay that “Ricoeur’s invoking of Hegel’s work […] portrays a process 
of mutual affirmation without any desire for eliminating or integrating the other.” Even though Joy responds to 
the Kojèvean challenge, or its emphasis on “destructive negativity,” it is a simplification to argue that Ricoeur’s 
conception of Anerkennung does not recognize the moment of struggle. For this very reason Ricoeur can only 
allude to the “sunny breaks,” and not to any pure mutuality devoid of differentiation. Joy 2003, 518-519. 
700 Ricoeur 2004b, 294. (201). 
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from the point of view of social esteem when arguing that this esteem “sums up all the 
modes of mutual recognition that exceed the mere recognition of the equality of right among 
subjects.”701 The notion of social esteem, I emphasize, is far from being a universal without 
contextual variation, however. Ricoeur points out that Honneth – reiterating Hegel’s 
philosophy – already connects social mediation, symbolic constitution, and the notion of 
culture together: “By stating that these relations of [social] esteem vary over time, [Honneth] 
opens the way to a multidimensional exploration of social mediations considered from the 
point of view of their symbolic constitution; the cultural conception that a society has of 
itself makes up the values and ethical ends in question in each case.”702 The cultural context, 
Ricoeur argues, determines esteem at the fundamental level.  
 Institutionalized organization that mediates by ensuring communicability at the 
different levels of social life – the “orders of recognition” Ricoeur already discussed in La 
critique et la conviction703 – does not exclude differences in personal opinion in relation to 
individuals’ social standing.704 Still, this cultural context guarantees a certain cohesion that 
helps maintain social stratum. Larger-scale sociocultural entities such as cities or “worlds,” as 
Ricoeur calls them, are not, however, fully above critical thought since individuals can make 
a passage from one sociocultural context to another. Specific social settings and models of 
institutionalized organization can and even should be criticized.705 Ricoeur maintains that 
“disputes and differences of opinion do not consist solely in disagreements over the standing 
of individuals; they have to do also with the reliability of physical mechanisms [such as 
                                               
701 Ricoeur 2004b, 295. (202). 
702 Ricoeur 2004b, 295. (202). 
703 Trans. Critique and Conviction (by Kathleen Blamey, 1998). From hereon the English title is used. Cf.  
Ricoeur, Azouvi, & de Launay 1995, 95-98, 148-149. (60-62, 96). 
704 Ricoeur 2004b, 296-299. (203-204). 
705 Ricoeur 2004b, 307. (210). Apparently Ricoeur distinguishes - paralleling Hegel’s Philosophy of Right - 
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Ricoeur 2004b, 280. (191). 
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utilities, commerce and various institutions] that give consistency to some ‘situation that 
works.’”706 The varying concrete forms of sociocultural entities, their institutionalized 
settings, are not beyond criticism, but the general need for such contexts is incontestable. 
To summarize, the reliability and consistency of a cultural context is disputable 
particularly at the institutional level of specific sociocultural entities. Ricoeur argues that 
these entities with their “mechanisms” are, nevertheless, necessary from the practical point 
of view: “Sheltered by these limited forms of consensus, different individual ways of living 
come from a ‘phronesis’ applicable to the variety of situations of ‘deliberation’ (to use an 
Aristotelian vocabulary).”707 In other words, a sociocultural entity provides a meaningful and 
organized context for human action that is carried out at the level of individuals who, in 
turn, are then conceived as social agents aiming at common good, however it might be 
defined in each context.  
 Besides different cultures with their own institutional settings, Ricoeur 
acknowledges that it is possible for different cultures to have developed “within one and the 
same institutional setting”; he calls this multiculturalism.708 The notion of struggle, notably 
present in the case of differences of personal opinion, then seems to make its way back to 
Ricoeur’s theory of different individual cultures. Ricoeur argues that multiculturalism, which 
in itself indicates communal distinctions within communities, makes apparent the battle 
against discrimination that results from a minority’s “demand for equality on the social 
plane.”709 In fact, Ricoeur claims, in the case of “the politics of recognition” – by which he 
means institutionalized procedures of “reverse” discrimination described by Charles Taylor – 
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“the demand for universal recognition proceeds from a differentiated cultural background” 
in contrast to the dominant or hegemonic cultural setting.710 The struggle for recognition has 
then shifted to a collective level of underprivileged or under-esteemed groups or minorities 
while still pertaining to the level of individuals as well. “It is collectively, one could say, that 
we demand an individualizing recognition,” Ricoeur maintains.711 Put differently – to 
revitalize again the imagery of Aristotle’s Politics – a human being, a ζώον 3ολιτικόν even more 
than bees,712 identifies himself as re-membered: an individual requires to be recognized as a 
member of a socio-cultural collective. 
 The notion of the struggle, however, is still worrisome. As noted above, the 
struggle for recognition is surpassed by mutuality as the need of the cultural, and the act of 
forgiving recognition of love prevails in this common conditioned sense of recognition 
through formation: language, for example, functions only when it is shared as a mutual 
condition. Nevertheless, the “pure concept of recognition” is set in play only in ethical life as 
politico-ethical situatedness in living history.713 Despite having focused on those “clearings” 
Ricoeur has reminded us of, the darker side of human reality, its dissymmetrical character, 
has not been abolished. Quite the contrary, in fact, as Ricoeur himself acknowledges, “a just 
distance is maintained at the heart of mutuality.”714 Ricoeur maintains – in contrast to 
Gadamer, as George H. Taylor emphasizes715 – that there is a fundamental dissymmetry even 
at the level of most agapeic recognition. In other words, I cannot become the other as if 
letting the other overshadow myself in the communalization of our horizons: there remains 
an unbridgeable gap between these two even when a “sunny break” is witnessed. In the end, 
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then, it is Ricoeur who reduces love to dissymmetrical relations and not Hegel. “The struggle 
for recognition,” Ricoeur argues blatantly, “perhaps remains endless.”716 In any case, then, 
trying to simply do away with the struggle is not helpful, as I have already argued in relation 
to Gonçalo Marcelo’s reading of Course of Recognition. Rather, its function as educative and 
self-revealing experience should be understood. 
 Although he does not restate it in Course of Recognition, Ricoeur has claimed that 
taking the “short route” from here to the there of loving harmony is not adequate to the 
philosopher’s task. Instead, he proposes the “long route” of mediation that correlates with 
the unceasing task of becoming a self.717 Let me remind us of Jean Greisch’s remark that 
Ricoeur and Hegel therefore “share the conviction that ‘the way of the spirit is primarily 
mediation, it is detour.’”718 Clarifying the nature of this detour in his essay “Hegel 
aujourd’hui,” Ricoeur maintains that from a rationalist and a humanist points of view the 
Phenomenology of Spirit “could be considered as a novel on culture, in a philosophical form. 
[…] It is a theory of culture.”719 The conflict, the struggle, finds its place precisely in this 
arduous but also rewarding cultural detour that only in its final phase surpasses the “one-
sidedness” of individuals, as Ricoeur maintains in Oneself as Another while reading Hegel’s 
Phenomenology:  
If there is a sense to all this [in Antigone], it is not “for them” but “for us.” 
“For them,” disappearance in death; “for us,” the indirect lesson of this 
disaster. The calm reconciliation sung by the chorus cannot take the place of 
pardon. The one-sidedness of each of the characters, including Antigone, 
excludes any such mutual recognition (reconnaissance mutuelle). This is why Hegel 
moves from Antigone to Oedipus Rex, in which he sees the tragedy of ignorance 
and of self-recognition concentrated in the same tragic individual. Self-
consciousness takes another step forward here, without reaching the sort of 
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reconciliation proposed at the end of chapter 6. One must first cross through 
the conflict tied to culture (Bildung), which is that of “spirit alienated from 
itself” (der sich entfremdete Geist), in order to apprehend this outcome.720  
 
Both Ricoeur and Hegel argue that tragic stories are not full descriptions but limited steps 
for us to understand an aspect of our condition: the full self-consciousness is reached only in 
a final reconciliation as having-been-forgiven – Hegel connects this with religion and with 
absolute remembering (Erinnerung) in a timeless reconciliation (Versöhnung). The conflict, or 
the arduous detour of self-consciousness, is tied to individual cultures, Ricoeur argues in the 
wake of Hegel, and in order to attain the forgiving recognition of love one must first accept 
this indirect cultural detour. In taking that detour it becomes understood that I must first 
become objectified, before being capable of reaching a reconciled notion of being the 
necessarily cultured social human being I am. 
The Phenomenology of Spirit aims at “der Weg die Erinnerung der Geister,” that is, to 
the recollection of the path of the Spirit’s historical-cultural unfolding of itself in its different 
shapes.721 This is why Hegel’s work also provides means for prefiguring Ricoeur’s cultural 
hermeneutics. Hegel insists, quite famously, that the path consciousness needs to undergo 
“is the detailed history of the cultural formation of consciousness.”722 Hegel also analyzed a 
course of recognition, but such a recognition must also be facilitated by a cultural shape – or 
rather, cultural shapes. The notion of Bildung, figuring or formation, is therefore essential as 
it explains how the Spirit’s unfolding of itself and the subsequent return to itself is mediated.  
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As stated above, it is evident that Ricoeur follows in Course of Recognition this 
path of historical-cultural unfolding while analyzing Hegel’s Realphilosophie II.723 In brief, self-
recognition takes place in the cultural detour that for the Spirit is its “other,” and it finds rest 
in a “reobtained immediacy” only though that “other.”724 In order to understand the conflict, 
therefore, we must understand the cultural “detour” to which it is bound. This task is in the 
interest of this whole dissertation, but it can be shifted to the proper, ethico-political level by 
briefly analyzing Ricoeur’s use of the concept of culture in Course of Recognition.  
 Again, Ricoeur does not give any precise definition of the term “culture” in 
Course of Recognition. As we have seen, he intentionally avoids such definition when insisting 
that “there is no reason, in this context, to oppose [the word culture] to the idea of 
civilization.”725 Instead, Ricoeur seems to accept the idea that culture is an elementary and 
therefore not fully explicable aspect of our everyday world of life – cultural facts such as 
sciences are in this presupposed world.726 As seen above, however, Ricoeur frequently uses 
the term and its derivatives in such a manner that more articulated features of culture are 
implied. Although not providing a concise definition himself, Ricoeur’s cultural concept 
appears to affirm that culture has a variegated context of meaning and of human action, and 
therefore has both synchronic and diachronic mediation as its major function.  
 Cultural variation is indisputable. Ricoeur’s discussion of multiculturalism 
includes the notion of differentiated cultural backgrounds, and contrasts the dominant 
cultural setting with the alternating cultural settings of minorities.727 Even if the contrast 
internal to an institutional setting is not always apparent, it is taken for granted. Charles 
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Taylor asserts, as quoted by Ricoeur in Course of Recognition, that “the supposedly neutral set 
of difference-blind principles of the politics of equal dignity is in fact a reflection of one 
hegemonic culture.”728 In addition, the non-political aspects of human life can also challenge 
the cultural cohesion maintained by various social structures, including institutions. Sexuality, 
for example, poses one of these challenges. Ricoeur claims that “in any culture, erotic love 
may remain rebellious toward the institution and toward the discipline of desire that this 
institution tries to establish.”729 Even within one institutional setting, the possibility for 
cultural variation persists.  
 In spite of its variability, culture functions as a context of meaning and 
meaningful or “suitable” action. The statements which imply both the action of an agent and 
his or her motive, taken as “action sentences” by Ricoeur in contrast to “closed attributive 
propositions” such as “A is B,” gain their overall meaning only within such a context. 
Human action, Ricoeur argues, is understandable only when it is interpretable in a particular 
culture: “[T]he open-ended structure of the [action] sentence invites an interpretation of 
gestures as a function of the broadest possible context of circumstances, rules, and norms 
belonging to a culture.”730 Human action is distinguishable from mere causal happening of 
events because in it there is an intention, a reason for acting.  
In other words, human action becomes meaningful only when a motive that is 
in accordance with what Geertz calls a “thick” cultural understanding becomes legible in it.731 
“The concept of imputation,” for example, “could be articulated only in a culture that, on 
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the other hand, had pushed the causal explanation of natural phenomena as far as possible, 
up to and including the human sciences, and that, on the other hand, had elaborated a moral 
and juridical doctrine where responsibility is framed by well-worked-out codes, balancing 
offenses and punishments on the scales of justice.”732 A culture is needed for “mapping” the 
motivational layer of human action onto meanings. Put differently, a cultural context, due to 
its explanatory power, or symbolic thickness, makes possible the meaningfulness of action. 
 Even though the individual capacities to act remain important for the 
phenomenology of being capable, Ricoeur also advocates the idea of social capacities. Social 
practices are “components of action in common,” and it is possible to ascribe to them “the 
sphere of those representations which human beings make of themselves and their place in 
society.”733 Social practices, in other words, are communally instituted forms of actions. 
These representations, Ricoeur claims, are then not “abstract ideas floating in some 
autonomous space, but, as said, symbolic mediations contributing to the instituting of the 
social bond.”734 Ricoeur makes explicit the implied notion of the context in and through 
which both the symbolic mediations and the instituting of the social bond take place when 
describing his analysis as an “exploration of the social forms of the power to act within the 
framework of the cultural history of collective representations.”735 In brief, the cultural 
framework pertains to action both at the level of individual members of a society and at the 
level of their collective practices. 
 Following Ricoeur, the cultural context of an action should, therefore, be 
understood as the general mode of particular communal life. Although its structural level – 
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economical, political, and juridical systems – is certainly important, this communal life is not 
limited to them but includes the affective level of human life as well. In philosophical terms 
this is quite acceptable. “Does Hegel not devote a long discussion to the institutions 
appropriate to the broad affective realm that he places under the heading of love? This is the 
case for parent-child and husband-wife relations, and even of the family itself, seen as the 
educator for our first point of initiation into culture,” Ricoeur points out.736 The affective 
aspect of human life – love, in particular – is a part of culture. Just as “the family constitutes 
a form of living together,” the cultural context constitutes a form of structured communal 
life which retains a strong connection to affections by providing means of realizing them in 
life through marital and other alike social bonds.  
 A culture therefore also mediates. The aspect of diachronic mediation as 
renewing cultural-historical evolution, or “renaissance,”737 is apparent, especially in the light of 
“the cultural history of conflicts,” to use Ricoeur’s term.738 These cultural conflicts – not 
necessarily wars or other physical confrontations between nations or rival groups – have an 
important role in that diachronic process which has led, for example, to the contemporary 
Western culture; just consider the paradigmatic encounter between Athens and Jerusalem: 
“these two cultures, which would contain nothing exceptional for an eye not situated 
anywhere in particular, constitute the first stratum of our philosophical memory.”739 This 
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encounter resulted in the stage of a “third man,” Ricoeur argues in an essay “Faith and 
Culture” (1957); “this ‘third man,’ this cultivated Christian, this believing Greek, is 
ourselves.”740 Encounters like these are as much caused in confronting the pressure from 
differing cultures as they are internal to a particular culture itself. “It turns out that [the 
sixteenth century] is the century in which Western culture hesitated among several cultural 
heritages and created new models for life to which we are still indebted,” Ricoeur comments 
in Course of Recognition.741 The notion of conflict, although irreducible, cannot therefore 
overcast cultural continuity.  
In sum, the diachronic mediation of cultural history is not merely conflictual. 
Ricoeur himself demonstrates the strength of continuity by choosing “ancient Greece as [his] 
starting point”742 – as Hegel did. Even though temporal distance induces cultural differences, 
                                                                                                                                            
guiding theme of Ricoeur’s The Symbolism of Evil. However, Tertuallian’s approach is to defend the “first 
naïveté” that clearly is alredy facing a threat coming from the side of philosophical thought. Ricoeur, in 
contrast, does not want to by-pass this apparent distanciation from the first naivety but is willing to pursue a 
“post-critical” task that would be taking a critical reader to a “second naïveté”. Tertuallian’s position - an 
apologetical defence of faith - is rather categorical and worth to be cited in this context in lenght: 
“The same subject-matter is discussed over and over again by the heretics and the philosophers; the same 
arguments are involved. Whence comes evil? Why is it permitted? What is the origin of man? And in what way 
does he come? Besides the question which Valentinus has very lately proposed – whence comes God? Which 
he settles with the answer: From enthymesis and ectroma. Unhappy Aristotle! Who invented for these men 
dialectics, the art of building up and pulling down; an art so evasive in its propositions, so far-fetched in its 
conjectures, so harsh, in its arguments, so productive of contentions – embarrassing even to itself, retracting 
everything, and really treating of nothing! Whence spring those ‘fables and endless genealogies,’ and 
‘unprofitable questions,’ and ‘words which spread like a cancer?’ From all these, when the apostle would 
restrain us, he expressly names philosophy as that which he would have us be on our guard against. Writing to the 
Colossians, he says, ‘See that no one beguile you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, 
and contrary to the wisdom of the Holy Ghost.’ He had been at Athens, and had in his interviews (with its 
philosophers) become acquainted with that human wisdom which pretends to know the truth, whilst it only 
corrupts it, and is itself divided into its own manifold heresies, by the variety of its mutually repugnant sects. 
What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What concord is there between the Academy and the Church? 
What between heretics and Christians? Our instruction comes from ‘the porch of Solomon,’ who had himself 
taught that ‘the Lord should be sought in simplicity of heart.’ Away with all attempts to produce a mottled 
Christianity of Stoic, Platonic, and dialectic composition! We want no curious disputation after possessing 
Christ Jesus, no inquisition after enjoying the gospel! With our faith, we desire no further belief. For this is our 
palmary faith, that there is nothing which we ought to believe besides.” Tertullian 1957. (The Prescription Against 
Heretics, VII.) 
740 Ricoeur 1957a, 246. 
741 Ricoeur 2004b, 344-345. (238). 
742 Ricoeur 2004b, 111. (69). 
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cultural affinities in many cases prevail. In other words, Ricoeur recognizes an underlying 
cultural kinship. Quoting Bernard Williams, Ricoeur acknowledges that “the ancient Greeks 
‘are among our cultural ancestors, and our view of them is intimately connected with our 
view of ourselves.’”743 The notion of “cultural ancestors” itself implies that cultural 
mediation, at least in its diachronic sense, is not overwhelmingly conflictual but instead 
reconciles us with our inherited past that molds our self-understanding.  
Cultural continuity as mediated by history therefore resembles the idea of the 
temporal course of recognition. Recognition despite the temporal distance requires 
something pervasive, however: a thing, a capacity, or an idea that remains diachronically. 
Ricoeur defines human action, for example, as such a “constant,” or a presupposed 
condition, in the cultural framework. Culture pertains to human action only insofar as this 
action pertains to culture. Because of this interdependence, we still recognize human beings 
in Greek epic and tragic literature as responsible agents. Ricoeur thus also agrees with 
Williams that “an agent’s recognition of his power to act, his agency, constitutes a cultural 
constant that confirms a transcultural readability of the classics of Western culture.”744 The 
notion of personal agency, in other words, opens the path of a diachronic continuity 
between temporally distinct cultures. 
Only because of the shared set of values and the shared understanding of 
“recognizing responsibility,” however, the notion of agency is capable of assuming the role 
of a cultural constant. Thanks to a conceptual “thematic trajectory” the idea of responsible 
action and self-recognition is shared between the ancient Greeks and the moderns.745 First of 
all, then, we are able to affirm that the moderns are – to use Ricoeur’s words – part of a 
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“still-vibrant cultural heritage”746 and that “there are goods, which [Michael Walzer] calls 
‘shared values,’ whose nature makes them nonvenal.”747 Secondly, to return to Ricoeur’s gift-
exchange parallel, these “goods” are diachronically mediated contexts of meaning which we 
have received as “gifts” from our ancestors since the shared values are indeed “without 
price.”748 I argue that this understanding, which relies on objectification of values as 
transculturally and transhistorically inherited “gifts,” is ultimately what “recognizing 
responsibility” as an agent within a historical trajectory, that is, in a diachronic cultural 
mediation, is about.  
In a similar manner, synchronic mediation among the concurrent members of 
a culture objectifies social bonds. To hold on to the notion of love, a figure of this 
synchronic mediation can be drawn from Ricoeur’s analysis of Honneth’s Hegel-renewal: 
“We can say that lovers recognize each other by recognizing themselves in models of 
identification that can be held in common.”749 Synchronic cultural mediation, then, hinges on 
the “relations of relative dependence,” as Ricoeur calls them, which in the face of the 
dialectics of dependence (“emotional fusion”) and autonomy (“self-affirmation in solitude”), 
resort to mutually acceptable accounts of identification. In other words, the “maintained 
order [of these relations], in the strongest sense of the word, is supported by mediations, 
principally from language and culture, that recall the ‘transitional objects’ of childhood 
discussed by D. W. Winnicott [as Axel Honneth points out].”750 As children find their 
favorite toys helpful in channeling their emotions, human beings in general find cultural 
                                               
746 Ricoeur 2004b, 338. (233). 
747 Ricoeur 2004b, 338. (233). 
748 Ricoeur 2004b, 338-339. (233). – Ricoeur makes an interesting cultural remark when defining sans prix: 
“That of what is ‘without price’ is posed in our culture by the relation between truth - or at least the search for 
truth - and money.” Ricoeur 2004b, 339. (234). 
749 Ricoeur 2004b, 278. (190). 
750 Ricoeur 2004b, 278. (189-190).; Honneth 1995, 98-107. 
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objects necessary in gaining self-understanding. Social relations hold because of synchronic 
cultural mediation enabling these means of objectification. 
In brief, again, Ricoeur implies in Course of Recognition that social relations are 
maintained in the synchronous mediation through the commonly shared means of identity, 
or the objectifying cultural models (les objectivications culturelles).751 The whole sociocultural 
complex, therefore, functions as an “order of recognition,”752 while also bringing together 
“the media system and its impact on the cultural reproduction of societies, and on the 
scientific system considered from the point of view of its institutional organization.”753 
Synchronic cultural mediation in the form of cultural reproduction is for that reason an 
essential aspect of the “‘systems’ taken as the leading paradigms for the social world, 
integrated into communicative activity.”754 The social world rests on cultural objectification 
that facilitates self-recognition through cultural mediation. 
Having now summed up Ricoeur’s understanding of the diachronic and 
synchronic aspects of cultural mediation – and its necessity for recognition – we have come 
well past the point of “letting appear” Ricoeur’s cultural hermeneutics. In Ricoeur’s 
conception of cultural mediation, like Hegel’s idea of cultural figuration or formation 
(Bildung), cultural objectification forms the basis of self-identification. Hegel argues in the 
Phenomenology that “it is cultural formation by virtue of which the individual here has validity and 
actuality,” recalling for us Ricoeur’s notion of cultural mediation.755 In addition, according to 
Hegel cultural figuration is mediation (Vermittlung): 
                                               
751 Ricoeur 2004b, 278. (190). 
752 Ricoeur 2004b, 299. (204). 
753 Ricoeur 2004b, 298. (204). 
754 Ricoeur 2004b, 298. (204). 
755 Hegel 2008, 443. (§488). 
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It [that is, Bildung] is at the same time the middle term (das Mittel), that is, the 
transition into actuality of the substance which has been rendered into thought as well as 
the transition of determinate individuality into essentiality. This individuality 
culturally educates itself (bildet sich) into what it is in itself and only by doing so is 
it in itself, does it have actual being-here (wirkliches Dasein).756 
 
Individuality, that is, self-recognized being-here, which includes the notion of identity, is 
possible only through cultural mediation in an outwardly expressive (Äußerung)757 and re-
collective (Er-Innerung)758 process of formation or figuration. The Spirit is educated of its true 
character by its objectification in culture and by the subsequent re-internalization of the 
objective notion (Begriff) it gave of itself. Only by this objectifying cultural-conceptual detour 
can the Spirit become self-conscious. “Being [that is understood] is absolutely mediated 
(absolut vermittelt),” Hegel summarizes in his famous preface to the Phenomenology.759 Ricoeur’s 
only objection could concern the depth of emphasis on the word “absolutely.” 
Hegel’s ultimate thesis is that being – even a subject’s personal being – can 
only be comprehensible through cultural-linguistic mediation.760 Cultural formation or 
figuration, in other words, is the process of becoming fully aware of oneself and one’s full 
potential by way of re-internalized objectifying or alienating mediation (entfremdende 
Vermittlung).761 According to Hegel, to become “for itself” (für sich selbst) is to become an 
object (Gegenstand) “in [the Spirit’s] own eyes,” but in a manner of becoming an immediately 
“mediated object (vermittelter), which is to say, it must be a sublated object reflected into 
                                               
756 Hegel 2008, 443. (§488). 
757 Hegel 2008, 282. (§317). 
758 Hegel 2008, 735. (§808). – Pinkard translates Er-Innerung as “inwardizing re-collection.” 
759 Hegel 2008, 33. (§37). – Hegel’s definition of mediation is worth citing here: “[M]ediation is nothing but 
selfmoving parity-with-itself, or it is a reflective turn into itself, the moment of the I existing-for-itself, pure 
negativity, that is, simple coming-to-be. The I, or coming-to-be, this act of mediating, is, precisely in terms of its 
simplicity, immediacy in the process of coming-to-be and is the immediate itself.” Hegel 2008, 18. (§21). 
760 Cf. Hegel 2008, 461. (§509). 
761 Hegel 2008, 442-443. (§487). 
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itself.”762 This objectifying mediation that includes the moment of re-appropriation is 
cultural in both diachronic and synchronic sense: 
Each individual also runs through the culturally formative stages of the 
universal spirit, but he runs through them as shapes (Gestalten) which spirit has 
already laid  aside, as stages on a path that has been worked out and leveled 
out in the same way that we see fragments of knowledge, which in earlier ages 
occupied men of mature minds, now sink to the level of exercises, and even to 
that of games for children, and in this pedagogical progression, we recognize 
the history of the cultural formation of the world sketched in silhouette. This 
past existence has already become an acquired possession of the universal 
spirit; it constitutes the substance of the individual, that is, his inorganic 
nature. – In this respect, the cultural figuration of the individual (die Bildung des 
Individuums) regarded from his own point of view consists in his acquiring all 
of this which is available, in his living off that inorganic nature and in his 
taking possession of it for himself. Likewise, this is nothing but the universal 
spirit itself, that is, substance giving itself its self-consciousness, that is, its 
coming-to-be and its reflective turn into itself.763 
 
In brief, the Spirit’s self-educative progress is culturally mediated figuration: a self figures out 
who one is in the very figuring of it. To restate Hegel’s main idea – by using Ricoeur’s 
summary of the Phenomenology’s chapter on the Spirit in From Text to Action – “consciousness 
becomes universal only by entering into a world of culture, mores, institutions, and 
history.”764 Self-recognition is equal to recognizing oneself in the re-appropriated “history of 
the cultural formation of the world,”765 which implies an indirect mutual recognition as well.  
Because of its structural elements, culture implies reciprocity. Given the 
distinction between reciprocity and mutuality Ricoeur makes in Course of Recognition766 as well 
as the nature of donated cultural heritage that forms “the substance of the individual,” 
however, it is appropriate to refer to it precisely as the context for mutuality. Cultural-
linguistically mediated being – the Spirit with its concept (Begriff) – carries with itself the idea 
                                               
762 Hegel 2008, 21. (§25). 
763 Hegel 2008, 25. (§28). 
764 Ricoeur 1986a, 283. (229). 
765 Hegel 2008, 25. (§28). 
766 Ricoeur 2004b, 319-320. (219-220). 
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of making possible by giving the possession of ethical self-understanding in the form of 
pedagogical progression.767 “Spirit is ethical actuality,” Ricoeur observes in From Text to 
Action.768 At the end of the Spirit’s self-realization as re-internalized culture, the notion of 
ethicality has been totally internalized. 
Put differently, re-appropriation is placing oneself both diachronically and 
synchronically on the path of re-cognition, An-erkennung – recognizing oneself in all one’s 
works as expressions of objectified humanity. I maintain that Ricoeur’s course of recognition 
is ultimately this path, and not the lexically instructed “surface” of the progression from 
identity to self-recognition and further to mutual recognition that Course of Recognition 
describes. That we actually are already placed on the diachronic course, however, is made 
apparent only speculatively. As Hegel summarizes, “the series of its shapes (Gestaltungen) 
which consciousness runs through on this path is the detailed history of the cultural formation 
of consciousness up to the standpoint of [philosophico-phenomenological] science.”769 
Hegel’s understanding is that the succession of the different figures or shapes the Spirit 
assumes is not apparent to the Spirit itself but only to the scientists of the phenomenology 
of the Spirit. Similarly, Ricoeur argues that the course of recognition can only be understood 
from the viewpoint of philosophical thought that – while progressing from identity to self-
recognition, and further to mutual recognition in gratitude – is not so much a “discourse 
about recognition” but rather “that of recognition.”770 The true course of recognition, in 
other words, is not the analytical study of the various meanings of the term “recognition,” as 
                                               
767 Of Ricoeur’s reflections on education and formation, cf. Kemp 2010, 181, 186-193. 
768 Ricoeur 1986a, 283. (229). 
769 Hegel 2008, 75. (§78). 
770 Ricoeur 2004b, 11, 37-38. (xi, 21). 
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Laitinen implies,771 but understanding or living the recognition in the hermeneutic process 
itself that educates us of our own, collectively formed and individually internalized or re-
appropriated mode of being. 
Only at the end of this course does the reward of a “reobtained immediacy”772 
surpass all arduous struggle for recognizing oneself in the very process of this philosophical thought. 
Hegel explains this processuality by using a metaphor of a winding path:  
When we wish to see an oak with its powerful trunk, its spreading branches, 
and its mass of foliage, we are not satisfied if instead we are shown an acorn. 
In the same way, science, the crowning glory of a spiritual world, is not 
completed in its initial stages. The beginning of a new spirit is the outcome of 
a widespread revolution in the diversity of forms of cultural figuration 
(Bildungsformen); it is both the prize at the end of a winding path and, equally as 
much, is the prize won through much struggle and effort. It is the whole 
which has returned into itself from out of its succession and extension and has 
come to be the simple notion (einfache Begriff) of itself.773  
 
For both Hegel and Ricoeur, the final prize of second immediacy is indeed at the end of a 
winding path; only cultural figuration or formation will lead a subject to proper self-
understanding, which also includes the notion of the other ones, since the cultural context 
determines the suitability or “fittingness” of one’s values and actions. The detour of 
objectification and mediation is unavoidable. After having then realized the possibility of den 
langen Weg der Bildung774 in Ricoeurian terms, or after letting appear his cultural hermeneutics, 
the course of cultural figuration has only begun for us when disclosing Ricoeur’s cultural 
understanding. 
 
                                               
771 Laitinen 2011. 
772 Hegel 1969, 272. 
773 Hegel 2008, 10-11. (§12). 
774 Hegel 2008, 63. (§68). 
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8. REFLECTIONS ON RE-CON-NAISSANCE 
This part concludes with the notion that Ricoeur advances a cultural-linguistic course of 
recognition. After having traversed some proposed ways of reading Ricoeur’s Course of 
Recognition, the idea of symbolic recognition as linguistically mediated re-membering, and the 
Ricoeurian An-erkennung as cultural figuration, the question of the cultural nature of 
Ricoeur’s “course” exposed itself to us. Ricoeur’s “long way” through cultural objectification 
parallels Hegel’s detour of cultural formation. 
I first emphasized the linguistic side of the issue in the form of symbolic 
language as a response to some of Ricoeur’s critics who fail to fully express the depth of 
symbolic and cultural recognition: Arto Laitinen, Gonçalo Marcelo, Jean-Luc Amalric, and 
also Jean Greisch. To close the circle, then, the fullness of language and the pedagogics of 
cultural mediation, are but two sides of the same coin. As Hegel argues in the Phenomenology, 
“the unity of the concept […] into which consciousness has distilled itself becomes actual in 
this mediating movement, whose simple existence as the middle term [in culture] is language (die 
Sprache).”775 Language, according to Hegel, is cultural, and mediation takes place in the 
fullness of discourse.  
I should stress, however, that language, like culture, nevertheless represents 
only the perfected alienation of the Spirit and not yet the re-collected Absolute Spirit: “the 
language of brokenness (Zerissenheit) [of the Spirit in its alienating expression] is the perfected 
language of this entire world of cultural formation as well as its true existing Spirit.”776 
Without cultural-linguistic alienation the whole notion of the “winding path” and the “prize” 
at the end of it would remain empty. Re-membering, as I have argued, is made possible by 
                                               
775 Hegel 2008, 461. (§509). 
776 Hegel 2008, 470. (§519). 
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this course of recognition. Hegel’s “inwardizing re-collection” of Er-Innerung,777 or what 
Ricoeur indicates with the re- of reconnaissance, requires the moment of reflection that is 
enabled by self-alienation (Entfremdung) in the Spirit’s “outward,” cultural-linguistic 
expression (Entäußerung).778 
 Hegel’s teleological model of consciousness is well-known to Ricoeur. In On 
Interpretation Ricoeur states that Hegel’s phenomenology of Spirit is “a description of the 
figures, categories, or symbols that guide the developmental process along the lines of a 
progressive synthesis,” thus letting us know that Ricoeur, perhaps, understands Hegel’s 
project.779 This synthetic movement, Ricoeur furthermore acknowledges, is dual: “The 
dispossession comes first, the reaffirmation only at the end.”780 The moment of re-
affirmation or re-appropriation is nevertheless crucial, as it ultimately defines the adult, 
absolute Spirit. What is important is “the internalization of this [dialectic] movement [of the 
Spirit], which must be recaptured in the objective structures of institution, monuments, 
works of art and culture.”781 As the Spirit unfolds itself in its educative self-realization it 
must, however, assume a cultural figure or shape (Gestalt), as this figure mediates the innate 
need for self-recognition; “culture is born (que naît une culture) in the movement of desire.”782 
This desire for self-realization, in other words, leads the Spirit to form itself by assuming a 
cultural-linguistic shape in order to progressively re-cognize itself in it in the moment of re-
internalization (Er-Innerung). 
                                               
777 Hegel 2008, 735. (§808). 
778 Hegel 2008, 438. (§483). 
779 Ricoeur 1965a, 447. (462). Cf. Ricoeur 2006. 
780 Ricoeur 1965a, 447. (463). 
781 Ricoeur 1965a, 448. (463). 
782 Ricoeur 1965a, 449. (465). 
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 The struggle for recognition – and not for power783 – should then, according 
to Ricoeur, be read inversely as “recognition through struggle.”784 As Ricoeur argues in 
Course of Recognition, the struggle cannot be avoided785 whereas the “prize” is within the reach 
of a searching consciousness who gradually becomes more and more aware of the fullness 
and possibilities of his or her being, yet never reaching the ultimate end. This “prize” of self-
consciousness that, nevertheless, remains a task, is therefore the “gift” of mutuality given by 
diachronic and synchronic cultural-linguistic mediation; mutuality that transcends reciprocity 
because it gives, even though it gives through the detour, or through the other. In the end, 
my personal being-here, my individuality depends on this indirect mutual recognition 
through cultural objectification that facilitates re-membering.786 The emphasis is therefore in 
the first term, recognition through struggle, and not the last one, that is, in struggle that, 
nevertheless, cannot be undone in the lived human reality. The clearings, “where the 
meaning of action emerges from the fog of doubt,”787 are perhaps not compeletely “pure,” 
but they testify of the positive and yet the unceasing  process of becoming a human self.  
 
* 
In the very end of this part, let me briefly return to my own working hypotheses. In terms of 
those proposed theses at the end of part one, I argue, I have in this part two begun to ground 
the theses from two to five. The call in Course of Recognition to return to Ricoeur’s earlier texts 
indicates that although the subject-centered progress from identity to self-recognition and 
furthermore to mutual recognition is important, the question of Ricoeur’s “course” of 
                                               
783 Cf. Ricoeur 1965a, 451-452. (466-467).; Ricoeur 1986b, 227, 263. 
784 Ricoeur 1965a, 455. (471). 
785 Ricoeur 2004b, 355. (246). 
786 Ricoeur 2004b, 278. (190). 
787 Ricoeur 2004b, 318, 355. (218, 245). 
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recognition is better approached at the level of cultural figuration as objectifying formation. 
A deeper analysis of Ricoeur’s earlier texts will, therefore, provide further material for the 
explication of Ricoeur’s cultural hermeneutics.  
On the basis of our analysis, however, we are already entitled to assume that 
the “phenomenology of being able” – which culminates in Ricoeur’s notion of l’homme capable 
– requires the support of cultural hermeneutics. This hermeneutic of culture recasts 
Ricoeur’s relation to Hegel; he is not merely a figure to be renounced but rather an essential 
forefigure to Ricoeur’s conception of culture. Lastly, this examination has paid attention the 
notion of les objectivations culturelles. The idea of “cultural objectification,” and the corollary 
“cultural objects,” is therefore already familiar to us, but only a further examination will 
reveal its role for both Ricoeur’s hermeneutic of culture and his anthropological 
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Part one, which introduced the general problematics of this dissertation, included a 
discussion of Ricoeur’s relation to cultural anthropology, and in particular with his affinity 
with Ernst Cassirer and Clifford Geertz. The assertion made in that part was that, according 
to Ricoeur, human action is always cultural-symbolically mediated. Part two, which engaged 
with recent interpretations of Ricoeur’s philosophy and especially with the discussion of 
recognition, then confirmed the assertion by analyzing Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of symbolic 
recognition and the underlying notion of cultural mediation as self-formation. This led to a 
concluding consideration of Ricoeur’s relation to Hegel and the notion of cultural 
objectification.  
I have pointed out above that Ricoeur argues that cultural objectification 
forms and maintains social relations. Course of Recognition asserts that the “maintained order 
[of the social relations of relative dependence], in the strongest sense of the word, is 
supported by mediations, principally from language and culture, that recall [D. W. 
Winnicott’s definition of] the ‘transitional objects’ of childhood.”788 As a result, Ricoeur 
maintains that cultural mediation includes the notion of cultural objects and objectification, 
which ground the commonly shared human identity as objectifying cultural models; les 
objectivications culturelles as he calls them.789 The social world, I concluded, rests for Ricoeur on 
cultural objectification as self-recognition through mediation – much like Hegel’s idea of 
cultural figuration or formation (Bildung). 
 The current part continues to examine the idea of objectivity and 
objectification while shifting the tone of argumentation from asserting the importance of 
cultural hermeneutics for Ricoeur’s thought to demonstrating Ricoeur’s involvement with 
                                               
788 Ricoeur 2004b, 278. (189-190). Cf. Honneth 1995, 98-107. 
789 Ricoeur 2004b, 278. (190). 
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the theme from the very early works to the latest ones. I emphasize that the close reading of 
Ricoeur’s work, modeled by his own “analytical reading of Freud” in On Interpretation, is 
intentional: I wish to show rather than declare that reading Ricoeur results in maintaining that 
his work ultimately is a hermeneutic of culture. I maintain that there is indeed a cultural 
hermeneutic parcours that becomes evident in the course of our consecutive steps. While the 
idea of reading will eventually gain a meaning of its own as hermeneutic relecture, this careful 
reading of Ricoeur’s work serves as a scholarly corrective in understanding what that work 
ultimately was about as a whole.  
In spite of firmly holding on to the idea that the cultural hermeneutic path 
runs through the whole of Ricoeur’s work, I have decided to proceed by offering two 
succeeding readings of it. This current part analyzes Ricoeur’s works to the threshold of his 
alleged “linguistic turn,” and part four continues the inquiry by starting with The Living 
Metaphor as the most prominent manifestation of that turn.790 This allows us also to address 
in this part the issue of Ricoeur’s philosophical indebtedness to Immanuel Kant – a 
philosopher so well known to Ricoeur that he was invited to write an entry of him to the 
massive Encyclopédie du protestantisme.791 Even if Ricoeur had openly acknowledged his debt to 
Hegel, Ricoeur maintained that he favored a “post-Hegelian Kantian style” of 
philosophizing.792 This part takes seriously the challenge presented by this odd 
characterization while inquiring into the role of Kant’s philosophy in Ricoeur’s hermeneutics 
of cultural objectification. I argue that in his cultural hermeneutics, Ricoeur reconciles these 
                                               
790 Even though I apply terminology widely utilized by Ricoeur scholarship, Ricoeur himself was not 
always content with the term “linguistic turn.” In his 1995 reply to David Stewart, for example, Ricoeur 
maintains that besides human action, he has always been interested in language, and therefore he sees more 
continuity than turns in his philosophy: “One can consider language to be the organizing focus of many [of my] 
investigations. In this regard, there is no reason to speak of a linguistic turn; the saying of willing, the saying of 
the symbol, and so on, are already at issue in my earliest works.” Ricoeur 1995g, 444-445. 
791 Ricoeur 1995c. 
792 Ricoeur 1985, 312. (215).; Ricoeur 1969, 402-405. (412-414).; Ricoeur 1986a, 251. (200). 
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two thinkers – often seen as incommensurate in Kant’s strong anti-metaphysical attitude and 
Hegel’s systemic “Spiritualism.”  
In addition, I will also point out in this part that the theme of recognition is 
developed and discussed by Ricoeur well before Course of Recognition. I will, therefore, agree 
with Morny Joy’s statement in her 2003 essay, namely, that “the notion of recognition, 
though largely unthematized, has been a vital element in Paul Ricoeur’s reflections since his 
early work.”793 In contrast to Joy,794 who alludes to an essay written in 1965, and discusses 
Oneself as Another (1990) and Le juste (1995),795 I demonstrate, however, that Ricoeur’s theme 
of recognition is grounded in the analyses of objectivity in The Voluntary and the Involuntary 
(1949), and explicitly developed and discussed – particularly in relation to the notion of 
culture – in Ricoeur’s subsequent works Fallible Man (1960), and On Interpretation (1965).796 
                                               
793 Joy 2003, 519. 
794 Joy 2003, 519-526.  
795 Trans. The Just (by David Pellauer, 2006). From hereon the English title is used. 
796 I have already discussed Ricoeur’s The Symbolism of Evil (1960) in sections 2.3, 3.1, 6.2, and 6.3. – My 
argument in the current part of this dissertation is not completely a novelty as Ricoeur-scholars have argued 
before in favor of thematic continuity in Ricoeur’s works. Placing an emphasis on cultural recognition and 
cultural hermeneutics is, however, not widely discussed among Ricoeur scholars. In contrast to David Pellauer, 
who in his Guide for the Perplexed leaves out entirely the works preceding Oneself as Another (Pellauer 2007, 126.), 
Jean Greisch (whom also Gonçalo Marcelo follows, cf. Marcelo 2011, 112, 128.) finds Ricoeur’s early work to 
be relevant, but narrows his scope to the hermeneutics of the symbol, which he conceives as possibly already 
containing “the seed of the problem of recognition.” (Greisch 2010, 92.) David M. Kaplan, for his part, stresses 
the problem of human capability as Ricoeur’s core theme in his oeuvre, implying that this theme has its roots as 
early as in The Voluntary and the Involuntary. Kaplan’s approach is, however, strictly anthropological. (Kaplan 
2010, 113-114, 123.) This is close to Jean-Luc Amalric’s position that Ricoeur’s anthropology (“centrée sur les 
différentes modalités de l’expérience du ‘Je peux’”) – which Amalric sees to be culminating on the analysis of 
recognition – is fundamentally continuous, and it has three phases starting from the analyses of Philosophie de la 
volonté (especially Fallible Man), and followed by more “constructive” takes on Oneself as Another, and Course of 
Recognition. (Amalric 2011, 12-13, 17.) Amalric acknowledges the role of intersubjective relations in self-
identification (“la question de la relation à autrui comme condition de possibilité de cette formation identitaire du 
soi”), but does not go beyond demanding a “poetico-practical” approach. (Amalric 2011, 23.)  
Both Kaplan and Amalric thus miss the question of culture and approach the question only from the side 
of philosophical anthropology. In fact, Kaplan even asserts that “Ricoeur already took a global view of social 
justice and the international institutions that could promote our rights to capabilities. But he never explicitly 
took on problems of development, nor did he explicitly address human deprivation and misery in poor 
countries. He never related our right to capabilities to a critique of political economy, to a critique of social and 
cultural life, to problems of resource and environmental management, or to questions of the meaning and 
nature of civilization itself. Those were not his explicit philosophical or political concerns.” (Kaplan 2010, 127.) 
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This validation of my first working hypothesis also strengthens my second thesis that in 
order to read Ricoeur’s work appropriately, the “course” of recognition should be 
approached at the level of Ricoeur’s work as a whole rather than solely focusing on his 2004 
work Course of Recognition. As a result, the third thesis – that Ricoeur’s “phenomenology of 
being able” requires the support of a cultural hermeneutics – will be discussed in a more 
detailed manner: I demonstrate that the philosophical anthropology of The Voluntary and the 
Involuntary, which examines subjectivity in the light of objectivity, leads Ricoeur to discuss the 
notion of cultural objects and cultural objectification more elaborately in Fallible Man and in 
On Interpretation. This demonstration, that will view objectification as positive instead of simply 
alienating, takes into account Ricoeur’s assertion that his philosophy is not only post-
Hegelian but also influenced by Immanuel Kant.797 This part will then also argue my fourth 
working thesis, that Ricoeur’s hermeneutic of culture recasts his relation not only to Hegel 
but to Kant as well. 
Engaging with Ricoeur’s discussion of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason 
(1781/1787) and Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), I will argue in this part 
three that Ricoeur uses Kant’s notion of an object for cultural hermeneutic purposes. The 
                                                                                                                                            
Although Kaplan is right in pointing out that also Ricoeur had his limits as a philosopher, Kaplan is most 
certainly mistaken in many of these accusations.  
Besides Marianne Moyaert - who (while criticizing Axel Honneth) explicitly uses Ricoeur’s work in favor 
of cultural minorities, and to support multicultural dialogue (cf. Moyaert 2011, esp. 98-103.) - David Rasmussen 
offers a rather different take in terms of those concerns raised by Kaplan (Rasmussen 2010, 196.): “The 
concept of narrative identity developed in Oneself as Another preserves the nonidentical relation between self and 
self, and between self and other. One need say only that such a concept or model enables an encounter with 
non-Western or nondemocratic cultures that allows for sufficient difference so that the identity of the other is 
not reduced to the identity of the self. The result would be the preservation of certain asymmetry of 
interpretation. In Ricoeur’s book The Just, narrative identity has precisely this function. As such, narrative 
identity can play a constructive role that, instead of reducing other cultures to our own, enriches the overall 
significance of the story in which the cultures of the world play the part of the protagonists. However, that very 
narrative identity that can account for difference, given its temporal exposition as theory of interlocution, 
requires a certain respect for the other. And in the respect for the other, one acknowledges both the rule of 
sincerity and the capacity to fulfill it. In this sense, the universality of human rights is acknowledged. That 
means that the acknowledgment of diversity simultaneously involves the attribution of human rights.” 
797 Ricoeur 1985, 312. (215).; Ricoeur 1969, 402-405. (412-414).; Ricoeur 1986a, 251. (200). 
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possibility of recognition is fundamentally grounded in this notion of an object, as I have 
claimed above in thesis five. Ricoeur follows Kant’s metaphysical standpoint in its 
“limitedness” – that is, possible experience and cognition is limited to objects as appearances 
and not to things in themselves (an sich)798 – and this explains Ricoeur’s conviction that a 
total, absolutizing mediation in a Hegelian manner is inconceivable. Ricoeur combines, as 
Kant does, symbolization (viz. conceptualization) with understanding. Ricoeur, however, also 
transcends Kant’s position when insisting that a subject’s full understanding of his situated 
condition is not only rational-epistemological as Kant argues but also onto-existential, that is, 
“the real a priori synthesis” adheres to the “ontological constitution” as Martin Heidegger’s 
famous Kant-book maintains.799 In Ricoeur’s words, “objectivity indicates this synthetic 
[ontological] constitution itself as a uniting of meaning to presence.”800 This conviction leads 
Ricoeur in the end to insist – as I maintain in my sixth working thesis – that the foundational 
and grounding poetic nucleus of human culture is found in and by the cultural objects which 
invite reflection that is unreserved to consider this ontological truth (and not only a mere 
ontic one). 
 In sum, to briefly explain the outline of this part, chapter 9 will argue that 
according to Ricoeur’s The Voluntary and the Involuntary our engagement in being is necessarily 
objective, since subjectivity is, paradoxically, explained by objectivity. Chapter 10, which 
focuses on Fallible Man, will confirm this assertion in the light of Ricoeur’s discussion of 
Kant’s works, The Critique of Pure Reason in particular. Furthermore, the discussion of 
Ricoeur’s factual post-Kantianism will provide an analysis of cultural recognition – 
reconnaissance through “cultural objectivity” – in relation to Kant’s Anthropology. In this analysis 
                                               
798 Cf. Kant 1999, III.Bxix-xx. (KrV).  
799 Ricoeur 1960a, 56-57. (38-39). 
800 Ricoeur 1960a, 57. (39). 
198 
objectivity will gain an inherently positive, enabling role in self-formation. Put differently, 
recognition becomes a possibility through the interpretation of cultural objects, or “les signes 
de l’homme.” Chapter 11 capitalizes this model of cultural recognition by analyzing On 
Interpretation as a hermeneutic of culture. In this course of recognizing Ricoeur’s cultural 
philosophy, this part three of the dissertation also highlights the fact that Ricoeur introduces 
the notion of reconnaissance – precisely as mutual recognition – in the 1960s. Ricoeur’s critics 
have failed to fully recognize that Ricoeur’s Course of Recognition is not only in line with Time 




9. ANTHROPOLOGY AND OBJECTIVITY 
9.1 The Reflective Self: Prereflective Imputation and Self-objectification 
Understanding the significance of objectivity for Ricoeur’s anthropology necessitates that we 
recall Ricoeur’s affiliation with the reflexive tradition of thought. Ricoeur states, in an 
intellectual autobiography, that he was initiated into French reflexive philosophy already in 
1930s, “akin to German neo-Kantianism,” as he describes it.801 According to Ricoeur the 
two main figures of this tradition were Maine de Biran and Jean Nabert, and especially 
“Nabert was to have a decisive influence on me in the 1950s and 1960s,” Ricoeur 
concludes.802 I have already argued in chapter 5 that both Nabert and Ricoeur hold that 
although acknowledging the “originating affirmation” and its Ricoeurian variant, the self is 
not intuitively constituted in the manner of Cartesian philosophy. The difference between 
Nabert and Ricoeur, however, lies in Ricoeur’s firm conviction that reflection is always 
interpretation.803  
                                               
801 Ricoeur 1995b, 6. 
802 Ricoeur 1995b, 6. Cf. Ricoeur’s 1962 essay “Nabert on Act and Sign” and Ricoeur’s selected essays on 
Nabert in Lectures 2; Ricoeur 1969, 211-221. (211-222).; Ricoeur 1992, 225-262. On Maine de Biran’s influence 
on later Ricoeur, cf. Umbelino 2012, 376-380. 
803 I will use the term “reflexive” - rather than “reflective” - to refer to reflexive philosophy. The alleged 
theoretical difference between “reflexion” and “reflection” has continued to cause confusion, however, since in 
English language the root for both of these terms is the same. The Oxford Dictionary of English maintains that the 
noun “reflexion” is an archaic spelling of “reflection.” The widely used Webster’s Third International Dictionary of 
the English Language simply mentions that “reflexion” is a British variant of “reflection.” Both dictionaries argue 
that the noun “reflex” originates from Latin reflexus, that is, “a bending back,” and from reflectere, “bend back.” 
("Oxford Dictionary of English"  2012.; "Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English 
Language: Unabridged with Seven Language Dictionary"  1986.) 
According to the Oxford Dictionary the adjective “reflexive” denotes a pronoun that refers back to the 
subject of the clause in which it is used, as well as means an action performed as a reflex, without conscious 
thought. In this sense the adjective repeats the meanings of the noun “reflex,” which is an (automated) action 
that is performed without conscious thought as a response to a stimulus, but also a thing which is determined 
by and reproduces the essential features or qualities of something else. Webster, however, adds to these 
meanings the sense of being directed back upon the mind or its operations, yet at the same time maintaining 
that such introspective sense of “reflex” still holds without necessarily the intervention of consciousness 
(Webster conflates the two terms when maintaining that the adjective “reflexive” means marked by or capable of 
reflection, that is, it means “reflective.”) 
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Jean-Luc Amalric, for example, argues that Ricoeur’s anthropology is at the same time 
reflective and hermeneutical.804 The internal conflict of the self is overcome in reflective 
interpretation that concerns all signs, symbols, and actions in which “our act of existing,” as 
Amalric calls it, is objectified. Amalric’s argument covers Ricoeur’s works from the early 
phenomenological writings to the very late hermeneutical ones. “In Fallible Man, Oneself as 
Another, and Course of Recognition,” Amalric states, “it is the same method of detour by 
objectification that Ricoeur practices, so as to guarantee an irreducible distinction between 
                                                                                                                                            
The verb-form “to reflect” means to throw back (heat, light, or sound) without absorbing it, as by a 
mirror, but in addition to that it also means to embody or represent (something) in a faithful or appropriate 
way. In contrast to “reflex,” it furthermore means to think deeply or carefully about something, that is, 
conscious action. The Webster Dictionary even adds a sense of remembering, or to remember with thoughtful 
consideration, or coming to recollect, realize, or consider in a course of thought. The noun “reflection” then 
both denotes the throwing back by a body or surface of light, heat, or sound without absorbing it, or a thing 
that is a consequence of or arises from something else, but also a serious thought or consideration as well as an 
idea about something, especially one that is written down or expressed. According to Webster, “reflection” can 
mean a thought, an idea, or an opinion formed or a remark made as a result of meditation, just as it can also 
mean consideration of some subject matter, idea, or purpose often with a view to understanding or accepting it 
or seeing it in its right relations. A further definition restates the introspective sense by maintaining that 
“reflection” means also contemplation of the contents or qualities of one’s own thoughts or remembered 
experiences. “Reflective” is therefore an adjective denoting an action or a subject concerned with ideas or with 
introspective pondering in the sense of thoughtful or deliberative. The Oxford Dictionary follows this sense when 
it defines “self-reflection” as a serious thought about one’s character and actions. 
Following the suggested distinction between “reflexion” and “reflection,” I will maintain in this 
dissertation that the term “reflexion” denotes an action that precedes self-consciousness, whereas “reflection” 
is always a self-conscious act of mind. Jean Nabert’s philosophy, for example, is reflexive since it grounds itself 
in an “originating affirmation” which is - although not being an immediate intuition and certainty of one’s own 
subjectivity in the full sense of Descartes’ cogito - still a post-Kantian reinterpreration of it. Nabert’s cogito is 
polyvalent, it is the conditioning and constituting act of consciousness upon which the empirical or “concrete” 
consciousness, which in turn finds itself in its works, is grounded. In other words, Nabert’s originating 
affirmation is the productive positing of the self at its source, or “pure consciousness,” for the conceptual-
empirical realization of the self that could be called the concrete, “real consciousness.” This pure, “ineffable” 
consciousness, however, is attainable only through the real consciousness - it is “the inner light of experience,” 
an indubitable certitude of “I am.” Nabert thus extends from Kant’s intellectualist transcendental unity of 
apperception, which loses certain subjective intimacy of experience and is therefore “pure nothing,” to 
concrete human experience in which personality seeks and realizes itself in its acts - and finds the originating 
affirmation as its own principle. (Nabert 1969, 41-56.) For the same reason I will also use reflexive as a 
technical term referring to the post-Kantian French tradition that has been widely called “reflexive philosophy” 
(la philosophie réflexive). In distinction, I will also maintain that although Paul Ricoeur recognizes the influences of 
this tradition in his own work, he also distinguishes himself from it, because he insists that all self-
understanding is based on interpretation and therefore on self-conscious mental action by which the subject 
gradually forms a narrative understanding of his own subjectivity (the ipse-self). Ricoeur summarizes this 
conviction in the last words of his 1962 essay “Nabert on Act and Sign”: “to use other words, which are not 
Nabert’s but which his work encourages: reflection, because it is not an intuition of the self by the self, can be, 
and must be, a hermeneutics.” Ricoeur 1969, 221. (222). 
804 Amalric 2011, 17. 
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immediate ego (le moi immédiat) and reflective self (le soi réflexif).”805 Amalric maintains, in 
other words, that Ricoeur’s Fallible Man was already pre-hermeneutical in this indirect, or 
“detouring” sense, even as an explicitly phenomenological work.806  
I agree with Amalric on Ricoeur’s methodological continuity – or that the 
hermeneutic “wager” in The Symbolism of Evil, for example, was not a total overturn807 – but I 
also propose that Ricoeur’s reflective anthropology can be drawn even earlier from his first 
major work, that is, from Ricoeur’s major doctoral thesis The Voluntary and the Involuntary.808 
In this work Ricoeur explores the two-sided phenomenon or experience of being both 
capable and bound (situé) – the human condition of “a general reciprocity of the voluntary 
and the involuntary,” as he calls it.809 It is impossible to cover the whole of this massive work 
in passing, but the tone of Ricoeur’s thought and his key ideas can be made clear, however. 
Drawing heavily from Gabriel Marcel’s religious existentialism as well as also applying 
Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy with a Nabertian spin, Ricoeur strives to 
examine a subject’s “fundamental possibilities,”810 that is, those possibilities that are available 
to a situated, reflecting subject. 
Ricoeur’s project of “phenomenology of being able,” I argue, dates back to 
The Voluntary and the Involuntary. Already in this early work Ricoeur stresses the idea that a 
human being finds himself in and through his capabilities: “in projecting myself as the subject 
                                               
805 Amalric 2011, 17. – Amalric acknowledges, however, that the anthropology developed in The Voluntary 
and the Involuntary rests already on the notion of shattered cogito: “… ce que montre tout d’abord la 
phénoménologie de l’expérience volontaire développée dans Le Volontaire et l’Involontaire, c’est que notre 
expérience est intérieurement brisée parce que le cogito est toujours aux prises avec une altérité irréductible qui est 
celle du corps propre, du désir et de la vie.” Amalric 2011, 14.  
806 Amalric 2011, 18. 
807 Ricoeur 1960b, 324-326, 330. (348-351, 355). Cf. Ricoeur 1995g, 444-445. 
808 Ricoeur wrote, as customary, two doctoral theses. The minor thesis was a translation of and a highly 
appreciated commentary on Edmund Husserl’s Ideen I, and the major thesis was the Marcelian-Jaspersian Le 
volontaire et l’involontaire. Cf. Reagan 1996, 17. 
809 Ricoeur 1949, 260. (276). 
810 Ricoeur 1949, 7, 18. (3, 15). 
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of an action, I affirm myself capable of that action […] I feel myself capable (je me sens 
capable), as an incarnate being situated in the world, of the action which I intend in 
general.”811 Ricoeur argues – in the wake of Kant’s discussion of the third antinomy of 
reason812 – that the capable human being, l’homme capable, is born for himself in the 
inescapable dialectics of necessity and freedom. The Voluntary and the Involuntary prefigures, 
therefore, the theories of capable human being that Ricoeur elaborates, for example, later in 
Fallible Man, Oneself as Another, and Course of Recognition. 
In the course of these analyses of l’homme capable Ricoeur maintains that self-
understanding is not immediate but reflective. The French phrase “je me sens capable” 
already implies this conviction, but Ricoeur insists explicitly in The Voluntary and the 
Involuntary that the Self (le Soi) is “a product of separation,” and that it is fallacious to argue 
for the radical autonomy of the self – Ricoeur re-examines this idea again in Oneself as Another 
as idem and ipse identities.813 In brief, “the Self is an alienated I,” Ricoeur maintains in The 
Voluntary and the Involuntary.814 Furthermore, a subject is not posited by himself but by his 
necessary social situation of which the most fundamental sign is that I am born from 
another human being. “I do not posit myself,” Ricoeur summarizes, “I have been posited by 
others.”815 Actually, the whole context of my life – and not only my parents in the line of 
ancestors – is involuntary. “Just as I have not chosen my body, I have not chosen my 
historical situation,” Ricoeur declares.816 My self, my personhood, is available to me only 
reflectively in a situation. 
                                               
811 Ricoeur 1949, 189. (203). 
812 Kant 1999, III.A444-451, A532-537/B472-479, B560-565. (KrV). 
813 Ricoeur 1990, 12-13. (2-3). 
814 Ricoeur 1949, 32. (29). 
815 Ricoeur 1949, 407. (433). 
816 Ricoeur 1949, 119. (125). Cf. Ricoeur 1990, 369-380. (319-329). 
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The early Ricoeur already argues for a radically anti-Cartesian “decentering” 
(décentrement) of subjectivity. Perhaps one of the most dramatic expressions of this conviction 
is Ricoeur’s description of a subject’s relation to the whole of life: “I am not the center of 
being. I myself am only one being among beings. The whole which includes me is the 
parabola of being which I am not. I come from all to myself as from Transcendence to 
existence.”817 Ricoeur concludes that the self is not auto-constituted but given as set against 
the vast horizon of the whole life that surpasses me. In sum, the self is not immediate but 
only reflectively given in the face of the other. 
 Despite maintaining the reflective anti-Cartesian sentiment, Ricoeur avoids 
arguing for a total annihilation of the “I” as the locus of self-identification. Following the 
Husserlian-Heideggerian understanding of intentionality, in The Voluntary and the Involuntary 
Ricoeur defines the notion of “being capable” with regard to the idea of a project: “The 
project is to-do, the capacity is capacity for doing.”818 Capacity, in other words, is defined as 
having the possibility of actualizing the project. “What I project,” Ricoeur then points out, 
“is possible only when the sense of capability (pouvoir) gives its thrust (donne son élan) and its 
force to the purely potential designation of the action which I am to do.”819 Put differently, 
the basic intentionality of the “I” locates the capable subject – the “I” that is the subject pole 
of one’s acts. The possibility of doing “concerns also the being of the subject who projects 
the doing,” Ricoeur states, “for in doing something, I make myself be (je me fais-être); I am my 
own capacity for being (pouvoir-être).”820 The “I” is the identifiable locus of the capable self, but 
following Ricoeur this locus is revealed only reflectively: “je me fais-être.” The basic 
                                               
817 Ricoeur 1949, 444. (472). 
818 Ricoeur 1949, 53. (54). 
819 Ricoeur 1949, 53. (54). 
820 Ricoeur 1949, 54. (55). Cf. Ricoeur 1967a, 211. (198). 
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intentionality of the “I,” in other words, is a needed presumption but – as Ricoeur himself 
notes – it in itself calls for a “reversal,” a “turning back” (rebroussement) to reflection.821 
 Self-designation and affirmation, Ricoeur argues, is always reflective, and its 
conditions must be such that reflection is made possible. Taking the French transitive verb 
“je me decide à” – I make up my mind to – as his guide in the question of self-reference, 
Ricoeur works his way from explicit cases of self-affirmation to its conditions. Passing 
through the conscious and verbal affirmation to the feeling of responsibility, and 
furthermore to commitment (l’engagement) – which, according to Ricoeur, “crowns the 
highest self-affirmation”822 as it combines myself and the project – Ricoeur reaches the idea 
of “the prereflective imputation of myself,” that is, the originating self-reference that has not 
developed into empirically grounded reflective self-observation. The possibility of self-
reflection and the possibility or the judgment of responsibility, he argues, are contained in 
this prereflective ascription, the originating affirmation of the “I,” which facilitates self-
observation by keeping a firm relation between the self and the object of intention.823  
 Two major points emerge from this analysis. First, the duality of the 
prereflective ascription between the “I” and the object of its intention enables the whole 
intentional, or projecting action. Second, a self-affirmative subject, a self, is achieved only 
indirectly by this intentional objectification, that is, by those intentional acts which objectify 
the “I” and facilitate the reappropriation of those acts as manifestations of the self. “The self 
is not complete in itself,” Ricoeur claims, “in particular it does not will itself in a void but in 
its projects.”824 To achieve the notion of the self, my endeavors, or my projects – as 
                                               
821 Ricoeur 1949, 54. (55). 
822 Ricoeur 1949, 56-57. (58). 
823 Ricoeur 1949, 57. (58-59). 
824 Ricoeur 1949, 57. (59). 
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Heidegger calls Dasein’s constant being-ahead-of-himself825 – will have to be taken into 
account. “I affirm myself in my acts,” Ricoeur summarizes, “I project my own self into the 
action to be done.”826 In short, the self finds the “I” as the locus of personal identity that in 
itself is achievable only in reappropriation. 
Such projecting implies that before action the “I” commits itself – il s’engage as 
Ricoeur puts it in The Voluntary and the Involuntary – as well as binds itself (il se lie) to the 
object that results from the action to be done. Using Heideggerian language, Ricoeur argues 
that projecting, in which the “I” makes itself into an object, is preconscious and 
preobservable self-objectification on the basis of which conscious self-recognition is 
possible: 
[The “I”] throws itself ahead of itself in posing itself as the object, as a direct 
complement of the project. In projecting myself thus, I objectify myself in a 
way, as I objectify myself in a signature which I will be able to recognize (je 
pourrai reconnaître), identify as mine, as my sign.827 
 
The prereflective ascription as both commitment and as the subject-pole in self-
objectification is, therefore, an active and initial source of self-affirmation as Jean-Luc 
Amalric argues in his Ricoeur analysis.828 Even though I recognize myself only reflectively, 
that is, in observing myself in my acts which objectify my subjective being-here, the 
prereflective “I” remains as the unchangeable core of my identity, or, in other words, as the 
unreflectible precondition of my self. 
As the self’s condition, the “I” cannot be detached from it; self-identification 
requires this connection. Ricoeur acknowledges that the projected self can take over the 
                                               
825 Heidegger 1967, 145-148, 191-192. (136-139, 179-180). 
826 Ricoeur 1949, 57. (59). 
827 Ricoeur 1949, 57-58. (59). 
828 Amalric 2011, 15, 20-21. – I maintain, however, that Ricoeur presents his application of Nabert’s 
“originating affirmation” already in The Voluntary and the Involuntary and not later as Amalric argues. 
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projecting “I” – that there is the risk of “exiling my self into the margins of its acts”829 – but 
argues that this separation from being a subject to an objectified subject is prevented by the 
“voiceless consciousness” (la conscience sourde) that all acts spring forth from their subject-
pole, from the “I,” that is, from the primordial locus of identity. This voiceless “I,” however, 
remains completely mute as a projecting self if the subject does not view it through the 
projected self. “I affirm myself as the subject precisely in the object of my willing,” Ricoeur 
insists with a Kantian-Husserlian undertone: the intended object stands against my own 
subjectivity.830 Only as a projected and objectified self can the projecting “I” find its voice 
and identity, that is, in reflection. 
 
9.2 An Authentic Choice as Practical Action 
The preceding section has emphasized the reflective style of Ricoeur’s philosophy as an 
opening up toward the notion of objectivity. This section capitalizes on that style in a 
manner that brings us again close to the philosophy of culture. Ricoeur’s analysis expands 
from intentional projects to practical, cultural action that acknowledges both the world of 
physical objects and the objects of actions. Just as the will actualizes itself only in its projects, 
                                               
829 Ricoeur 1949, 58. (60).  
830 Ricoeur 1949, 10, 58. (6-7, 60). Cf. Kant 1999, III.B132-138. (KrV).; Husserl 2012, 65-72, 162-164, 170-
172, 272-275, 280-283. – In his 1954 essay “Kant and Husserl” Ricoeur points out, however, that there is a 
unsurpassable difference between Kant’s transcendental epistemology and Husserl’s phenomenological epoché: 
“The transcendental ideality of the object turns back to the realism of the thing-in-itself, and this latter leads to 
the former. The preface to the second edition [of the Critique of Pure Reason] says nothing else when it posits the 
mutual implication of the conditioned and the unconditioned. This structure in Kantianism has no parallel in 
Husserlian phenomenology. Like the Neo-Kantians, Husserl lost the ontological dimension of the 
phenomenon and simultaneously lost the possibility of a meditation on the limits and foundations of 
phenomenality. This is why phenomenology is not a ‘critique,’ that is to say, an envisagement of the limits of its 
own field of experience.” Put differently, Ricoeur argues that Husserl’s noetic-noematic structure of 
consciousness “disontologized” reality, whereas Kant’s critical approach retained the idea of a noumenal object 
= X, thereby establishing limits for experience in general. Ricoeur 1954, 57. (Ricoeur 1967b, 190.) 
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self-identifying reflection also does not take place in a void but in a situation.831 The self 
affirms itself capable, identifies itself, “as an incarnate being situated in the world,” Ricoeur 
states.832 In brief, a self-conscious homme capable is a result of acting in the cultural world in 
which my intentions are actualized. 
Let me now also bring up the theme of Ricoeur’s Kantianism, implicit in the 
preceding examination. Ricoeur’s theoretical affinity with Kant unveils in the conviction that 
although “being situated,” or being tied to empirical intuition, gives the possibility for self-
affirmation, it also limits a human being’s understanding of himself: “I am not divine 
understanding; my comprehension is limited and finite.”833 According to The Voluntary and the 
Involuntary a human being never achieves a total notion of himself – Kant argues this 
particularly in the Paralogism section of The Critique of Pure Reason834 – but always finds 
himself “in a corporeal, historical situation, because he stands neither at the beginning nor at 
the end but always in the middle, in medias res.”835 Ricoeur calls this state of incompleteness 
the “genuine condition” of human beings, “la condition véritable,” the authentic state of being a 
human.836 It is in this situation of never-ending acts that a person self-identifies through 
reflection. 
 Self-identification is not an easy task but an unending one, as a subject is 
contested by all impulses, perceptions, and stimuli, including those coming from the social 
sphere of life. Ricoeur’s subject is never a solipsistic one but always concerns with-being and 
                                               
831 Cf. Ricoeur 1949, 57. (59). 
832 Ricoeur 1949, 189. (203). 
833 Ricoeur 1949, 165-166. (174). Cf. Kant 1999, III.B145, B150. (KrV). 
834 Kant 1999, III.Bxxviii, B153-158, A341-A366. (KrV).  
835 Ricoeur 1949, 166. (175). 
836 Ricoeur 1949, 165. (174). 
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being-among.837 Human history, and the contemporary social topography which reflects it, 
add to the challenge of indeterminacy already implicit in being incarnated in the world. 
Ricoeur maintains that daring and risking are inseparable from the process of 
individualization that gathers the notion of my self, my personhood:  
Social topography projects itself in contradictory affective signs and painful 
alternatives [or choices]. Familial, professional, cultural, sporting, artistic, 
religious, and all such associations, tear us apart so that a person has to create 
his own unity, his independence, his originality, and to dare his own style of 
life. The person is born (naît) from this distortion among the conflicts of 
duties.838 
 
Ricoeur argues, in other words, that with-being and being-among disperse a subject by 
throwing him in an unavoidable state of making a choice; this necessity to choose while 
being torn apart is a fundamental trait of the voluntary and the involuntary. The unity of 
one’s own style of life, one’s own personality, is not given but gradually formed. Individual 
consciousness is unified in the midst of a disjointed and shattered society, which threatens to 
scatter the subject by mutually non-coherent sets of demands, obligations, and appeals. 
Paradoxically, a subject does not decide himself in a void but precisely in a social and cultural 
situation that in itself threatens to tear the subject’s unity apart.  
In terms of our discussion in this dissertation, let me point out that for 
Ricoeur choice facilitates self-recognition. In summing up the unavoidable step from 
hesitation to choice, Ricoeur states in The Voluntary and the Involuntary that an “authentic 
choice assumes an authentic debate among values which are not invented but 
encountered.”839 An authentic choice also maintains, in Ricoeur’s words, both the possibility 
                                               
837 Ricoeur 1949, 407-416. (433-443). – Ricoeur argues in The Voluntary and the Involuntary that each 
individual consciousness is not independent from the social history of humankind, and that this results the 
accumulation of social history that is carried in contemporary consciousnesses: “all the ages of humankind are 
thus represented within our consciousness.” Ricoeur 1949, 141. (148). Cf. Ricoeur 2004b, 239. (161-162). 
838 Ricoeur 1949, 141. (148). 
839 Ricoeur 1949, 171. (180). 
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of being in agreement with oneself – thus also recognizing oneself as “I recognize (reconnais) 
my line of conduct in the new decision”840 – and the possibility of taking a risk. Ricoeur 
argues that these two possibilities, which pertain to received, suggested or imposed existence 
(viz. encountering values or other’s choices) and willed, self-chosen human existence (viz. 
recognizing oneself in one’s decision), are reconciled in one’s practical act which has the 
acknowledged self as its subject. “To exist is to act,” Ricoeur maintains.841 A “project” is a 
mere intention of action but a practical act is authenticating that intention, testing and 
verifying it in the corporeal world, thus taking on risk as well as choosing one’s own self.842 
In sum, “I ‘recognize’ (reconnais) the empty intention in the full act.”843 In other words, the 
intention remains an idea until it has been realized, put to test in the practical world that 
recognizes only actions and not silent intentions. In practical action, therefore, the choice 
actualizes itself and becomes my authentic choice. In short, the step from hesitation to 
authentic choice, from imposed existence to self-recognized human existence, is made in 
practical action. 
 Since practical actions gain their signification only by their objects, Ricoeur 
also calls that action “expressive”: voluntary action expresses the object of a person’s will, 
and therefore also his self-affirmation in his acts, insofar as that action pertains to its 
intended object.844 Even though Ricoeur is mainly interested in intentional, voluntary actions 
                                               
840 Ricoeur 1949, 161. (169). – Ricoeur clarifies his statement of the correlation between an authentic 
choice and self-recognition by also mentioning that “I recognize myself,” je me reconnais moi-même.  
841 Ricoeur 1949, 316. (334). 
842 Ricoeur 1949, 187-188. (201-202). – A practical act includes muscular movement, although it is difficult 
to describe how will and bodily movements are combined. Ricoeur argues therefore that “the acid test of a 
philosophy of the will is indisputably the problem of muscular effort.” Ricoeur 1949, 291. (308). 
843 Ricoeur 1949, 191. (206). 
844 Practical action, or transforming my environment by altering my object-relation, is done in a corporeal 
world, that is, in the world of physical objects and objects of actions. Ricoeur argues that the personal body, 
“my own body,” is already an indication of the fact that subjectivity cannot dismiss this dimension of being 
human. A subject’s personal body is, as Ricoeur defines it in The Voluntary and the Involuntary, “an original 
relation of subjectivity to the world.” Being a subject in the world includes the notion of having my own body: 
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– in contrast to non-voluntary actions such as reflexes – some automated bodily actions such 
as “cigarette rolling”845 are also expressive due to their basic voluntary origin. In other words, 
these actions manifest the personality of their subject. “The smoker who automatically rolls a 
cigarette knows very well that he does it ‘expressly’,” Ricoeur states, “because he is capable 
of recognizing (reconnaître) his act as his and to take it up again as a focal act.”846 A smoker 
might have perfected his skills of cigarette rolling to the level of automation, but this still 
does not prevent of thinking cigarette rolling as an intentional, expressive act.  
  As argued above, however, social topography necessitates and guides person-
formation that in itself pertains to practical action by which a subject’s personal character is 
expressed and “tested.” Read in connection with this idea of practical action, the notion of 
topography means that the environment of my action is not blank but a cultured one. 
Approaching Henri Bergson’s notion of homo faber, the constructive human being who, 
besides physical artifacts, makes indefinitely variable linguistic tools,847 Ricoeur argues 
                                                                                                                                            
I use it in action. “Acting,” however, “is a way in which a subject relates himself to objects,” by bringing a 
change to these relations in using the personal body. Ricoeur therefore maintains that practical action is “a 
transformation of my environment itself,” but in such a way which combines doing with its intent – the doing 
“passes over” into its object as Ricoeur describes it. “The pragma is this complete correlate of doing.” Practical 
action, in other words, is not mere “doing” but “doing” in the light of its object. Ricoeur 1949, 194, 196. (208, 
210). 
845 Ricoeur, perhaps surprisingly, returns to this particular example multiple times in The Voluntary and the 
Involuntary. Cf. Ricoeur 1949, 38, 187, 313. (39, 201, 331). 
846 Ricoeur 1949, 313. (331). 
847 Although the term “homo faber” was already used as a description of a human being in Latin literature, it 
is most commonly associated with the French philosopher Henri Bergson (1859-1941). For the purpose of the 
present study, his critical understanding of homo sapiens and seeing humans as “producing beings” - presented in 
L’évolution créatrice (1907) - is well worthy to be cited at length: “As regards human intelligence, it has not been 
sufficiently noted that mechanical invention has been from the first its essential feature, that even to-day our 
social life gravitates around the manufacture and use of artificial instruments, that the inventions which strew 
the road of progress have also traced its direction. […] A century has elapsed since the invention of the steam-
engine, and we are only just beginning to feel the depths of the shock it gave us. But the revolution it has 
effected in industry has nevertheless upset human relations altogether. New ideas are arising, new feelings are 
on the way to flower. In thousands of years, when, seen from the distance, only the broad lines of the present 
age will still be visible, our wars and our revolutions will count for little, even supposing they are remembered 
at all; but the steam-engine, and the procession of inventions of every kind that accompanied it, will perhaps be 
spoken of as we speak of the bronze or of the chipped stone of pre-historic times: it will serve to define an age. 
If we could rid ourselves of all pride, if, to define our species, we kept strictly to what the historic and the 
prehistoric periods show us to be constant characteristic of man and of intelligence, we should say not Homo 
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forcefully that since subjects are primordially constituted by with-being and being-among, 
human action is also re-acting to former actions:  
Our civilized milieu is particularly complex: it is peopled with the products of 
human action. Fields, marks, tables, books, etc., are the same time tasks and 
utensils involved in new actions. Since the milieu of human behavior has itself 
been produced by behavior, man reacts to his own works. This eminently 
technical character of the human milieu and of human action depends, as we 
know, on the fact that man works with tools to produce the “artificial” objects 
of his civilized needs and even of his vital needs. This is why man’s action is 
typically “artificial”: it is techne, mother of arts and techniques.848 
 
I don’t intend to reword this whole dense passage but only emphasize Ricoeur’s idea that a 
human being “reacts to his own works,” he re-acts while pro-jecting, and the idea that the 
milieu of practical action is the cultured world. From these Ricoeur concludes that the world 
is presented to me as a human subject “as horizon, as theater, and as a matter of my 
actions.”849 By “habits of civilization and culture” as generally acquired forms of practices 
and imposed social rhythms850 my practical action, in other words, relates to general human 
object-setting – to habitual action – that guides the authentication of my intentions as it 
reacts to the cultural milieu in which I am corporeally situated. In that theater of cultural 
milieu – that, according to History and Truth, also constitutes the “human time” as the “time 
of works”851 – I present myself to the others but also to myself in objectifying myself in my 
practical action and reflecting upon the meaning of those actions to my own subjectivity. In 
sum, the cultural world is the stage for me to present my self to myself by forming 
                                                                                                                                            
sapiens, but Homo faber. In short, intelligence, considered in what seems to be its original feature, is the faculty of manufacturing 
artificial objects, especially [intellectual] tools [such as symbols] to make tools [such as language], and of indefinitely varying the 
manufacture [e.g. in discourse].” Cf. Bergson 1975, 153-154, 172-178. 
848 Ricoeur 1949, 197. (211-212). 
849 Ricoeur 1949, 198. (212). 
850 Ricoeur 1949, 265, 271. (281, 287). – Ricoeur also argues that “habit is the most perfect instrument in 
civilizing the body.” Ricoeur 1949, 297. (314-315). 
851 Ricoeur 1967a, 82. (82). 
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“artificial” objects, through which I can reflectively gain an understanding of my cultural and 
vital needs. 
 
9.3 The Spell: the Detour of Objectivity 
For the sake of the discussion that follows in chapter 10, it is important for us to pay 
attention to the fact that Ricoeur’s early anthropology frequently returns – as we have seen – 
to the notions of object, objectification, and objectivity. The inheritance of Kantian thought 
shines through in Ricoeur’s claim that my subjectivity, my acting self, is always and only 
through the objectivity of objects.852 The phrase “to exist is to act” applies, according to 
Ricoeur, “to me in terms of effort,” but also “to things in terms of the resistance they offer 
me.”853 The “resistance” Ricoeur discusses in The Voluntary and the Involuntary refers to Maine 
de Biran’s idea that a subject’s intentional action is countered by the constantly present 
“alien terminus” which resists the subject’s efforts.854 A subject remains captive to things and 
matters at hand: in human experience of life no pure subjectivity is possible. This is why 
Ricoeur asserts that “an object is not non-self but a presence of an other.”855 A subject is 
constantly in the presence of other-than-its-subjectivity. Ricoeur also argues in The Voluntary 
and the Involuntary that “an act can be understood only as intention, that is by its object.”856 
Insofar as I act intentionally, I objectify myself in my actions, I work in a world of objects to 
produce objects, that is, I intend to express my subjective self in an objective manner.  
                                               
852 Cf. Kant 1999, III.B132-138. (KrV). 
853 Ricoeur 1949, 316. (334). 
854 Ricoeur 1949, 316. (334-335). 
855 Ricoeur 1949, 316. (334). 
856 Ricoeur 1949, 321. (343). 
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 Subjecting oneself to the presence of an other, to the texture of experienced 
reality, is consenting, according to Ricoeur’s “third cycle” of analysis in The Voluntary and the 
Involuntary. In contrast to deciding and acting, Ricoeur argues that consenting “acquiesces to 
necessity,” that it silently assents that the condition of my willing is already given and 
therefore involuntary. Consenting is thus a more concealed form of the will’s relation to the 
involuntary than deciding and acting, in which the involuntary, or all that is necessarily 
“given” and received, is more apparent.857 In brief, Ricoeur defines the task of the whole of 
The Voluntary and the Involuntary by three guiding ideas – reciprocity, subjectivity, and 
conciliation – which form an argumentative succession and therefore also the structure of 
the work: “the reciprocity of the voluntary and the involuntary, the necessity of going back 
beyond psychological dualism and seeking the common standard of the involuntary and the 
voluntary in subjectivity, and finally the primacy of conciliation over paradox.”858 What I can will 
appears only in connection with what cannot be willed, but my will also manifests my 
subjectivity, my personal life among all life – this subjectivity, which acknowledges the 
involuntary, reconciles the paradox of necessity and freedom. Ricoeur maintains that this 
inevitable reciprocity between the human voluntary and involuntary is overcome in consent 
which reconciles human nature and the freedom of human will within situatedness.859  
 Ricoeur notifies his readers that consenting to situatedness is not doing away 
with a person’s will, however. According to Ricoeur’s definition, consenting is “un engagement 
dans l’être,” an engagement in being, a constant note to self – made when exercising the will – 
of being necessarily involved in being, that is, of being situated.860 Ricoeur argues that this 
                                               
857 Ricoeur 1949, 319. (341). Cf. Amalric 2011, 26. 
858 Ricoeur 1949, 319. (341). 
859 Ricoeur 1949, 322-323. (344-345). 
860 Ricoeur 1949, 323. (345). 
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engagement and involvement (which, unlike the human will, are incorruptible because 
consenting is not a question of possession but of necessity) is an inevitable aspect of willing: 
“wise men have always construed the cognition (connaissance) of necessity as a moment of 
freedom.”861 To consent, Ricoeur emphasizes, “is still to do,” albeit it is also “adopting” all 
determinations that ground my subjectivity.862 Ricoeur therefore adheres to “Kant’s warning 
that there is no freedom without law.”863 The human freedom is engagement with necessity 
and consenting to its lawlike determinations. A determined subject, however, is not a 
subject-like object but a willing subject engaged in living being. 
 Besides Ricoeur’s treatment of a living subject, the notions of object and 
objectivity pose a problem for his philosophical inquiry. Despite the statement that willingly 
moving my body affirms a continuity of freedom and nature, the distinction between 
voluntary and involuntary remains a challenge for his philosophical anthropology.864 Ricoeur 
admits that “the involuntary [which presents itself naturally as an objective reality among the 
objects of the world] seems in principle to demand an objective treatment and there seems 
to be no common standard between object and subject.”865 Besides conceiving a subject as an 
object in the world, Ricoeur points out that an objective analysis of a subject proposes this 
same dilemma.  
Being determined to make a voluntary choice – which also is an objective, 
fundamental human condition – should, according to Ricoeur, be accurately described in 
non-subjectivizing terms. How could a subject’s experience, however, survive in the face of 
such scientific objectivity, Ricoeur ruminates, and returns then to the idea of my body: 
                                               
861 Ricoeur 1949, 322. (344). 
862 Ricoeur 1949, 323-324. (345-346). 
863 Ricoeur 1949, 170. (179). 
864 Ricoeur 1949, 324-325. (347-348). 
865 Ricoeur 1949, 325. (348). 
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“Total objectification of man is an invitation to betray the responsibility I have for my body 
itself.”866 It is the Marcelian mystery of “my own body” (mon corps propre) that resists all attempts 
to reduce my subjective-bodily experience to mere objective explanation. Following his 
mentor Gabriel Marcel, Ricoeur argues that objective problematization fails to retain a 
connection to what Marcel calls the mystery of living existence.867  
 Let me turn this reading of The Voluntary and the Involuntary to its closing by 
summing up the notion of the “spell” of objectivity; even if Ricoeur strongly emphasizes the 
ideas of objects, objectification, and objectivity, subjectivity still remains the core of his 
thought in the work. The “full scope” of living human experience, “une expérience intégrale du 
Cogito,” remains his task from the beginning to the very end.868 If a subject would submit 
completely to objectivity, or if instead of describing the intersubjectively experienced human 
condition one were to try to explain it objectively,869 it would be impossible to reintroduce 
subjectivity – Ricoeur argues in a Kantian manner – since “to conceive an object is to 
conceive of it under a law; a partial or permissive determinism makes no sense.”870 
Categorical determinism, in other words, does not allow relativism or subjective variation. If 
determinism is adopted, a subject is in this sense “lost,” since the subject’s subjectivity has 
no significance; it is a mere object itself without real freedom. Objective necessity is in 
Ricoeur’s final analysis pure causality that, for this reason, applies “only between object and 
object.”871 The use and function of such objective explication of the human condition 
subjectively encountered then becomes a problem for Ricoeur, who explicitly wishes to 
retain a connection to a living experience of a subject: the human subject vanishes otherwise. 
                                               
866 Ricoeur 1949, 326. (348). 
867 Ricoeur 1949, 18. (15). Cf. Ricoeur, Azouvi, & de Launay 1995, 21, 41-45. (9-10, 23-25). 
868 Ricoeur 1949, 12, 456. (8, 485-486). 
869 Cf. Ricoeur 1949, 12-20. (8-17). 
870 Ricoeur 1949, 328. (350). Cf. Kant 1999, A93/B126, B143. (KrV). 
871 Ricoeur 1949, 328. (351). 
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A universalizing explanation does not reach the heart of my subjective experience of 
freedom but empties it completely. 
 Subjectivity cannot be understood solely in terms of objectivity. The “spell of 
objectivity,” of which Ricoeur warns his readers, is to forget or neglect the subjective 
experiences of necessity; “a mode of our existence,” as Ricoeur defines this necessity 
“within” us.872 The necessity “within” is, Ricoeur points out, the only necessity that is 
coherent with the idea of consent. Only the experienced necessity “can be matched with the 
freedom of consent, for only an internal experience can be partial with respect to freedom 
and call forth an act of the will which it completes,” he insists.873 The paradox, however, still 
remains: the delicate balance of the voluntary and the involuntary – at the level of 
description/explanation: subjectivity and objectivity – should be maintained, and reducing 
objectivity to a subjective quasi-objectivity would also avoid the richness of the paradox.  
 In terms of what follows later in this dissertation, it is also important to pay 
attention to the fact that Ricoeur overcomes the either-or of subjectivity/objectivity by 
introducing a dialectics of being human that acknowledges a subject’s existence as a task in 
life.874 Existence as an exercise of freedom is, already in The Voluntary and the Involuntary, 
described as an endless process: “I am always in the process of beginning to be free, I have 
always begun to live when I say ‘I am.’”875 The fundamental argument for this resolution – 
which retains the focus in a subject whose self remains a task – is given in the following 
passage that not only clarifies why the detour through (scientific) objectivity is necessary for 
an understanding of the human condition, but also forecasts Ricoeur’s much later 
                                               
872 Ricoeur 1949, 327. (350). 
873 Ricoeur 1949, 329. (351). 
874 Ricoeur 1949, 326, 393-394. (349, 419). 
875 Ricoeur 1949, 415. (441). 
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discussions of the necessary dialectics of scientific explanation and hermeneutic-existential 
understanding.876 
 Furthermore, for the sake of this current part three of this dissertation, let me 
also reconnect with the theme of Ricoeur’s Kantianism; it springs forth once again in this 
same passage when he alludes to the universal categories, such as causality, and their 
function to enable experience: 
Does [the idea] that [necessity can be the locus of our responsibility] mean that 
in reverting from the objective to the subjective we lose the benefit of 
scientific knowledge of character, of the unconscious, and of life? Not at all; 
we experience nothing subjectively unless we try, at the risk of failure, to 
conceive of it along causal lines. The detour through objective knowledge is 
necessary; at its limits we begin to sense necessity for us and in us. It is always 
a definite objective knowledge which lends its inadequate language to Cogito’s 
experience. We shall thus be led to retain the language of causality as an index 
of that investment of freedom by necessity subjectively experienced; in this 
sense we are, we shall say, determined by our character [which situates me, 
casts me into individuality], our unconscious, and our life. This is expressed in 
the fine term, human condition, which articulates well the necessity to which I 
yield by the very fact that I have not chosen to exist. But we must not lose 
sight of the improper and indirect character of such language: it is transposed 
from the level of explanation, where causal necessity is not limited and made 
complete by any freedom, to the level of the lived where necessity is the 
condition of a freedom.877  
 
Ricoeur insists here that even though the subject’s living experience of his freedom is at the 
crux of his interest, it is necessary for him to take an argumentative detour through 
objectivity. Only by this detour, or, rather, in the light of the Kantian objective, does 
Ricoeur’s notion of the self as a task – which correlates with the idea of human condition – 
become apparent and henceforth understandable.  
The objective description renders the subject’s experience intelligible by 
conceptualizing and universalizing it, but it remains inadequate for the same reason. 
                                               
876 Ricoeur 1983, 187-194. (132-137); Ricoeur 1986a, 137-182, 197-211. (105-143, 156-167). 
877 Ricoeur 1949, 329, 345. (351-352, 368). Cf. Kant 1999, III.A80/B106, A189-211/B232-256. (KrV). 
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Ricoeur’s philosophy of decentered subjectivity can only be paradoxical as he himself 
admits.878 The objective detour is necessary to gain an understanding of a subject’s condition 
as both receptive and productive: “Freedom is not a pure act. It constitutes itself in receiving 
what it does not produce; values, capacities, and sheer nature.”879 As in Course of Recognition 
over fifty years later, receiving therefore becomes in The Voluntary and the Involuntary “the 
pivotal category” on which a subject’s freedom depends.880 Subjectivity is, paradoxically, 
explained by objectivity when the notion of subjectivity is regained in the midst of 
necessitating conditions. The dialectics of subjectivity and objectivity, in which hopeful 
consent – Ricoeur refers to the postulates of Kant’s practical philosophy881 – takes place as a 
“yes” that is “won from the no,”882 therefore results in the conciliation with paradox Ricoeur 
was searching for. Even if overcoming the paradox then becomes possible, it cannot be 
emptied but only accepted in consent.  
Alluding to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason Ricoeur thus maintains in The 
Voluntary and the Involuntary that “the beginning of philosophy is a Copernican revolution 
which centers the world of object on the Cogito: the object is for the subject.”883 Instead of 
thinking how the subject conforms to objects, Ricoeur adopts Kant’s famous “Copernican 
revolution” for subjectivity itself in claiming that the object must conform to the 
constitution of the subject.884 “This entire work,” Ricoeur asserts, “is carried out under the 
sign of that first [philosophical] Copernican revolution.”885 As Ricoeur maintains later in 
                                               
878 Ricoeur 1949, 444. (472). 
879 Ricoeur 1949, 454. (484). 
880 Ricoeur 2004b, 351. (243). 
881 Ricoeur 1949, 22. (19). 
882 Ricoeur 1949, 332, 451. (354, 479-480). 
883 Ricoeur 1949, 443. (471). 
884 Cf. Kant 1999, III.Bxvi-xvii. (KrV).  
885 Ricoeur 1949, 443. (472). 
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Course of Recognition, this revolution is the “founding act of critical philosophy.”886 Ricoeur’s 
own application of critical philosophy locates itself after this revolution.  
In conclusion, therefore, I maintain that The Voluntary and the Involuntary “had 
already begun Ricoeur’s rethinking of Kant” as Pamela Sue Anderson also argues in her own 
analysis.887 As we have seen, the whole of The Voluntary and the Involuntary is thoroughly 
Kantian, manifested by Ricoeur’s requirement that a firm relation – maintained by 
prereflective imputation as a transcendental condition – between a subject and the objects, 
for this subject, facilitates reflective observation.888 The most convincing testimony of 
Ricoeur’s situatedness in the Kantian tradition, including and beyond the first Critique, is his 
concluding definition of human freedom, which is determined by Kantian “limit concepts,” 
or limited to the realm of possible experience: “our freedom is only human and reaches a 
complete understanding of itself only with respect to some limit concepts which we also 
understand in general as Kantian ideas, regulatory, and not constitutive, that is, as ideal 
essences which determine the limit degree of essences of consciousness.”889 Human freedom 
is experienced freedom and thus limited to the possible experience regulated by the 
transcendental conditions Kant laid out in the first Critique. It is also, however, the same 
freedom that Kant postulated in the second, and attempted to reconcile with necessity in the 
third Critique. Freedom, in other words, is regulated, conditioned freedom, but it still is 
thinkable as freedom.890 
Ricoeur’s dialectics of being human, however, intentionally avoids adopting an 
exclusively Kantian position, and transcends its epistemological tone by insisting on a 
                                               
886 Ricoeur 2004b, 65, 88-89. (38, 56-57). 
887 Anderson 1993, 10-11, 45-46, 50-54. 
888 Cf. Ricoeur 1949, 57. (58-59). 
889 Ricoeur 1949, 455. (484). Cf. Kant 1999, III.A179-180/B222. (KrV). 
890 Cf. Kant 1999, III.Bxxviii. (KrV). 
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“second revolution”: reflection which takes into account a subject’s bodily experience “frees 
us from an intellectualism which pays attention only to impersonal structures of knowledge 
(categories of understanding and ideas of reason).”891 In a manner similar to the existential 
phenomenology of Gabriel Marcel, The Voluntary and the Involuntary expresses the worry that 
focusing solely on the transcendental conditions of experience and cognition – the 
“universal conditions which make knowledge in general possible” as Ricoeur defines them – 
renders the personal, subjective level of experience meaningless, and overlooks the 
embodied person under the transcendental conditions of “I think.”892 
Ricoeur’s critical Kantian attunement remained throughout his works. Course of 
Recognition, Ricoeur’s work at the other end of his career, repeats this idea of the importance 
of personal experience when calling for an expansion to Kant’s transcendental idealism that 
would recognize “the situation of the subject and the subject in situation.”893 Objectivity 
facilitates self-recognition, but the transcendental analysis of the conditions for the 
possibility of experience is not enough: Ricoeur also considers the living subject’s 
experience. In particular, universalizing language does not reckon the social experience of 
being a living subject. Ricoeur argues, therefore, in his essay “Science and Ideology” that “all 
objectifying knowledge about our position in society, in a social class, in a cultural tradition, 
and in history is preceded by a relation of belonging upon which we can never entirely reflect. 
Before any critical distance, we belong to a history, to a class, to a nation, to a culture, to one 
or several traditions.”894 The experience of belonging to a context is not exhausted in 
                                               
891 Ricoeur 1949, 318. (337). 
892 Ricoeur 1949, 318. (337). Cf. Kant 1999, III.B132-135. (KrV). 
893 Ricoeur 2004b, 90-91, 93. (58, 60). 
894 Ricoeur 1986a, 328. (267). – Of subjectivity and historical objectivity, or, of historian’s task to objectify 
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objective explanation as conceived in Kant’s transcendentalism. Ricoeur argues, as we have 
seen, that the objective detour is needed for a subject’s self-understanding, which has to 
include the level of personal experience as onto-existentially situated. 
Now that we have introduced Ricoeur’s affinity with the neo-Kantian reflexive 
philosophy as well as Ricoeur’s critical allusions to Kant, his self-definition as a “post-
Hegelian Kantian” philosopher is perhaps already less enigmatic. The Voluntary and the 
Involuntary follows Kant in regulating the realm of human understanding by demanding the 
objectivity of objects as the condition for the subjectivity of subject, yet still insists that the 
universal explanation of the human condition is not enough for understanding the concrete 
experience of being a situated subject. This subject can only recognize itself, and hence begin 
to understand itself, by constantly taking the detour through objectivity which extends far 
beyond being only a transcendental condition of cognition.  
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10. THE OBJECTS OF HUMAN WORKS 
In this chronological survey of Ricoeur’s works, let me now move on to his subsequent 
monograph Fallible Man. It continues the problematics of The Voluntary and the Involuntary 
while also striving to grasp the spheres of human experience that were “bracketed,” or put 
aside, in the preceding work: fault and the conditions of human fallibility. This second 
volume of Philosophie de la volonté that began with The Voluntary and the Involuntary – or, actually, 
the first part of the second volume895 – provides a study of the structures of human reality 
and therefore “represents a broadening of the anthropological perspective of the first work, 
which was much more extensively a study of the structures of the will,” as Ricoeur himself 
makes the distinction between the tasks of these two works.896   
 In Fallible Man Ricoeur makes a clear distinction between a theoretical and the 
practical “stage” of an anthropology of human disproportion, that is, between the 
transcendental synthesis and the practical synthesis as he calls them using Kantian 
language.897 Although these both refer to “synthesis” in their respective manners – in 
knowing and in acting – the practical one is capable of opening the third stage of Ricoeur’s 
analysis in Fallible Man, namely, that of human affects, or “the philosophy of feeling.”898 In 
this threefold structuring of his Fallible Man, Ricoeur perhaps could be said to allude to 
Kant’s three Critiques: The Critique of Pure Reason defines the necessary conditions for the 
possibility of cognition and possible experience, The Critique of Practical Reason those of 
                                               
895 The other part of the second volume of Philosophy of the Will is The Symbolism of Evil, published separately 
but at the same time as Fallible Man. As Ricoeur had anticipated in The Voluntary and the Involuntary to publish a 
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this decision has caused much confusion ever after the separate publication of the two parts of the second 
volume. The third volume was never published, but Ricoeur scholars seem to hold on to the idea that Ricoeur’s 
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896 Ricoeur 1960a, 11-12. (xliii). 
897 Ricoeur 1960a, 64. (47). 
898 Ricoeur 1960a, 97-99. (81-83). 
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human freedom and moral action, and The Critique of Judgment those of the harmonious 
interplay of cognitive powers to which the feeling of pleasure is connected.899 In terms of the 
progression of knowing, acting, and feeling, the structure of Ricoeur’s Fallible Man simulates 
the structure of Kant’s critical works. 
The overall Kantian tone of Ricoeur’s Fallible Man is not mere speculative 
observation, however. Ricoeur draws the order of the “deduction of the categories of 
fallibility” in Fallible Man from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason – more precisely, from the triad 
of the categories of quality Kant introduces in the section commonly called metaphysical 
deduction, or “the clue to the discovery of all pure concepts of the understanding”: reality, 
negation, and limitation.900 Ricoeur argues that he transposes Kant’s categories “onto the 
level of a philosophical anthropology so as to systematize the language employed throughout 
the course of this book.”901 This three-part “course” of Fallible Man, in brief, follows themes 
of 1) knowing, focusing on “thing,” 2) acting, focusing on “a person,” and 3) feeling, 
focusing on “cultural passions” – which parallels the structure of Kant’s critical works. 
Ricoeur, in other words, maps Kant’s transcendental epistemology onto his own work and 
claims that he bases the philosophical anthropology he develops in Fallible Man on the first 
of Kant’s Critiques. 
Despite Ricoeur’s professedly unorthodox reading of Kant,902 Fallible Man is 
saturated with Kant’s philosophy beyond the critical works: it turns against the critical works 
with the help of Kant’s Anthropology. Ricoeur’s engagement with Kant’s philosophy amounts 
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to, I maintain, not only an anthropology of a fallible human being, but also to a 
corresponding philosophy of culture which concretizes the notion of object in Fallible Man. I 
will demonstrate that according to Ricoeur a subject becomes recognized and gains an 
understanding of being a capable human being – l’homme capable de faillir903 – only in the light 
of this philosophy of culture that is grounded in the idea of cultural objectivity. I maintain, 
therefore, that Fallible Man prefigures with yet another overlapping triad of consciousness, 
self-consciousness, and cultural recognition the much later triad in Course of Recognition, 
namely, the triad of identity, self-recognition, and mutual recognition. The focus of this 
chapter, however, is on the Kantian tones of Fallible Man which participate in the broader 
philosophy of mediated cultural recognition this dissertation has laid out so far. 
This chapter 10, and section 10.3 in particular, holds a central place in the 
dissertation. While following the structure of Kantian-Ricoeurian triads, it specifies Ricoeur’s 
understanding of cultural objectivity that necessitates a hermeneutic of culture. I will focus in 
section 10.1 on consciousness by notions of knowing, phenomenon, schema, and reality – 
this thematic corresponds with The Critique of Pure Reason. Second, in 10.2 I will examine the 
level of self-consciousness in terms of “practical mediation”: acting and personhood. Section 
10.2 thus parallels with The Critique of Practical Reason. Third, section 10.3 reconciles the rift 
between the “theoretical” (viz. nature or reality) and the “practical” (viz. freedom) 
approaches by centering on cultural recognition in its analyses of affects and cultural 
passions. Even though Ricoeur in this third phase moves away from Kant’s critical works to 
the Anthropology, the section 10.3 still accords with The Critique of Judgment, in which a peculiar 
                                               
903 Ricoeur 1960a, 161. (145). 
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feeling of pleasure indicates the reconciling, harmonious interplay of the cognitive powers, 
and in which Kant presents his cultural theory.904 
 
10.1 The Synthesis under Objects: the Formal Unity of Consciousness 
Ricoeur opens his argument in Fallible Man with a reflection he calls transcendental, because 
it starts with the notion of an object; “it is a reflection that begins with the object […], 
reflection upon the object.”905 Ricoeur’s line of reasoning is easier to comprehend if the main 
thesis of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is explained first. The crux of Kant’s transcendental 
deduction – his most important inquiry into the faculty of understanding906 – lies in the so-
called reciprocity thesis (§17 of B-edition) that argues for necessary conditions that hold 
both for a cognizable object and cognizing subject,907 and in Kant’s definition of an object: it 
is “that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united.”908 In other 
words, cognizing a determinate object requires that the pure concepts of understanding be 
applied to the given intuition, thus synthesizing the sensibly given intuition under the 
concepts of understanding that belong to one and self-same consciousness. The object, in 
sum, stands as a litmus test for philosophical anthropology, that is, for a philosophical 
understanding of a subject.909 
 To further clarify Ricoeur’s approach, I will explain the heart of Kant’s 
reciprocity thesis briefly. Since everything manifold in an intuition – or the sensibly given 
variegated material that is “offered” for synthesis under the pure conditions of time and 
                                               
904 Kant 1999, V.177-179, 431-434. (KdU). 
905 Ricoeur 1960a, 36. (18). 
906 Kant 1999, III.Axvi. (KrV). 
907 Kant 1999, III.B138. (KrV). 
908 Kant 1999, III.B137. (KrV). 
909 Ricoeur 1960a, 35-36. (17). 
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space910 – must necessarily refer to the “I think” in the same subject in whom the manifold is 
found, all the manifold of intuition necessarily stands under the condition of original 
synthetic unity of apperception, that is, under one unified consciousness. In Kant’s words, 
“all unification of representations requires unity of consciousness in the synthesis of 
them.”911 Kant concludes that the formal unity of consciousness is therefore “that which 
alone constitutes the relation of representations to an object in their objective validity, and 
consequently is that which makes them into cognition and of which even the possibility of 
the understanding depends.”912 In sum, the transcendental unity of apperception, or the 
necessary synthetic unity of consciousness, and the determinate combination of the manifold 
of given intuition – that is, synthesis upon the object in its concept – are interdependent. Put 
differently, Kant argues that the subjectivity of a subject, and the objectivity of an object are 
reciprocal. 
 This brief elucidation of one of the key ideas in The Critique of Pure Reason 
clarifies what Ricoeur means when he asserts that he initiates a genuinely philosophical 
anthropology “by means of a reflection of a ‘transcendental’ style, that is, a reflection that 
starts not with myself but with the object before me, and from there traces back to its 
                                               
910 Kant 1999, III.B33-73, A76-77/B102, B129-130, B136. (KrV). 
911 Kant 1999, III.B137. (KrV). 
912 Kant 1999, III.B137. (KrV). – In terms of rigor, let me mention that my brief summary of Kant’s 
reciprocity thesis does not include Kant’s full argument, that is, his argument for the other direction from 
sensible intuition to transcendental apperception. The relation between pure apperception and an object, in 
fact, must be argued from this other direction as well in order it to hold: 1) The original synthetic unity of 
apperception is “entirely independent from all conditions of sensible intuition.” Because the pure form of 
sensibility is not cognition but only gives the manifold, it is, therefore, of this given manifold of intuition that a 
subject must “synthetically bring about a determinate combination” for there to be cognition. This means that 
the unity of apperception requires that in a cognition there is a synthesis of representations, as 2) “the unity of 
this [synthetic] action is at the same time the unity of consciousness in the concept.” The synthesis of the 
manifold is possible only as a synthesis under the concepts. But then, 3) as the synthetic unity in the concept is, 
in cognitions, possible only by the manifold that is given in an intuition, it is also so that “thereby is an object 
first cognized” (since “an object is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united”). 
Kant 1999, III.B137-138. (KrV). 
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conditions of possibility.”913 Ricoeur, in other words, uses Kant’s transcendental 
epistemology in highlighting the radical disproportion, or shatteredness, of a subject: an 
anthropological reflection can only start with the object that stands in contrast to the subject. 
A subject is at best an intermediary, Ricoeur argues in Fallible Man, “discovered reflectively 
upon the object.”914 Ricoeur’s initial stance is, therefore, transcendental in its orientation to 
the object, although he wows at the outset of this analysis to expand and enlarge reflection 
on the human condition to the levels of action and affection – the transcendental reflection 
is perhaps necessary but insufficient.915 
 The strength of Ricoeur’s transcendental reflection is at the same time its 
limitation: it is reflection that begins with and concerns objects. “The synthesis that [this 
reflection] reveals and inspects will be a synthesis only in the object, in the thing,” Ricoeur 
points out; it reveals “a synthesis that is merely intentional, projected outside, into the world, 
into the structure of the objectivity it makes possible.”916 As Kant did, Ricoeur admits that 
this power of synthesis – rooted in the transcendental imagination – can be called 
“consciousness,” but Ricoeur clarifies that this consciousness is “not for itself.” Even if the 
transcendental reflection allows us to discuss consciousness, this consciousness “remains 
purely intended, represented in [its objective] correlate.”917 An analysis of the necessary 
conditions for the possibility of cognition, Ricoeur argues, does not give a full 
comprehension of the concrete experience of the human condition. 
 Even though the transcendental analysis functions only as an acknowledged 
philosophical starting point for further reflection, Ricoeur still argues that this analysis points 
                                               
913 Ricoeur 1960a, 25. (5). 
914 Ricoeur 1960a, 25. (5). 
915 Ricoeur 1960a, 35. (17). 
916 Ricoeur 1960a, 36. (18). 
917 Ricoeur 1960a, 36. (18). 
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out the most fundamental disproportion, or shatteredness, of a human subject: a finite 
understanding resulting from a subject’s perspectival receptivity. “Kant was not wrong,” 
Ricoeur maintains, “in identifying finitude and receptivity: according to him the finite is a 
rational being that does not create the objects of its representation but receives them.”918 
Ricoeur, in other words, follows Kant’s statement that the limit of possible experience is 
constituted by the given manifold of empirical intuition.919 This receptivity – already referred 
to a number of times in this dissertation – is according to Fallible Man the “primary 
modality” of human mediation.920 Again, then, a human being receives before he gives 
productively in return.  
A subject is first of all bound to empirical intuition, or sense perception, but 
this receiving of empirical raw data is also limited by its perspective. Ricoeur points out that 
an appearance “refers me back to my point of view”;921 that is, an object is nothing more 
than a phenomenon cognized from a point of view, and not a thing in itself, a noumenon.922 In 
other words, the object refers back to the subject as “a finite center of perspective” as 
Ricoeur defines it.923 In sum, “to perceive from here is the finitude of perceiving something; the 
point of view is the ineluctable initial narrowness of my openness to the world.”924 This 
primal human finitude – being bound to receiving – is unconquerable according to Ricoeur. 
 Ricoeur argues, however, that the finite human understanding is countered by 
an infinite human will. Strikingly, “it is finite man himself who speaks of his own finitude,” 
Ricoeur notices and maintains that human finitude is conceivable only when it has become a 
                                               
918 Ricoeur 1960a, 38. (20). 
919 Kant 1999, III.A239/B298. (KrV). 
920 Ricoeur 1960a, 38. (20). 
921 Ricoeur 1960a, 39. (21). 
922 Kant 1999, III.A235-260, B294-315. (KrV). 
923 Ricoeur 1960a, 39. (21). 
924 Ricoeur 1960a, 41. (23). 
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discourse on finitude.925 This discourse transgresses my finite perspective, steps over or 
beyond a subject’s fundamental finitude by invoking the question of the human infinitude. 
For sure, “a non-situated view or Übersicht does not exist,” Ricoeur reaffirms, but still the 
idea that I am able to express my “onesidedness” contests this finitude. In brief, “this 
transgression is the intention to signify,” as “in the sign dwells the transcendence of the λόγος 
of man.”926 The possibility of conceptualization and discourse carries a subject over or 
beyond from his initial and unavoidable situatedness. “I am not merely a situated look or 
gaze (regard situé),” Ricoeur argues, “but a being who intends and expresses as an intentional 
transgression of the situation.”927 I intend, I will, and when I express this willing I declare that 
I am able to adopt a “non-point of view,” that is, an indefinitely applicable view in the world 
of meaning. 
Even if a subject’s first condition is to receive, this does not imply that a 
subject would remain completely mute in his experience. “In being born I enter into the 
world of language that precedes me and envelops me,” and language “transmits intention 
(visée),” whereas sight (vision) does not, Ricoeur reasons.928 Saying, and in general signifying, 
transcends all appearances – or “the undetermined objects of empirical intuition” as Kant 
defines them929 – and therefore also a subject’s perspective. The ultimate infinitude in 
signifying is, however, found in judgments, or in “functions of unity among our 
representations,” to use Kant’s definition.930 According to Ricoeur, a judgment such as 
“Socrates is walking”931 is a movement that linguistically transgresses the human finitude.932  
                                               
925 Ricoeur 1960a, 42-43. (24-25). 
926 Ricoeur 1960a, 44, 46. (26, 28). 
927 Ricoeur 1960a, 45. (26-27). 
928 Ricoeur 1960a, 45. (27). 
929 Kant 1999, III.A20/B34. (KrV). 
930 Kant 1999, III.A69/B94. (KrV). 
931 Ricoeur 1960a, 50. (32). 
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Let me make a brief pause here. A relating clarification that already prepares us 
for the part four of this dissertation concerns these judgment statements. Both Kant and 
Ricoeur point out that judgments use verbs as copulas: “The verb is what makes the 
sentence ‘hold together’ since it ascribes the attributed signification to the subject of 
attribution by means of its supplemental signification.”933 The copula “glues” attribution and 
subject together, thus forming a judgment in which the attributed signification supplements 
the already given meaning. According to Ricoeur, however, the “supplementarity” of 
copulative verbs also extends to their capacity to “supra-signify,” by which Ricoeur means 
that copulas are both relational and existential; they transmit the additional attribution, but 
they also posit existence by asserting being: “‘Socrates is walking’ means that the walk ‘exists 
now’ and that the walk is ‘said of’ Socrates.”934 For Kant the copula indicates the necessary 
transcendental unity, whereas for Ricoeur a copula has the function of supra-signification. 
The copular verb, in Ricoeur’s terms, is affirmative: first, it affirms the 
relational-existential conditions in the judgment, and second, it also implies a correlation 
between a judging subject’s volitional act (that is, the primary intention of signifying), and 
                                                                                                                                            
932 Ricoeur 1960a, 44. (26). 
933 Ricoeur 1960a, 49-50. (32). – Ricoeur refers to Aristotle’s Peri Hermeneias but it should not be forgotten 
that Kant’s transcendental deduction (in the B-edition of the first Critique) also refers to the copula “is” which 
safeguards the notion of transcendental unity. Having reached the mutual interdependence between the 
transcendental unity of apperception and the objects of experience through concepts, as well as having shown 
that this has an objectively valid ground, Kant has to implement the notion of judgment (since understanding is 
a faculty for judging; cf. Kant 1999, III.A69/B94.) Thus, having investigated the pure, i.e., non-empirical, 
relations of given cognitions in judgments Kant finds that “a judgment is nothing other than the way to bring 
given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception.” The copula “is” in judgments (which Kant also 
understands more broadly than logicians) indicates this relation of the representations to original apperception 
and its necessary unity: its aim is “to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the 
subjective.” Furthermore, the copula “designates the relation of the representations to the original apperception 
and its necessary unity, even if the judgment itself is empirical, hence contingent” (Kant 1999, III.B141-142.) 
Kant concludes that only through this necessary unity of apperception – which is objectively valid (§18) – can 
there be an objectively valid relation between the given representations, that is, a judgment. 
934 Ricoeur 1960a, 50. (32). 
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the “objective moment of the verb”935 in its function of supra-signifying (that is, the 
predication which concerns an object for the judging subject). This second affirmation of a 
correlation between an act and a signification, Ricoeur points out, is an affirmation of “the 
correlation of the [infinite] will and the [finite] understanding.”936 Ricoeur’s conclusion is 
therefore that the infinity of the will extends in judgments, or in a subject’s speech, to the 
understanding.  
 Reminding the reader that the previous “interlude” not only leads us to what 
follows in this chapter but also relates to our discussion in part four, let me now reiterate the 
theme of finitude/infinitude in the light of Ricoeur’s discussion of judgments. The question 
now concerns the necessity of synthesis. Ricoeur names the “disproportion” of the 
infinitude of expression and finitude of perception as the “duality of understanding and 
sensibility,” and claims that the discovery of such disproportion necessitates an intermediary 
third term that would reconcile these two incommensurable conditions, or at least draw 
them together.937 To continue tracing Ricoeur’s Kantianism, Ricoeur expresses in Fallible 
Man his support for the idea that the third term between finite appearances (empirical 
intuition) and the infinite discourse (concepts of understanding) is pure productive imagination in 
the manner that Kant defined it in The Critique of Pure Reason – “The principle of the 
necessary unity of the pure (productive) synthesis of the imagination prior to apperception is 
the ground of the possibility of all cognition, especially that of experience.”938 Based on this 
revolutionary conception of the productive a priori synthesis of the imagination, Ricoeur 
admits that “it is not by chance that our anthropology of the finite and the infinite 
                                               
935 Ricoeur 1960a, 54. (36). 
936 Ricoeur 1960a, 50-54. (32-37). 
937 Ricoeur 1960a, 55. (37). 
938 Kant 1999, III.A118. Cf. B151-152. (KrV). 
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encounters Kant at this stage of its development.”939 In short, Ricoeur argues that Kant 
overcame the seemingly insurmountable duality of empirical finitude and rational-idealistic 
infinitude with the transcendental function of imagination.940 
Put differently, in Fallible Man Ricoeur finds Kant’s explication of the 
transcendental conditions of cognition – in which the productive imagination is the proper 
“faculty for determining sensibility a priori”941 – philosophically relevant, just as he did later in 
the opening study in Course of Recognition.942 In both of the works he relies especially on 
Kant’s schematism943 as an attempt to reconcile empirical intuitions with concepts of 
understanding,944 and in both Fallible Man and in Course of Recognition Ricoeur even goes as far 
as to directly quote The Critique of Pure Reason: 
If to judge is to subsume an intuition under a concept, “there must be some 
third term, which is homogenous on the one hand with the category, and on 
the other hand with the appearance, and which thus makes the application of 
the former to the latter possible. This mediating representation must be pure, 
that is, void of all empirical content, and yet at the same time, while it must in 
one respect be intellectual, it must in another be sensible. Such a representation is 
the transcendental schema.”945 
 
By recalling Kant’s definition of a transcendental schema, Ricoeur explains how Kant’s idea 
of productive imagination, introduced in the transcendental deduction, is applied in 
cognition. As Kant clarifies, “the schema is in itself always only a product of the 
imagination,” since the transcendental imagination is the fundamental faculty of a synthesis a 
priori, and therefore a necessary condition for cognition in general.946  
                                               
939 Ricoeur 1960a, 58. (40-41). 
940 Ricoeur 1960a, 58. (40-41). Cf. Kant 1999, III.Bxvi-xvii; A118-125; B151-152. (KrV).  
941 Kant 1999, III.B152. Cf. A120. (KrV). 
942 Ricoeur 2004b, 63-105. (36-68). 
943 Kant 1999, III.A137-147/B176-187. (KrV). 
944 Ricoeur 1960a, 58-62. (41-45).; Ricoeur 2004b, 78-86. (49-55). 
945 Ricoeur 1960a, 58-59. (41). Cf. Ricoeur 2004b, 79. (49). 
946 Kant 1999, III.A123-124; A140/B179. (KrV). 
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Both Kant and Ricoeur maintain, however, that in contrast to the pure forms 
of intuition (time and space), and the pure concepts of understanding (categories), the pure 
imagination as the condition for applying categories to appearances remains an enigma in 
itself: “the ‘third term’ remains obscure, hidden, and blind.”947 The transcendental function 
of imagination is “blind but indispensable” condition a priori, just as “the schematism is ‘an 
art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly 
likely ever to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze,’” as Ricoeur again repeats 
Kant’s words from The Critique of Pure Reason.948 The third, mediating term (either the 
transcendental imagination, or the schema as its product and as “a monogram of pure a priori 
imagination”949) is not intelligible in itself. The schemata is, Ricoeur argues in the wake of the 
first Critique, “an application of the categories to the phenomena,”950 because the concepts of 
understanding remain the necessary condition for all formal unity in the synthesis – in which 
a schema, in accordance with its concept, is a pure mediating representation between the 
categories of understanding and sensible intuition.  
As a result of Kant’s assertion that the third or mediating term is an 
application of the categories to appearances, Ricoeur argues that the paradox of finitude-
infinitude has only been “sharpened by a more subtle approximation,” since the synthesis 
that is brought about by the pure imagination is still constituted only in the objectivity of the 
object.951 Consequently, I must return to an interlude in Fallible Man that precedes Ricoeur’s 
analysis of pure imagination, a text that highlights the necessity of objects in their objectivity. 
“Objectivity is nothing other than the indivisible unity of an appearance and expressibility; 
                                               
947 Ricoeur 1960a, 62. (45). 
948 Ricoeur 1960a, 59. (41, 42). Cf. Kant 1999, III.A78/B103; A141/B180-181. (KrV). 
949 Kant 1999, III.A141-142/B181. (KrV). 
950 Ricoeur 1960a, 61. (44). Cf. Kant 1999, III.A139/B178. (KrV). 
951 Ricoeur 1960a, 60, 63. (43, 45). Cf. Kant 1999, III.A145-146/B185-186. (KrV). 
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the thing shows itself and can be expressed,” Ricoeur maintains, but notices, however, that 
“the thing (la chose) points to man as point of view and as speech.”952 Even though an 
appearance is determined in the synthesis of “meaning and presence,” that which appears 
becomes legible as a determined object. Ricoeur strongly insists that “the objectivity of the 
object is by no means ‘in’ consciousness; it stands over against it as that to which it 
relates.”953 Ricoeur, in other words, stresses the synthesis of the manifold of intuition, or the 
thing’s becoming an object for consciousness, rather than the transcendental apperception, 
or the a priori synthetic unity of consciousness, in the manner Kant does. As a result, Ricoeur 
argues that “the objectivity of the object is constituted on the object itself.”954 For Ricoeur, 
in other words, the synthesis concerns that which appears, and to which a meaning is given, 
that is, an object in its objectivity, as opposed to Kant who emphasizes the formal condition 
of the one and self-same consciousness.955  
Even if Ricoeur’s Kantian attunement is evident, the difference between the 
two thinkers is also explicit and definitive: Kant considers the formal conditions of possible 
experience, whereas Ricoeur focuses on the actual or “concrete” experience of a living 
subject in the presence of things. Ricoeur acknowledges that an object stands over against 
consciousness and, as Kant proposes, actually results in “the very consciousness that the 
pure ego acquires of this synthesis.”956 Ricoeur argues, however, that this Kantian 
transcendental consciousness is nevertheless not yet real, empirical consciousness but merely 
its formal condition: “[The transcendental] consciousness is not yet the unity of a person in 
                                               
952 Ricoeur 1960a, 55-56. (37-38). 
953 Ricoeur 1960a, 56. (38). 
954 Ricoeur 1960a, 56. (38). 
955 Kant 1999, III.B132-135. (KrV). 
956 Ricoeur 1960a, 56. (38). 
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itself and for itself; it is not one person; it is no one.”957 The unity of transcendental 
synthesis, Ricoeur stresses, is “not yet self-consciousness, not yet ‘man.’”958 In other words, 
an object is the formal condition of an equally formal consciousness that lacks any empirical 
personality: “The consciousness philosophy speaks of in its transcendental stage constitutes 
its own unity only outside of itself, on the object. […] Consciousness spends itself in 
founding the unity of meaning and presence ‘in’ the object.”959 The transcendental 
consciousness is only consciousness in general, Ricoeur concludes, but Kant’s analysis of this 
formal condition of consciousness still represents for Ricoeur the first stage of a 
philosophical anthropology that tries to locate the experienced human “disproportion.”960 
 Ricoeur’s emphasis also differs from Kant in its reference to the notion of 
onto-existential “presence,” in which consciousness is, however, achieved. According to 
Fallible Man, consciousness is “a middle ground (milieu) between the infinite and the finite by 
delineating the ontological dimension of things, namely, that they are a synthesis of meaning 
and presence.”961 This definition that refers to the mode of being of things – literally, their 
“le mode d’être”962 – indicates that Ricoeur is not completely aligned with Kant’s critical 
enterprise. In contrast to Kant’s transcendental approach, Ricoeur connects consciousness 
directly to the ontological status of “things,” thus fully exposing the difference between his 
and Kant’s standpoint: “consciousness makes itself an intermediary primarily by projecting 
itself into the thing’s mode of being.”963 If for Kant an object is an essential part of the 
                                               
957 Ricoeur 1960a, 63. (45-46). 
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959 Ricoeur 1960a, 63. (45). 
960 Ricoeur 1960a, 63. (46). 
961 Ricoeur 1960a, 56. (38). 
962 Ricoeur 1960a, 56. (38). 
963 Ricoeur 1960a, 56. (38). 
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transcendental conditions of cognition, for Ricoeur the ontological presence of things 
represents the same necessity in relation to consciousness. 
Before this dissertation moves on to the succeeding stages of Ricoeur’s 
threefold anthropology, I will have to address his break away from Kantian 
transcendentalism, as it explains the reasons why Ricoeur judges the transcendental analysis, 
necessary in itself, to be insufficient. In a very clear explanation of why the synthesis 
between “meaning and presence,” rather than one between “understanding and sensibility,” 
guides his reading of Kant’s first Critique, Ricoeur converges with Heidegger’s Kant-book – 
whose critical insights he also recalls in the Kant-section of Course of Recognition964 – in 
insisting on a “concretizing” expansion of such a transcendental approach.965 In short, 
Ricoeur argues – in a similar manner as Cassirer was shown to argue in our introductory 
remarks – that Kant’s epistemologically oriented critical philosophy is a far too narrow 
approach for a philosophical anthropology that is concerned about the living subject in his 
                                               
964 Ricoeur 2004b, 91-95. (59-61). 
965 Ricoeur’s statement is free from doubt and confusion: “The point where I differ from Kant is clear: the 
real a priori synthesis is not the one that is set forth in the “principles,” that is, in the judgment that would be 
prior to all the empirical propositions of the physical domain. Kant reduced the scope of his discovery to the 
restricted dimensions of an epistemology. The objectivity of the object is reduced to the scientific aspect of 
objects belonging to a domain carved out by the history of the sciences. But criticism is more than 
epistemology, transcendental reflection is more than an exploration of the scientific nature of the objects of 
science. The real a priori does not appear even in the first principles; it consists in the thing’s objectival [objectal] 
character (rather than objective [objectif], if objective means scientific), namely that property of being thrown 
before me, at once given to my point of view and capable of being communicated, in a language 
comprehensible by any rational being. The objectivity of the object consists in a certain expressibility adhering 
to the appearance of anything whatsoever. This objectivity is neither in consciousness not in the principles of 
science; it is rather the thing’s mode of being. It is the ontological mode of those ‘beings’ which we call things. 
Heidegger – whom we shall eventually refuse to follow – is right in saying [in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics] 
that the Copernican revolution [that Kant proposed] is first of all the return from the ontic to the ontological, 
that is, from the ‘thing’ considered as a ‘being’ among ‘beings’ […] to its ontological constitution. Objectivity 
indicates this synthetic constitution itself as a uniting of meaning to presence. In order for something to be an 
object, it must conform to this synthetic constitution: ‘Ontic truth conforms necessarily to ontological truth. 
There again is the legitimate interpretation of the meaning of the ‘Copernican revolution.’” Ricoeur 1960a, 56-
57. (38-39). 
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or her being. The epistemological horizon has to be expanded to also cover the cultural 
human life.966 
Instead of the a priori conditions for cognizing an object, Ricoeur’s own focus 
is on the “objectival” character of things that are set over against, and even “thrown” before 
me as a living subject. The second philosophical Copernican revolution Ricoeur searches for 
in Fallible Man therefore grounds itself in the first philosophical one, introduced by Kant, but 
it also transcends this transcendental analysis by insisting on a more comprehensive opening 
to the question of human condition. “The whole epistemological conception of objectivity 
tends to make the ‘I-think’ a function of objectivity and imposes the alternatives to which we 
referred at the outset: either I am ‘conscious’ of the I-think but do not ‘know’ it, or I ‘know’ 
the ego, but it is a phenomenon within nature,” Ricoeur clarifies in his essay “Kant and 
Husserl”; “This is why Kant’s phenomenological description tends toward the discovery of a 
concrete subject who has no place in the system.”967 Knowing, a necessary starting point for 
such reflection, or its formal ground, is only one aspect of a human subject who partakes in 
being. The synthesis as “joining together,” with which Course of Recognition crystallizes Kant’s 
idea of identifying recognition (Rekognition),968 however, already leads us to pay attention to 
this synthetic “grasping” or “joining together” as the moment of “con,” as in reconnaissance. 
Further analysis in this chapter will reveal how this formally introduced moment of re-con-
naissance comes to play in the concrete experience of a living subject. 
 
                                               
966 Cf. section 2.3 of this dissertation as well as Cassirer 1974, 43. 
967 Ricoeur 1954, 53. (Ricoeur 1967b, 185.). 
968 Ricoeur 2004b, 63, 70-86. (36-37, 42-55). – Ricoeur argues that “for Kant, to recognize […] is to 
identify, to grasp a unified meaning through thought. […] For Kant, to identify is to join together.” 
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10.2 Ideal Self-consciousness and the Enigma of Respect 
The gap between Kant’s “pure” transcendental reflection and Ricoeur’s “concrete” 
comprehension of human subjectivity is evident. Ricoeur maintains in Fallible Man that “the 
transcendental stage furnishes only the first stage of a philosophical anthropology”; this is 
why he tries to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the human condition by 
also reflecting action and feeling.969 Ricoeur reassures that these approaches, however, still 
reflect a human subject’s “non-coincidence with himself” just as in the transcendental stage, 
albeit now in the “orders of action and feeling,” or at the practical and affective levels.970 The 
initial task of investigating the human condition as fallibility remains therefore intact 
throughout Fallible Man.  
Even though the task pertaining to the human condition remains the same, 
Ricoeur opens the investigation into the practical and affective aspects of the human life-
world that are missing from the abstract transcendental framework. Such a transcendental 
“nexus of things especially lacks the presence of persons with whom we work, fight, and 
communicate, and who stand forth on the horizon of things, on the setting of pragmatic and 
valorized objects, as other poles of subjectivity, apprehension, valorization, and action,” 
Ricoeur maintains. “In this new stage the ‘person’ and no longer the ‘thing’ is the object that 
serves us as a guide.”971 As in the second part of Course of Recognition, “Recognizing Oneself,” 
Ricoeur focuses in this second stage of his analysis in Fallible Man on action, will, and feeling, 
a triad which results in self-consciousness and emphasizes a social point of view.972 
According to Ricoeur, the transcendental analysis we have seen – with which he begins both 
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971 Ricoeur 1960a, 65, 67. (47-48, 50). 
972 Ricoeur 2004b, 109-219. (69-149). 
239 
Fallible Man and Course of Recognition, however – culminates in the necessary conditions for 
the possibility of mediation, and it achieves a merely pure consciousness without personality 
or living experience. 
When Ricoeur amplifies his analysis from the transcendental object or “thing” 
to the “person,” he also opens an extension to ethics by redefining the notions of finitude, 
infinitude, and mediation. Ricoeur bases the “practical finitude” of character, or “the limited 
openness of [a subject’s] field of motivation taken as a whole,”973 on the transcendental 
notion of perspective, and bases the “practical infinitude” of happiness, or the “infinite end” 
of the subject’s oriented field of motivation,974 on signification. The “practical mediation” – 
which will be our focus here – opens the discussion to another whole realm by asking for 
“the constitution of the person by means of ‘respect.’”975 Like transcendental imagination, 
respect in Ricoeur’s analysis is also torn by its inner duality; it is a “paradoxical 
intermediary”976 between the infinitude of happiness and the finitude of character.  
This duality is, however, an “ethical duality” because it presupposes relations 
to other human beings,977 and its analysis therefore also draws support from moral 
philosophy – especially from Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, and The Critique of 
Practical Reason. In other words, Ricoeur’s analysis of the “practical mediation” of respect 
implies a step from individual to communal, while it retains a firm connection to Kant’s 
philosophy.978 This groundlaying analysis will later build up into a consistently ethico-political 
stance.  As George H. Taylor maintains, “Ricoeur shows us how objectification, including 
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975 Ricoeur 1960a, 67. (49-50). Italics added. 
976 Ricoeur 1960a, 90. (73). 
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objectification of values in institutions, can be something not only positive but necessary in 
order for values to flourish.”979 This ethical extension from transcendental objects to persons 
follows Kant’s correlating move from the first to the second Critique. 
Ricoeur’s notion of a “world of persons” stands at the center of the shift to 
the communal. According to Ricoeur, however, this human world “expresses itself through 
the world of things by filling it with new things that are human works.”980 As I will show in 
section 10.3, Ricoeur does not divide the world of “things” and the human world into two 
distinct and non-communicative spheres, but places them in a dialectical relationship in 
which each can be found only in the other. This move towards intersubjectivity by means of 
the “world of things” rests on Ricoeur’s assertion that the unrestricted side of my character, 
that is, the openness of my total field of motivation, “is my fundamental accessibility to all 
values of all men in all cultures.”981 Put differently, the communal “world of persons” 
necessitates the cultural medium of the “world of things,” in which a human subject 
demonstrates human intentionality by his or her work, and is able to recognize the same 
intentional characteristic of other works belonging to this world of things, thus inferring that 
there are other beings equipped with a similar kind of motivational basis. This culturally 
demonstrated intentionality is the “fundamental accessibility” to the “world of persons.” 
By calling this openness a subject’s humanity – which, in contrast to a human 
social collective, is “the human quality of man”982 – Ricoeur maintains that the phrase 
“nothing human is foreign to me” is explained by the field of motivation, because the field 
                                               
979 G. H. Taylor 2010a, 3. – George H. Taylor’s view parallels that of Axel Honneth in The Struggle for 
Recognition. Honneth maintains, following G. H. Mead, that the social relations of recognition have “not only a 
negative, transitional function but also a positive (that is, consciousness-forming) function.” Honneth’s account 
also includes the legal order that is of Taylor’s particular interest. Cf. Honneth 1995, 26, 59, 79-80, 94, 118, 164, 
172-175.; G. H. Taylor 2010b. 
980 Ricoeur 1960a, 65. (48). 
981 Ricoeur 1960a, 77. (60). Cf. Ricoeur 1960a, 87. (70). 
982 Ricoeur 1960a, 87. (70). 
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covers all the possible human intentions. Human intentionality, as demonstrated by works 
encountered in the “world of things,” is a shared human quality. As a result of this, “I am 
capable of every virtue and every vice; no sign of man is radically incomprehensible, no 
language radically untranslatable, no work of art to which my taste cannot spread.”983 A 
subject’s character and his or her humanity are therefore defined in terms of each other: 
“character is the narrowness of the ‘whole soul’ whose humanity is openness.”984 In other 
words, a subject’s total field of motivation defines his or her individual character, and also 
connects him or her with the principle of humanity that grounds the world of persons and 
sets a paradigm for a person’s own being. 
Even though character and humanity are ultimately conjoined and not 
mutually exclusive notions, the idea of humanity leads Ricoeur to call for pre-ethical equality 
– the idea of humanity as the summing up of human quality grounds the possibility of 
intersubjectivity.985 In Ricoeur’s words, “my humanity is my accessibility in principle to [all] 
human outside myself; it makes every human alike to me.”986 This humanity, however, is 
realizable only in a subject’s character, since a person lives his or her humanity through it. 
“Everything human – ideas, beliefs, values, signs, works, tools, institutions – is within my 
reach in accordance with the finite perspective of an absolutely singular form of life,” 
Ricoeur states.987 The human disproportion appears thus here again in an evolved form, as 
all the human “outside” refers not to a subject’s personal character but to his or her human 
quality. Ricoeur insists that “it is not my character or my individuality that I consider when I 
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come upon the signs of man, but the humanity of those signs.”988 The character is the 
limitation of a subject’s openness to that which is human, but the challenge set by “my 
humanity” invokes me to relate to all those alike in humanity. 
 Ricoeur’s analysis of respect is not, therefore, an isolated analysis but is built 
up from the preceding argumentation. After Ricoeur has established this link between a 
subject and the idea of humanity, he opens the discussion of respect with it. Again, rather 
than focusing on human beings or their collective, Ricoeur understands humanity as a 
principle, or as “the mode of being on which every empirical appearance of what we call a 
human being should be patterned.”989 The Kantian undertone of Ricoeur’s language reveals 
that he also continues, yet at the same time deepens, the analysis which held the objectivity 
of a thing in focus: “Humanity is the person’s personality,” Ricoeur argues, “just as 
objectivity was the thing’s thingness.”990 In other words, Ricoeur prescribes humanity as the 
necessary condition for a subject’s personality. The human character is therefore, Ricoeur 
sharpens his definition, connected with the idea of humanity; it is “a perspective on 
humanity” rather than a petrified portrait of a singular human being.991 Put differently, the 
idea of humanity specifies the human character. 
 Instead of continuing the language of human character, Ricoeur’s discussion 
of respect focuses on the redefined notion of synthesis; in particular, he emphasizes the 
“practical synthesis” of character and happiness. Ricoeur maintains that this synthesis 
between the finite openness of one’s total existence, and the ultimate end of a subject’s total 
intention is based on the person, by which he means “the Self (le Soi) that was lacking to 
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consciousness in general.”992 Foregrounding the analysis of narrative ipse-self in Oneself as 
Another – which he continues in Course of Recognition under the notion of character – Ricoeur 
argues, however, that this self only aims at itself, since the person is “a projected synthesis 
that seizes itself in the representation of a task.”993 Even though the “person” is then a 
corrective to Kant’s abstract definition of a pure consciousness, it is still not a total 
comprehension of one’s self: “the person is not yet consciousness of Self for Self; it is 
consciousness of self in the representation of the ideal of the Self.”994 The person, Ricoeur 
argues, is a project that a subject represents to himself; this project, which draws together my 
finiteness and the ideality of my representation in my humaneness, is the synthesis out of 
which the notion of respect arises. 
 Kant did not extend the notion of transcendental synthesis pertaining to the 
objects of cognition to the level of the human person – in Groundwork Kant actually 
distinguishes rational persons from natural things.995 Ricoeur claims, however, that Kant’s 
critical philosophy is still “very instructive” for his own elaboration of synthesis;996 he refers 
to Kant’s definition of a person as an objective end whose existence does not have only 
relative value but is “an end in itself,” when he redefines practical synthesis as the “synthesis 
of reason and existence.”997 The idea of a rational being’s rationality as an unrelativizable 
end, and the rational being’s being having absolute worth, to follow Kant’s language, gives 
Ricoeur a definition of the end that was left open in the preceding steps of his argument.  
The intentional self – previously defined in terms of its openness to the idea of 
humanity – Ricoeur now defines in the light of this end in itself to which the self’s project is 
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ultimately directed, the end which Ricoeur freely borrows from Kant. For Ricoeur, this 
redefinition of the self also marks a crucial shift from consciousness to self-consciousness: 
The Self as a person is given first in an intention. In positing the person as an 
existing end, consciousness becomes self-consciousness. This self is still a 
projected self, as the thing was the project of what we called “consciousness.” 
Self-consciousness is, like the consciousness of the thing, an intentional 
consciousness. But whereas the intending of the thing was a theoretical 
intention, the intending of the person is a practical intention; it is not yet an 
experienced plentitude but an “is to be” (“à-être”); the person is an “is to be,” 
and the only way to achieve it is to “make it be” (la “faire être”).998 
 
The end, although clarified, does not render the self fulfilled or completed, according to 
Ricoeur. The Ricoeurian self still remains a task, but the now acknowledged end presupposes 
a subject who constitutes and thus maintains Kant’s objective principle of a universal 
practical law. In other words, when defining self-consciousness, Ricoeur also presupposes a 
rational subject who necessarily conceives his or her own existence as an end in itself.999 This 
principle refers to the subject as a Kantian “person,” which Ricoeur then defines as self-
consciousness.  
Kant’s notion of person, however, is not a living subject who requires self-
consciousness, but merely an ideal of such a person, a rational being (ein vernünftige Wesen) 
defined by the principles of reason. Kant is very clear that the foundation, or ground (der 
Grund), of the objective principle of the will that serves as a universal practical law is this: die 
vernünftige Natur existiert als Zweck an sich selbst, “rational nature exists as an end in itself.”1000 In 
other words, reason necessarily embraces itself and its principles; it could not suggest 
otherwise without subjecting itself as a means instead of an end. Ricoeur’s affinity with this 
definition of a person is questionable at the least; “The only intelligible world in which I can 
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‘place’ myself is the one with which I have complied through respect, […] but upon entering 
into this world (Verstandeswelt), I can ‘neither see nor feel myself in it (mich hineinschauen, 
hineinempfinden),’” Ricoeur acknowledges in his 1954 essay “Kant and Husserl.”1001 Ricoeur 
defends himself, therefore, in Fallible Man in a prolonged footnote, in which he 
acknowledges that he “uses Kantianism freely” and that his writing “betrays Kantian 
orthodoxy.”1002 Ricoeur also insists, however, that he brings out “the Kantian philosophy of 
the person that is outlined in the Groundwork and stifled in The Critique of Practical Reason.”1003 
In sum, Ricoeur’s application of Kant’s practical philosophy is, for reasons I will next 
explain, interpretative rather than pure and conventional.  
 The step Ricoeur takes with Kant’s practical philosophy brings him closer to 
the philosophical setting within which he aspires to operate. Kant’s governing practical 
principle, the second formulation of the famous categorical imperative, denotes a shift from 
rational principles to a practical law that has an ethical import: “Act so as to treat humanity 
(die Menschheit), whether in your own person or in that of any other, always as an end [and] 
never only as a means.”1004 The clear ethical demand opens the rational principles of reason 
to will, which – to use Kant’s terminology – calls for a sovereign legislator in the kingdom of 
ends, and consequently also requires the respect and duty to follow the moral law laid down 
by the rational subject exercising his will, free from natural inclinations, as a universally 
legislative will.1005 Ricoeur’s argument that “The synthesis of the person is constituted in a 
specific moral feeling that Kant called respect,”1006 thus changes the ideal of the person to an 
ethical affection. Both Kant and Ricoeur, however, take a leap – Kant from pure reason to 
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will, Ricoeur from Kantian reasoning to human affections – but in Fallible Man they do it 
together. 
 Kant might insist that Ricoeur is misguided in overreaching to the level of 
affections, since the respect Kant discusses is merely subjective adherence, or volitional 
coherence, with the rational-moral law. Kant writes in the Groundwork that “the legislation 
itself which assigns the worth of everything must for that very reason possess dignity, that is, 
an unconditional incomparable worth; and the word respect [or attention] (Achtung) alone 
supplies a becoming expression for the valuation which a rational being must have for it 
[that is, for the legislation].”1007 In brief, Kant states that a rational being must respect the 
rational law as his or her condition. Ricoeur has, however, prepared himself for such an 
attack, since he admits that he is “fully aware here of changing the gist of the Kantian 
analysis of respect; for Kant, respect is respect for law, and the person is nothing but an 
example.”1008 Ricoeur’s counterattack focuses on the leap Kant makes:  
[The Kantian] respect is a paradoxical ‘intermediary’ that belongs both to 
sensibility, that is, to the faculty of desiring, and to reason, that is, to the power 
of obligation that comes from practical reason. […] Respect is in itself the 
obscure thing that Kant calls an a priori incentive of which we can speak only 
by drawing together opposed terms without showing its true unity.1009  
 
Kant’s term “respect,” taken in itself, is unfounded, Ricoeur asserts, as it reduces rational 
principles to a paradox that mediates between the two mental faculties. “The enigma of 
respect,” Ricoeur summarizes his criticism, “is indeed that of the practical synthesis of 
reason and finitude, therefore that of the third term.”1010 Like transcendental imagination, 
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respect is a “hidden art” – but also a necessary condition for the possibility of rational-moral 
maxims of action. 
 Ricoeur defends Kant’s leap to will, however, perhaps to justify his own leap 
to affection. Reason as a principle is pure but would not reach the realm of action. “It would 
be not practical but only critical in the moral sense of the word,” Ricoeur argues.1011 Kant’s 
joining of the will and reason would be necessary: the faculty of desire, will, would have to 
be “touched” by reason in order to become respectful, and only in this manner can reason 
guide the will’s maxims of action. “It is therefore necessary to forge the idea of an a priori 
feeling,” Ricoeur argues, “that is, one produced by reason, the reason [itself] becoming an 
‘incentive’” – a subjective ground on which a will can act (die Triebfeder) – “to make this law 
itself a maxim.’”1012 This a priori feeling is respect. As Ricoeur summarizes in Course of 
Recognition, “for Kant, respect is the one motive that practical reason imprints directly on 
affective sensibility.”1013  
The results of such a “forging” are devastating for Ricoeur, however: the 
“paradoxical constitution” of respect, as Ricoeur calls it, binds it to reason, and thus limits 
possibilities to reflect on the very feeling which binds practical synthesis altogether. Steering 
towards the notions of human “fragile experience” and human “disproportion,” which 
interest him in Fallible Man, Ricoeur surmises that this weakness in Kant’s notion of 
“person” benefits his own philosophical exploration: 
In respect I am an obeying subject and a commanding sovereign; but I cannot 
imagine this situation otherwise than as twofold belonging, “so that the person 
as belonging to the world of sense is subject to his own personality so far as he 
belongs to the intelligible world.” Into this twofold belonging is written the 
possibility of a discord and what is, as it were, the existential “fault” that 
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causes man’s fragility […] [, that is,] a situation of war between man and man, 
between man and himself.1014 
 
Guided by Kant’s analysis of the person, Ricoeur concludes liberally that human practical 
experience is in the mode of always already shattered, that the primordial practical condition 
of a human being is that he is “already divided against himself.”1015 Respect, however, the 
constitution of the form of the person as much as the “fragile synthesis” of it, drives Ricoeur 
towards the notion of feeling.  
Let us take some breath here. Even though Ricoeur has now examined the 
theoretical and practical conditions of human experience, the possibility of human 
affectionate disproportion remains to be studied. The direction for subsequent analysis has 
been set, however. I have pointed out above in passing that Ricoeur maintains that “the 
world of persons expresses itself through the world of things by filling it with new things 
that are human works.”1016 The human world that correlates with the living experience of a 
subject is not limited to ethical ideals, but includes real actions in the present moment, in the 
presence of other, equally real subjects and a multitude of things. Ricoeur indicates that his 
ultimate interest concerns this social world of action, as one of his definitions of “practical 
synthesis” also references this social dimension of human experience: 
In the form of the person, I intend a synthesis of a new kind: that of an end of 
my action which would be, at the same time, an existence. An end, 
consequently a goal to which all means and calculations of means are 
subordinate; or, in other words, an end in itself, that is, one whose value is not 
sub-ordinated to anything else; and the same time an existence that one 
apprehends, or, to be more precise, a presence with which one enters into relations of 
mutual understanding, exchange, work, sociality.1017 
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Although the Kantian approach satisfies the condition of inferring “my existence” from “my 
action,” it is still merely a transcendental description of the conditions under which the 
person, a purely rational being (ein vernünftige Wesen), is able to define his mode of being by 
choosing – necessarily – in accordance with the principles of an absolute rational-moral law. 
Ricoeur’s recurring notion of work in Fallible Man, however, implies that the question for 
him includes an inquiry that strives towards the experience of a living subject, or “the ‘acting 
and suffering’ human being,” as Ricoeur defines it in Course of Recognition,1018 who fails and 
succeeds and gradually defines himself in and through his work. This inquiry into the living 
subject that is constituted by the cultural world of works is next in my focus. 
 
10.3 Cultural Objectivity and the “Signs of Being Human” 
Ricoeur argues in Course of Recognition that socioeconomic, sociopolitical (including juridical), 
and (institutionalized) sociocultural complexes can be understood as “orders of 
recognition.”1019 According to Ricoeur’s explication of Axel Honneth’s three “patterns of 
intersubjective recognition” (die Muster der Anerkennung) – love (or the economics of filiation), 
law or rights, and social esteem or solidarity1020 – each of these various “organized 
mediations” indirectly recognizes a subject by granting a status or standing as a social agent. 
The triad of these “orders of recognition” Ricoeur’s Course of Recognition analyzes is, therefore, 
not unique as it continues the discussion formerly carried out by Jean-Marc Ferry, from 
whom Ricoeur derives his terminology, and Axel Honneth, whom Ricoeur criticizes in his 
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work.1021 In addition, Ricoeur’s triad of orders echoes an earlier triad in his own work that 
also focused on the idea of being recognized, explicitly from the viewpoint of cultural 
objectivity as positive facilitation. This earlier triad that grounds and explains the later 
“orders” is of my interest in this section. 
Fallible Man, under the title “Affective Fragility,” presents a triad that follows 
the same arranging as that of Course of Recognition; the economics of having, politico-juridical 
power, and culturally gained esteem are all social in nature. In addition, in its general 
progression from consciousness to ideal self-consciousness, and furthermore to mutual 
recognition in cultural objectivity, Fallible Man prefigures the line of Ricoeur’s argument in 
Course of Recognition. Despite these similarities between Ricoeur’s early and late work, I argue 
that Fallible Man brings forth more explicitly the necessity of cultural philosophy than Course 
of Recognition, which implies but does not elaborate on this openly. This section focuses on 
the connection Fallible Man draws between anthropology of authenticity, or concrete human 
experience, and philosophy of mediating cultural objectivity, especially at the level of 
fundamental, yet fragile affections. 
 Before reaching the notion of culture in this analysis, another deviation or 
detour is necessary for us to clarify Ricoeur’s conception of affections and their fragility. 
Luckily, however, there is no need to dwell in Ricoeur’s prolonged remarks on feeling 
(sentiment), since Ricoeur summarizes the main idea well himself: “by means of feeling, 
objects touch me.”1022 For Ricoeur, feeling is a quasi-objective mode of relating and situating 
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oneself ontologically. In other words, it is “the very adherence of existence to the being 
whose thinking is reason.”1023 According to Ricoeur, feelings are synthetic as they are both 
affections and intentions,1024 and their correlates are quasi-objects as “it is on the things 
elaborated by the work of objectification that feeling projects its affective correlates, or its 
felt [and evaluative] qualities.”1025 Feeling is profoundly dual and cannot be reduced to either 
one of its aspects. 
Feelings are inherent in human reality and experience, Ricoeur argues, noticing 
that they receive “a functional justification only in a perspective of adaptation to the 
biological and cultural environment.”1026 Feeling expresses “my adhering to this 
landscape,”1027 Ricoeur clarifies, but it is also “a function of the recovery of the person’s 
equilibrium [or the person’s psychological balance],”1028 and its analysis therefore explicates a 
subject’s relation and readaptation to the conditioning, received situation. Feelings, however, 
are not merely regulative in their adaptive function but ultimately “ontological;” that is, they 
“reveal the identity of existence and reason.”1029 Feelings, Ricoeur maintains, personalize 
reason in their synthesis of intention and affection, and open it to question his socio-cultural 
condition. This connection between “feelings of being in one’s place in society”1030 and 
critical reason is a radically new opening in the quest of fundamental human condition: 
If one could say that man’s life, work, and even intelligence consist in solving 
problems, he would be wholly and radically definable in terms of adaptation. 
But more fundamentally man is a being who poses problems and raises 
questions – if only by bringing into question the very foundations of the 
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society that bids him to adapt himself quietly to its system of work, property, 
law, leisure, and culture.1031 
 
My feelings about the conditions, or the situation, I live in, question the meaningfulness of 
this very situation. In other words, feeling expresses my belonging in a manner that is 
capable of opening that situatedness to critical evaluation.  
It is against this background of the onto-existential pertinence of feelings, or 
sentiments, that Ricoeur studies the trilogy of “interhuman, social and cultural” passions, 
which he defines as quests for having, power, and esteem, in one of the most intriguing 
sections of Fallible Man. According to Ricoeur, these quests occur in “typical situations of a 
cultural milieu and a human history,” highlighting the living experience of a disproportionate 
self.1032 The section containing these passages – to which Ricoeur refers in On Interpretation1033 
– again conjoins Ricoeur and Kant’s philosophy (although no longer the critical one).  
Ricoeur’s analysis is based on Kant’s concept of the three cultural passions or 
“manias” (die Leidenschaften) as laid out in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View: ambition 
(Ehrsucht), dominion (Herrschsucht), and avarice (Habsucht). This analysis of the perverted 
manias for honor, authority, and possession1034 – to which Kant refers in The Critique of 
Judgment1035 – focuses on these desires, which hinder or distort the use of reason. Passions as 
hidden human dispositions, or desires, are always in affiliation with those purposes that 
reason sets, but as perverted inclinations they are “without exception evil.”1036 Kant’s 
understanding is that passion, as a weakness leading to servile submission, collides with the 
                                               
1031 Ricoeur 1960a, 117. (101). 
1032 Ricoeur 1960a, 127. (111). 
1033 Ricoeur 1965a, 487-488. (507). 
1034 Kant 1999, VII.265-274. (Anthropologie). Cf. Kant 1999, VIII.20-21. (Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte). 
1035 Kant 1999, V.432-433. (KdU). 
1036 Kant 1999, VII.267. (Anthropologie). – According to Kant, affects (Affekt) are distinct from passions 
(Leidenshaft) in the manner that their objects are easily substitutable. Passions are sensible desires that are more 
pervasive inclinations, and, therefore, more severe perversions that threaten the free use of reason.  
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concept of freedom, which is established by reason alone: “Ambition is a weakness of 
people, which allows them to be influenced through their opinions; dominion allows them to 
be influenced through their fear; and avarice allows them to be influenced through their own 
interest.”1037 These three acquired passions, which arise “from the culture of humankind,” 
are according to Kant possible only for human beings and concern interhuman relations.1038  
 Ricoeur’s discussion of these cultural passions is in many ways the heart of this 
dissertation as they express the necessity of cultural objectivity in a search for the human 
constitution. Ricoeur argues that the three perverted inclinations (-sucht) indicate an authentic 
Suchen, that is, a fundamental human quest (requête) that takes the threefold cultural form of a 
search for having (avoir), power (pouvoir), and esteem (valoir).1039 Put differently, Ricoeur 
maintains that the specifically human quests for having, power, and esteem connect to a 
primordial search for an authentic mode of being. In itself, this primordial search, which 
Ricoeur calls an “imagination of the essential,” remains an assumption of an unperverted 
primordial condition, or “an innocent kingdom,” which precedes the empirical state of 
“having fallen.”1040 Ricoeur’s theologically-inclined language should not obscure the fact that 
he does not allude to a theologically describable (that is, otherworldly) state of being but to a 
pure state of human situatedness, that is, the human cultural condition as the very authentic 
Suchen, or search, for the primordial constitution of being human. Whether this “search” is 
perverted or not, it is nevertheless a search or a quest of a cultural kind. 
                                               
1037 Kant 1999, VII.272. (Anthropologie). 
1038 Kant 1999, VII.268. (Anthropologie). – Culture is not merely a framework for perversions of reason but 
also a context of culturation. In Kant’s own words from Anthropology: “[Because] there is an inclination to desire 
actively what is unlawful [that is, because ] […] a person is destined by his reason to live in a society of other 
people, and in this society he has to cultivate himself, civilize himself, and apply himself to a moral purpose by 
the arts and sciences.” Kant 1999, VII.324-330. (Anthropologie). 
1039 Ricoeur 1960a, 127-128. (111). 
1040 Ricoeur 1960a, 128, 160. (112, 144). 
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 Ricoeur’s analysis of the cultural passions completely alters the meaning of the 
preceding, preparatory analyses in that it explains why the notions of object and objectivity 
have been under such a detailed scrutiny. The transcendental synthesis of appearance and 
concept, and the practical synthesis of reason and desire are mere preparation under the 
thematics of objectivity for this final examination that calls for a cultural analysis, which 
Ricoeur deems necessary for his anthropology of fallibility and fallenness: 
If our theory of feeling (sentiment) is valid, the feelings that gravitate around 
power, having, and esteem ought to be correlative with a constitution of 
objectivity on a level other than that of the merely perceived thing. To be 
more precise, they ought to manifest our attachment to things and to aspects 
of things that are no longer of a natural order but of a cultural one. The theory 
of the object is by no means completed in a theory of representation; the thing 
is not merely what others look upon. A reflection that would end the 
intersubjective constitution of a thing at the level of the mutuality of seeing 
would remain abstract.1041  
 
Ricoeur’s firm conviction is that the concrete experience of a living subject does not exclude 
affections, but that sentiments express the essential human experience of situatedness, and 
their analysis therefore clarifies the transcendental and pure practical analyses of being 
constituted in the presence of objects and practical principles (such as the idea of humanity 
represented in persons). He argues, therefore, that the human world, in which a living 
subject operates, is inherently cultural, and for this reason the cultural passions – which 
express situatedness as interiorized – help explain this fundamental condition: 
We must add the economic, political, and cultural dimensions to objectivity; 
they make a human world out of the mere nature they start with. The 
investigation of authentic human affectivity, therefore, must be guided by the 
progress of objectivity. If feeling reveals my adherence to and my inherence in 
aspects of the world that I no longer set over against myself as objects, it is 
necessary to show the new aspects of objectivity that are interiorized in the 
feelings (sentiments) of having, power, and esteem.1042 
                                               
1041 Ricoeur 1960a, 128. (112). Cf. Ricoeur’s essay “Nature and freedom” that discusses culture as “the 
naturalizing of freedom” and as “the second nature.” Ricoeur 1962, 134-137. (Ricoeur 1974, 40-45.). 
1042 Ricoeur 1960a, 128-129. (112). 
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Although objectivity, redefined, still functions as Ricoeur’s guide and criterion for the 
forthcoming investigation of primordial affections, the overturn of objectivity by cultural 
passions is quite complete: only by this cultural analysis – which takes into account the 
“making” of the human world – does the authentic human quest of trying to understand the 
fundamental human disproportion reach the level of “truly” human. 
 Consequently, the most concrete notion of the self is achievable only within 
the same context of analysis, that is, in the realm of cultural passions. Ricoeur insists that 
both distinguishing an individual self and articulating the relationship between individual 
selves requires the support of the “objectivity that is built on the themes of having, power, 
and esteem”;1043 this is why he also calls these aspects of human experience “roots of self-
affirmation.”1044 Again, then, Ricoeur emphasizes in the concepts of having, power, and 
esteem the fundamentally indirect character of achieving the notion of a self; there is no 
immediate intuition of one’s own being. The human subject “is constituted only in 
connection with things that themselves belong to the economic, political, and cultural 
dimensions.”1045 The objectivity of these “things” and quasi-things allows intelligibility 
without completely distorting the existential level of experienced subjectivity. A human 
subject, a self capable of reflection, is found only in this redefined objectivity, that is, 
through the cultural objectivity of these three Kantian cultural passions.1046 
 The leading idea for Ricoeur in the threefold analysis of having, power, and 
esteem is that a human subject recognizes himself only in and through the various cultural 
                                               
1043 Ricoeur 1960a, 129. (113). 
1044 Ricoeur 1960a, 132. (116). 
1045 Ricoeur 1960a, 129. (113). 
1046 Kant also points out a connection between human abilities and culture. Cf. Kant 1999, VII.329. 
(Anthropologie). 
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forms his being assumes and the “monuments” he has produced, and which stand over and 
against himself by objectifying the experience of his own being. As Ricoeur’s 1962 essay 
“Nature and Freedom” states, “freedom is potency only by means of a fundamental 
objectification in works.”1047 Inasmuch as all cultural manifestations are at least quasi-
objective, they also are for Ricoeur at least quasi-material. Although the search proceeds 
from “things” such as human products or artifacts and commodities to institutions, and 
furthermore to “proper” cultural works such as human ideas, the relation to some 
“thingness” does not disappear. The exalted levels of cultural achievements manifest 
themselves only corporeally in the world as “emergences of corresponding human 
feelings.”1048 In addition, the more sublime the level of human products, the more apparent 
the essentiality of interhuman relations becomes. To use the words of George H. Taylor, 
“the productive capacity of externalization is positive.”1049 Considered from the point of 
view of this positive figuring,  the threefold analysis – which I will next introduce by 
focusing on each of its moments respectively – also leads Ricoeur to conclude that 
intersubjectivity gives a person the possibility of attaining himself as a human being.1050 
                                               
1047 Ricoeur 1962, 135. (40). 
1048 Ricoeur 1960a, 129. (113). 
1049 G. H. Taylor 2010a, 8. 
1050 This is a suitable place to mention that Fallible Man, which refers to Husserl’s phenomenology, also 
utilizes Husserlian themes well known to Ricoeur on the basis of his Husserl-analyses. The notion of 
intersubjectivity is inherently important for Husserl in his Ideen II and especially later in the Fifth Cartesian 
Meditation; the human lifeworld includes cultural objects and it presupposes intersubjectivity. For example, 
Husserl conceives a “true thing” as an object that “maintains its identity within the manifolds of appearances 
belonging to the multiplicity of subjects.” Furthermore, an intersubjective givenness is a necessary condition 
for the Ego to be recognized: “For a psychic being to be, to have Objective existence, the conditions of possibility of 
intersubjective givenness must be fulfilled. Such an intersubjective experience-ability, however, is thinkable only 
through ‘empathy’, which for its part presupposes an intersubjectively experienceable Body that can be 
understood by the one who just enacted the empathy as the Body of the corresponding psychic being.” 
Intersubjectivity, however, is not a sufficient condition as Husserl also requires that Lebenswelt is inherently 
cultural: “He who sees everywhere only nature, nature in the sense of, and, as it were, through the eyes of, 
natural science, is precisely blind to the spiritual sphere, the special domain of the human sciences. Such a one 
does not see persons and does not see the Objects which depend for their sense on personal accomplishments, 
i.e., Objects of ‘culture.’ Properly speaking, he sees no person at all, even though he has to do with persons in 
his attitude as a naturalist psychologist.” Husserl 1989, 87, 101, 201. Cf. Ricoeur 1967b, 64-68, 130-142. 
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The Quest for Having 
The search for the constitution of the self begins by acknowledging that before being able to 
discuss human alienation one would have to presuppose a self “having” itself – Ricoeur, in 
other words, assumes that the primal identity is formed in self-objectification. In the 
thematization that recalls John Stuart Mill’s concept of homo oeconomicus, the “economic 
human,”1051 Ricoeur argues that the self makes of its own self a primordial economic object, 
that is, it “has” itself by claiming identity in an economic manner: “the ‘I’ constitutes itself by 
founding itself on a ‘mine.’”1052 This grounding notion of an economic object, or an object 
of economic interest, also differentiates the properly human needs from the animal “simple 
needs” (le simple besoin), which are directed towards natural objects, and for which the 
                                               
1051 The term “homo oeconomicus” that Ricoeur uses in The Voluntary and the Involuntary (Ricoeur 1949, 111. 
(116).) is commonly associated with the critical reception of John Stuart Mill’s 1836 essay “On the Definition 
of Political Economy, and on the Method of Investigation Proper to It.” Defining “political economy” as a 
narrower science than “social economy” Mill “brackets” all the aspects of human nature except that of desiring 
wealth: “What is now commonly understood by the term ‘Political Economy’ is not the science of speculative 
politics, but a branch of that science. It does not treat of the whole of man’s nature as modified by the social 
state, nor of the whole conduct of man in society. It is concerned with him solely as a being who desires to 
possess wealth, and who is capable of judging of the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end. It 
predicts only such of the phenomena of the social state as take place in consequence of the pursuit of wealth. 
[…] Political Economy considers mankind as occupied solely in acquiring and consuming [socially sustaining] 
wealth.” (Mill 1874, 137-138.) Let me also point out that in his own brief discussion of homo oeconomicus, Marcel 
Hénaff, however, refers to Adam Smith instead of J.S. Mill. Adam Smith is most well-known not for his 
economic anthropology, but his economic philosophy of  “the invisible hand” that, according to Smith, 
naturally structures human co-operation through the marketplace without pre-established patterns. Hénaff 
2010, 16-18, 110-111, 157-159, 348-349. Cf. A. Smith 1984, 184-185.; A. Smith 1979, 72-81, 456. 
1052 Ricoeur 1960a, 129. (113). – Ricoeur’s emphasis on the body as “mine” could, of course, also be seen 
through the lens of Lockean liberalism. In chapter five of his Second Treatise of Government Locke maintains that 
property ownership is a natural right that has its ground in a person’s physical body: “Though the earth, and all 
inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any 
right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. 
Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour 
with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed 
from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes 
the common right of other men: for this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but 
he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common 
for others. […] From all which it is evident, that though the things of nature are given in common, yet man, by 
being master of himself, and proprietor of his own person, and the actions or labour of it, had still in himself the great 
foundation of property; and that, which made up the great part of what he applied to the support or comfort of his 
being, when invention and arts had improved the conveniencies of life, was perfectly his own, and did not 
belong in common to others.” Locke 1995, 287, 298. 
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correlative feeling is an “oriented lack,” as Ricoeur defines the shortage of sustenance 
indicated by instincts.1053 In contrast to natural objects, an economic object is “an available 
good” (un bien disponible) that according to Ricoeur is characterized by its very availability “for 
me.” The affective interiorization of the external relation between the “I” and the economic 
object is a correlate of this mode of relating.1054 
Ricoeur restates, however, the distinction between animal environment and 
the human world in terms of work, as he claims that the transformation from one 
environment to another is “obviously related” to it. According to Ricoeur a human being is 
distinguished from the other animals because the essence of his needs is different, and the 
difference between these needs is itself brought about by human production in the form of 
establishing an economic relation to things, that is, treating natural objects as possessions. 
Consequently, Ricoeur defines as human being as the Working Human: “Man, because he 
produces his subsistence, is a being who works.”1055 In Ricoeur’s analysis, it is the working 
human being who establishes this economic relation to things. Natural objects thus become 
possessions which connote control and dependence, and which therefore also imply certain 
“otherness” in the very form of the object “on which I make myself dependent.” This 
otherness reintroduces the idea of a shattered ego: the possibility of no-longer-having (ne-
plus-avoir) forms a breach in the constitution of the economic “I” who works to have and to 
gain sustenance.1056 
Ricoeur argues that having also defines interpersonal relations. Possessing 
distinguishes the “I” from another “I,” since excluding “mine” from “yours” differentiates 
                                               
1053 Ricoeur 1960a, 129-130. (113-114). 
1054 Ricoeur 1960a, 130. (114). 
1055 Ricoeur 1960a, 130. (114). Cf. Ricoeur 1967a, 210-233. (197-219). 
1056 Ricoeur 1960a, 130-131. (114). 
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the “I” and the “you” in relation to their respective “spheres of belonging,” or contexts of 
having. Reiterating the analyses of The Voluntary and the Involuntary Ricoeur also states that 
one’s body is an “occupied spatiality” by which one enters into the world of things as 
economic objects.1057 In other words, Ricoeur maintains that goods and commodities of all 
kinds pertain to me in this body which is the nexus of my spatial occupation. The “economic 
human” is therefore primordial and passionate about having; “I cannot imagine the I 
without the mine, or man without having,” Ricoeur concludes.1058  
 
The Quest for Power 
As indicated by the notion of control, the quests for having and power are intertwined, but, 
Ricoeur states, not reducible to each other. They differ in that the quest for power implies 
two sets of problems: those of political power and those of socio-economics.1059 Ricoeur’s 
exposition of the set of socio-economic problems re-examines work as “owning and 
controlling the means of production,” “domination,” “work force,” and “alienation”1060 – 
Ricoeur’s allusions to Marxist philosophy are evident as explicated by his 1956 essay “What 
does ‘Humanism’ mean?” that discusses the “peril of the ‘objectification’ of man in work 
and in consuming.” According to Ricoeur, this type of alienation “poses a social and, finally, 
a political problem; objectification, a cultural problem.”1061 The set of problems of political 
power introduces the idea of institutions as objectifications of the human quest for power. 
Both sets, however, include relations of subordination.  
                                               
1057 Ricoeur 1960a, 131. (115). Cf. Ricoeur 1949, 195-202. (209-216). 
1058 Ricoeur 1960a, 132. (115). 
1059 Ricoeur 1960a, 132. (116). 
1060 Ricoeur 1960a, 132-134. (116-117). 
1061 Ricoeur 1956, 86-87. (Ricoeur 1974, 74.) 
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In brief, Ricoeur argues that political structures are means of control over 
socio-economic structures, and that they necessarily imply “the power of man over man.”1062 
This power-structuring as the organization of institutions is the “new ‘object’” for Ricoeur, 
since he maintains that institutions objectify the political power as its manifestations; 
Ricoeur’s essay “The Tasks of the Political Educator” stresses later that “each historical 
group only appropriates its own technical and economic reality through [these political] 
institutions.”1063 As Fallible Man clarifies, through social roles individuals are adopted under 
“all the modalities of influence, control, direction, organization, and compulsion,” and this 
manifold exercise of power is objectified in institutions.1064 “The ‘object,’” Ricoeur argues, 
“is nothing other than the form in which the interhuman relation of power is realized.”1065 
Institution, in this political sense, is therefore for the early Ricoeur a socially adopted form of 
exercising power and control in a society. 
A member of a society – no matter his or her “peculiar rationale” as Fallible 
Man observes – is set in relations which draw their objectivity from human orderings. 
Consequently, he points out, the self relates to “a new layer of objects that may, in broad 
sense, be called cultural.”1066 These objects have a positive role, Ricoeur maintains, because 
they function as “ordering principles” which, in themselves, do not invoke the use of force. 
In human praxis, Ricoeur argues, this distinction between power and violence is lost, 
however, and political power is perverted. When a subject is adopted into systems of such 
cultural objects, that is, when a person becomes alienated from the structurally non-violent 
                                               
1062 Ricoeur 1960a, 134. (118). 
1063 Ricoeur 1965c, 80. (Ricoeur 1974, 274.) 
1064 Ricoeur 1960a, 134-135. (118-119). 
1065 Ricoeur 1960a, 135. (119). 
1066 Ricoeur 1960a, 135. (119). 
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power, “man becomes alienated from himself.”1067 Still, the same objectivity (for which 
feelings of power are the correlative interiorization) also “ground[s] man as a political 
animal.”1068 Put differently, according to Ricoeur, a human being is fundamentally a socio-
political being. 
 
The Quest for Esteem 
Ricoeur’s analysis of the third human quest in Fallible Man fully opens the realm of cultural 
recognition – or, in the language of History and Truth, “the cultural sphere of mutual 
recognition” (sphère culturelle de la reconnaissance mutuelle).1069 Neither the reciprocally exclusive 
relations of having, nor the hierarchical and asymmetrical relations of power reach the level 
of the quest for worth, or “the quest for esteem in another’s opinion” as Ricoeur defines it 
in Fallible Man.1070 This most primordial quest is also the constitutive one for a human 
subject who, according to Ricoeur, becomes for the first time recognized as an individual 
self: “It is there [in the realm of interpersonal relations] that I pursue the aim of being 
esteemed, approved, and recognized. My existence for myself is dependent on this 
constitution in another’s opinion.”1071 Ricoeur clarifies the quest for worth as the desire to 
exist and to be acknowledged. 
 The quest for esteem is not, however, a subject’s mere desire to be recognized, 
but includes a fundamental mutuality that establishes the ground for the fulfillment of gained 
esteem. For this reason, Ricoeur characterizes the quest for esteem as “the true passage from 
                                               
1067 Ricoeur 1960a, 136. (119-120). 
1068 Ricoeur 1960a, 136. (120). 
1069 Ricoeur 1967a, 116. (113-114). 
1070 Ricoeur 1960a, 136. (120). 
1071 Ricoeur 1960a, 137. (121). 
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consciousness to self-consciousness.”1072 The key moment in this analysis of esteem is 
Ricoeur’s emphasis on the received recognition upon which human subjects are founded. 
Ricoeur summarizes his conviction clearly: “My ‘Self,’ it may be said, is received from the 
opinion of others that establishes it. The constitution of subjects is thus a mutual 
constitution through opinion.”1073 Once again, as later in Course of Recognition, receiving is “the 
pivotal category” on which a subject’s self-consciousness depends.1074 The quest for esteem, 
as Fallible Man defines it, is, in other words, “the quest of recognition (reconnaissance).”1075  
 Even though he has distanced himself from Kant’s initial analysis of the three 
passions in Anthropology, Ricoeur maintains a Kantian tone by holding on to the idea of 
“objectivity” from The Critique of Pure Reason. With regard to this particular quest for 
recognition, however, Ricoeur resorts to Kant’s Groundwork, in which a rational being is 
defined as an objective end in himself. “Kant gives the name of humanity to this 
objectivity,” Ricoeur argues; “the proper object of esteem is the idea of man in my person 
and in the person of another.”1076 In other words, by expanding the notion of objectivity 
Ricoeur stretches the register of his analysis to recognition, while still claiming to follow the 
trail of Kantian philosophy. More importantly, by using this mixed notion of objectivity, 
Ricoeur is capable of joining together the diverse elements of his analysis of the quest for 
esteem: 
I expect another person to convey the image of my humanity to me, to esteem me by 
making my humanity known to me. This fragile reflection of myself in another’s 
opinion has the consistency of an object; it conceals the objectivity of an existing end 
that draws a limit to any pretension to make use of me. It is in and through this objectivity 
that I can be recognized (je puis être reconnu).1077  
                                               
1072 Ricoeur 1960a, 137. (121).  
1073 Ricoeur 1960a, 137. (121). 
1074 Ricoeur 2004b, 351. (243). 
1075 Ricoeur 1960a, 138. (122). 
1076 Ricoeur 1960a, 138-139. (122-123). 
1077 Ricoeur 1960a, 139. (123). Italics added. 
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As Kant’s categorical imperative denies using other rational subjects merely as means, 
Ricoeur reasons, everyone must treat others as ends in themselves. They will have to 
“esteem me” and “make my humanity known to me,” that is, make my being-an-end-in-
myself known to me. In this esteem the others offer to me in their opinions or statements 
with regard to my personhood, I can then “read” the objective truth that I truly am an 
existing being and an end in myself. This objective recognition – which is fragile only 
because I infer it in my subjectivity – gives me therefore the notion of being a self or a 
person, that is, a human being with self-consciousness. 
 This “formal objectivity,” however, would again render a living subject’s 
experience insignificant, if not supplemented with a correlating notion of “material 
objectivity,” or cultural objects which mediate the notion of esteem. Again, Ricoeur’s 
insistence on not suspending the subject’s concrete experience necessitates this 
“materializing” of esteem and recognition. These objects differ from the economic and 
political ones in the respect that they can be seen as media for self-expression in general, and 
therefore as proper cultural works. Ricoeur’s definition of the “works of the mind,” which 
echoes Bergson’s concept of homo faber who produces intellectual tools,1078 pushes him then 
to the no-man’s land between philosophical anthropology and cultural philosophy: 
“Works” of art and literature, and, in general, works of the mind (l’esprit), 
insofar as they not merely mirror an environment and an epoch but search out 
man’s possibilities, are the true “objects” that manifest the abstract universality 
of the idea of humanity through their concrete universality.1079 
 
                                               
1078 Bergson 1975, 153-154, 172-178. Cf. section 9.2 of this dissertation. 
1079 Ricoeur 1960a, 139. (123). 
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Ricoeur, in other words, argues that the notion of humanity – a subject’s being-an-end-in-
himself – is manifested in those “highly expressive”1080 works that pertain to a human being’s 
fundamental quest or Suchen of expressing himself most accurately and most authentically. 
This, ultimately, is the cultural institution of which Ricoeur is interested in; History and Truth 
maintains that even though “it is not very common to speak of ‘institutions’ in respect to 
culture, such as with regard to political, social, or economic life, yet the profound meaning of 
the institution appears only when it is extended to the images of man in culture, literature, 
and the arts.”1081 These works that institute the idea of humanity are concrete and yet 
universal because as works of imagination they always remain in the mode of the “possible” 
– they explore human possibilities – as art and literature demonstrate.1082 
 This “material objectivity” of genuinely “true works,” which reveal a subject to 
himself and mediate the idea of humanity to others, is, therefore, cultural. As Ricoeur puts it 
later in an interview, “it is from the depth of a certain culture that I approach a new object of 
the culture.”1083 In brief, therefore, the “material objectivity” is culture, as also History and 
Truth argues: “The struggle for recognition is pursued by means of cultural realities. […] This 
quest for mutual esteem (d’estime mutuelle) is pursued through images of man (images de 
l’homme); and these images of man [which are embodied in cultural works] constitute the 
reality that is culture.”1084 As George H. Taylor points out, Ricoeur’s conception of cultural 
objectivity is, therefore, not restricted to mere reification.1085 The formal objectivity of a 
subject’s being-an-end-in-himself is quasi-materialized in cultural works which bear witness 
                                               
1080 Ricoeur 1960a, 76-77. (59-60). 
1081 Ricoeur 1967a, 129. (126). 
1082 Ricoeur 1960a, 160-161. (144).; Ricoeur 1956, 88-89. (Ricoeur 1974, 78-80.) 
1083 Ricoeur & Nakjavani 1991, 446. 
1084 Ricoeur 1967a, 121. (118-119). 
1085 G. H. Taylor 2010a, 7. 
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to my being-an-end-in-myself, and by which I can be recognized, although indirectly, in 
others’ opinions concerning them.  
The objectivity attained at the level of the quests of having and power still 
prevails at this level of being recognized in the quasi-material “thingness” of these “works” 
of the human spirit, which also presuppose human relations through institutions. In their 
reference to the very idea of humanity, however, these “true” cultural works differ from 
mere possession and authority. As Ricoeur insists in his 1957 essay “Place de l’oeuvre d’art 
dans notre culture,” in art “it is only and always of human that is the question.”1086 Referring 
to the theatrical forms of art that represent the human itself in an artistic way,1087 Ricoeur 
maintains that unlike at the level of economics and politics that manifest the human but do 
not generalize the notion of being human as an end in itself, “each work of art outlines and 
proposes a possible world, and as every possible world is a possible environment for a 
possible human being, in each time it is human being, the virtual center of this world, that is 
in question.”1088 Unlike the works of having and power, the “proper” cultural works of art 
are therefore intersubjectively constitutive in their concrete universality as they enable 
mutuality by mediating the “idea of humanity” – the idea of the human quality – through 
this cultural objectivity that is “a vast imaginary experimentation of the most impossible 
possibilities of being human.”1089 As Fallible Man stresses, such cultural objectivity that is 
manifested in the works of art as well as all the human works that are centered around this 
idea of humanity, facilitates becoming a human being:  
Cultural objectivity (l’objectivité culturelle) is the very relation of man to man 
represented in the idea of humanity (l’idée d’humanité) [that is properly 
                                               
1086 Ricoeur 1957b, 8. 
1087 Ricoeur 1957b, 7-8. 
1088 Ricoeur 1957b, 8. 
1089 Ricoeur 1957b, 8. 
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manifested in the works of art and literature, and, in general, works of the 
mind]; only cultural testimonies endow it with the density of things, in the 
form of monuments existing in the world: but these things are “works.” […] 
These monuments and institutions extend the synthesis of the thing. The thing 
was understood in the unity of Saying and Seeing; the work is made in the unity 
of Sense and Matter, of Worth and Work. Man, artisan, artist, legislator, 




In sum, an anthropological analysis of the triad of human passions conceived as affective 
fundamental human quests for having, power, and esteem has led Ricoeur to the “very 
relation of human to human,” that is, to the notion of cultural objectivity. Only cultural 
expressions as conceivable manifestations of human possibilities furnish the abstract idea of 
humanity – a subject’s being-an-end-in-himself generally – and bring it to life. A subject’s 
constitution is therefore utterly cultural, as “the relation to self is an interiorized relation to 
another,” Ricoeur states in Fallible Man.1091 An authentic interiorization of this mutuality that 
is mediated by cultural objectivity (that stresses not the economic or the political structure, 
but the interpersonal connection between a human and another human in the idea of 
humanity), however, is possible only in the mode of affections which synthetize the living 
human experience onto-existentially: 
The universal function of feeling is to bind together. It connects what 
knowledge divides; it binds me to things, to beings, to being. Whereas the 
whole movement of objectification tends to set a world over against me, 
feeling unites the intentionality, which throws me out of myself, to the 
affection through which I feel myself existing. Consequently, it is always shy of 
or beyond the duality of subject and object.1092  
 
Recognition, in the manner Ricoeur understands it, is therefore best described as re-con-
naissance, as the synthetic moment of grasping or putting together, “con,” in and under 
                                               
1090 Ricoeur 1960a, 140, 157. (123-124, 141). Cf. Ricoeur 1957b, 5-7. 
1091 Ricoeur 1960a, 140. (124). 
1092 Ricoeur 1960a, 147. (131). 
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objectivity that materializes the idea of humanity and renders it interiorizable (viz. Erinnerung). 
The interiorization of this idea, however, leads us to notice the fragility of the affective 
synthesis of the person. A human being, “mediator of the reality outside of himself,” 
Ricoeur maintains, is “a fragile mediation himself,” and remains therefore an endless task for 
himself.1093 “In himself and for himself man remains torn,” Ricoeur summarizes.1094 The 
unity of the self is maintained in reflection enabled by cultural objects, “the signs of being 
human,”1095 which mediate the idea of self in their concreteness. The notion of the self is, in 
other words, a task for interpretation instructed by the cultural. 
 
                                               
1093 Ricoeur 1960a, 156. (140). 
1094 Ricoeur 1960a, 157. (141). 
1095 Ricoeur 1960a, 85. (67). 
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11. A HERMENEUTIC OF CULTURAL OBJECTS 
Our path of reading Ricoeur has reached the point of cultural objectivity. The analysis of The 
Voluntary and the Involuntary led us to think that subjectivity is, as explained by Kant, only 
achievable by facing objectivity. The succeeding reading of Fallible Man then clarified that 
understanding subjectivity is dependent on cultural objectivity in particular. As we have seen, 
this cultural objectivity transforms to human interrelatedness, since the “idea of humanity” 
that defines being human is manifested through cultural expressions, including institutions, 
which demonstrate the human possibilities. The preceding discussion has, therefore, led us 
to the threshold of Ricoeur’s full-blown hermeneutic of culture in On Interpretation that re-
reads the quests for having, power, and esteem explicitly from a cultural hermeneutic point 
of view. This hermeneutics, as Charles Taylor, Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan 
maintain, lent to the interpretive turn of the social sciences.1096  
 
11.1 Toward a Hermeneutic Reflection on “the Signs of Being Human” 
Before getting to Ricoeur’s “analytic” and the succeeding hermeneutic of culture, let me 
emphasize the importance of “con” in re-con-naissance as the con-joining of life (βίος) and the 
foundational unifying principle of intelligibility (λόγος) in cultural-linguistic communication. 
“Con,” which normally means jointly or together, in Fallible Man also connects the synthetic 
unity of appearance and concept, the practical unity of character and humanity, and the 
affective unity of being among beings. All three connotations, however, point to a common 
denominating meaning, that is, to com-munication which adds another level of “con” to our 
examination. As the Oxford English Dictionary explains, the everyday meaning of  “the 
                                               
1096 C. Taylor 1987, 33.; Rabinow & Sullivan 1987, 6, 9. Cf. Michel 2006, 244-245. 
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imparting or exchanging of information” includes the Latin noun communicatio and the verb 
communicare, “to share,” or “to participate mutually.”1097 In general, synthesis requires 
communication between the elements of which it consists – their com-bination (con-junctio) as 
Kant points out1098 – but Ricoeur seems to maintain that the cultural synthesis also enables 
communication as discourse which con-joins in a fundamental manner. 
 As I have argued in section 10.2, Ricoeur holds that in their concreteness “the 
signs of man,” and especially the “works of the mind,” mediate the idea of humanity.1099 In 
correlation, the fundamental but limited openness to everything “human” led Ricoeur to 
maintain that in theory “no sign of man is radically incomprehensible, no language radically 
untranslatable, no work of art to which my taste cannot spread.”1100 The unity of the self is 
upheld only in reflection enabled by cultural objects, which themselves express unity in the 
idea of humanity. Put differently, the differentiation of selves through individual limitedness, 
or the “otherness of consciousnesses” (as Ricoeur calls it in Fallible Man), is “relative to a 
primordial identity and unity” which precede otherness.1101 As a result, I argue, the “works of 
the mind or human spirit,” les oeuvres de l’esprit,1102 are signs which communicate the 
fundamental unity of humanity under this condition. 
For Ricoeur, the human community, or the material representation of the 
social collective, is only one aspect of humanity that is an essentially com-municative human 
quality of a person. Ricoeur refines his position in Fallible Man, arguing that this unity in the 
notion of humanity “makes possible the understanding of language, the communication of 
                                               
1097 "Oxford Dictionary of English"  2012.  
1098 Kant 1999, III.B129-131. (KrV). – Marcel Hénaff uses a similar kind of wordplay in his Price of Truth: 
“To establish a community is to become a society of com-munia – shared gifts (munia).” Hénaff 2010, 139. 
1099 Ricoeur 1960a, 85, 139. (67, 123). 
1100 Ricoeur 1960a, 77. (60-61). 
1101 Ricoeur 1960a, 154. (138). 
1102 Ricoeur 1960a, 139. (123). 
270 
culture, and the communion of persons.”1103 In short, language and cultural communication 
also pertain to humanity as an idea. In fact, Ricoeur maintains that language and culture are 
means of communication by which the social community is held together, since “in being 
born I enter into the world of language that precedes me and envelops me.”1104 A human 
subject is therefore primordially “a being who intends and expresses as an intentional 
transgression of the situation.”1105 A social collective stands firm only on the basis of its 
articulated identity through the works of the human mind. Even at its most elementary levels 
it can become a com-munity, a shared social context, only if the sustaining principle is 
communicated; one can think of the expression “I do” in a wedding ceremony as a 
performative example. Cultural-linguistic communication is therefore more essential to 
humanity as an idea than the material or biological bonds that nevertheless are included in it 
as pertaining to the animal world in which human subjects still participate.  
Despite his preference for the idea of humanity, Ricoeur locates cultural-
linguistic communication between the extremities of βίος, life, and λόγος, reason.1106 As 
Ricoeur maintains in his 1962 essay “Nature and Freedom,” the opposition “between the 
human act of culture and nature considered as violence in man, or as spontaneity in living 
organisms and as mute existence in mere things” has to be challenged.1107 Even though 
“nature is that which is, pure and simple, as opposed to that which is said,”1108 freedom and 
nature intersect in cultural works that include communication. This cultural “relation of 
mediation between freedom and nature is more fundamental than the relation of 
                                               
1103 Ricoeur 1960a, 154. (138). 
1104 Ricoeur 1960a, 45. (27). 
1105 Ricoeur 1960a, 45. (27). 
1106 Ricoeur 1960a, 98, 123. (81-82, 107). 
1107 Ricoeur 1962, 134. (Ricoeur 1974, 38-39.) 
1108 Ricoeur 1962, 126. (Ricoeur 1974, 25.) 
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opposition.”1109 In communication, therefore, an idea of reason encounters the reality of life 
in signs – they are brought together in them. 
Ricoeur argues in Fallible Man, accordingly, that “in the sign dwells the 
transcendence of the λόγος of man.”1110 Put differently, the communication of the idea of 
humanity takes place in the “works of the mind or human spirit”1111 as signs of this idea that 
qualifies a subject’s human existence. In Ricoeur’s words, the “fundamental unity of λόγος” 
that is the originating principle of reason is, however, relative to the “difference in λέγειν,” 
the difference “in speaking,” or the different discourses (which all signify, but only by 
referring to that what is signified).1112 The Greek word λόγος, meaning word or constituting 
principle, is put to signs in λέγειν, meaning to lay in order, to gather, to reckon, to speak, or to 
utter.1113 The difference and multitude of these utterances – which still order life while 
gathering it in signs – points to the cultural fact that there is no universal speech but there 
are only historical, local, and particular discourses and cultures that manifest the human 
aspect of being situated in life (βίος).  
Put differently, as Ricoeur maintains in his 1975 introduction to the UNESCO 
publication Les cultures et le temps, the common cultural condition is manifested in cultural 
diversity as forms of discourse;1114 the unity of λόγος is gathered only in the difference of 
λέγειν. The distinction between λόγος and λέγειν, also thinkable as the Saussurean distinction 
between language (langue) and discourse (parole),1115 leads Ricoeur to argue in Fallible Man that 
“the unity of humanity is realized nowhere else than in the movement of 
                                               
1109 Ricoeur 1962, 137. (Ricoeur 1974, 43.) 
1110 Ricoeur 1960a, 46. (28). 
1111 Ricoeur 1960a, 139. (123). 
1112 Ricoeur 1960a, 154. (138). Cf. Ricoeur & Daniel 1998, 18. 
1113 "The Classic Greek Dictionary"  1951. 
1114 Ricoeur 1975c, 19, 21, 23, 25. 
1115 Ricoeur 1965a, 386. (397). Cf. Ricoeur 1993, 6-7.  
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communication.”1116 Communication, in brief, is the coming of the idea in human discourse; 
the idea of humanity is brought about as discourse. “Speech,” Ricoeur maintains, “is the 
human destination,”1117 that is, the human quality can only be lived out as expressed. 
Discursive action, in other words, is necessary for the humanity of a human being. 
Consequently, a human subject is “a plural and collective unity in which the unity of 
destination and the difference of destinies are to be understood through each other.”1118 
Even though a human subject engages in situated discourses – the subject’s openness is 
limited – they are still discourses that find their unity in the very communicating of the idea 
of humanity as culture. In sum, then, the cultural “world of language” unified in λόγος is both 
my origin and my destination, my άρχή and my τέλος.  
  As I have argued above, Ricoeur maintains in Fallible Man that cultural 
synthesis enables communication as discourse which con-joins: it glues the human 
community together, but, more fundamentally, connects human subjects with the idea of 
humanity. In addition, I maintain that for this reason Ricoeur opens On Interpretation by 
stating that “there is an area today where all philosophical investigations cut across one 
another – the area of language.”1119 Not forgetting nor underestimating the hermeneutic 
“wager” in The Symbolism of Evil,1120 discussed in parts one and two of this dissertation, I 
argue that Fallible Man necessitated, by conjoining the “unity of humanity” and the 
“movement of communication,” the shift of emphasis from pre-hermeneutical 
phenomenology to hermeneutics of language and culture. “Perhaps for the first time,” 
                                               
1116 Ricoeur 1960a, 154. (138). 
1117 Ricoeur 1960a, 159. (143). – Ricoeur parallels the thought proposed by Martin Heidegger, who in his 
1931 lecture course on Aristotle gives four different qualifications or modes to logos. Pol Vandevelde, in his 
Heidegger analysis, explicates these modes as alethic truth-telling, categorizing address, concomitant saying (mit-
sagend) of a being, and lastly as the power of discursive configuration. 
1118 Ricoeur 1960a, 154. (138). 
1119 Ricoeur 1965a, 13. (3). 
1120 Ricoeur 1960b, 324-326, 330. (348-351, 355). 
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Ricoeur then comments in On Interpretation, “we are able to encompass in a single question 
the problem of the unification of human discourse.”1121 This problem presents itself, 
however, for Ricoeur initially in Fallible Man. 
Moreover, Ricoeur’s interest in Freud – the major figure in On Interpretation – 
can be seen as an extension of the analysis of primordial affections in Fallible Man, but also 
as having been motivated by his interest in culture. Unlike the lengthy discussion of Freudian 
determinism of the unconscious in The Voluntary and the Involuntary,1122 On Interpretation treats 
Freud’s work not for psychological but for philosophical reasons “as a monument of our 
culture, as a text in which our culture is expressed and understood,” that is, as “an 
interpretation of culture.”1123 The first of the guiding questions Ricoeur sets for the work 
concerns “the interpretation of the signs of man.”1124 As also confirmed by the lengthy 1965 
essay “Psychoanalysis and the Movement of Contemporary Culture” that maintains its focus 
on cultural hermeneutics,1125 On Interpretation proposes a cultural philosophy instead of merely 
examining psychoanalysis. Although On Interpretation materially consists of two distinct parts 
that share Freud as their common denominator – an analytic reading, and a subsequent 
philosophical interpretation of Freud’s work – it is “a discussion with Freud”1126 rather than of 
Freud, in which Ricoeur elaborates and broadens his cultural analysis by addressing directly 
the question of culture. Seemingly paralleling the opening of his 1965 colloquium 
                                               
1121 Ricoeur 1965a, 13-14. (3-4). 
1122 Ricoeur 1949, 350-384. (373-409). Cf. Ricoeur 1965a, 443. (458). 
1123 Ricoeur 1965a, 7-8, 14. (xi-xii, 4). Cf. Pellauer 2007, 44, 49.; Eckholt 1999, 97-98. – Richard J. 
Bernstein makes a similar kind of point in his very recent essay “Ricoeur’s Freud”: “Against the prevailing view 
that Freud began his psychoanalytic investigations with a focus exclusively on the analytic situation of curing 
individual patients and only turned to problems of culture in his later writings, Ricoeur argues that the 
interpretation of culture was always evident in Freud’s writings. He also argues that when Freud introduces the 
Death Instinct and pursues its consequences in the great struggle of Eros and Thanatos, there is a radical 
transformation in the psychoanalytic understanding of culture. Psychoanalysis as an interpretation of culture 
becomes an intrinsic aspect of all culture.” Bernstein 2013, 133. 
1124 Ricoeur 1965a, 8. (xii).  
1125 Ricoeur 1969, 122-159. (121-159). 
1126 Ricoeur 1965a, 13. (3). Italics added.  
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presentation “Psychanalyse et culture,” Ricoeur maintains that his task is not to elaborate 
psychoanalytic interpretation theory but respond to it instead from a cultural hermeneutic 
point of view.1127 
As a result, Ricoeur’s discussion of culture is by no means limited to Freud. In 
the philosophical interpretation of Freud (which Ricoeur explicitly separates from reading 
Freud’s work exegetically1128) Ricoeur places the Freudian “archeology of the subject” in 
dialectics with the Hegelian “teleology of the subject.”1129 In other words, Ricoeur theorizes 
an “implicit teleology” in Freud and an “implicit archaeology” in Hegel to explicate a 
dialectics by which a human subject’s cultural-linguistic condition is explicated. Once again, 
therefore, On Interpretation – only subtitled as an Essay on Freud and misleadingly translated as 
Freud and Philosophy: an Essay on Interpretation1130 – is not primarily a work focusing on Freud, 
but on developing a philosophy of culture. Ricoeur’s use of Hegel’s philosophy, which takes 
the question of culture very seriously, only strengthens Ricoeur’s ultimate goal. 
Before analyzing Ricoeur’s enterance into the hermeneutic of culture in On 
Interpretation, I want to rediscuss briefly the role of Kant’s philosophy, as it helps explain 
Ricoeur’s situatedness within the philosophical tradition he felt the most comfortable with. 
In Fallible Man Ricoeur aspired to base his analysis on Kant’s transcendentalism, but 
repeatedly broke with the “Kantian orthodoxy,” whereas On Interpretation represents more 
clearly Ricoeur’s detachment from Kant’s critical philosophy and his explicit affiliation with 
post-Kantian reflexive philosophy.  
                                               
1127 In his december 1965 presentation at the Critique sociologique et critique psychanalytique colloquium 
in Paris, Ricoeur makes it clear that his response to psychoanalytical hermeneutics is a cultural hermeneutics: 
“Après les contributions des psychanalystes, mon intervention ne peut avoir qu'un but: rendre possible le 
passage d'une interprétation psychanalytique à une interprétation non psychanalytique, par exemple 
sociologique, de l'oeuvre d'art et en général de l'oeuvre de culture.” Ricoeur 1970, 179. 
1128 Ricoeur 1965a, 9, 71. (xii-xiii, 63-64). 
1129 Ricoeur 1965a, 444-446. (459-462). 
1130 Trans. by Denis Savage. 
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Although the theme is lightly developed, throughout On Interpretation Ricoeur 
suggests possible correspondences between Kant’s and Freud’s ideas.1131 The most notable 
of these thematic parallelisms is the affinity Ricoeur sees between the Kantian sublime – a 
peculiar intellectual feeling of pleasure (das Wohlgefallen) analyzed in The Critique of Judgment1132 
– and Freud’s notion of sublimation, that is, the libido’s directing itself to a non-sexual 
(substitute) satisfaction.1133 Even so, Ricoeur still refers to Kant’s epistemological 
transcendentalism as a model for his own philosophical examination of the “Freudian 
realism of unconscious,”1134 and in the wake of The Symbolism of Evil, he also connects his 
continuing interest in symbolic language – to “justify cultural contingency”1135 – with Kant’s 
third Critique and its analysis on beauty as the symbol of morality.1136 As seen with Fallible 
Man, however, Ricoeur’s Kantianism is not of an orthodox kind, but utilizes Kant’s thought 
quite liberally in formulating ideas of his own. In a similar manner, it appears as if Ricoeur’s 
remarks on Kant in On Interpretation would be tangents of his cultural analysis. 
Ricoeur’s interest in culture correlates with his situating of himself in the post-
Kantian rather than Kantian philosophy. Even though Ricoeur agrees with Kant that self-
consciousness as immediate, intellectual intuition is ruled out by the transcendental 
conditions of cognition (Kant argues in The Critique of Pure Reason that a subject is in relation 
to him- or herself only “as [he] appears to [him]self”1137), Ricoeur modifies Kant’s standpoint 
                                               
1131 Ricoeur 1965a, 121, 124, 177, 182, 185, 202, 221, 263, 422, 433-434. (116, 120, 176, 182, 185, 204, 225, 
265, 435, 448-449). 
1132 Kant 1999, V.244-247. (KdU). 
1133 Ricoeur 1965a, 132-133, 178, 210, 226-227, 244, 291, 327, 434-437. (128-129, 178, 212, 230-231, 249, 
296, 335, 448-452). 
1134 Ricoeur 1965a, 418-420. (431-433). 
1135 Ricoeur 1965a, 50. (42). 
1136 Ricoeur 1965a, 45-46. (37-38). Cf. Kant 1999, V.351-354. (KdU). – Kant also states in the Critique of 
Judgment that “only culture can be the ultimate purpose that we have cause to attribute to nature with respect to 
the human species.” Kant 1999, V.429-434. (KdU). 
1137 Kant 1999, III.B152-159. (KrV). 
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by emphasizing that self-consciousness can only be attained reflectively. In turn, Ricoeur 
defines reflection in On Interpretation as an effort or as a task of achieving self-consciousness 
in the light of the objects which mediate the notion of the self: 
Reflection is the effort to recapture the Ego of the Ego Cogito in the mirror of 
its objects, its works, its acts. But why must the positing of the Ego be 
recaptured through its acts? Precisely because it is given neither in a 
psychological evidence, nor in an intellectual intuition, not in a mystical vision. 
A reflective philosophy is the contrary of a [Cartesian] philosophy of the 
immediate. The first truth – I am, I think – remains as abstract and empty as it 
is invincible; it has to be “mediated” by the representations, actions, works, 
institutions, and monuments that objectify it. It is in these objects, in the 
widest sense of the word, that the Ego must lose [that is, displace or 
“decenter” itself] and find itself.1138 
 
In the manner of the reflexive tradition, Ricoeur distinguishes himself from Kant by 
demanding an expansion of the idea of objectivity: it is “in the widest sense of the word” 
that the objectifying actions would have to be considered. The self, Ricoeur maintains, has to 
be recovered in all its acts, first and foremost the cultural-linguistic ones, and not only in the 
analysis of the transcendental conditions of (self-)cognition. As Ricoeur argues in History and 
Truth, “we know the [human] spirit only in the works of this spirit, in cultural works, each of 
which demand our friendship (amitié).”1139 Ricoeur’s conception of reflection, while focusing 
on the self’s intellectual acts in the cultural works – acts that “bear witness” to “our effort to 
exist and our desire to be”1140 – is therefore a step away from Kant’s transcendental 
epistemologism toward the manner Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Jean Nabert elaborated 
Kant’s ideas.1141 In this sense Ricoeur could be said to think in the wake of Kant’s 
philosophy, that is, “after” Kant, just as he philosophizes “after” Hegel.1142  
                                               
1138 Ricoeur 1965a, 51. (43-44).  
1139 Ricoeur 1967a, 78. (74). 
1140 Ricoeur 1965a, 54. (46). 
1141 In terms of Ricoeur’s self-definition as a “post-Kantian” philosopher, it is exactly this narrowness of 
Kant’s critical philosophy that he maintains as the main reason for contesting the Kantian “orthodoxy”: “It is 
in opposition to this reduction of reflection to a simple [epistemological] critique that I say, with Fichte and his 
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 Ricoeur’s discomfort with the epistemological orientation of Kantianism 
results in his repositioning of himself in relation to the reflexive tradition of Maine de Biran 
and Jean Nabert, and insisting that the positing of self is a task; it is not given but always in 
the making.1143 For this reason, Ricoeur explains, reflection has to become interpretation. 
Because the meaning of a subject’s acts as cultural works “remains doubtful and revocable,” 
reflection “calls for an interpretation and tends to move into hermeneutics.”1144 Ricoeur’s 
decision to examine culture correlates therefore firmly with the hermeneutic mode of 
approach. In order to recover the notion of the self, the shattered and decentered self would 
have to be retrieved from the objects it has set; this retrieving is nothing but interpretative 
reappropriation of these objects as cultural signs of the self: 
Reflection must become interpretation because I cannot grasp the act of 
existing except in signs scattered in the world. That is why a reflective 
philosophy must include the results, methods, and presuppositions of all the 
sciences that try to decipher and interpret the signs of man. […] In positing 
itself, reflection understands its own inability to transcend the vain and empty 
abstraction of the I think and the necessity to recover itself by deciphering its own 
signs lost in the world of culture.1145  
 
To restate, in On Interpretation Ricoeur argues that the notion of self is possible only as a 
hermeneutical task, this is, as an interpretation that focuses – by whatever means – in 
“reading” and decoding culture as a representation of humanity.1146 Reflection also faces, 
                                                                                                                                            
French successor, Jean Nabert, that reflection is not so much a justification of science and duty as a 
reappropriation of our effort to exist. […] We have to recover the act of existing, the positing of the self, in all 
the density of its works.” Ricoeur 1965a, 52. (45). 
1142 Cf. Ricoeur 1985, 298. (206). 
1143 Ricoeur 1965a, 52-53. (45). 
1144 Ricoeur 1965a, 54. (46). 
1145 Ricoeur 1965a, 54. (46-47). Italics added. 
1146 Ricoeur’s terminology shifts later from interpretation to “reading” (la lecture), but they both address the 
issue of appropriation. In an 1982 interview with Philip Fried, for example, Ricoeur describes the same process 
of mediated self-recognition in terms of reading: “Proust says in Time Recovered, Time Regained that the reader is 
the reader of himself when he reads a book. So, in fact, I am taught by the work of art to read myself in terms 
of the work of art. This is linked to a conviction of mine that I am not an ego, an ego which is finished. I am an 
unfinished ego, and therefore, what I call myself, the self of myself, is in fact the pupil of all the works of art, 
works of literature, works of culture which I read, which I loved, which I understood. And therefore, it’s a kind 
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therefore, the embarrassing observation that a total comprehension of the self is 
unachievable. “In order to operate,” Ricoeur maintains, “reflection must take to itself the 
opaque, contingent, and equivocal signs scattered in the cultures in which our language is 
rooted.”1147 In the concrete reflection of the contingent “signs of being human,” however, 
the self recognizes itself (elle se reconnaît) “as an Aufgabe,” that is, as an arduous task to be 
resolved amidst a threefold “crisis” of reflection, interpretation, and language.1148  
 
11.2 An Analytic of Culture 
After the introductory remarks that shifted us toward a hermeneutic of culture, let us now 
begin reading Ricoeur’s own reading and analysis of Freud. As we will see, his subsequent 
interpretation of it is not devoid of dialectical oppositions. On Interpretation, to begin with, 
portrays Freud’s psychoanalytical theory as reductive, demystifying, and in opposition to a 
hermeneutic restorative of the sacred. As such the theory represents the “school of 
suspicion” whose other “masters of destruction” are Marx, and Nietzsche.1149 Despite their 
differences, Ricoeur argues, all three thinkers are united by the culmination of their 
respective analyses in the idea of “false consciousness,” that is, in the separation of 
consciousness and meaning.1150 According to Ricoeur, this destruction of a consciousness 
that understands itself is a new beginning, however, since the three masters open the path to 
                                                                                                                                            
of deposit, a treasure of all these experiences. There is no ego ready-made before reading. The act of reading 
creates a new ego.” Ricoeur & Fried 1991, 454. 
1147 Ricoeur 1965a, 54. (47). 
1148 Ricoeur 1965a, 53-55, 61-63. (45-46, 48, 54-56). 
1149 Ricoeur 1965a, 67-68. (59-60). 
1150 Ricoeur 1965a, 40-41. (32-33). 
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the idea that “understanding is hermeneutics,” and that meaning is recovered in the 
hermeneutical “deciphering” of the expressions of consciousness.1151 
Ricoeur maintains that of the three masters, all intellectually insightful in their 
respective ways, Freud should be considered as primus inter pares since “the Freudian question 
as questions of language, ethics, and culture” establishes thematic connections to the issues 
discussed by Marx and Nietzsche. Of these “three interpretations of culture” Ricoeur 
chooses Freud as the figure by whom the question of culture is examined.1152 Ricoeur’s 
concern with culture rather than Freud’s theories is already evident in his “analytical reading” 
of Freud; this “analytics” section of On Interpretation gives a central role – and a structural 
place – to the interpretation of culture as well as providing a “systematic view” of it.1153 In 
addition, the analytics section opens with a study that examines interpretation in 
psychoanalysis and has a preparatory function “for the study of cultural phenomena”; the 
concluding study of Freud’s reformulated instinct theory enables Ricoeur, in turn, “to 
complete the theory of culture.”1154 In sum, Ricoeur considers Freud as a means for 
examining the cultural condition of being human. 
Even though Ricoeur emphasizes that the “analytics” is an inquiry that can be 
read separately from the rest of On Interpretation, he also maintains that it is preparation for 
the succeeding “philosophical interpretation” that surpasses the level of Freudian 
psychology. Since Ricoeur already adopts a cultural perspective in this “analytics,” I will 
touch upon it before carving out Ricoeur’s cultural hermeneutics in the interpretive 
“dialectics” section of On Interpretation. As Freud’s psychological speculation lies outside the 
                                               
1151 Ricoeur 1965a, 42. (33). – Oliva Blanchette offers in his Philosophy of Being a correlating discussion of 
the necessity of the indirect exercise of judgment. Blanchette 2003, 56-65. 
1152 Ricoeur 1965a, 68. (60). 
1153 Ricoeur 1965a, 160. (156). 
1154 Ricoeur 1965a, 70-71, 75. (62-63, 65). 
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scope of my current interest, my reading of Ricoeur’s “reading of Freud” is restricted to 
those traits that have significance in the formulation of his hermeneutic of culture. 
After an excursion through Freudian psychology in On Interpretation, Ricoeur 
concludes by paying tribute to the idea of the “hidden”, that is, Freud’s concept of the 
unconscious. Instinctual desires are “always prior to language and culture,” Ricoeur 
summarizes, but it is, however, “impossible to realize this pure economics [or the 
psychological organization of the desiring drives] apart from the representable and the 
sayable.”1155 Both metapsychologically and psychologically, Freud’s thematization of 
psychological structures culminates in the notion that the primordial psychical drives force 
themselves to consciousness by “representatives” (Repräsentanz), which Ricoeur understands 
analogically to be the representation of ideas.1156 In other words, the unconscious that in 
itself remains hidden “is continued into what are known as derivatives,” through which the 
unconscious becomes indirectly recognized.1157 The cultural representations are necessary 
even at the most basic level of becoming recognized.  
 Ricoeur’s analysis of Freud’s theory of consciousness keeps the cultural in its 
sight by insisting that “to become conscious is to become an object of perception.”1158 
Becoming conscious is relative to the antecedent objects of instincts “through which the 
instinct is able to achieve its aim [of satisfaction],” since the notion of such objects opens the 
possibility of narcissistically placing the ego itself as an aim of instinct.1160 This narcissistic 
                                               
1155 Ricoeur 1965a, 151-152. (150). 
1156 Ricoeur 1965a, 152. (150). 
1157 Ricoeur 1965a, 152-153. (151). 
1158 Ricoeur 1965a, 125. (120). – This objectification rests on three resisting conditions: 1) the self-
regulation of psychical systems, 2) the interpretation of dream-works as fulfillment of a repressed existence that 
asks for subsequent and auxiliary interpretation of symbols, and 3) the psychological “topography” of 
preconsciousness, unconsciousness, and consciousness. Cf. Ricoeur 1965a, 94, 98-99, 108, 112-113, 120, 122-
123. (86, 90, 92, 101-102, 106-107, 115, 117-119). 
1160 Ricoeur 1965a, 127-130. (123-126). 
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identification with an object – that makes the ego (Ichtrieb) symmetric with the object 
(Objektrieb) – results in cultural inventiveness; Ricoeur explains that the psychic processes 
which exalt either the object of desire (idealization) or the object-libido by redirecting it to 
non-sexual satisfaction (sublimation) dwell at the origins of aesthetic and cultural 
creativity.1161  
 Ricoeur’s subsequent analysis of Freud’s interpretation of culture, therefore, 
argues for an extension from the dream-world to the cultural one – from the “oneiric” to the 
sublime. Paralleling his claim in the 1965 colloquium presentation “Psychanalyse et culture,” 
in which Ricoeur stated that the proper research object of psychoanalysis is not the psychic 
drive itself but “the relation of desire with culture,”1162 Ricoeur maintains in On Interpretation 
that the psychoanalytical theory of culture is an application of the method of deciphering 
dreams and neuroses. Just as dreams and neurosis are interpreted with a view to the 
repressed, art, morality, and religion convey a subject’s instinctual desires, albeit sublimated 
ones: “the psychoanalysis offers to the interpretation of culture the submodel of wish-
fulfillment (Wunscherfüllung); the psychoanalytic interpretation of culture generalizes this 
prototype of all cultural phenomena.”1163 This cultural orientation of the psychoanalytical 
theory is not, however, a mere by-product of the interpretation of dreams. The 
confrontation of the libido with the non-libidinal object of its desire establishes the libido as 
“situated within a culture” and, from the viewpoint of a series of socially formative roles: 
personal, impersonal, and suprapersonal, this triad is Ricoeur’s equivalent of the 
“topography” of weak ego, anonymous id, and controlling superego.1164 The difference 
                                               
1161 Ricoeur 1965a, 132-136, 151-152. (128-129, 131-133, 149-150). 
1162 Ricoeur 1970, 179, 181. 
1163 Ricoeur 1965a, 157-159. (153-155). 
1164 Ricoeur 1965a, 159-160, 181-187. (155-156, 181-187). 
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between Freud’s “second topography” of ego, id, and superego, and the first of 
preconsciousness, unconsciousness, and consciousness is that the first was completely 
focused on instinct, whereas the new topography views the libido as being “subject to 
something other than itself,” that is, culture.1165 
Ricoeur argues that the Freudian conception of aesthetic creativity is, through 
its detour in culture, a means of collective self-understanding. In Ricoeur’s reading of Freud, 
the analysis of culture begins with aesthetics and then moves to socio-political institutions, 
including morality and religion. Pointing to the esteem psychoanalytic aesthetics holds for 
poetry, or creative writing, and visual art as prominent forms of aesthetic substitute 
satisfaction,1166 Ricoeur stresses that works of art are created psychical derivatives. This 
emphasis almost already takes him away from the “analytic” to the “interpretative”: “the 
fantasy, which was only a signified absence, […] finds expression as an existing work in the 
treasury of culture.”1167 Ricoeur holds that the works of art are representatives of the instinct 
– or, in Ricoeur’s words: “a disappearing of the archaic object as fantasy and its reappearing 
as a cultural object”1168 – but inasmuch as they are “symptoms,” or projections of psychic 
drives and conflicts, in their expressivity they also “cure” the satisfaction that is constantly 
searched for.1169 As a durable, materialized “cure,” however, the works of art also 
“communicate this meaning to a public, and thus open man to a new self-understanding.”1170 
This communication rests on the symbolic value that the work of art conveys; it is a 
gathering place of experienced reality and fantasized wish-fulfillment. “The work of art goes 
                                               
1165 Ricoeur 1965a, 160. (156). 
1166 Cf. Ricoeur 1965a, 165-168, 169-174. (163-166, 168-174). 
1167 Ricoeur 1965a, 175. (174). 
1168 Ricoeur 1965a, 308. (314). 
1169 Ricoeur 1965a, 175-176. (174-175). Cf. Ricoeur’s 1968 essay “Art and Freudian Systematics,” Ricoeur 
1969, 195-207. (196-208). 
1170 Ricoeur 1965a, 175. (175). 
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ahead of the artist,” Ricoeur maintains: “it is a prospective symbol of [his] personal synthesis 
and of man’s future. […] The only thing that gives a presence to the artist’s fantasies is the 
work of art; and the reality thus conferred upon them is the reality of the work of art itself 
within a world of culture.”1171 In sum, Ricoeur’s reading of aesthetic substitute satisfaction 
results in an understanding of culture as a collective means of existential self-recognition.  
 Ricoeur’s discussion of aesthetics extends to one of psychic and social control, 
that is, to the institution of morality. Sophocles’ tragedy of King Oedipus – which Ricoeur 
rightly defines as a “struggle for self-recognition”1172 – is well-known to us because of 
Freud’s famous interpretation, crystallized in the notion of Oedipus complex. Ricoeur asserts 
that Freud’s reading of the tragedy is both “an individual drama and the collective fate of 
humanity, a psychological fact and the source of morality, the origin of neurosis and the 
origin of culture.”1173 The Oedipus complex, in other words, is an idea drawn from a Greek 
tragedy, but it also helps explain human destiny as a “universal drama,” which, according to 
Ricoeur, in turn brings forth “one of the most formidable cultural institutions,” the incest 
taboo.1174 The prohibition of incest is made indirectly explicit in the cultural myth, but the 
myth also creates culture by instituting the idea that sexual instincts must find the object of 
their satisfaction outside familiar relationships. 
Ricoeur concludes that sublimation is also repression.1175 Repression, viewed as 
a correlate to substitute satisfaction, is therefore – paradoxically – an element of essentially 
expressive culture: “repression and culture, intrapsychical institution and social institution, 
                                               
1171 Ricoeur 1965a, 176-177. (175, 177). 
1172 Ricoeur 1965a, 363. (371). 
1173 Ricoeur 1965a, 188. (188). 
1174 Ricoeur 1965a, 189-190. (190). 
1175 Ricoeur 1965a, 224. (228). 
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coincide in this exemplary case.”1176 The psychological and cultural origins of humanity are 
inseparable, Ricoeur infers, but culture that is erected by the force of primordial sexual 
instincts also has the function – the same as the superego1177 – of restricting and overseeing 
these instincts so that their potentially destructive power remains under control.1178 The 
correlate of this “mortifying” repression, or this “renouncing of archaic practices,” as 
Ricoeur calls it, is institutionalization that introduces cultural practices so as to also set ideals, 
including morality and religion, by which the drives in their force become apparent and part 
of articulated human reality.1179 Culture, especially in form of religion that is both a regulating 
illusion and an ultimate wish-fulfillment, therefore, also protects against the supremacy of 
nature.1180 
The cultural phenomena of art, morality, and religion, however, remain 
separated from each other in Ricoeur’s analysis of Freud until the introduction of Θάνατος 
(Thanatos), the death instinct. Before opening the last phase of the “analytics” that focuses on 
this re-elaboration of instinct theory, Ricoeur argues that only this expansion to Thanatos 
unifies all the libidinal phenomena, or cultural representations of instinctual desires, under 
one endeavor, that is, under the battle between the self-expressing life-drive and the 
pathological death-drive.1181 Ricoeur quotes Freud as saying “everything living dies for 
internal reasons … the aim of all life is death,” in order to explain this radical drive to die.1182 
Correspondingly, “all of life’s organic developments are but detours toward death, and the 
so-called conservative instincts are but the organism’s attempts to defend its own fashion of 
                                               
1176 Ricoeur 1965a, 190. (191). 
1177 Ricoeur 1965a, 244. (249). – Ricoeur maintains that “culture is just another name for the superego.” 
1178 Ricoeur 1965a, 193. (194). 
1179 Ricoeur 1965a, 195, 205. (196, 207). 
1180 Ricoeur 1965a, 244-249. (249-254). 
1181 Ricoeur 1965a, 256. (258). 
1182 Ricoeur 1965a, 285. (290). 
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dying, its particular path to death.”1183 Life, in itself, is only a path to death, and Ἔρως (Eros), 
the sexual instinct, is the only resisting power in this individualized journey toward it.1184 The 
death instinct, therefore, calls for a complete reinterpretation of the role of culture. 
In the face of an inevitable – and even wished – death, culture represents the 
working of Ἔρως that desires to create life and render it satisfactory. “The process of 
culture,” as Ricoeur quotes Freud, “is a modification which the vital process experiences 
under the influence of a task imposed by Ἔρως and necessitated by Ἀνάγκη, [that is,] the 
inevitability of reality [more commonly spoken of a necessity].”1185 Culture, in other words, is 
the necessary realm of the struggle between the destructive death-drive and the productive 
life-drive. The consequent paradox between the drive to this cultural process, Ἔρως, and the 
restricting incentive of culture leaves the ego dissatisfied, however. Ultimately, as Ricoeur 
summarizes, this is the working of the death instinct, or “the anticultural instinct,” that 
renders the ego hostile towards everyone else.1186 This conflict at the social plane is only 
secondary or derivative as the primordial conflict takes place at the instinctual level. Culture, 
Ricoeur interprets, is a state of “declared war” between Ἔρως and Θάνατος.1187 In Freud’s 
words, “the evolution of culture may therefore be described as the human species’ struggle 
for existence.”1188 The struggle, however, gains control over the individuals, “mortifies” 
them, and leaves them indefinitely dissatisfied in the “sense of guilt produced by culture.”1189 
                                               
1183 Ricoeur 1965a, 285. (290). 
1184 Ricoeur 1965a, 286. (290-291). 
1185 Ricoeur 1965a, 298. (303). 
1186 Ricoeur 1965a, 298-299. (303-305). 
1187 Ricoeur 1965a, 300. (306). 
1188 Ricoeur 1965a, 300. (305). Translation modified on the basis of Ricoeur 1965a, 243-244. (248-249). 
1189 Ricoeur 1965a, 301-303, 316. (306-309, 323). Translation modified on the basis of Ricoeur 1965a, 243-
244. (248-249). 
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In Freud’s thought, according to Ricoeur, culture is the realm of the battle between the two 
primal giants.1190 
 Freud’s idea of the death-instinct, however, transfers the discussion of 
instincts and their essence completely to the symbolic plane: in order to analyze their 
function, instincts must be objectified in myths. Ricoeur points out that “all direct speculation 
about the instincts, apart from their representatives, is mythical.”1191 In a way this 
speculation, which by aestheticizing the notion of instincts uses a romantic tonality rather 
than a scientific one,1192 reduplicates (in its mode of symbolization) the unsatisfiable quest of 
desire, because speculation arises from dissatisfaction that needs to be expressed. After all, it 
is also a desire to make apparent the hidden structures of the human psyche, to articulate 
them in speculation. “Desire, as an insatiable demand, gives rise to speech,” Ricoeur 
maintains.1193 Desire, in other words, finds its ways in its search for satisfaction in 
sublimation; in this case, in the very cultural means of substitute satisfaction, that is, in the 
form of myths that help explain the very origin and essence of that desire. 
Even though Ricoeur does not suggest that Freud would have made a turn to 
aesthetics and, in fact, denies altogether that Freud would have had an aesthetic world 
view,1194  Freud’s discussion of primal instincts through the symbols of Ἔρως and Θάνατος 
nevertheless testifies to the unavoidable aestheticism; the “unnameable” realm of instincts is 
approachable and articulable only indirectly in mythical language. “Through symbolism,” 
Ricoeur maintains, “the fantasies of the abolished past are recreated in the light of day.”1195 
Symbols cannot substitute for the clarity of exact description, but – as Ricoeur argues in the 
                                               
1190 Ricoeur 1965a, 160, 289, 300. (156, 293, 305). 
1191 Ricoeur 1965a, 305. (311). 
1192 Cf. Ricoeur 1965a, 254. (255-256). 
1193 Ricoeur 1965a, 316. (322). 
1194 Ricoeur 1965a, 326. (334). 
1195 Ricoeur 1965a, 325. (332). 
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wake of Freud – they still help us, as the only available means of maintaining the movement 
towards the resolution of the enigma presented by instincts: 
The symbolic resolution of conflicts through art, the transfer of desires and 
hatreds to the plane of play, daydreams, and poetry, borders on resignation; 
prior to wisdom, while waiting for wisdom, the symbolic mode proper to the 
work of art enables us to endure the harshness of life, and, suspended between 
illusion and reality, helps us to love fate.1196 
 
Put differently, as I will explain in more detail in chapter 14, Ricoeur’s analysis of Freud 
invites the working out of the human “unnameable” in critical “understanding,” rather than 
mere explaining, interpretation which takes symbols and especially poetic expression as its 
nexus.1197 The implied idea that this poetico-symbolic resolution of the enigma of primal 
human constitution is an acceptable human fate stands out, however, as a suggestion that 
crosses the borders of mere “analytics.” At this point, after having noticed the necessary 
cultural element in the Freudian archeology of the subject, Ricoeur’s reading of Freud 
transforms itself from questioning the psychological human condition to a full cultural 
hermeneutics in the form of a dialectics that concludes in his examination of the mytho-
poetic function of language.1198 
 
11.3 A Hermeneutic of Culture 
Placed after the “problematics” and the “analytics” sections, the “dialectics” section of On 
Interpretation represents an intermediary in a philosophical process of what Ricoeur calls 
“revealing man’s structures or fundamental possibilities” on the first page of The Voluntary and the 
                                               
1196 Ricoeur 1965a, 328. (335). 
1197 Cf. Ricoeur 1965a, 325. (332). 
1198 Cf. Ricoeur 1965a, 335. (343). 
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Involuntary.1199 As seen in chapter 9, the notion of self-objectification in “making myself 
be”1200 opened the path toward the discussion of cultural objectivity in Fallible Man analyzed 
in chapter 10. Chapter 11 has so far shown Ricoeur’s problematization of the question of 
culture that follows from these steps – self-objectification, cultural objectivity, and question 
of culture – Ricoeur has pursued in his preceding works. Ricoeur’s phenomenological 
anthropology, which required a detour through cultural objectivity, now turns into a 
hermeneutic of culture, necessitated by the quest of revealing the human “fundamental 
possibilities.” 
 Ricoeur’s organization for this “Dialectics” section consists of two parts: he 
portrays first Freud’s psychoanalysis as “an archeology of the subject.”1201 He argues, 
however, that this archeology implies the complementing “teleology of the subject” – 
because “in order to have an άρχή a subject must have a τέλος.”1202 These two approaches to 
the human subject constitute the dialectic at the concrete level of human experience, 
between coming from and going to somewhere. As such, they also constitute the “properly 
dialectical” level of the philosophical interpretation for Ricoeur. He emphasizes the 
importance of this “dialectics of recognition” (la dialectique de la reconnaissance),1203 which holds 
“the mytho-poetic formations of culture” at the epicenter, by treating the whole 
interpretative re-examination precisely as “Dialectics.”1204 
Despite its indisputable centrality, Ricoeur stresses that the dialectics of 
archeology and teleology (which in itself culminates in the internal dialectics of both Freudian 
                                               
1199 Ricoeur 1949, 7. (3). 
1200 Ricoeur 1949, 54, 57-58. (55, 59). 
1201 Ricoeur 1965a, 407-443. (419-458). 
1202 Ricoeur 1965a, 444. (459). 
1203 Ricoeur 1965a, 453, 458, 466, 473, 474-475. (469, 474, 483, 490, 492-493). 
1204 Ricoeur 1965a, 334, 445. (342, 460). 
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psychoanalysis and Hegelian phenomenology1205) is still “only a transition […] to a symbolic 
understanding that would grasp the indivisible unity of its archeology and its teleology in the 
very birth (naissance) of discourse (parole).”1206 This transition is enabled by the fact that both 
Freud’s psychoanalysis and Hegel’s phenomenology maintain that “language is the being-
there of the mind” in their respective theories that a self becomes recognized through 
interpretative work, and also by Ricoeur’s conviction that a symbol is “the concrete ‘mixture’ in 
which we read the double exposure of archeology and teleology.”1207 The dialectical conflict, 
in other words, is concretized in a symbol that is an authentic expression of human 
condition; these symbols, however, crave for interpretative reflection. The “Dialectics” 
section is therefore for Ricoeur a means of reaching the hermeneutical level of “concrete 
reflection” that is capable of facilitating the examination of a human being in the context of 
the Whole – the only context in which, I argue, a Ricoeurian subject ultimately becomes 
recognized.1208  
 
The Indirect Approach: Feelings as a Key to the Creation of Sense 
At the outset of the hermeneutic of culture, On Interpretation states that the aim is not to 
formulate a general hermeneutics but only to integrate conflicting hermeneutics – 
                                               
1205 Ricoeur 1965a, 446, 477. (461, 495). – I have analyzed Ricoeur’s relation to Hegel in chapter 7. That 
examination, however, focused in Ricoeur’s texts that were published after Time and Narrative III in which 
Ricoeur “renounces” Hegel (Ricoeur 1985, 280-299. (193-206)). Ricoeur’s application of Hegel’s 
phenomenology in On Interpretation precedes this “renouncement” and was for this reason left out from my 
analysis. Needless to say that the section of Hegelian phenomenology in On Interpretation strengthens my thesis 
that Ricoeur, as a “post-Hegelian Kantian” philosopher, considers Hegel’s philosophical work as a major tenet 
for his own philosophy. In On Interpretation Ricoeur assumes The Phenomenology of the Spirit as his “guide” while 
summarizing the work’s idea by stating that “consciousness is simply the internalization of this [externalizing] 
movement [to shapes or figures of consciousness], which must be recaptured in the objective structures of 
institutions, monuments, works of art and culture.” Ricoeur 1965a, 447-456. (462-472). 
1206 Ricoeur 1965a, 334-335. (342-343). 
1207 Ricoeur 1965a, 373-376, 476. (383-386, 494). 
1208 Ricoeur 1965a, 334-335, 475. (342-343, 493). 
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represented by archeology and teleology – into one reflection.1209 I argue that this dialectically 
based reflection in the end correlates with the so-called secondary naïveté. Put differently, 
Ricoeur’s On Interpretation does not focus on the question of hermeneutics per se, but 
explicates the reasons why the hermeneutic turn in The Symbolism of Evil was necessary; the 
postcritical naïveté is interpretation – “it is in hermeneutics that the symbol’s gift of meaning 
and the endeavor to understand by deciphering are knotted together.”1210 Reconfirming this 
earlier assertion, Ricoeur is firmly convinced that “the concreteness of language which we 
border upon through painstaking approximation is the second naïveté of which we have 
merely a frontier or threshold knowledge.”1211 In other words, the secondary, postcritical 
innocence (naïveté seconde) to which Ricoeur aspired in The Symbolism of Evil is acquirable in the 
hermeneutics of symbolically rich language, or in the “attitude of listening to language” that 
surpasses the simple “hearing” of trivialities, as Ricoeur rephrases it in On Interpretation.1212 As 
Ricoeur maintains later in 1975, such a postcritical attitude turns the critical distanciation 
into a productive distance in culture that first and foremost animates one’s comprehension 
of cultural situatedness in general.1213 In sum, the internally dialectical reflection becomes the 
secondary naïveté in cultural interpretation. 
Let us focus, therefore, on language in all its “fullness.” Symbolic language – 
by which Ricoeur means all forms of language that retain equivocity in contrast to 
formalized univocal languages, such as symbolic logic1214 – is “rich” because it verbalizes the 
human desire to express in its fullness, albeit in a situation. In more precise terms, “symbols 
present the projection of our [human] possibilities onto the area of imagination,” Ricoeur 
                                               
1209 Ricoeur 1965a, 476. (494). 
1210 Ricoeur 1960b, 326. (351). 
1211 Ricoeur 1965a, 477. (495). 
1212 Ricoeur 1960b, 25-26, 326-328. (19, 350-353).; Ricoeur 1965a, 477. (495-496). 
1213 Ricoeur 1975c, 40-41. 
1214 Ricoeur 1965a, 54-61. (47-54). 
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maintains; this is their authentic function.1215 Symbols are authentic, in other words, because 
they involve a correlation between that which is expressed and the subject who expresses his 
situated being in the very expression. For this reason, in their “creation of meaning” that is 
at the same time already “a living interpretation,”1216 symbols are also revealing with regard 
to the subject: they are true “signs of man” to use Ricoeur’s words. In short, “symbols 
involve a schema of becoming oneself that opens up to what the symbols disclose [that is, 
the process of self-consciousness].”1217 Symbolic language in its creativity is, therefore, 
existentially revealing, but at the source of this revealing expressivity is human desire. 
Ricoeur’s approach to the creative moment in symbols is therefore indirect. 
He asserts that a direct analysis is utterly impossible; instead, a philosophical analysis of this 
creative moment has to be guided by an analogical analysis, that is, by an analysis of desire, 
or of feeling, which is – as explicated in Fallible Man – also a “mixture” of life and idea, 
quasi-origin and quasi-destination.1218 This analysis of feeling pertains to a subject placed in a 
situation that admits an origin and a destination. For this reason, On Interpretation explores 
again the “authentic Suchen” drawn from Kant’s Anthropology, or the constitutive human quest 
that takes the threefold cultural form of searching for having (avoir), power (pouvoir), and 
esteem (valoir).1219 In other words, the analysis of this threefold quest in Fallible Man is re-
examined in On Interpretation taking into account the dialectics of άρχή and τέλος, because the 
creative source of symbolization is that of the original search for a subject’s humanity.  
 
                                               
1215 Ricoeur 1965a, 478. (497). 
1216 Ricoeur 1965a, 486. (505). 
1217 Ricoeur 1965a, 479. (497-498). 
1218 Ricoeur 1965a, 487. (506). 
1219 Ricoeur 1965a, 487-488. (507).; Ricoeur 1960a, 127-128. (111). 
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Re-interpretation: the Quests for Having, Power, and Esteem 
Ricoeur’s analysis of having, power, and esteem in Fallible Man already emphasizes that 
recognition is possible only through cultural objectivity. The dialectical polarity of a subject’s 
origin and destiny, which also explicates the human condition of being “torn” in his or her 
task of becoming an authentic self, necessitates, however, that this threefold analysis of 
“fragile mediation” – based on Kant’s remarks on cultural passions – is reread through this 
newly introduced dialectics.1220 The gravity of being an alienated self, a self fundamentally 
unaware of its own constitution, is fully exposed after Freud, that is, after the “master of 
destruction” and an advocator of “false consciousness.”1221 For the sake of clarity, I will next 
introduce this re-reading of having, power, and esteem by pairing Ricoeur’s re-reading of 
each of these with his correlating philosophical elaboration of Freud. 
Let us begin with having. Ricoeur’s use of Marx’s conception of economic 
alienation to explain his idea of economic objectivity – the sphere of having – echoes the 
conviction of the self’s fundamental alienation. While in Fallible Man Ricoeur only assumes a 
Marxist tone late in the discussion of the realm of power (as I explained in 10.3), On 
Interpretation opens the section on the re-interpretation of having with Marx, by relating the 
idea of “economic objectivity” to Marx’s conception of “economic alienation.” Ricoeur 
argues that the feeling of alienation is tied to cultural objects as objects of having, and that it 
makes a subject “an adult” while making him capable of non-libidinal, sublimed “adult 
alienation.”1222 Paradoxically, becoming capable of being alienated is therefore also a mode of 
becoming self-conscious: 
                                               
1220 Ricoeur 1960a, 156-157. (140-141). 
1221 Ricoeur 1965a, 41. (33). 
1222 Ricoeur 1965a, 489. (508). 
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We may say, then, that man becomes self-consciousness insofar as he 
experiences this economic objectivity as a new modality of his subjectivity and 
thus attains specifically human “feelings” relative to the availability of things as 
things that have been worked upon and appropriated, while at the same time 
he becomes an expropriated appropriator.1223 
 
In brief, the human work that forms a subject’s relation to the objects that can be called 
economic, alienates him from himself, but also gives him the notion of being an alienated 
self.  
 Ricoeur points out that the Freudian exploration of “the substructures of our 
affects” does not alter this economic analysis, but confirms it instead by explicating the 
determining power of human instinctual desires with regard to objects of economic 
valuation. Freud’s interpretation of having is a libidinal one, and it too reveals a displacement 
of (erotogenic) feelings onto cultural objects. This takes place in the pregenital formation of 
the ego. In particular, Ricoeur refers to Freud’s analysis that draws a correlation between a 
person’s excrement and valuation of gold and money.1224 The constitution of the economic 
object in self-recognition therefore remains, Ricoeur concludes. 
 The second sphere, power, repeats the idea that the evolvement of self-
consciousness is constituted in objectivity. Alluding to Hegel’s “objective Spirit,” which 
again echoes the idea of alienation, Ricoeur argues that the institutionalized structures of 
commanding and obeying bring a human being into existence, make him “an adult” who 
struggles against being alienated. The objective power-structures also open the possibility of 
considering more the object, power, rather than the subject – instead of being helpful 
societal means of structuring human community, the institutions become ends in themselves. 
Nevertheless, Ricoeur argues, this mode of cultural objectification is necessary for self-
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recognition: “one can say that man becomes human insofar as he can enter into the political 
problematic of power, adopt the feelings that center around power, and deliver himself up to 
the evils accompanying that power.”1225 Still, the structures of power threaten to objectify the 
subject so completely that he becomes a mere index, a chip tossed around in the arena of 
political play. 
 The Freudian analysis again confirms the objectification of power. Ricoeur 
points out that according to the Freudian interpretation the social groupings are held 
together by ideas drawn from an “invisible leader” who, however, only represents re-
diverted “love instincts.”1226 This leader-object, the “dreaded primal father,” has replaced the 
individuals’ ideal-egos, and they are therefore reciprocally connected with each other in this 
new object of group ideal. The imminent threat of reducing oneself to just another “group-
individual” thus correlates with the idea of institutionally subdued subjects. Ricoeur’s 
conclusion in the quest for power is therefore the same as in  the quest of having: the 
Freudian analysis re-enforces the outcome of the “phenomenological” analysis.1227 
 The third sphere, the quest for esteem, is more clearly an intersubjective matter 
than the two preceding quests of the primordial human “Suchen.” The sphere of having 
pertains to a self’s relation to things, the sphere of power to objectified, dominated subjects, 
and the sphere of esteem, finally, to the self’s relation to culture and through it to other 
human beings as human: “The constitution of the self is not completed in an economics and 
a politics, but pursues itself in the region of culture,” Ricoeur argues.1228 Even if a subject 
could gain self-understanding in the light of economic or political objectivity, it would 
                                               
1225 Ricoeur 1965a, 490. (509). 
1226 Ricoeur 1965a, 493. (513). 
1227 Ricoeur 1965a, 494. (514). 
1228 Ricoeur 1965a, 490, 502. (509, 523). 
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remain an alienated one. The quest for esteem is “the quest of recognition” (la quête de la 
reconnaissance),1229 and only in the mode of being recognized, in the mode of received 
recognition, a subject becomes a person. “My existence for myself is dependent on this 
constitution of self in the opinion of others; my ‘self’ is shaped by the opinion and 
acceptance of others,” Ricoeur insists in On Interpretation, just as he did in Fallible Man.1230  
More forcefully than in Fallible Man, however, On Interpretation asserts that this 
recognition requires cultural objects – including law, art, and literature which most purely 
manifest the human esprit – by which esteem in others’ opinion is given, and that “the 
exploration of human possibilities extends into this new kind of objectivity.”1231 In particular, 
Ricoeur emphasizes those possibilities given in aesthetic expression: “Even when Van Gogh 
sketches a chair, he at the same time portrays man; he projects a figure of man, namely the 
man who ‘has’ this represented world.”1232 Human respect of the self for the self is formed 
through these kinds of cultural objects, or “works and monuments” that manifest the idea of 
humanity, or the human quality, and which invoke a multifaceted relation between a subject 
and these objects which not only express a producing subject’s capabilities, but also elevate 
the notion of these capabilities to the level of the idea of humanity thus rendered 
appropriable for the self seeking to be recognized as a capable human being.  
A person’s worth as a human being is given indirectly through culture, it is 
“received” by those objects which concretize the human esprit, and mediate the notion of 
self-respect to those subjects who appropriate the idea of higher human capabilities by 
interpreting these “true” objects of culture precisely as signs of capable human being: I can 
                                               
1229 Ricoeur 1965a, 502. (523). 
1230 Ricoeur 1965a, 490, 502-503. (510, 523).; Ricoeur 1960a, 137. (121). 
1231 Ricoeur 1965a, 490. (510). 
1232 Ricoeur 1965a, 490. (510). – Ricoeur’s example recalls Heidegger’s Van Gogh example in The Origin of 
the Work of Art; cf. Heidegger 1977a, 18-21. (Heidegger 2001b, 32-35.) 
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esteem myself, because I conceive this sketch of a chair as a sign of being capable, and being 
thus capable of surpassing the state of the immediate satisfaction of my desires, that is, as a 
sign of human quality that both assures me that such sublimation is possible, and challenges 
me to similar achievements at this level of cultural objectivity – to further other’s self-
recognition through their own reception of this cultural recognition.1233  
The same structure of cultural recognition is evident in Ricoeur’s 
reinterpretation of Freud, which somewhat lets go of the notion of esteem while focusing 
again on the tragedy of Oedipus Rex. After pointing out that for Freud the drama does not 
narrate an individual’s destiny but a collective human destiny (because it ultimately speaks of 
“oedipal” primal desires), Ricoeur argues that the tragedy is interpretable as one “of self-
consciousness, of self-recognition.”1234 Rather than centering upon Oedipus as a child, 
Ricoeur maintains, the tragedy portrays the adult Oedipus, the king facing the truth, or 
recognizing himself more properly through his socio-cultural condition. While describing 
this process of recognition in the drama, the tragedy itself – a cultural monument – functions 
as means of recognition for its readers. This dual idea of recognition, this “double function,” 
Ricoeur points out, is also included in Freud’s analysis of the drama. Quoting Freud, Ricoeur 
maintains that “the poet, while uncovering Oedipus’ fault, obliges us to consider ourselves, 
and to recognize those same impulses that, though suppressed, still remain.”1235 The drama, 
in other words, is a cultural object that enables self-recognition. 
Put differently, cultural objects are the media through which esteem, or mutual 
recognition, is formed. Ricoeur argues for the necessity of this mutual recognition not only in 
                                               
1233 Consequently, if a human subject is to lose himself, to “destroy” himself as Ricoeur mentions, this 
level of esteem is the proper level for such self-degradation as a failure in the process of “receiving” 
recognition. Cf. Ricoeur 1965a, 491. (510). 
1234 Ricoeur 1965a, 495-496. (515-516). 
1235 Ricoeur 1965a, 496-498. (518). 
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Course of Recognition, but already in Fallible Man, where he theorizes that “the constitution of 
subjects is a mutual constitution (constitution mutuelle) through opinion [concerning cultural 
works].”1236 On Interpretation repeats Ricoeur’s conviction of recognition through culture while 
stressing the mediating function of “highly” expressive works that manifest the human esprit: 
“It is through the medium of these [painted, sculptured, or written] works or monuments 
that a certain dignity of man is constituted, which is the instrument and trace of a process of 
reduplicated consciousness, or recognition of the self in another self (reconnaissance du soi dans un autre 
soi).”1237 In short, the realm of cultural objects is the realm of mediated mutual recognition 
that manifests the idea of humanity and constitutes human dignity. 
 
Mytho-poetics: the Creation of Cultural Meaning 
After having now drawn a connection between Ricoeur’s early anthropology and the 
necessary hermeneutic of culture he develops in On Interpretation, a relating problem appears 
to us that leads us to continue our reading of Ricoeur’s work. Ricoeur namely bases the 
mediating power of cultural objects upon their symbolic function. Sophocles’ drama, or “the 
symbol created by Sophocles,” for example, “reveals, in the work of art itself, the profound 
unity of disguise and disclosure, inherent in the very structure of symbols that have become 
cultural objects.”1238 The human quest for esteem is fulfilled through this symbolism; cultural 
objects, which on the one hand are signs of sublimation, are on the other hand means of 
esteem because they symbolize the human effort to exist. Ricoeur’s re-interpretation of the 
threefold Suchen thus transforms the discussion into one of symbols. Leaving the theme of 
                                               
1236 Ricoeur 1960a, 137, 139-140. (121, 123-124). 
1237 Ricoeur 1965a, 503. (523). Italics added.  
1238 Ricoeur 1965a, 499. (519). 
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esteem gradually (his sudden remarks of esteem at the end of the re-examination only call 
attention to this suspension while merely repeating the words of Fallible Man1239), Ricoeur 
indicates that the re-examination had only a relative value: the core of cultural hermeneutics 
is not in economics, politics, nor – surprisingly – in esteem. It is in symbols and in the 
symbolic function of cultural objects. Ricoeur therefore returns, and we with him, to the 
question of the creation of meaning by moving on to the theme of mytho-poetics.  
In sum, Ricoeur’s re-elaboration of the threefold Suchen as well as the relation 
between the archaisms of dreams and cultural objects leads him to notice their common 
essence: symbolization. Ricoeur concludes that “the area in which the concrete dialectic [of 
disguise and disclosure] must be elaborated is that of language and its symbolic function.”1240 
This idea that linguistic-symbolic, or “mytho-poetic,”1241 function constitutes a generally 
unifying realm – the most fundamental “con” to use the terms of this dissertation – connects 
the “archeological” and “teleological” aspects of the self, the affective origin and the 
objectified destiny, with each other. In other words, the mytho-poetic function of language 
constitutes self-recognition in the cultural objects that also convey primordial human desires.  
Ricoeur’s proposition of the poetic essence of culture both recapitulates and 
redirects the lengthy discussion by invoking the poetic as that which both gives meaning and 
preserves its meaningfulness. While summarizing his hermeneutic of culture Ricoeur thus 
also sets the task of defining the poetic function: 
I propose therefore that cultural phenomena should be interpreted as the 
objective media in which the great enterprise of sublimation with its double 
value of disguise and disclosure becomes sedimented. Such an interpretation 
opens up to us the meaning of certain synonymous expressions. Thus the term 
“education” designates the movement by which man is led out of his 
                                               
1239 Ricoeur 1965a, 502-503. (523).; Ricoeur 1960a, 137, 139-140. (121, 123-124). 
1240 Ricoeur 1965a, 502. (522). 
1241 Ricoeur 1965a, 500. (520). 
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childhood; this movement is, in the proper sense, an “erudition” whereby man 
is lifted out of his archaic past; but it is also a Bildung, in the two-fold sense of 
an edification and an emergence of the Bilder or “images of man” which mark 
off the development of self-consciousness and open man to what they 
disclose. And this education, this erudition, this Bildung function as a second 
nature, for they remodel man’s first nature. In them is realized the movement 
so well described by Ravaisson in the limited example of habit; this movement 
is at the same time the return of freedom to nature through the recapture of 
desire in the works of culture. Because of the overdetermination of symbols, 
these works are firmly tied in the world of life (monde de la vie): it is indeed 
where id was that the ego comes to be. By mobilizing all our childhood stages, 
all our archaisms, by embodying itself in the oneiric, the poetic keeps man’s 
cultural existence from being simply a huge artifice, a futile “artifact,” a 
Leviathan without a nature and against nature.1242 
                                               
1242 Ricoeur 1965a, 503. (524). – Ricoeur’s allusions to Bildung are quite sudden, since he has referred to the 
term in On Interpretation only twice in passing in the sense of “formation.” (Ricoeur 1965a, 148, 203. (146, 204).) 
Rather than referring to these allusions he has made in analyzing Freud, the present context suggests that 
Ricoeur refers to Hegel’s sense of cultural formation, or culturing, Bildung. Ricoeur would not, however, be the 
only hermeneutic thinker to resort to Hegel’s sense of culturing. In general, as George H. Taylor has remarked 
in our discussion, the question of culture has for long been incorporated in hermeneutics; one of Taylor’s 
examples recall the fact that the journal Philosophy and Social Criticism was initially entitled Cultural Hermeneutics 
(edited by David Rasmussen).  
In contrast to Heidegger’s uneasiness with culture, the most apparent hermeneutic approach that includes 
the cultural examination is that of Hans-Georg Gadamer. His summary of Hegel’s cultural understanding 
captures the structure of the formation through culture, namely, that “the essence of Bildung is clearly not 
alienation as such, but the return to oneself - which presupposes alienation, to be sure.” (Gadamer 1989, 14.) 
(Italics added.) Since the notion of Bildung is also important for Gadamer himself, it is necessary to make two 
further remarks. First, in beginning his critique (part I.I of Truth and Method) of the aesthetic experience 
conceived as Erlebnis (rather than Erfahrung which is experience capable of avoiding immediate immersion as it 
is being linked with definite knowledge) and the “radical subjectivization” which began with Kant’s Critique of 
Judgment, Gadamer introduces Bildung (culture) as the first guiding concept of humanism (the rest are sensus 
communis, judgment, and taste). He draws this from Herder, who understood Bildung as “rising up to humanity 
through culture.” Gadamer writes: “More than anyone, Herder transcended the perfectionism of the 
Enlightenment with his new ideal of ‘cultivating the human’ (Bildung zum Menschen) and thus prepared the 
ground for the growth of the historical sciences in the nineteenth century. The concept of self-formation, 
education, or cultivation (Bildung), which became supremely important at the time, was perhaps the greatest idea 
of the eighteenth century, and it is this concept which is the atmosphere breathed by the human sciences of the 
nineteenth century, even if they are unable to offer any epistemological justification for it.” Second, as can be 
seen in his analyses on Gebilde (I.II.1.b) and the ontological event of Bild (I.II.2.a), Gadamer still understands 
Bildung to have a great importance in his own project – it relates to human sciences. Even though Gadamer also 
departs from Hegel’s “spiritualism” (especially in II.II.B.iv) by emphasizing 1) situatedness in (linguistic) 
tradition (which is the “ground” of validity constantly affirmed, embraced, and evolved, thus describing an 
“element of the ontological structure of understanding”), 2) radical finitude, whose counterpart is the 
“foregrounding” (abhebend) hermeneutical “horizon” in which we move, 3) understanding as both “participating 
in an event of tradition,” and thus also as “fusion of present and historical horizons (Horizontverschmelzung),” 
and 4) the consequent “legitimate ambiguity” of wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein (consciousness of being affected by 
history that is “primarily consciousness of the hermeneutical situation”), he also acknowledges that “Hegel has 
thought through the historical dimension in which the problem of hermeneutics is rooted.” This is why 
Gadamer has to define “the structure of historically effected consciousness with an eye to Hegel.” Gadamer, 
however, maintains that his proposal can be seen as different from Hegel’s: “Bildung is an element of spirit 
without being tied to Hegel’s philosophy of absolute spirit, just as the insight into the historicity of 
consciousness is not tied to his philosophy of world history.” One indication of this difference is that 
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Cultural phenomena, or cultural objects, utilize poetic expressivity in mediating human 
desire, and give a context for self-objectification and subsequently enriched self-
consciousness. Since the self is not immediate but shattered, all cultural objects, or works, 
express the human incapability to be directly self-recognized – while, in turn, providing 
means for one’s self-recognition and understanding under the thematics of humanity and 
mutuality. 
The cultural objects, by which this newly reformed understanding of one’s 
being is acquired, are, as means of human expressivity, alienating, however. As objects, they 
stand over and against the subject, who is then threatened with “losing” the notion of his 
own being in the objectivity of those objects: “Freedom becomes alienated in alienating its 
own mediations, economic, politic, cultural; the servile will, one might add, mediates itself by 
passing through all the figures of our incapability that express and objectify our capability to 
exist.”1243 Against this threat of becoming alienated, Ricoeur argues, the poetic maintains a 
firm connection to a subject’s living experience that desires expression. At the same time, 
however, the poetic functions as means of objectifying; that is, cultural objects gain their 
objectivity only through symbolization.  
                                                                                                                                            
Gadamer’s “playful” and “conversational” Bild-ung, cultur-ing, of a hermeneutical self – that is both dialectical 
and dialogical – is never complete. (Cf. Gadamer 1989, xxxiv-xxxv, 9-10, 15, 97-100, 281, 290, 293, 301-306, 
346, 367-368, 389-390.)  
Metaphysically speaking, then, Ricoeur is much closer to Gadamer than to Hegel. I would misrepresent 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, however, if I did not point out that his critique of Gadamer’s concept of tradition 
(Überlegung) in Time and Narrative III retains, in the wake of Horkheimer and Adorno, a connection to the 
approach that includes the idea of the necessary critical assessment of one’s traditionality, only through which 
understanding is possible. (Cf. Ricoeur 1985, 318-332. (219-227).) Ricoeur’s critical cultural hermeneutics that, 
in contrast to Gadamer’s Heideggerian emphasis on ontological understanding and belongingness 
(Zugehörigkeit), stresses more the critical, or objective, moment in the necessary duality of both explanation and 
understanding (viz. Erklären and Verstehen), and is, therefore, also distinct from that of Gadamer. Even Merold 
Westphal, who defends Gadamer from oversimplifications regarding this issue, maintains that “distanciation 
does not get much respect in Gadamer’s hermeneutics, which is overwhelmingly devoted to belonging.” 
(Westphal 2011, 43, 53.) Of the recent reassessment between Gadamer and Ricoeur, cf. Ritivoi 2011, 69-82.; G. 
H. Taylor 2011, 105-111. 
1243 Ricoeur 1965a, 525. (547). 
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The poetic creativity will be in our focus in chapter 13, that is, in the opening 
chapter of the next part in this dissertation. The current chapter has, however, already led us 
to the threshold of this new stage of analysis by emphasizing that sublimation ultimately 
concerns the poetic “images of being human.” The problem that remains for us relates to 
the implied objectification. The poetic has the double function as the means of 
expressivity/objectivity, that is, it both expresses and invigorates what is expressed. In other 
words, the poetics maintains  human cultural existence both as cultural and as a subject’s 
mode of existence; it objectifies the experience of being a living subject onto the cultural 
plane, thus letting the expression and reappropriation of this existence to take place. This 
cultural existence under the poetic function1244 is the ultimate “con” to which I have alluded 
in this dissertation; it is the poetic unity between a subject and his or her cultural objects. An 
important outcome of this chapter 11 is, therefore, that the creation of cultural meaning is 
utterly dependent on this poetic function that enables the intelligible expression of human 
interiority and com-municates the idea of humanity. 
 
                                               
1244 Ricoeur understands the poetic imagination as enabling human expressivity and as the ability to 
reappropriate the manifestations of being a living subject. Cf. Ricoeur 1965a, 522. (544). 
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12. REFLECTIONS ON RE-CON-NAISSANCE 
After presenting the problem of Ricoeur’s cultural thought in part one of this dissertation, 
and after having confirmed in part two that the assertion of Ricoeur as a philosopher of 
culture gains support in the light of his Course of Recognition, this part moved into reading 
Ricoeur’s work as a philosophy of culture. The interim conclusion at the end of part two, 
that Ricoeur’s phenomenology of l’homme capable requires the support of a cultural 
hermeneutics, rested on the notion of les objectivations culturelles, but this idea of “cultural 
objectification” and of the corollary “cultural objects” was still left undefined. The aim of 
this part was to clarify how the idea of cultural objectification brings together, or con-joins, 
Ricoeur’s phenomenological anthropology and his hermeneutic of culture.  
 Starting the reading of Ricoeur’s work from his very early texts, we have seen 
in chapter 9 that The Voluntary and the Involuntary argued that human subjectivity is only 
explained by objectivity. The analysis of Fallible Man in chapter 10 confirmed the necessity of 
objectification by explicitly lending support from Kant’s critical philosophy, in which the 
necessary correlation between the objectivity of an object and the subjectivity of a subject is 
defined as the transcendental condition for all self-cognition – in other words, their synthetic 
com-bination (con-junctio). Ricoeur’s unorthodox reading of Kant’s transcendental philosophy 
resulted in his redefining his relation to Kant’s position, however. The definition Ricoeur 
gives for his own mode of philosophizing – that it pursues a “post-Hegelian Kantian 
style”1245 – helps explain Ricoeur’s insistence on cultural objectivity, which Kant does not 
emphasize. Hegel’s phenomenology includes the idea of cultural objectification and 
mediation, but Ricoeur draws the theoretical basis for this objectification in culture from 
                                               
1245 Ricoeur 1985, 312. (215).; Ricoeur 1969, 402-405. (412-414).; Ricoeur 1986a, 251. (200). 
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Kant’s critical work rather than Hegel’s systemic and totalizing phenomenology. This dual 
transgression, Ricoeur’s post-Hegelianism and post-Kantianism, was then capitalized on in 
chapter 11 that examined On Interpretation. Our conclusion was that Ricoeur maintains in On 
Interpretation that a hermeneutic of culture is necessary for the phenomenology of being able. 
 While making explicit the shift in Ricoeur’s emphasis from phenomenological 
anthropology to cultural hermeneutics, this part also argued that the model of mutual 
recognition Ricoeur discusses in Course of Recognition was already introduced in his early 
works. The primacy of received recognition was latently present in The Voluntary and the 
Involuntary, but chapter 10 exposed that Fallible Man prefigured Ricoeur’s argument in Course 
of Recognition. Besides structural resemblances, both Fallible Man and Course of Recognition 
conclude with cultural, or mutual, recognition as being recognized, that is, with the idea that 
recognition is enabled by cultural objectivity that grounds the human subject and facilitates 
self-recognition. As we have seen in chapter 11, On Interpretation continued to examine 
recognition under the theme of a dialectics of recognition that accompanies the idea of 
recognition through culture; it is in this dialectics insisting interpretation that the human 
dignity is constituted as “a process of reduplicated consciousness, or recognition of the self 
in another self (reconnaissance du soi dans un autre soi).”1246  
 This mutualizing cultural objectivity that con-joins and therefore allows the 
sociocultural re-membering that was argued in part two, results in maintaining that Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutic of culture is describable as a hermeneutics of re-con-naissance – the synthetic 
moment of “con” under cultural objectivity is literally com-munication in its radical meanings 
of making common, sharing, and mutual participation. In particular, the “works of the 
                                               
1246 Ricoeur 1965a, 503. (523). 
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[human] spirit,” les oeuvres de l’esprit,1247 are cultural signs that communicate the fundamental 
unity of humanity, but only because they stand out as symbols of concordance – or of the 
necessity of shared condition – in the unavoidable living experience of primordial 
discordance. Culture, in its objectivity, configures the human experience of being alive, or of 
being a living, acting, and suffering human subject.1248 By doing so, culture mediates the 
notion of being capable (of failing),1249 and thus renders this experience appropriatable for a 
human subject, for whom self-recognition is an unceasing task – a hermeneutical task that is 
only possible under the objectifying condition of a cultural “con.” 
 This part has, therefore, replied to the first five of those working hypotheses I 
have presented at the very end of part one. The theme of recognition is indeed developed 
and discussed by Ricoeur well before Course of Recognition (thesis 1). This indicates that the 
“course” of recognition should be approached at the level of Ricoeur’s work as a whole, 
instead of restricting this notion only to the discussion of Ricoeur’s very late work (thesis 2). 
Accepting this broader conception of the “course” also results in the observation that 
Ricoeur’s “phenomenology of being able” – which culminates in the notion of l’homme capable 
– necessarily requires the support of a cultural hermeneutics (thesis 3), which recasts 
Ricoeur’s relations to Hegel and Kant (thesis 4). Making this hermeneutic of culture explicit 
begins by pointing out that the notions of “cultural objectivity” and “cultural objects” have a 
meaning that goes beyond Ricoeur’s phenomenological anthropology; the possibility of 
recognition through culture is fundamentally grounded in them (thesis 5). 
                                               
1247 Ricoeur 1960a, 139. (123). 
1248 George H. Taylor comes close to this claim in his 2010 conference presentation by conjoining 
objectification as institutionalization with configuration: “As we turn to Ricoeur, my more ultimately objective 
in the present part is to show this relation between spirit and institutionalization in the positive objectification 
that we might call, following Time and Narrative, the configurational stage of mimesis2.” G. H. Taylor 2010a, 4. 
1249 Cf. Ricoeur 1960a, 161. (145). 
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 Even though this part has argued that poetic imagination forms the basis for 
cultural existence, it also enables the synthesis between a subject and his or her cultural 
objects (I called it therefore the ultimate “con”). This poetic function was merely noticed in 
relation to the mytho-poetic creation of cultural meaning, and not yet properly defined. The 
hypothesis that this foundational poetic nucleus of human culture is found only indirectly in 
and by cultural objects (thesis 6), has, however, been thus made worthy to be considered. I 
have also asserted (in my thesis 7), however, that this poetic nucleus, as an opening up of a 
language of the possible, is a necessary condition for the possibility of an adequate self-
understanding. The fact that the present part in this dissertation has identified the problem 
of the poetic constitution of culture, challenges us to continue this reading of Ricoeur as a 
philosopher of culture. As I will argue in the following part four, the poetic enables human 
action that in its mutualizing cultural condition gives birth to a human self who recognizes 












The Etho-Poetic Essence of Culture 
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Ricoeur, in a 1978 interview with Richard Kearney, argues that there is an indirectly 
approachable “nucleus” of a culture that holds in the specific identity of that culture. This 
foundational mytho-poetic condition shapes the ways of institutionalization as it precedes all 
cultural formation or figuration:  
It is my conviction that one cannot reduce any culture to its explicit functions 
– political, economic and legal, and so on. No culture is wholly transparent in 
this way. There is invariably a hidden nucleus which determines and rules the 
distribution of these transparent functions and institutions. […] There is an 
opaque kernel which cannot be reduced to empirical norms or laws. This 
kernel cannot be explained in terms of some transparent model because it is 
constitutive of a culture before it can be expressed and reflected in specific 
representations or ideas. It is only if we try to grasp this kernel that we may 
discover the foundational mytho-poetic nucleus of a society. By analyzing itself in 
terms of such a foundational nucleus, a society comes to a truer understanding 
of itself; it begins to critically acknowledge its own symbolizing identity. The 
mythical nucleus of a society is only indirectly recognizable.1250 
 
Put differently, the poetic “nucleus” of a culture constitutes, as a condition for cultural 
expressivity and its reflection, cultural being-here that is manifested as works. Besides 
construed expressions of cultural identities – “a culture tends to understand itself by 
crystallizing its convictions in key-words,” Ricoeur argues in The Living Metaphor1251 – all ideas 
and artifacts, or representations of this poetic condition, are symbols of the hidden 
foundation from which cultural being originates. In addition, Ricoeur also implies in this 
passage that “reading” human action as a symbol that requires deciphering is necessary for 
cultural self-understanding and identification, or, in other words, self-recognition. 
 Ricoeur’s assertion of the poetic core of culture parallels Freud’s conception of 
unconsciousness; both of them become knowable only indirectly by the symbols which 
“cover” and yet manifest them at the same time. Just as “the symbolic resolution of 
[instinctual] conflicts through art, and the transfer of desires and hatreds to the plane of play, 
                                               
1250 Ricoeur & Kearney 2004, 117-118. Cf. Appendix 3. 
1251 Ricoeur 1975d, 114. (111). 
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daydreams, and poetry” in its own way leads towards understanding the psychical human 
condition,1252 the human works in culture and as culture can be conceived as symbolic 
resolutions of the enigma of primal human constitution. These symbols, in both cases, 
presuppose the condition of poetic expressivity, however. The idea of a poetic “nucleus” 
that covers itself with symbols and myths, or with the “mytho-poetic formations of 
culture,”1253 reassures that the core of Ricoeur’s cultural hermeneutics lies in the question of 
the poetic creation of meaning.  
 I have already argued in part three that, according to Ricoeur, the mytho-
poetic essence of culture enables self-recognition in cultural objects – they convey the 
primordial levels of human existence. In other words, the threefold cultural Suchen, or the 
quest for finding the essence of humanity, rests on symbolization, or, put differently, mytho-
poetic creativity. For this reason, On Interpretation insisted that cultural phenomena should be 
interpreted as the objective media that “remodels” the human natural condition, because 
“this movement is at the same time the return of freedom to nature through the recapture of 
desire in the works of culture.”1254 Cultural objects are symbols of liberating human creativity 
that is essentially poetic. Still, these cultural objects are objects that merely “remodel” the 
experience of being a living subject; they are “firmly tied in the world of life.”1255 The poetic 
does not, therefore, exclude or shun the “unnamable” in a subject’s experience, but “keeps 
man’s cultural existence from being simply a huge artifice, a futile ‘artifact,’ a Leviathan 
without a nature and against nature,” as Ricoeur argues in On Interpretation. 1256 This firm, yet 
                                               
1252 Ricoeur 1965a, 328. (335). 
1253 Ricoeur 1965a, 445. (460). 
1254 Ricoeur 1965a, 503. (524).  
1255 Ricoeur 1965a, 503. (524).  
1256 Ricoeur 1965a, 503. (524).  
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symbolized, connection to the living existence is why self-recognition in cultural objects is 
possible in the first place. 
 Because of Ricoeur’s conviction that cultural objects are signs of creative 
human existence as well as symbols of primordial human constitution, this part analyzes 
Ricoeur’s assertion that culture is essentially poetic first from a linguistic point of view. In 
the 1978 interview cited above, Ricoeur explicates the relation between language, poetics, 
and the possible by arguing that there is a need for “a third dimension of language, a critical 
and creative dimension, which is directed towards neither scientific verification nor ordinary 
communication but towards the disclosure of possible worlds.”1257 Ricoeur designates this 
third dimension as “the poetic” one, and insists that “the adequate self-understanding of 
man is dependent on this third dimension of language as a disclosure of possibility.”1258 Even 
though Ricoeur maintains that the self has to be recovered in all its acts, or, that the poetic 
“nucleus” is recognizable by a variety of means – such as discourse, human praxis, or the 
distribution and hierarchization of social institutions1259 – he still prioritizes the cultural-
linguistic ones as explications of this expressivity.  
As Ricoeur also maintains in the same interview, the myth is “the bearer of 
possible worlds,” because it is “essentially symbolic,” and therefore myths “speak to man as 
such.”1260 A discourse that does not shy away from symbolic meanings is for Ricoeur the 
prime example of expressivity that conveys existential meanings; in discursive action an idea 
of reason (λόγος) encounters the reality of life (βίος) in symbols. Again, as I argued in the 
chapter 11, for Ricoeur the idea of humanity is brought about as such equivocal discourse. 
                                               
1257 Ricoeur & Kearney 2004, 124. 
1258 Ricoeur & Kearney 2004, 124. 
1259 Ricoeur & Kearney 2004, 118. 
1260 Ricoeur & Kearney 2004, 122-123. 
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Instead of only reproducing meanings, the poetic expression seeks new ways of describing 
the living human experience of being, that is, the concrete human existence in its social and 
political dimensions. As Frederick Lawrence summarizes, Ricoeur understands language “as 
a kind of institution of institutions, which offers a primordial model for distributive 
justice.”1261 For this reason, Ricoeur insisted in The Symbolism of Evil that the poetic shows 
itself to us as “expressivity in its nascent state”;1262 the symbolic discourses manifest creation 
of meaning and culture. 
Despite their differences with regard to the methods of regaining onto-
existential understanding,1263 Ricoeur’s elucidation of such 3οίησις seems to resemble Martin 
Heidegger’s convictions. Both of these thinkers hold that the poetic work creates by dis-
covering.1264 Already in Being and Time (which Ricoeur claims to “rule” Heidegger’s later 
philosophy1265), that is, before Heidegger’s subtle Kehre, or his readdressing the ontological 
                                               
1261 Lawrence 2003, 504. – This dissertation will eventually also discuss Ricoeur’s etho-poetically grounded 
ethico-political thought, especially in chapters 14 and 15. In relation to Frederick Lawrence’s reference to 
distributive justice, however, let me propaedeutically mention that Johann Michel’s analysis of Ricoeur’s Rawls-
based hermeneutics of justice is a clear exposition of that particular issue. Cf. Michel 2006, 383-420. 
1262 Ricoeur 1960b, 21. (14). 
1263 Ricoeur argues in his well-known essay “Existence et herméneutique” that even though he gives a full 
credit to Heidegger’s “short route,” he would have to retain the more arduous “long route” that remains at the 
level of critical reflection: “There are two ways to ground hermeneutics in phenomenology. […] The short 
route is the one taken by an ontology of understanding, after the manner of Heidegger. I call such an ontology of 
understanding the ‘short route’ because, breaking with any discussion of method, it carries itself directly to the 
level of an ontology of finite being in order there to recover understanding, no longer as a mode of knowledge, 
but rather as a mode of being. […] The long route which I propose also aspires to carry reflection to the level 
of an ontology, but it will do so by degrees, following successive investigations into semantics and reflection.” 
(Ricoeur 1969, 10. (6-7).) Ricoeur, quite obviously, portrays Heidegger as based on Being and Time, and does not 
take into account, for example, Heidegger’s Zollikon seminars (1959-1969) that included prolonged discussions 
on method. Cf. Heidegger & Boss 2001, 79-113, 127-136.  
1264 In Heidegger’s case this is based on his understanding that λόγος brings about a-lethic disclosure, or 
“letting something be seen” (α3οφαίνεσθαι). Heidegger 1967, 32-34. (28-30). 
1265 Even though Ricoeur’s explicit remarks and comments indicate that he is well aware of Heidegger’s 
“turn” and the philosophical work following it (Ricoeur 1969, 223, 230-231, 392, 452-456. (224, 232-233, 400, 
463-467).), Ricoeur constantly approaches Heidegger’s philosophy from the viewpoint of Being and Time. Cf. 
Ricoeur 1969, 10, 14, 23, 27, 222-232, 261-262, 383-384, 391-392, 440-441. (6, 10, 19, 23, 223-235, 265-266, 
391-392, 399, 450-451).; Ricoeur 1983, 128. (85-86).; Ricoeur 1990, 357-360. (308-311). 
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question by “turning” from Dasein’s constitution to the poetics of being,1266 Heidegger argues 
that “as the existential constitution of the disclosedness of Dasein, expressive articulation 
(Rede) is constitutive for the existence of Dasein.”1267 Put differently, understanding the 
fundamental human condition as be-ing in being requires articulation that explicates this 
condition and renders it comprehensible by putting it into language as a discourse 
(Sprache).1268 Being and Time maintains that this expressive articulation closely relates to both 
Dasein’s situatedness as the mode of relating (Befindlichkeit) and of poetry as Dichtung: 
Articulation (Rede) is the “significant” parsing of the intelligibility of being-in-
the-world, to which belongs being-with, and which maintains itself in a 
particular way of heedful being-with-one-another. […] Being-with is 
“explicitly” shared in expressive articulation (Rede) [as communication]. […] 
The outspokenly undisguised is exactly the being-out-in-the-world 
(Draußensein), that is, the corresponding manner of [Dasein’s] attunement (its 
disposition), that pertains to the full disclosure of being-in[-the-world]. The 
lingual indication of attuned being-in’s awoval belonging to expressive 
articulation lies in intonation, modulation, in the tempo of talk, [or, in short,] 
“in the manner of speech (in der Art des Sprechens).” The communication of the 
existential possibilities of attunement (Befindlichkeit), that is, the disclosing of 
existence can become the appropriate purpose of “poetic” articulation (der 
“dichtenden” Rede).1269  
 
                                               
1266 In his letter to William Richardson, intended as a preface to Richardson’s work on the development of 
Heidegger’s thought, Heidegger maintains that he is willing to accept the thesis of his “Turn” only on the 
condition that there is no decisive and definitive rupture between his earlier and later work, but that the later 
(“Heidegger II”) is incipient in the early phase (“Heidegger I”). (cf. Heidegger 2003, xxii-xxiii.) Ricoeur argues 
for the same continuity from Heidegger I to Heidegger II in his 1968 essay “Heidegger and the Question of the 
Subject.” (Ricoeur 1969, 223, 227, 230-232. (224, 229, 232-234).) William Richardson, despite maintaining that 
a clear difference remains between what he calls “Heidegger I” and “Heidegger II,” still argues that both the 
earlier and the later phase of Heidegger’s thought are rooted in the “Ur-Heidegger”: “if Heidegger I reverses 
his perspective in order to become Heidegger II, the reason is not that the effort went bankrupt but that the 
thinker simply left one place in order to gain another along the same way.” Richardson 2003, xxxiii-xxxiv, 628-
633. Italics added. 
1267 Heidegger 1967, 161. (151). 
1268 Heidegger argues in §34 of Being and Time that “the existential-ontological foundation of discourse 
(Sprache) is language (Rede).” Heidegger 1967, 160. (150). – Some translations use “discourse” or “talk” for 
Heidegger’s term Rede, and “language” for Sprache. In terms of following the intention of the both Rede and 
Sprache, I draw my own translation from the clue provided by Ricoeur: “Discourse is the counterpart of what 
linguists call language systems or linguistic codes. Discourse is an event of language [that is, that language is 
either spoken or written].” Like Rede (Talk) is the condition for Sprache (Speech), articulation is the condition 
for discourse, that is, for the various actual uses of languages. As a result, I translate Rede as “articulation” and 
Sprache as “discourse” or “speech.” Cf. Ricoeur 1986a, 184. (145). 
1269 Heidegger 1967, 162. (152). 
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Being and Time, in other words, opens up the possibility to think that Dichtung is a condition 
for interpreting Dasein’s manner of being-in-the-world-with-others (Befindlichkeit), and that 
this is why it is more fundamental than psychology, anthropology, historiography, or any 
other of those particular articulations Heidegger mentions in §5 in the same work.1270 The 
later Heidegger, or “Heidegger II,”1271 then maintained that “the world’s destiny is heralded 
in poetry”1272 as “poetic composition is truer than exploration of beings”1273 – truly, we can 
summarize Heidegger’s position, dichterisch wohnet der Mensch auf dieser Erde.1274 Even though 
many critics, such as Johann Michel, have found a “strong resonance” between Ricoeur’s 
poetics and that of the “second Heidegger,”1275 we will see in this part four that Heidegger’s 
notion of the poetic dwelling does not, nevertheless, completely match up with that of 
Ricoeur. 
 In spite of the early discussions of culture in the 1919 summer lectures in 
Freiburg that indicate Heidegger’s awareness of various philosophies of culture,1276 his 
attitude to culture and cultural objects is very different from Ricoeur’s. In his analysis of the 
everydayness of Dasein, Heidegger insists in Being and Time that his interpretation of Dasein 
                                               
1270 Heidegger 1967, 16. (14). – In contrast to Pol Vandevelde, who understands “der ‘dichtenden’ Rede” as 
both a non-instrumental mode or an instantiation of language and a mediation between Rede and Sprache, I 
maintain that Rede, to use Vandevelde’s words, “is the articulation of the significability of the world” precisely 
because it is poetic (dichtend). Rather than understanding Dichtung, poetry, as a particular mode of articulation 
(that is, as Poesie), I argue that Heidegger’s allusion to “der ‘dichtenden’ Rede” in §34 of Being and Time clarifies that 
Rede is the existential condition for Sprache, or “the communication of existential possibilities of attunement,” 
only because all articulation is poetic. Rede, I claim, can have Sprache as its “purpose” only because all 
articulation is both creative and dis-covering – this Dichtung is an essential function of Rede as the existential 
Vorstruktur for Sprache. I also maintain, therefore, that in Heidegger’s 1934-1935 lecture course on Hölderlin, 
the relation between poetry and phenomenology is not inverted, as Vandevelde argues, but that Heidegger’s 
focus is sharpened in terms of Dichtung; it is the “founding discourse.” Vandevelde 2012, 94-97, 118-119. Cf. 
Mirković 2011, 174-175. 
1271 Richardson 2003, xxv-xxvii, xxxii-xxxviii, 22, 238-254, 623-633. 
1272 Heidegger 1976, 339. (Heidegger 1977b, 219.) 
1273 Heidegger 1976, 363. (Heidegger 1977b, 240.) 
1274 Heidegger 2000, 191-193. (Heidegger 2001c, 211-213.) Cf. Ricoeur 1969, 456. (466-467). 
1275 Michel 2006, 294, 297-298. 
1276 Heidegger 2002, 105, 110-116, 124-125, 146-148. – My heartfelt thanks to Professor Richard Kearney 
for donating this edition to me. 
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“has a purely ontological intention and is far removed from any moralizing critique of 
everyday Dasein and from the aspirations of a ‘philosophy of culture’ (“kulturphilosophischen” 
Aspirationen).”1277 As also indicated by Heidegger’s exegeses of Hölderlin’s poems, poetic 
dwelling overcasts the notion of cultural work. Even though the working human subject is 
“full of merit” when “establishing himself on the earth” by work, all this is, according to 
Heidegger, “never more than the consequence of a mode of poetic dwelling.”1278 If poems as 
art works are interesting, they are such only because they highlight “thinking of Being,” and 
open humans to their dwelling that is poetic. This ontological clearing, or lighting, is the 
essence of poetry (Dichtung),1279 and cultural artifactiness is not in the focus of Heidegger’s 
thought – except under the critique of Machenschaft or machination.1280  
                                               
1277 Heidegger 1967, 167. (156). – Kevin A. Aho contributes a complementary analysis in his 2009 work 
Heidegger’s Neglect of the Body. Aho points out that Heidegger’s discomfort with culture in Being and Time relates to 
the notion of inauthentic “They”: “In Chapter IV of Division I of Being and Time, Heidegger explains why 
Dasein should not be interpreted in terms of the concrete actions of a ‘subject’ or ‘I.’ According to Heidegger, 
Dasein is more like a ‘mass’ term that captures the way human activity is always shared, communal; ‘being-in-
the-world’ is already ‘being-there-with-others’ (Mit-dasein) (BT, 152). Dasein, in this regard, is properly 
understood in terms of ‘what it does,’ going about its daily life, ‘taking a stand on itself,’ handling equipment, 
talking to friends, going to work, and getting married (BP, 159). ‘For the most part,’ as Heidegger says in Being 
and Time, ‘everyday Dasein understands itself in terms of that which it is customarily concerned. ‘One is' what 
one does’ (BT, 283). Heidegger is stressing the fact that our prereflective everyday dealings are shared. I am 
engaged in the acts and practices that ‘They’ are or ‘Anyone’ (das Man) is engaged in. And if I am what I do, 
then I am an indistinguishable ‘Anyone.’ When Heidegger asks ‘Who is it that Dasein is in everydayness?,’ the 
answer is ‘Anyone.’ ‘[The anyone] is the ‘realist subject' of everydayness’ (BT, 166). In my everyday life, I am a 
teacher, a husband, or a father because I have been ‘absorbed’ (aufgehen) and ‘dispersed’ (zerstreuen) into the 
discursive roles, habits, gestures, and equipment of others (BT, 167). Others assign meaning to my life. They 
make me who I am. Thus Dasein is ‘existentially’ or structurally being-with-others, a ‘They-self’ (BT, 155). But 
who are ‘They’? Heidegger explains: ‘The ‘who’ is not this one, not that one, not oneself [man selbst], not some 
people [einige], and not the sum of them all. The ‘who’ is the neuter, the ‘They’ [das Man].’ (BT, 164) The 
anonymous ‘They’ or ‘Anyone’ refers to a totality of interconnected relations: customs, occupations, practices, 
and cultural institutions as embodied in gestures, artifacts, monuments, and so forth. This totality of relations 
gives meaning to beings; it is on the basis of these relations that things can show up or count in determinate 
ways. Thus ‘Anyone’ determines in advance the possible ways that I can understand or interpret the world (BT, 
167).” Cf. Aho 2009, 20. 
1278 Heidegger 1981, 89. (113). Cf. Vandevelde 2012, 120.  
1279 Heidegger 1981, 41-43, 144-151. (58-61, 165-172). Cf. Richardson 2003, 443, 460-464, 469-471. – In 
his 1943 exegesis of Hölderlin’s Andenken, for example, Heidegger states that it is “only through poetry” that 
“there is a founding.” It is thus the poet who “becomes the founder of the history of a humanity [as] he 
prepares the poetic upon which a historical humanity dwells as upon its own ground.” Furthermore, “the poet 
stands between men and gods.” The poet, “thinking like a mortal […] puts the highest into a poem.” In other 
words, “the poets consecrate the earth.” Heidegger 1981, 106, 123, 148. (130, 145, 170). 
1280 Heidegger 1989, 130-134.; Heidegger 1997a, 16-25. 
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This critical stance describes Heidegger’s overall standpoint: Even though he 
in Being and Time defines Dasein’s constitutive mode of being-in-the-world as taking care of 
things in their everydayness,1281 or its ontic-ontological priority,1282 Heidegger did not regard 
cultural objects relevant to the alethic phenomenological analysis as objects – describing the 
objectively present things “in” the world in their respective “outward appearances” remains 
solely at the ontic level of beings (as beings essentially unlike Dasein), and never reveals the 
ontological level of be-ing of beings in which Heidegger is interested.1283 In The Origin of the 
Work of Art, for example, Heidegger then contrasts his understanding of art as “the spring 
that leaps to the [alethic] truth of what is, in the work,” and a cultural understanding of art 
that, according to him, reduces it merely to a “commonplace cultural appearance.”1284 
Ricoeur’s notion of cultural objects, or the “signs of man” (les signes de l’homme) – through 
which, Ricoeur argues, a human subject becomes aware of his own constitution – represents 
therefore for Heidegger mere ontic culture falling short of dislosing onto-poetic dwelling.1285 
 These different understandings of the poetic provide a basis for the analyses of 
this current part of this dissertation. Even though Roberto J. Wallton’s 1973 essay “Cultura, 
existencia y logica transcendental” – the first one known to me to discuss Ricoeur’s cultural 
philosophy – focuses on phenomenology and not poetics, his essay, nevertheless, already 
                                               
1281 Heidegger 1967, 16-17, 41-44, 50-53, 56-58, 66-67, 73, 117-130, 167-180, 191-196. (14-15, 37-42, 47-
50, 53-55, 62-63, 68-69, 110-122, 156-168, 178-183). 
1282 Heidegger 1967, 11-15, 64-65. (9-12, 60-61). 
1283 Heidegger 1967, 63-65. (59-61). 
1284 Heidegger 1977a, 66. (Heidegger 2001b, 75.) – Heidegger’s criticism relates to his objection of such 
conceptions of art that consider it in terms of subject-object dichotomy: “Art is the setting-into-work of truth. 
In this proposition an essential ambiguity is hidden, in which truth is at once the subject and the object of the 
setting. But subject and object are unsuitable names here. They keep us from thinking precisely this ambiguous 
nature, a task that no longer belongs to this consideration[, namely, that art lets truth originate].” (Heidegger 
1977a, 27, 65. (Heidegger 2001b, 40, 74-75.)). Of Heidegger’s alethic conception of truth in The Origin of the 
Work of Art as originating disclosure, openness, lighting, and enowning, cf. Tobias Keiling’s concise analysis. 
Keiling 2011. 
1285 Heidegger 2000, 195. (Heidegger 2001c, 215.); Heidegger 1981, 42, 89. (60, 113). Cf. Taminiaux 1993, 
397.; Thomson 2011, 52-53. 
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contrasts Ricoeur’s views with those of Heidegger.1286 My question in this part is that if the 
essence of culture is, as Ricoeur claims, poetic, then how does he respond to the challenge 
set by Heidegger II? Ricoeur’s approach, which retains a firm connection to the idea of post-
critical naïveté, helps explain why his cultural philosophy is both post-Hegelian and post-
Kantian, but also recasts Ricoeur’s relation to Heidegger (as proposed above in thesis 4 at 
the end of part one). As I have shown, however, both Ricoeur and Heidegger argue that an 
authentic human subject is born poetically (viz. naissance). By contrasting Ricoeur’s poetics 
with that of Heidegger’s, this part four analyzes the foundational poetic nucleus of human 
culture that, according to Ricoeur, is found only indirectly in and by cultural objects (thesis 
6). In addition, this part argues that this poetic nucleus, as an opening up of a language of 
the possible, is a necessary condition for the possibility of an adequate self-understanding 
(thesis 7). As such, that is, as being an opening up of the possible, the poetic also reveals the 
ethotic (ήθος)1287 as equally constitutive for a cultural human subject. This essentially etho-
poetic culture that is manifested in ethico-political institutions then sums up Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutic of culture in the appearing of a cultural and ethical subject, or, in the moment 
of “having-been-born-as-an-ethico-political-subject” (thesis 8). 
As an attentive reader will notice, this part four not only discusses Ricoeur’s 
relation to Heidegger, but it also echoes and deepens the triad of knowing, acting, and 
                                               
1286 Wallton opens his essay on cultural existence by discussing the prospects of Husserlian 
phenomenology, and moves then into Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of symbolic language, in order to contrast it with 
Heidegger’s fundamental ontology of Dasein. On Wallton’s discussion of Ricoeur as well as his relation to 
Heidegger, cf. Wallton 1973, 41-42, 48-58. 
1287 Even though the adjective form of “ethos,” that is, “ethotic,” is not widely used in English language, it 
has had a long philosophical use, especially in relation to Aristotle’s Rhetoric that discusses “ethotic arguments.” 
According to Alan Brinton’s summarizing definition these ethotic arguments are “the kind of arguments or 
techniques of argument in which ήθος is invoked, attended to, or represented in such a way as to lend credibility 
to or detract credibility from conclusions which are being drawn.” Brinton maintains that “in ethotic argument 
the aim is to transfer (or to shortcircuit the transfer of) credibility (or lack thereof) from some person or 
persons to a conclusion. Whenever ήθος is appealed to, attacked, or otherwise employed with an aim toward 
producing such effects, argument is ethotic.” Brinton 1986, 246. Cf. Budzynska 2012. 
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cultural affections that was analyzed in particular in chapter 10 of this dissertation. To briefly 
outline the structure of this current part, chapter 13 will examine Ricoeur’s notion of the 
poetic as the creation and understanding of meaning (viz. knowing). Mirroring Ricoeur’s 
philosophy to Martin Heidegger’s so-called later phase, I will utilize Ricoeur’s 1975 work The 
Living Metaphor as a main source in this discussion. Chapter 14 continues this thematics, but 
Ricoeur’s essays in From Text to Action extends its scope by focusing on the question of social 
action as poetically grounded (viz. action). The final analytic section of this dissertation, 
chapter 15, then draws mainly from Oneself as Another, and moves into the notion of etho-
poetics, or, into the idea of recognizing one’s self as ethico-political through the socio-
cultural context in which the self is situated (viz. culturally instituted affections).1288 Chapter 
15 will close with a “reversal,” however, by which I mean a re-reading of Ricoeur’s work 
from the point of view of the Wholly Other. As I will argue at the very end of this part, this 
course of analysis brings about the notion of the culturally facilitated birth (naissance) of an 
ethico-political self that is capable of recognizing him or herself as such cultural self (re-con-
naissance). 
                                               
1288 I should note that in a way the structure of this part four follows the order of Richard Kearney’s 
crystallization of Paul Ricoeur’s poetic hermeneutics: “Thinking poetically, acting poetically, dwelling poetically 
are all modalities of imagining poetically. They are ways of realizing the fundamental possibilities of what we 
are.” Kearney 2004, 175. 
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13. POETICS AND THE BECOMING OF CULTURAL BEING 
13.1 The Poetic Ricoeur: the Origin 
Even though Ricoeur’s alleged “linguistic turn” is commonly placed in The Living Metaphor, 
the frequently recurring notion of poetics derives its Ricoeurian meaning from his early 
rather than his later works.1289 Ricoeur maintains, in an interview with Charles E. Reagan, 
that The Living Metaphor, for example, is an explication of and an extension to his project of 
the poetics of the will that was anticipated in The Voluntary and the Involuntary.1290 This early 
work expresses Ricoeur’s openness for “a poetics of being and of the will in being” – une 
‘poétique’ de l’être et de la volonté dans l’être – as his aid in understanding the human condition.1291 
According to The Voluntary and the Involuntary, the eidetic method that Ricoeur nevertheless 
applies in that work is insufficient in describing the ontology of a situated subject; the 
phenomenological “pure description” functions as a mere propaedeutic for a more 
comprehensive poetics of the will.1292 To expose the ontological rootedness of a subject’s 
living experience, les racines ontologiques, Ricoeur would need to surpass any phenomenology of 
the will that serves as a preparatory stage for this anticipated deep analysis, namely, for a 
poetics of the will in being. Ricoeur’s dissatisfaction with all abstractions and bracketing is that 
they necessarily objectify life (βίος) that in itself is non-objectifiable and non-articulable.1293 
The poetics of being would lessen, if not even avoid, this problem. 
                                               
1289 The definition Ricoeur gives, for example, in From Text to Action follows Aristotle’s Poetics and focuses 
on the art of composition: “We can term poetics – after Aristotle – that discipline which deals with the laws of 
composition that are added to discourse as such in order to form of it a text that can stand as a narrative, a 
poem, or an essay.” This definition also used in The Living Metaphor, is, however, far too limited as an approach 
to Ricoeur’s poetics that has an existentially revealing function. Ricoeur 1986a, 13. (3).; Ricoeur 1975d, 18. (12). 
1290 Ricoeur & Reagan 1996, 122, 124-125. 
1291 Ricoeur 1949, 443. (471). 
1292 Ricoeur 1949, 36. (33-34). Cf. p. 28 n3. (26 n13). 
1293 On Ricoeur’s discussion of the two confronting requirements of philosophical thought, namely clarity 
and depth (la clareté et la profondeur), cf. Ricoeur 1949, 18-20. (15-17). 
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Ricoeur reveals an essential element of this poetics with his use of Gabriel 
Marcel’s terminology when describing the fundamental mode of being as the “highest 
mystery.”1294 For Ricoeur, who in The Voluntary and the Involuntary openly acknowledged the 
influence of Marcel’s work,1295 this idea of corporeal and yet mysterious participation in 
presence as a present is instrumental in reverting from objectifying explanation to 
understanding a subject’s living experience: “I participate actively in my incarnation as a mystery. 
I need to pass from objectivity to existence.”1296 This “mysterious relation of participation in 
the Whole” cannot be emptied by turning it into knowledge, but it would have to be 
approached by means such as “the poetry of admiration” instead.1297 The poetics Ricoeur 
aspires to as his aide would avoid problematizing distanciation from the very root of being 
itself, rendering this poetics thus “suitable to the new realities that need to be discovered” 
beyond mere objectifying description.1298 This poetics, that appears as quite Heideggerian, 
would thus reveal “the art of conjuring up the world of creation” as well as “the order of 
creation,”1299 unlike constantly running up against the explanatory limits of 
                                               
1294 Ricoeur 1949, 32-33. – In his 1933 work Position et approches concrètes du mystère ontologique, translated as On 
the Ontological Mystery, Marcel introduces a distinction between mysteries and problems. For Marcel a mystery 
“encroaches upon its own data, invading them, as it were, and thereby transcending itself as a simple problem,” 
because mystery relates to being in the presence of something non-nameable, that is, in the presence of “a reality 
rooted in what is beyond the domain of the problematical [i.e. distanced and potentially resolvable] properly so 
called.” In contrast to a mystery, a methodologically articulated problem – limited by this same approach – 
admits a solution because it objectifies and externalizes this reality in which a subject participates as an 
intellectual, sensuous, and affective being. According to Marcel, however, “no apprehension of ontological 
mystery in whatever degree is possible except to a being who is capable of recollecting himself.” The notion of 
mystery guards one from unintentionally slipping into reductive rationalizations, but it still requires a subject 
capable of self-recognition. Marcel 1991, 19, 21, 23.; Gallagher 1962, 21, 31, 36, 38-39.  
1295 Ricoeur 1949, 18. (15). – The Voluntary and the Involuntary is dedicated to “à monsieur Gabriel Marcel, 
hommage respectueux.” 
1296 Ricoeur 1949, 18. (14). – Ricoeur analyzes “flesh” or one’s body again in Oneself as Another, in which he 
also claims that the phenomenology of “I can” must retain a connection to “an ontology of one’s own body.” 
Ricoeur 1990, 134-135, 369-380. (111, 319-329). 
1297 Ricoeur 1949, 445. (472-473). 
1298 Ricoeur 1949, 32. (30). 
1299 Ricoeur 1949, 32-33. (30). 
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phenomenological eidetics that has lost the element of ontological mystery in problematic 
analysis. 
Because of the ontologically revealing task of Ricoeur’s poetics, he 
intentionally resorts to “scientifically suspect language,”1300 or equivocal expressivity. 
According to The Voluntary and the Involuntary, the “poetry of admiration” connects with “a 
lyric tradition to which belong the final philosophy of Goethe, the final philosophy of 
Nietzsche, and especially R. M. Rilke’s Sonnets to Orpheus and Duino Elegies.”1301 Ricoeur argues 
that this ontologically unreserved orphic “intoxication” provides a poetic reconciliation – 
under the mode of “as if” – between subjectivity and totality: “In myth a philosophy of man 
and a philosophy of the Whole encounter each other in symbolization; all nature is an 
immense ‘as if.’”1302 In brief, The Voluntary and the Involuntary already necessitates the use of 
symbolic language, in which the shift from objectivity to existence takes place.  
Unlike the orphic poets, for whom “existence is still enchanted and sacred,” 
Ricoeur acknowledges, however, that the modern age is “prosaic and skeptical.”1303 This 
scientific skepticism leads one to comprehend symbolic language as symbolic, that is, critical 
modernity conceives symbolic language as equivocal and inexact, which draws a difference 
between Ricoeur and Heidegger. The naïveté Ricoeur searches for in The Voluntary and the 
Involuntary is not a primary but a secondary one, in a word, post-critical. Critical modernity 
does not need to “fear the great Orphic poetry” but can use it as a resource instead, because 
such poetry has been conceived as “a limit which I neither can nor dare reach.”1304 The 
                                               
1300 Ricoeur 1949, 393. (419). 
1301 Ricoeur 1949, 445. (473). 
1302 Ricoeur 1949, 449-450. (478). 
1303 Ricoeur 1949, 447. (475). 
1304 Ricoeur 1949, 447. (475). 
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possibilities imbedded in mythic-symbolic language, now understood to apply the “as if” 
function, become apparent only after having been noticed through criticism.  
The Symbolism of Evil, published ten years later, continues this thematics by 
examining the human experience of evil that would again need the support of a poetics in 
revealing being as be-ing.1305 Ricoeur argues that the task of philosophical hermeneutics is 
“to elaborate existential concepts – that is to say, not only structures of reflection but 
structures of existence, insofar as existence is the being of man.”1306 A human subject, 
Ricoeur maintains, does not subsist but finds itself within being, and has a correlating need 
to express this belongingness. Ricoeur’s explicit call for a post-critical ontology leads one to 
assume that symbols have an onto-existential function, which in the language of The 
Symbolism of Evil can be described as “an appeal by which each man is invited to situate 
himself better in being.”1307 Symbols, Ricoeur insists, “speak of the situation of the being of 
man in the being of the world.”1308 Symbols, then, are expressions of being, and 
hermeneutics is a means of opening up this poetic language of human situatedness. 
As already argued in chapters 2 and 6 of this dissertation, The Symbolism of Evil 
emphasizes that “the symbol gives rise to thought,”1309 or, that the post-critical secondary 
naïveté is achievable in understanding interpretation through the detour of scientific 
explanation; “it is by interpreting that we can hear anew.”1310 This plea for critically informed 
understanding of the human condition through symbols – only noticed as symbols by a 
critique of them – resulted in the so-called “wager,”1311 namely, Ricoeur’s full admission of 
                                               
1305 Ricoeur 1960b, 304. (329). Cf. Ricoeur 1949. (20-28). 
1306 Ricoeur 1960b, 331-332. (356-357). 
1307 Ricoeur 1960b, 331. (356). 
1308 Ricoeur 1960b, 331. (356). 
1309 Ricoeur 1960b, 324, 330. (348, 355). Cf. Ricoeur 1965a, 46. (38).; Kant 1999, V.351-353. (KdU). 
1310 Ricoeur 1960b, 326. (351). 
1311 Ricoeur 1960b, 330. (355). 
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the creative use and interpretation of symbolic language that ultimately manifests culture that 
is both “poetic” and “critical” as Ricoeur also maintains in “What Does ‘Humanism’ 
Mean?”.1312 In short, The Symbolism of Evil stresses that equivocal language is the medium for 
re-gaining the onto-existential meaning in creative interpretation.1313 The gift of symbolic 
language, as I have maintained in chapter 6, is “a better understanding of man and of the 
bond between the being of man and the being of all beings”1314 given in “a creative 
interpretation of meaning,”1315 that is, in the hermeneutics of symbols.  
 An aspect of Ricoeur’s symbol theory that I haven’t yet emphasized concerns 
his claim that authentic symbols, that situate a human being in being, are grounded in the 
poetic essence of symbols.1316 Whether the symbols utilize religious (i.e. cosmic) or psychic 
(i.e. oneiric) mode of expression, according to Ricoeur they still are based in poetic 
expressivity: “The structure of the poetic image is also the structure of the dream when the 
latter extracts from the fragments of our past a prophecy of our future, and the structure of 
the hierophanies that make the sacred manifest in the sky and in the waters, in vegetation 
and in stones.”1317 A symbol becomes authentic thanks to the poetic coming-into-an-image 
that responds to the need to express the living experience of being human. In brief, the 
poetic representation is a needed condition for symbolic expression – the poetic image 
enables symbolization by bringing expressivity to experience. According to The Symbolism of 
Evil, a poetic image remains therefore “a process for making present,” that it is “much closer 
to a verb than to a portrait.”1318 Such poetic symbol “shows us expressivity in its nascent 
                                               
1312 Ricoeur 1956, 88-92. (Ricoeur 1974, 78-86.) 
1313 Ricoeur 1960b, 324, 330. (348-349, 355). 
1314 Ricoeur 1960b, 330. (355). 
1315 Ricoeur 1960b, 324. (348). 
1316 Ricoeur 1960b, 17-20. (10-13). 
1317 Ricoeur 1960b, 21. (14). 
1318 Ricoeur 1960b, 20. (13). Italics added. 
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state,” because “in poetry (la poésie) the symbol is caught at the moment when it is a welling 
up of language, ‘when it puts language in a state of emergence.’”1319 As in The Voluntary and 
the Involuntary, Ricoeur maintains in The Symbolism of Evil that poems are capable of 
authentically expressing the human situation of being in the world.  
 In the wake of introducing the notion of poetic image in The Symbolism of Evil, 
Ricoeur then substitutes in On Interpretation “poetic symbolism” with “poetic imagination.”1320 
In Ricoeur’s words, the “grace” of poetic imagination results in considering “Speech as 
Revelation.”1321 According to Ricoeur it is discourse (la parole), the correlate of poetico-
productive expressivity, “in which the advancement of meaning occurs.”1322  The creation of 
meaning utilizes the mytho-poetic imaginary, but it realizes itself properly in “nascent 
speech,” or discourse in its state of finding expression (la parole à l’état naissant).1323 Ricoeur, in 
other words, returns to the idea of poetic discourse, but enriched with the idea of productive 
poetic imagination that not only enables existentially pertinent expression but creates 
meaning, or, gives birth to the discourse that “speaks out” and reveals the mysterious human 
condition. 
At this point – having reached again Ricoeur’s On Interpretation – this poetic 
path crosses with the earlier analyses in this dissertation. As I pointed out in chapter 11, the 
creation of cultural meaning, according to Ricoeur, is based on the mytho-poetic function of 
language. The poetic imagination could be necessary for such functionality, but, as Ricoeur 
maintains, the poetic advancement of meaning in discourse remains his question. Again, 
Ricoeur concludes that behind the human Suchen an arena is exposed, in which the question 
                                               
1319 Ricoeur 1960b, 21. (14). 
1320 Ricoeur 1965a, 24. (15). 
1321 Ricoeur 1965a, 43-44, 529. (35-36, 551). 
1322 Ricoeur 1965a, 522. (543). 
1323 Ricoeur 1965a, 522. (544). 
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of the creation of meaning should be analyzed as “language and its symbolic function.”1324 
Only this analysis will clarify how “the grace of imagination” as advancement of meaning is 
at the same time a mytho-poetic exploration of our relationship to beings and to Being1325 – 
that is, how the surplus of meaning is the surplus of human being. 
 
13.2 The Birth of Meaning as the Becoming of Our Being 
Ricoeur’s analysis of the birth of equivocal meaning in The Living Metaphor addresses the 
unresolved issue of his earlier works. Rather than being a “linguistic turn” the work clarifies 
the question of symbolization Ricoeur introduced already in The Voluntary and the 
Involuntary.1326 “Metaphor,” Ricoeur argues in The Living Metaphor, “is to poetic language what 
the model is to scientific language.”1327 The “key study,” as Ricoeur calls it, of this 1975 work 
focuses on metaphor and the semantics of discourse, and unlocks the hermeneutic question 
of the creation of meaning, or, the question of semantic innovation.1328 According to 
Ricoeur, this “hermeneutics of metaphor” requires that the notions of productive 
imagination and metaphor’s iconic function, or poetic image, be reinterpreted in the light of 
“the 3οίησις of language” that surpasses the levels of the form and sense of metaphor, and 
analyzes “the reference of the metaphorical statement as the power to ‘redescribe’ reality.”1329 
This hermeneutic analysis that centers on metaphoric language has the function of 
unconcealing how poetic discourse comes about; Ricoeur maintains that an analysis of how 
                                               
1324 Ricoeur 1965a, 502. (522). 
1325 Ricoeur 1965a, 529. (551). 
1326 Ricoeur 1949, 449-450. (478). 
1327 Ricoeur 1975d, 302. (240). 
1328 Ricoeur 1975d, 8. (4). 
1329 Ricoeur 1975d, 10-11. (6-7). 
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the literal meaning is suspended in a metaphor helps explain the constitution of poetic 
discourse.1330  
 As indicated by his earlier works, Ricoeur connects the advancement of 
meaning (“surplus of meaning”) to the advancement of being (“surplus of being”). The Living 
Metaphor states, in particular, that language has a reflective capacity that relates to being: 
“Kant wrote that something must be for something to appear. We are saying that something 
must be for something to be said.”1331 Ricoeur’s ontological assertion is strengthened by his 
demand that for a language to signify, it needs such a function – revealed by speculative 
discourse – that grounds the referential function ontologically: 
Language designates itself and its other. This reflective character extends what 
linguistics call meta-linguistic functioning, but articulates it in another 
discourse, speculative [i.e., philosophical] discourse. It is then no longer a 
function that can be opposed to other functions, in particular to the referential 
function; for it is the knowledge that accompanies the referential function 
itself, the knowledge of its being-related to being.1332 
 
Language itself calls for reflection and ontological situatedness. To fully understand the 
implications of this statement, it is necessary to examine briefly Ricoeur’s basic arguments 
concerning metaphors that explicate the overall tensional nature of his hermeneutics. 
Ricoeur studies the metaphoric use of language by placing it in a dialectical 
process. At the theoretical level, he proceeds from semiotics to semantics and, finally, to 
hermeneutics. At the level of metaphorical statements, he follows the path from a word to a 
sentence and finally to language per se.1333 Moreover, Ricoeur places the substitutive “word” 
and contextual “interaction” theories of metaphor in a dialectical relationship. For Ricoeur, 
these theories form a dialectic pair that reflects the totality of the problematics of 
                                               
1330 Ricoeur 1975d, 10-11. (6). 
1331 Ricoeur 1975d, 386. (304). 
1332 Ricoeur 1975d, 385. (304). 
1333 Ricoeur 1975d, 7, 10. (3, 5-6). 
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language.1334 At the same time, Ricoeur aims to bridge the theories by placing the metaphor 
in connection with both a substituted word and a sentence (that is, its context). This 
becomes possible when the relationship between a word and its context are seen from the 
viewpoint of polysemy. With this term, Ricoeur means a certain semantic elasticity or 
expandability of discourse, namely, its capacity to “acquire new significations without losing 
[its] old ones.”1335 Language, Ricoeur argues, is semantically elastic. 
The polysemic character of language is itself not a metaphor, but it can be seen 
as a necessary condition for one to occur. A word, any word, already has some “semantic 
capital” but it is also open to new significations. In its use, it is adjusted and fixed 
semantically according to its context. Ricoeur argues, in other words, that connecting a word 
to a sentence alters it into a process by which the semantic potential of the word is actualized 
in full and then limited by the context to such a signification that renders the discourse 
meaningful. The context – a sentence, a discourse – then works “playfully” as a limiting 
semantic apparatus.1336  
This interplay between a word and its context has two diverging directions. In 
a process that I call “univocization,” the sentence achieves meaningfulness by limiting the 
“semantic capital” of its words in such a way that the semantic potential of each word is 
reduced to one acceptation, which makes it compatible with the newly formed meaning of 
the whole sentence. Consider, for example, the sentence “Socrates is a wise man.” In the 
case of a metaphor – which Ricoeur understands as “a semantic event that takes place at the 
                                               
1334 Ricoeur 1975d, 161-171. (125-133). 
1335 Ricoeur 1975d, 217. (170). 
1336 Ricoeur 1975d, 167. (130). – As much as there is a “play” in the copula, and a play between the word 
and the sentence, there is also a “play” played by a poet; “[a poet] is that artisan who sustains and shapes 
imaginary only by a play of language (le seul jeu du langage).” Ricoeur 1975d, 167, 268. (130, 211).; Ricoeur 1965a, 
167. (165). This notion can be taken as being inspired by Kant’s third Critique and the “free play of 
imagination,” which is an aspect of Kant’s thought Richard Kearney is quite obviously willing to highlight. Cf. 
Kearney 2001, 172. 
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point where several [incongruent] semantic fields intersect”1337 – this process can be 
understood as inverse: there are no suitable potential senses that would make the expression 
meaningful. We can consider, then, the sentence “Socrates is a stingray.”1338 For Ricoeur, this 
implies that “it is necessary, therefore, to retain all the acceptations allowed plus one, that 
which will rescue the meaning of the entire statement.”1339 For example, the word “stingray” 
has to be given an additional meaning that refers to a personal capacity of making someone 
stunned and astounded; only then the entire sentence becomes meaningful. Put differently, a 
signification needs to be added to achieve a meaningful expression. In this 
“metaphorization” or “equivocization,” the tension between the utterance and its context 
produces a semantic surplus that then leads to the meaningfulness of the entire expression. 
In sum, a metaphor illustrates semantic creativity, the ability to produce new 
meanings, which – according to The Living Metaphor – is connected to the “iconic character” 
of metaphor that discloses its ultimate reference in the paradoxical, or “tensional,” mode of 
“is” and “is not”; it is a dialectic expression both of the ontological naïveté and of the critical 
approach (la démythisation).1340  This “is as” of a metaphor, Ricoeur argues, is connected both 
                                               
1337 Ricoeur 1975d, 127. (98). 
1338 Cf. Plato 1993, I.79e-80b. (Meno). 
1339 Ricoeur 1975d, 168. (131). – After having learned the nature of the “semantic innovation” based on 
the process enabled by the polysemic character of language (Ricoeur 1975d, 126-127. (98-99).), it has also 
become possible to connect both the nominalist, noun-focused substitution theories (Aristotle, Pierre 
Fontanier) and discursive, context-focused interaction theories (Ivor Richards, Max Black, Monroe Beardsley) 
to each other. Ricoeur’s contribution is to show that these two approaches do not really oppose each other, 
since they describe a metaphor from different perspectives: on one hand a word is a lexeme, on the other it is a 
part of discourse. (Ricoeur 1975d, 201. (157).) Substitution theories examine the impact of the dynamics of a 
metaphorical expression on the lexical code, i.e., on the semiotics of this expression, whereas interaction 
theories focus on the semantics of metaphorical expression. However, as the metaphor arises from a semantic 
impact facing a word in its context – amid a semantic crisis – it would suffice to require that a metaphor should 
be defined in connection with the semantic approach. Ricoeur takes this to mean that the metaphorical 
meaning, as being a value created by the context, is “non-lexical.” (Ricoeur 1975d, 217-220. (169-172).) The 
metaphorical meaning cannot be drawn from known significations.  
1340 Ricoeur 1975d, 238-242, 310-313, 321. (187-191, 247-249, 255-256). – With the notion of “iconic 
character” Ricoeur relates to a view pursued by Paul Henle, namely, that a metaphor can be understood in an 
analogical manner: “to speak by means of metaphor is to say something different ‘through’ some literal 
meaning.” (Ricoeur 1975d, 239. (188).) A metaphor linguistically expresses an object or an event which in some 
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to “saying as” and “seeing as.” This iconicity, then, also has its correlate in poetic praxis. 
Ricoeur states that “thinking in poetry is a picture-thinking.”1341 This means, for example, 
that a poet “is that artisan who sustains and shapes imagery only by a play of language.”1342 
Poetic images rest on the polysemic character of language, which becomes figurative speech 
by using its “is as” function also in the mode of “seeing as.” 
A shift from polysemy to poetic images and “seeing as” leads us, finally, to 
consider again the question of onto-existential import. According to Ricoeur, who at this 
point draws both from Kant’s schematism and especially from later Wittgenstein, the 
pictorial capacity of language (“seeing as”) is, first, related to reception – the idea of received 
understanding is then, again, an insurmountable aspect of Ricoeur’s analysis. Anticipating the 
refigurative aspect of the threefold mimesis in Time and Narrative I, Ricoeur announces in The 
Living Metaphor that the “seeing as” is exposed in the act of reading.1343 The semantics of a 
metaphorical expression is, therefore, reaching its limits and about to turn to hermeneutics. 
The question of being arises in connection with this idea of a metaphorical statement as an 
image inviting interpretation.  
                                                                                                                                            
respect is analogous to this metaphorical expression - hence borrowing, through Paul Henle, the term “icon” 
from C.S. Peirce (cf. Ricoeur 1978, 149-150.; Peirce 1932, 157.) This iconic function, or character (le caractère 
iconique), thus gives birth to a parallel structure which by semantically challenging the limits of vocabulary 
extends these limits with a “surplus” produced by the intended semantic crisis (“a planned category mistake”). 
(Ricoeur 1975d, 250-251. (196-197).) When Ricoeur then applies Marcus Hester’s theory of metaphors, this 
thought of an “iconic,” i.e. figurative, character takes on a different, in a sense more “literal” meaning. Poetic 
language seen as a verbal icon (l’icône verbale) – which reveals the non-verbal factor inside a semantic theory – is 
a method for constructing images. 
1341 Ricoeur 1975d, 269. (212). 
1342 Ricoeur 1975d, 268. (211). Cf. Ricoeur 1960b, 20-21. (13-14).; Ricoeur 1965a, 24-25. (15-16). 
1343 Ricoeur 1975d, 268-269. (212).; Ricoeur 1983, 117, 121. (77, 80). – I should mention that in The Living 
Metaphor Ricoeur relies on the argumentative support provided by Marcus Hester. Ricoeur proposes that the 
“seeing as” -operator or, rather, the experience-act of “seeing as,” and the imagining function clarify each other. 
As such, it also helps to clarify the birth of a metaphorical meaning. Ricoeur quotes: “The same imagery which 
occurs also means.” And in turning back to Kant and his famous dictum, Ricoeur argues: “‘seeing as’ quite 
precisely plays the role of the schema that unites the empty concept and the blind impression.” So understood, 
“seeing as” unites the verbal and non-verbal, it is the fusion of sense and imagery. In brief, it “designates the 
non-verbal mediation of the metaphorical statement.” Ricoeur 1975d, 268-271. (212-214). 
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As Ricoeur stated already in On Interpretation, however, interpretation and 
reflection coincide.1344 It is the poetic image that opens up the whole sphere of being while 
discovering it in reflection. Using once again the words of Gaston Bachelard’s The Poetics of 
Space (1957), just as he did in both The Symbolism of Evil and On Interpretation, Ricoeur argues 
in The Living Metaphor that there is a direct relation between poetic images and reflection on 
being:  
Bachelard has taught us that the image is not a residue of impression, but an 
aura surrounding speech: “The poetic image places us at the origin of the 
speaking being.” The poem gives birth to the image; the poetic “becomes a 
new being in our language, expressing us by making us what it expresses; in 
other words, it is at once a becoming of expression, and a becoming of our 
being. Here expression creates being (l’expression crée de l’être) … one would not 
be able to meditate in a zone that preceded language.”1345 
 
Put differently, the question of the “very birth (naissance) of discourse (parole)”1346 is not 
separable from the question of becoming a human being. Ricoeur maintains that poetic 
expressivity “makes us” while being the “becoming of our being.” The poetic, in other 
words, gives birth to a human subject by enabling recognition (recon-naissance) in reflection.  
 
13.3 Critical and Ontological Poetics 
While The Voluntary and the Involuntary announced a search for the “fundamental human 
possibilities,”1347 The Living Metaphor argues that these possibilities originate from the poetic: 
“Is it not the function of poetry to establish another world – another world that corresponds 
to other possibilities of existence, to possibilities that would be most deeply our own?”1348 In 
                                               
1344 Ricoeur 1975d, 271-272. (213-215).; Ricoeur 1965a, 59-60. (52-54). 
1345 Ricoeur 1975d, 272. (215). Cf. Ricoeur 1960b, 20. (13).; Ricoeur 1965a, 24. (15-16). 
1346 Ricoeur 1965a, 334. (343). 
1347 Ricoeur 1949, 7. (3). 
1348 Ricoeur 1975d, 288. (229). 
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a manner that resembles Heidegger’s suggestion of the appropriate purpose of “poetic” 
articulation as “the communication of the existential possibilities of attunement, that is, the 
disclosing of existence,”1349 Ricoeur argues that the profundity of human existence is 
disclosed in a poetic statement that works as a metaphorical image of a subject’s own being. 
The poetic image, to restate, is a processual event of becoming (more) self-conscious of 
one’s own being in the reflection necessitated by the very expression. A poem is, Ricoeur 
maintains, “in the language of Heidegger, a way of finding oneself among things 
(Befindlichkeit).”1350 The human possibilities, crystallized in the notion of l’homme capable, 
originate from and are founded in the poetic. 
 Ricoeur’s allusion to Heidegger’s terminology is not coincidental; besides 
analyzing Heidegger’s use of metaphors, the final study of The Living Metaphor examines the 
ontological implications of poetic language, and concludes by discussing the poetic approach 
of Heidegger II.1351 In poetry, Ricoeur summarizes Heidegger’s understanding of it, “the 
word is brought forth from its origin”; poetry “makes the world to appear.”1352 Despite 
Ricoeur’s uneasiness with any “naïve ontology,” his affinity with Heidegger is recognizable in 
his analysis of the relation of language to reality. Language, for Ricoeur, appears “as that 
which raises the experience of the world to its articulation in discourse, that which founds 
communication and brings about the advent of man (fait advenir l’homme) as speaking 
subject.”1353 In brief, Ricoeur maintains that language articulates the human experience of 
                                               
1349 Heidegger 1967, 162. (152). 
1350 Ricoeur 1975d, 288-289. (229). 
1351 Ricoeur 1975d, 323, 356-361, 392-399. (257, 280-284, 309-313). – Ricoeur acknowledges that 
Heidegger criticized metaphors as means of metaphysical Übertragung. Ricoeur points out, however, that “the 
constant use Heidegger makes of metaphor is finally more important than what he says in passing against 
metaphor.” Moreover, “when Heidegger hears non-dissimulation in a-lêtheia, the philosopher creates meaning 
and in this way produces something like a living metaphor.” Ricoeur 1975d, 357, 370-371. (280, 292). 
1352 Ricoeur 1975d, 361. (284). 
1353 Ricoeur 1975d, 385. (304). 
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being-in-the-world. Ricoeur’s kinship with Heidegger is apparent in his plea that an 
ontological understanding of human condition requires articulation in discourse.1354 
 Utilizing the idea of “tensional” truth, Ricoeur argues, however, that 
articulation is not separable from the reflective capacity of language, that is, its ability to 
consider itself by the means of distanciation. Put differently, the notion of “dialectic” truth 
necessitates a rejection of an immediate ontology, while retaining a connection with the 
critical.1355 According to Ricoeur, language is primordially “installed” in being, but he also 
maintains that it “becomes aware of itself in the self-articulation of the being which it is 
about.”1356 The reflective capacity of language accompanies its referential function; this intra-
linguistic reflective distanciation then facilitates the peculiar ontological “knowledge” that 
language is “being-related to being.”1357 Ricoeur argues, nevertheless, that articulation 
expresses being as be-ing, that is, it is the becoming of being in expression – Ricoeur even 
reverses the order between language and its reference to being and its articulation: 
When I speak (je parle), I know that something is brought to language. This 
knowledge is no longer intra-linguistic but extra-linguistic; it moves from being 
to being-said (de l’être à l’être-dit), at the very time that language itself moves 
from sense to reference.1358 
 
                                               
1354 Cf. Heidegger 1967, 160. (150). 
1355 Cf. Ricoeur 1975d, 374-375. (295). 
1356 Ricoeur 1975d, 385. (304). 
1357 Ricoeur 1975d, 385. (304). 
1358 Ricoeur 1975d, 386. (304). – Ricoeur borrows the term “extra-linguistic” from Gottlob Frege. Mary 
Gerhart mentions that this terminological loan has been criticized by many as Ricoeur’s antipositivist 
hermeneutics and Frege’s positivism deviate greatly from each other. However, Gerhart sees that Frege assists 
Ricoeur in some key issues: “Frege’s distinction [between sense and reference] allows Ricoeur to attend to two 
functions of metaphor: (1) its production of new meaning in the semiotic systems of signs, and (2) its 
denotation of a world to which the new meaning refers. In other words, Ricoeur utilizes the Fregean distinction 
between sense and reference to clarify the opposition between the semiotic and the semantic and shows that 
the one is irreducible to the other. The opposition is important for an understanding of metaphor because in 
the past, metaphor as word has been ‘divided between a semiotics of lexical entities and a semantics of the 
sensence’.” Gerhart however also admits that “Ricoeur is not without reservations about Frege’s work.” 
(Gerhart 1995, 223-224.) As it turned out, also Ricoeur himself became rather dubious later on: “I would say 
today that […] I am no longer satisfied by what I wrote in chapter 7 of The Living Metaphor. First of all, 
borrowing from Frege the distinction between sense and reference (or denotation) appears to me to go outside 
the bounds of Frege’s logical semantics.” Ricoeur 1995k, 234. 
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Such onto-existentially revealing articulation would not be possible, however, without the 
critical moment that is able to appreciate the becoming of being in the being-said. Even 
though Ricoeur maintains that language is “the being-said of reality,”1359 that it is being that 
is articulated and expressed, this ontological “knowledge” or understanding is attainable only 
in and with the critical, because the ontological vehemence of expression becomes apparent 
only in such distanciation.  
In short, then, Ricoeur’s relation to Heidegger’s hermeneutics of being is 
ambiguous. When noticing that actuality – which according to Ricoeur also includes all its 
possibilities through an interplay between the actual and the possible1360 – has meaning only 
in the critical, or speculative, discourse concerning being, Ricoeur points out that “the 
polysemy of being” (la polysémie de l’être) signifies the ultimate reference of poetic discourse, 
although this can be articulated only in a speculative discourse.1361 The poetic and the 
speculative are in a dialectical relationship with each other: the poetic leads us to recognize a 
certain tension of being (“being-as” conceived as the same and the other); whereas the 
speculative construes this tension critically – metaphor works at the very intersection of 
speculative and poetic discourses.1362 In brief, the dialectical conflict of these discourses 
defines a difference between Ricoeur’s critical “metaphorical ‘as’” and Heidegger’s 
ontological “hermeneutic ‘as’” as Gert-Jan van der Heiden summarizes.1363 Ricoeur 
maintains, nevertheless, in a Heideggerian undertone, that “lively expression is that which 
                                               
1359 Ricoeur 1975d, 386. (304). 
1360 Ricoeur 1975d, 389-390. (307). 
1361 Ricoeur 1975d, 389. (307). 
1362 Ricoeur 1975d, 212, 377, 398-399. (166, 298, 313). 
1363 Heiden 2010, 148-149. 
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expresses the living existence,”1364 which explains why Ricoeur held his phrase la métaphore vive, 
the living metaphor, so important.1365  
While criticizing but also borrowing from Heidegger, Ricoeur reaches the 
threshold of a post-critical “first philosophy,” namely a philosophy that would illustrate the 
ontological in referential relation.1366 Since Ricoeur’s approach includes the notion of 
interpretation, the ontological is not immediately conceivable, however. The extra-linguistic 
is expressed in poetic language and appropriated hermeneutically. As argued by The Symbolism 
of Evil, On Interpretation, and The Living Metaphor, it is only in interpretation that the 
ontological becomes attainable. Furthermore, there are two levels of interpretation: First, the 
expression itself is a coming-into-words of being, an innovative and dynamic articulation of 
being that is experienced; it is therefore also evoking and establishing a world of possibilities 
by eclipsing the natural order and remaking reality in redescription.1367 Ricoeur summarizes: 
“An experience requests to be expressed.”1368 Second, this innovative expression is 
appropriated in interpretation by canceling out its impossible literal meaning and invoking its 
“living” onto-existential meaning as a manifestation of being in be-ing. This displaying and 
explicating the world to which the poetic expression refers is therefore also a hermeneutic 
reappropriation of one’s existence: “the process of interpreting is pursued at the level of 
modes of existing.”1369 The ontological is revealed only in dual interpretation; Ricoeur’s “first 
philosophy” is hermeneutics that in its critical fashion nevertheless shares with Heidegger 
the call that comes from being as be-ing. 
                                               
1364 Ricoeur 1975d, 61. (43). 
1365 Ricoeur & Kearney 2004, 127. 
1366 Cf. Ricoeur 1975d, 388-393. (307-309).; Heidegger 1997b, 154-157. 
1367 Ricoeur 1975d, 52-53, 288-290, 298, 301, 376. (36-37, 229-230, 237, 239, 297). 
1368 Ricoeur 1975d, 378-379. (298, 300). 
1369 Ricoeur 1975d, 109, 277-278, 288-290, 301, 375-376. (83, 220, 229-230, 239, 296). 
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Put differently, Ricoeur argues that this critical, yet ontologically “restorative” 
hermeneutics1370 is grounded in the possible intersection of the speculative and poetic 
discourses. The hermeneutical conflict is unsurpassable, but it invites “concrete reflection” 
as Ricoeur already maintained in On Interpretation.1371 Paradoxically, aided by the speculative, 
the poetic discourse brings to language “a pre-objective world in which we find ourselves 
already rooted, but in which we also project our innermost possibilities.”1372 This notion of 
the world as the source of being is inherently important, because it functions as an extra-
linguistic referent – it is the correlate of signified meaning. As such, it is a necessary 
condition for the possibility of speech: “We must dismantle the reign of objects in order to 
let be, and to allow to be uttered, our primordial belonging to a world which we inhabit, that 
is to say, which at once precedes us and receives the imprint of our works (nos oeuvres).”1373 In 
short, the poetic discourse reveals our being-in-the-world while, however, being also “our 
work,” which in its interpreting expressivity brings about critical distance to the “pre-
objective” world, and immediately cuts us off from the world as the source of being. A 
human being does not live in the immediacy of being but in the world of cultural distance; 
his being is mediated by language and work that are grounded in the poetic and the 
ontological. 
                                               
1370 Ricoeur 1965a, 36-40, 445. (28-32, 460). 
1371 Ricoeur 1965a, 61-63. (54-56).; Ricoeur 1975d, 383. (303). – On the basis of the “opposite pull of rival 
demands” between the poetic and the speculative discourses Mary Gerhart asserts that there is a distinction 
between the “immediate ontology of the symbol” in The Symbolism of Evil and the “critical ontology” in The 
Living Metaphor. She explains that “La métaphore vive preserves the tension between an immediate ontology and a 
critical ontology arrived at through a relative pluralism of modes of discourse and modes of use.” (Gerhart 
1995, 225.) Even though I understand the reasons for Gerhart’s assertion, I would have to point out that 
Ricoeur is explicit in The Symbolism of Evil that the immediate naïveté, or “the sunken Atlantides,” has been lost 
in modernity, but through critical hermeneutics – and in interpreting – a second immediacy, “the postcritical 
equivalent of the precritical hierophany,” is still within our reach. The symbols, which are in the first place 
understood to be symbols only after critical distanciation, do not convey an immediate ontology but they reveal 
their onto-existential meaning only in interpretation. In terms of “ontological tones” Ricoeur is therefore 
consistent when The Symbolism of Evil and The Living Metaphor are compared with each other. 
1372 Ricoeur 1975d, 387. (306). 
1373 Ricoeur 1975d, 387. (306). 
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Such a poetic discourse that sets up the world while giving means to 
expressing our belonging-ness to it, however, brings Ricoeur to the threshold of the 
Hölderlinian-Heideggerian “Worte, wie Blumen,” the notion of words as flowers: “the ‘flowers’ 
of our words […] utter existence in its blossoming forth.”1374 Much like Heidegger, who 
criticized reducing wie to mere comparison that would reduce “this poetic expression to a 
‘herbarium, a collection of dried-up plants,’”1375 Ricoeur maintains that poetry “articulates 
and preserves the experience of belonging that places man in discourse and discourse in 
being.”1376 Poetry explicates the human condition as being-in-being and being-in-language in 
the manner Heidegger’s The Origin of the Work of Art explains Dichtung as founding bestowing, 
grounding, and beginning that have their corresponding modes of preserving (Bewahrung). 
Ricoeur’s understanding of poetic language draws close to Heidegger’s understanding of the 
poetic work: “for a work is in actual effect as a work only when we remove ourselves from 
our commonplace routine and move into what is disclosed by the work, so as to bring our 
own being itself (unser Wesen selbst) to take a stand in the truth of what is.”1377 In the end, 
therefore, Ricoeur’s conception of the poetic is much akin to that of Heidegger. The 
experience of “belonging” is, however, made apparent only in a critical, speculative 
distanciation. Without this critical distance, the poetic would remain only lived and not 
understood. Ricoeur argues, moreover, that this distance is not foreign to the poetic but 
quite natural to it: “poetic discourse, as text and as work, prefigures the distanciation that 
speculative thought carries to its highest point of reflection.”1378 Even though language 
                                               
1374 Ricoeur 1975d, 392. (309). Cf. Heiden 2010, 145-148. 
1375 Ricoeur 1975d, 361. (284). 
1376 Ricoeur 1975d, 398. (313). 
1377 Heidegger 1977a, 62. (Heidegger 2001b, 72.) 
1378 Ricoeur 1975d, 398-399. (313). 
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discloses being at its coming-to-presence as blossoming, the being-as is not simply “is” but is 
tensional – and, therefore, also “is not.” 
Ricoeur remains, therefore, uncompromisingly reserved with regard to 
Heidegger’s ontological hermeneutics; Heidegger’s approach appears to him as a mere 
inspiring temptation.1379 “With Heidegger’s philosophy,” Ricoeur argues in his essay “The 
Task of Hermeneutics,” “we are always engaged in going back to the foundations, but we are 
left incapable of beginning the movement of return that would lead from the fundamental 
ontology to the properly epistemological question of the status of human sciences.”1380 Put 
differently, Ricoeur maintains that Heidegger’s work is not able to respond to this challenge: 
“how can a question of critique in general be accounted for within the framework of a 
fundamental hermeneutics?”1381 In brief, Ricoeur criticizes Heidegger’s ontological 
hermeneutics of evading the question of philosophical criticism.  
Being reserved, however, does not mean that Ricoeur would be incapable of 
using Heidegger’s later texts pedagogically. As Ricoeur admits in the opening lines of his 
                                               
1379 Cf. e.g. Ricoeur 1969, 23-28. (19-24).; Ricoeur 1975d, 393. (309). – Ricoeur’s 1978 article on metaphors 
argues for a connection between poetic language and emotions. This dense text is highly illuminating and it 
suggests that there is a certain “split reference” at work in poetic language. The meaning of the Heideggerian 
“temptation” becomes well highlighted in this text: “On the basis of this analysis of the split structure of poetic 
feeling, it is possible to do justice to a certain extent to a claim of Heidegger's analytic of the Dasein that feelings 
have ontological bearing, that they are ways of ‘being-there,’ of ‘finding’ ourselves within the world, to keep 
something of the semantic intent of the German Befindlichkeit. Because of feelings we are ‘attuned to’ aspects of 
reality which cannot be expressed in terms of the objects referred to in ordinary language. Our entire analysis 
of the split reference of both language and feeling is in agreement with this claim. But it must be underscored 
that this analysis of Befindlichkeit makes sense only to the extent that it is paired with that of split reference both 
in verbal and imaginative structures. If we miss this fundamental connection, we are tempted to construe this 
concept of Befindlichkeit as a new kind of intuitionism - and the worst kind! - in the form of a new emotional 
realism. We miss, in Heidegger's Daseinanalyse itself, the close connections between Befindlichkeit and Verstehen, 
between situation and project, between anxiety and interpretation. The ontological bearing of feeling cannot be 
separated from the negative process applied to the first-order emotions, such as fear and sympathy, according 
to the Aristotelian paradigm of catharsis. With this qualification in mind, we may assume the Heideggerian 
thesis that it is mainly through feelings that we are attuned to reality. But this attunement is nothing else than 
the reverberation in terms of feelings of the split reference of both verbal and imaginative structure.” Ricoeur 
1978, 158. 
1380 Ricoeur 1986a, 94. (69). 
1381 Ricoeur 1986a, 95. (69). 
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essay “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics,” his philosophy is not only post-Kantian and 
post-Hegelian, but also a philosophy “with” Heidegger and “after” Heidegger.1382 “Here, as 
elsewhere,” Ricoeur states, nevertheless, that “I shall not adhere to the letter of Heidegger’s 
philosophy but shall develop it for my own purposes.”1383 Despite Ricoeur’s comments in 
The Living Metaphor that Heidegger’s later works are inescapably ambiguous in their internal 
struggle that both resorts to and cancels out thought,1384 his critical reading of later 
Heidegger’s work silently affirms that Ricoeur’s hermeneutics comes close to that of 
Heidegger II.  
Ricoeur rubs shoulders with Heidegger only because they share the same 
philosophical concern: understanding the unfolding of life. This sharing, or “thinking with,” 
bursts out occasionally quite surprisingly. The Living Metaphor, for example, seeks support for 
the view that it is acceptable to comprehend Heidegger’s term Ereignis as a “philosopher’s 
metaphor” that retains the critical distance Ricoeur requires.1385 Reading Ereignis together 
with es gibt, Ricoeur argues, “announces every blossoming of appearing under the 
connotation of ‘gift’; Ereignis and es gibt mark the opening and the unfolding by reason of 
                                               
1382 Ricoeur 1986a, 39. (25). 
1383 Ricoeur 1986a, 49-50. (33). 
1384 Ricoeur 1975d, 395-398. (311-313). 
1385 Ricoeur 1975d, 394-395. (310). – Ricoeur argues that the “philosopher’s metaphor” is distinct from a 
“poet’s metaphor,” since he maintains that a philosopher is firmly tied to the speculative discourse. The whole 
passage, in which Ricoeur struggles with the distinction he wants to maintain between speculative and poetic, is 
worthy to be cited in length: “What is remarkable, in this short text [Heidegger’s Aus Der Erfahrung des Denkens, 
1947], is that the poem does not serve as an ornament to the philosophical aphorism, and that the latter does 
not constitute the poem’s translation. Poem and aphorism are in a mutual accord of resonance that respects 
their difference. To the imaginative power of thought-full poetry, the poet replies with the speculative power of 
poeticizing thought. Certainly the difference is infinitesimal when the philosopher approves a thinking poetry – 
that of poets who themselves write poetically on language, like Hörderlin – and when he responds in a thinking 
that poeticizes, ‘semi-poetic thinking.’ But even here, speculative thought employs the metaphorical resources 
of language in order to create meaning and answers thus to the call of the ‘thing’ to be said with a semantic 
innovation. A procedure like this has nothing scandalous about it as long as speculative thought knows itself to 
be distinct and responsive because it is thinking. Furthermore, the philosopher’s metaphors may well resemble 
those of the poet – like the latter, they diverge from the world of objects and ordinary language – but they do 
not merge with the poet’s metaphors.” 
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which there are objects for a judging subject.”1386 In the end, Ricoeur claims, Heidegger 
juxtaposes but does not confuse philosophical discourse with the poetic one – Ricoeur 
concludes by using Heidegger’s words from What is Philosophy? (1956): 
Between these two [viz. thinking and poetry, or, speculation and poetics] there 
exists a secret kinship because in the service of language both intercede on 
behalf of language and give lavishly of themselves. Between both there is, 
however, at the same time an abyss for they “dwell on the most widely 
separated mountains.”1387  
 
Based on this idea of uncoverable rift, Ricoeur affirms that Heidegger’s words capture well 
the “very dialectic between the modes of discourse.”1388 At the same time, however, Ricoeur 
profiles Heidegger’s hermeneutics as ontologically non-naïve; Heidegger, in fact, “is part of 
the lineage of speculative philosophy,” his philosophy is not opposed to but part of that 
metaphysical thought Heidegger criticized. Even if Heidegger did not succeed in surpassing 
or annulling the metaphysical tradition, the value of his attempt to poetically analyze the 
becoming of being “lies in its contribution to the continuous and unceasing problematic of 
thinking and of being.”1389 This same problem animated Ricoeur’s own investigations in The 
Living Metaphor. 
In sum, as much as the poetic animates speculative reflection, the poetic 
discourse also depends on the possibility of distanciation provided by the speculative. These 
two are not, then, just “the most widely separated mountains” but truly have “a kinship,” 
albeit a tensional one. Ricoeur concludes, therefore, that the “is as” grounds our experience 
of being torn between life and thought: “What is given to thought in this way by the 
‘tensional’ truth of poetry is the most primordial, most hidden dialectic – the dialectic that 
                                               
1386 Ricoeur 1975d, 393, 397. (309, 312). 
1387 Ricoeur 1975d, 398. (313). 
1388 Ricoeur 1975d, 398. (313). 
1389 Ricoeur 1975d, 397. (312). 
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reigns between the experience of belonging as a whole and the power of distanciation that 
opens up the space of speculative thought.”1390 The understanding that I am alive is possible 
only by maintaining a critical distance (λόγος) from life itself (βίος), that is, by letting life 
appear through culture and as culture. 
 
                                               
1390 Ricoeur 1975d, 399. (313). 
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14. POETICS OF CULTURAL ACTION 
The theme of action that I will re-examine in this chapter widens the idea of the poetic 
constitution of culture. I have already showed in chapter 10 that Ricoeur establishes a 
connection between action and culture in Fallible Man. As Marcel Madila-Basanguka points 
out, however, Ricoeur’s conception of culture expands the idea that symbolic language is 
both representation and praxis; culture is not limited to being the human condition but 
includes practical action.1391 This current chapter, therefore, also draws us close to chapter 2, 
in which I discussed Ricoeur’s relation to Clifford Geertz and Ernst Cassirer.  
Ricoeur acknowledges in On Interpretation that Cassirer’s notion of “the 
symbolic” designates “the common denominator of all the ways of objectivizing, of giving 
meaning to reality.”1392 Cassirer, in other words, focuses on the universality of cultural forms 
as the unifying condition of culture. Cassirer maintains that self-knowledge is tied to the 
symbolic forms – such as language, science, art, and religion – as processes of culture that 
articulate the human experience while providing means of its expression in human action, 
through which a human subject finds himself as a capable subject in the philosophically 
explicated “unity of the creative process.”1393 In the various workings out of this foundational 
process that, according to Cassirer, defines culture as “progressive self-liberation,” a cultural 
subject “discovers and proves a new power – the power to build up a world of his own, an 
‘ideal’ world.”1394 Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of cultural symbols, presented in The Symbolism of 
Evil and in On Interpretation, is therefore continuously present in this discussion, albeit more 
discreetly that in the previous ones. In addition, this chapter echoes Ricoeur’s critical 
                                               
1391 Madila-Basanguka 1996, 296-299, 319-322, 340-347, 445-446. 
1392 Ricoeur 1965a, 20. (10). 
1393 Cassirer 1974, 1, 3, 70. 
1394 Cassirer 1974, 228. 
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attraction to Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms that includes the idea of self-
knowledge as culturally mediated self-recognition. 
The idea of recognizing one’s capabilities as an opening up of fundamental 
human possibilities, however, blooms in the realm of the poetics of action. As mentioned in 
chapter 2, Ricoeur admits in Memory, History, Forgetting that he is indebted to Clifford Geertz 
for “the concept of mediated symbolic action.”1395 Ricoeur’s affinity with Geertz’s 
anthropology, however, also brings in the idea of culture as a “thickly” describable context 
of action.1396 Semiotic processes are not only conditioned by culture but culture is the 
context for pursuing them. “Action is symbolic just like language,”1397 and these both attain 
their signification by interpretation within a cultural context. The idea of the hermeneutics of 
texts as a model for the hermeneutics of human actions, argued in From Text to Action, 
capitalizes on this notion.  
 
14.1 Explanation-Understanding as a Clarification of “Tensional” Poetics  
Before getting to the proper practical level of action, an intermediary step will have to be 
taken in the form of critical mediation through interpretation; this will be Ricoeur’s model 
for understanding the poetic in human 3ραξις. Extending the previous discussion of the 
poetics of language, I maintain that Ricoeur transposes the primordial dialectics of βίος and 
λόγος onto the level of the dialectics between the poetic and the speculative. These two 
dialectics are not, however, “mute” but they produce a surplus as an opening up of 
                                               
1395 Ricoeur 2000b, 279. n 71. (546. n 76). 
1396 Ricoeur 1986b, 255.; Geertz 2000, 14. 
1397 Ricoeur 1986b, 255-256. 
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understanding in the creation of meaning, or, a correlating surplus as an opening up of the 
world of belonging.  
In spite of Ricoeur’s objections to Heideggerian terminology, I call Ricoeur’s 
tensional dialectics of being as “presencing in absensing,” as it is – to use the words of Gert-
Jan van der Heiden – “productive distancing” that Ricoeur has in focus.1398 The creation of 
meaning, and of being in meaning, is enabled by making explicit the event of meaning-
creation itself. “The concept of distanciation is the dialectical counterpart of the notion of 
belonging,” Ricoeur argues; “to interpret is to render near what is far (temporally, 
geographically, culturally, spiritually).”1399 My terminological giving in to Heidegger is not 
devastating for Ricoeur, however, as he always stresses the importance of critical 
distanciation, in the consideration of which alone the notion of belongingness is 
comprehensible. Ricoeur’s tensional, or “critical,” hermeneutics, that is, his model of 
interpretation that requires the support of critical distanciation under objectifying 
explanation – just as poetics requires speculation – clarifies, however, both his dialectical 
conception of poetics and his critique of Heidegger’s “short route” of hermeneutics.1400 
Ricoeur’s critical approach is describable as a conception of interpretation that 
stands in contrast to Wilhelm Dilthey’s dichotomy between explanation (Erklärung) and 
                                               
1398 Heiden 2010, 72-73, 76, 152. – Gert-Jan van der Heiden summarizes Ricoeur’s affinity with 
Heidegger’s in-der-Welt-sein as follows: “Poetic language is the medium of understanding our being-in-the-world 
par excellence.” (Heiden 2010, 84.) In Heiden’s related analysis, however, the notion of fiction (taken as the “is-
not” aspect of “as if”) seems to be stressed in such a manner that it threatens to leave the “is” aspect of “as if” 
aside quite completely. Heiden understands that in distanciation the experienced “everyday world” is 
suspended. The poetic task of language, however, is not only to describe an imaginary world, i.e., that of 
possibilities, but precisely to understand the living experience of the world (the “is”). It is this distanciation in 
language that Ricoeur discusses in relation to “is not” – and not a literary genre of fiction which only highlights 
this dimension of “alienation.” Heiden is thus correct when he later states: “the genuine concern of poetics is 
not language as such but rather the disclosure of our own existence.” For Ricoeur, poetics reveals a surplus of 
being. Heiden 2010, 140. 
1399 Ricoeur 1986a, 51. (35). 
1400 Cf. Ricoeur 1969, 10. (6-7).  
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understanding (Verstehen), and Heidegger’s reformulation of it.1401 Heidegger’s fault, Ricoeur 
maintains in “The Task of Hermeneutics,” was to transpose the problem of Dilthey’s 
epistemological hermeneutics to the level of ontological hermeneutics. The difficulty that for 
Dilthey remained internal to epistemology – between its two modes – is with Heidegger 
restated in the form of a distinction between ontology and epistemology. “With Heidegger’s 
philosophy,” Ricoeur argues, “we are always engaged in going back to the foundations, but 
we are left incapable of beginning the movement of return that would lead from the 
fundamental ontology to the properly epistemological question of the status of the human 
sciences; a philosophy that breaks the dialogue with the sciences is no longer addressed to 
anything but itself.”1402 Put differently, Heidegger reformulates the Diltheyan position by 
demanding a rift between ontological understanding and its epistemological explication.1403  
                                               
1401 Dilthey’s proposition, as clarifying the epistemology of human sciences and historiological knowledge 
in particular, sets, according to Ricoeur’s essay “The Task of Hermeneutics,” a “heavy opposition” between the 
models of explanation used by natural sciences that analyze the physical world (Naturwissenschaften), and the 
model of understanding required by human sciences that analyze the world governed by human mentality or 
spirit (Geisteswissenschaften). The human sciences might not use the same pattern of methods and explanation as 
the natural sciences, Dilthey argues, but that does not mean that the human sciences would not have a 
defensible model of approach to the questions they pose – on the contrary, the model of understanding is the 
appropriate approach for the questions of human comportment in a sociocultural world, and the creation of 
meaning in that fundamentally historical world. Creating a rift between the natural and the human sciences, 
however, results in a problem of denying the explanatory power of critical, scientific enterprises – they have no 
value in terms of understanding the human condition, and this, in turn, expects too much from the human 
sciences. Ricoeur criticizes Dilthey’s account for necessitating that life itself “contains the power to surpass 
itself through meaning,” that life as human spirit “grasps life” in its own self-expression. This attitude that 
separates understanding from explanation, was, according to Ricoeur, in a way replayed in Heidegger’s 
hermeneutics. Ricoeur 1986a, 82-83, 86-87. (59, 62-63). Cf. Ricoeur 1992, 451-456. 
1402 Ricoeur 1986a, 94. (69). – David Pellauer points out that Ricoeur was willing to move “to a 
philosophical anthropology closer to that implicit in Heidegger’s being-in-the-world.” Pellauer warns, however, 
that this “is not to say that Ricoeur simply accepted Heidegger’s position. It is well known that he thought that 
Heidegger’s leap to a fundamental ontology came at the price of not being able to deal with real epistemological 
questions, such as those involved in the practice of historical research and writing. And there is more than a 
hint that Ricoeur thought that Heidegger was most helpful in having recognized what was at issue, rather than 
that Heidegger had resolved every question involved in it.” Pellauer 2010, 47. 
1403 Cf. Michel 2006, 155-162. 
343 
Heidegger, Ricoeur explains in his essay “On Interpretation,” encloses 
understanding at the primordial level of belonging that does not yet recognize the subject-
object dichotomy required by epistemological distanciation: 
[According to Heidegger,] we find ourselves first of all in a world to which we 
belong and in which we cannot but participate, that we are then able, in a 
second movement, to set up objects in opposition to ourselves, objects that we 
claim to constitute and to master intellectually. Verstehen for Heidegger has an 
ontological signification. It is the response of being thrown into the world who 
finds his way about in it by projecting onto it his ownmost possibilities. 
Interpretation, in the technical sense of the interpretation of texts, is but the 
development, the making explicit of this ontological understanding, an 
understanding always inseparable from a being that has initially been thrown 
into the world. The subject-object relation[, Heidegger maintains,] is thus 
subordinated to the testimony of an ontological link more basic than any 
relation of knowledge.1404 
 
Heidegger’s ultimate shortcoming, according to Ricoeur, was to not see that his conception 
of Verstehen stresses the ontological at the cost of explication. “For Heidegger,” Ricoeur 
summarizes in “Philosophical and Biblical Hermeneutics,” “understanding is diametrically 
opposed to finding oneself situated [that is, the explication of one’s situatedness], to the very 
extent that understanding is addressed to our ownmost possibilities and deciphers them in a 
situation that, itself, cannot be projected because we find ourselves already thrown into 
it.”1405 Heidegger, in short, by-passed the epistemological requirement of critical explanation 
as purely ontic misconception, and formulated his ontological conception of understanding 
in such a manner that it pertains to the pre-critical state of thrownness, or being-in-the-
world. 
                                               
1404 Ricoeur 1986a, 28. (14-15). 
1405 Ricoeur 1986a, 128. (97). – Ricoeur also defines the term understanding (compréhension) in an 
ontologically rich manner. According to his essay “Explanation and Understanding,” “understanding testifies to 
our being as belonging to a being that precedes all objectifying, all opposition between an object and a subject.” 
This understanding is, however, never detachable from explanation that opens up one’s understanding of one’s 
belongingness only in the movement of distanciation. Ricoeur 1986a, 181-182. (143). 
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 Ricoeur’s proposition of an alternative critically informed conception of 
interpretation – in his essay “What is a text?” – is based on the idea that appropriative 
interpretation in which a human subject “begins to understand himself” is mediated by 
explanation instead of being opposed to it.1406 Ricoeur argues that the linguistic conditions 
explicated by structuralism, for example, already point out that explanation and 
interpretation are situated along the same hermeneutical arc, rather than dichotomously 
opposed to each other.1407 Even though structural analysis falls short, in the end, in 
explaining linguistic phenomena,1408 Ricoeur maintains that it is still able to distinguish a 
naïve interpretation from a critical one by unveiling the challenges opened up by the 
semiotics and the semantics that objectify the whole process of retrieving meaning – the text 
itself orients interpretation that is intralingual: “the intended meaning of the text is not 
essentially the presumed intention of the author, the lived experience of the writer, but 
rather what the text means for whoever complies with its injunction.”1409 Ricoeur argues that 
Dilthey’s and Heidegger’s conceptions of interpretation do not take this challenge of a text 
seriously; Heidegger, in particular, emphasizes the completing preservation of the work 
(Bewahrung) in such a manner that, as Pol Vandevelde comments, it “runs the risk of eclipsing 
the text to the extent that the interpreter no longer confronts the work as something that 
                                               
1406 Ricoeur 1986a, 152. (118). 
1407 Ricoeur 1986a, 145-151, 153-155. (112-117, 120-121).  
1408 Ricoeur emphasizes the idea that language is not an enclosed structure but firmly connected with the 
cultural world that has a semantic effect. In The Living Metaphor, for example, Ricoeur insists that meaning is 
determined by the social: “The appearance of new natural and cultural objects in the field of naming; the 
deposit of beliefs in key-words; the projection of social ideals in emblematic words; the reinforcement or lifting 
of linguistic taboos; political and cultural domination by a linguistic group, by a social class, or by a cultural 
milieu – all these influences leave language, at least at the level of semantics of the word […] to the mercy of 
social forces whose effectiveness underlines the non-systematic character of [language as a] system.” Ricoeur 
1975d, 163. (127). 
1409 Ricoeur 1986a, 155-156. (121-122). 
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offers a resistance.”1410 In contrast to such hermeneutics, Ricoeur’s objective or critical 
conception of interpretation is grounded in the text itself that opens a path of thought to 
follow; interpretation as the appropriation of meaning is an act of the text rather than on the 
text.1411 
 Ricoeur further explains this dialectics between explanation and understanding 
in “The Model of the Text.” Reminding us of our analyzes of objectivity in parts two and 
three of this dissertation, Ricoeur maintains that the “‘objectivity’ of the text” is constituted 
by “1) the fixation of the meaning, 2) its dissociation from the mental intention of the 
author, 3) the display of non-ostensive references, and 4) the universal range of its 
addressees.”1412 These traits comprise the paradigm of reading by providing a platform for 
explanation: “from this ‘objectivity’ derives a possibility of explaining,” or, that explanation 
is “the appropriation of textual objectivity.”1413 The text that for Ricoeur is “an analogue of 
la langue,”1414 in its so described objectivity, is a condition for interpretation – in other words, 
the intralingual moment of explanation is a condition for understanding, it mediates 
understanding: “Understanding is entirely mediated by the whole of explanatory procedures 
that precede it and accompany it.”1415 Understanding, Ricoeur argues, is dependent on the 
objective conditions that pertain to the text that is to be understood. 
                                               
1410 Vandevelde 2012, 126, 138-139. Cf. Heidegger 1977a, 62-63, 65-66. (Heidegger 2001b, 72-73, 75.) – 
Vandevelde also comments on Heidegger’s understanding of texts that disdains their cultural artifactiness. In 
contrast to Ricoeur, for whom the objectival character of a text facilitates understanding, Heidegger conceives 
the same objectival appearing of a text as a mere object: “Heidegger only has contempt for a text understood as 
a configuration of signs. This he regards as mere appearance (Schein), the necessary appearance of the saying of 
being itself. This saying, says Heidegger, is not first present in libraries, bookshops, and print shops. Before 
this, it is held in the intimate space of the language of a people. For Heidegger, as soon as the poem is a text it 
becomes simply vorhanden, present-at-hand, an object of study and concern, the occasion of idle talk.” 
Vandevelde 2012, 127. 
1411 Ricoeur 1986a, 156. (122). 
1412 Ricoeur 1986a, 199. (157). 
1413 Ricoeur 1986a, 199. (157). 
1414 Ricoeur 1986a, 206. (163). 
1415 Ricoeur 1986a, 211. (167). Italics added. 
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Put differently, Ricoeur repeatedly emphasizes that “there is no self-
understanding that is not mediated by signs, symbols, and texts” that function as explanatory 
means for the task of achieving understanding of the concrete human condition.1416 As a 
result, Ricoeur “remains faithful” to the Heideggerian position that language conditions 
human existence in its articulation; “language is the originating condition of all human 
experience.”1417 Language, Ricoeur agrees with Heidegger, is a necessary existential 
condition, without which the concrete human experience would indefinitely remain “mute” 
and unarticulated. Ricoeur’s critique of Heidegger points out, however, that this language 
itself, in its fundamental function of disclosing existence, distances from the “root” of 
existence as its “critical” evaluation or articulation. In other words, Ricoeur stresses that 
language, in its articulating and mediating function, both discloses and encloses human 
experience seeking expression.  
Without agreeing in the end with either de Saussure or Heidegger, Ricoeur 
uses, among other means, structuralism in criticizing any ontological hermeneutics that 
would be “too direct.” Understanding, that still remains Ricoeur’s goal, requires explanation, 
but Ricoeur maintains that explanation requires understanding too; interpretation as a whole 
consists of these two movements that form the full hermeneutical circle that in itself pertains 
to poetic disclosure.1418 “The non-ostensive reference of the text is the kind of world opened 
up by the depth semantics of the text,” Ricoeur argues; “what we want to understand is not 
something hidden behind the text, but something disclosed in front of it.”1419 The text, in 
other words, functions as an “explanation” only if it is “understood,” that is, when the text 
                                               
1416 Ricoeur 1986a, 29. (15). 
1417 Ricoeur 1986a, 29, 56, 59-60, 94. (16, 38-39, 41-42, 68). Cf. Heidegger 1967, 160-163. (150-152). 
1418 Ricoeur 1986a, 211. (167). 
1419 Ricoeur 1986a, 208. (165). 
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itself is allowed to disclose a world for its reader, or to propose a world of possibilities with 
regard to the readers’ belongingness: “to understand a text is to follow its movement from 
sense to reference” – this is the very mediation between explanation and understanding.1420 
In short, explanation develops understanding, and understanding envelops explanation.1421 
Interpretation has to start with the objectivity of the text, but the appropriation of this 
objectivity, or explanation, is only opened up by understanding the disclosure of a world that 
is given by the text.  
In sum, Ricoeur argues for a hermeneutic model that conjoins explanation and 
understanding rather than opposes or even separates them with each other. Heidegger’s flaw 
was to focus on understanding and set aside the critical moment of explanation that, 
nevertheless, grounds the whole of understanding. The conflict of interpretations is internal 
to interpretation itself, which, nevertheless, has the poetic function of disclosing a world of 
belonging. “Understanding,” Ricoeur maintains, “has less than ever to do with the author 
and his or her situatedness.”1422 Instead, the world opened up by the text is disclosed for its 
reader, who re-situates in the disclosed world which has then also become a world of 
possibilities. “It is always someone who receives, makes his or her own, appropriates the 
meaning for him or herself,” Ricoeur maintains, and adds that “if the subject is called upon 
to understand him or herself in front of the text, this is to the extent that the text is not 
closed upon itself but open unto the world, which it redescribes and remakes.”1423 Ricoeur’s 
                                               
1420 Ricoeur 1986a, 208. (165). 
1421 Ricoeur 1986a, 181. (142). 
1422 Ricoeur 1986a, 209. (165). 
1423 Ricoeur 1986a, 168. (131-132). 
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model of explanation-understanding, in other words, reiterates his conception of “tensional” 
poetics that also covers the sphere of human 3ραξις.1424 
 
14.2 Poetic Work: from Discourse to Cultural Action 
Even though Ricoeur’s analysis of the conditions for interpretation as explanation-
understanding explicates Ricoeur’s idea of tensional poetics, as it restates his criticism on 
Heidegger, it only has a clarificatory function in the context of this dissertation that uses 
Heidegger simply as a point of comparison. What is most important for this current analysis 
of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic of culture is his conviction that the model of explanation-
understanding extends from texts and discourses to human action that in the final analysis is 
always cultural, thus including ethics as well as politics.1425 “The theory of the text is but one 
of the ‘places’ where the present debate [about the dialectic between explanation and 
understanding] can be instructed,” Ricoeur argues in “Explanation and Understanding”; “the 
theory of action is another.”1426 As he maintains elsewhere in From Text to Action, 
hermeneutics that in its primary sense means an examination of “the rules required for the 
interpretation of the written documents of our culture,”1427 should therefore be broadened to 
cover the whole cultural sphere of action.  
Making way for this new hermeneutic approach, Ricoeur refers in 
“Explanation and Understanding” to the pair of µύθος and µίµησις in Aristotle’s Poetics, and 
                                               
1424 Cf. Ricoeur 1975d, 399. (313). 
1425 Cf. Ricoeur & Reagan 1996, 109, 118-119. 
1426 Ricoeur 1986a, 168. (132). – Ricoeur credits a Finnish philosopher Georg Henrik von Wright, whose 
1971 work Explanation and Understanding provides the model for Ricoeur’s argument. (Ricoeur 1986a, 169, 172-
174. (132, 135-136).; Ricoeur 1983, 187-202. (132-143); Ricoeur 1990, 134. (110).) Besides The Voluntary and the 
Involuntary, in which the theme of action is extensively analyzed, Ricoeur provides another thorough analysis of 
the theories of action in the studies three and four of Oneself as Another. Ricoeur 1990, 73-136. (56-112). 
1427 Ricoeur 1986a, 183. (144). 
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argues that some texts have action as their referent: “Poetry shows humans as acting, as in 
act.”1428 In short, poetic discourse is about action, it takes action “as its reference, redescribes 
it, and remakes it.”1429 In other words, Ricoeur locates an extension of the models of 
interpretation that focus only on texts in the intertwining of poetry about human action and 
human creativity as action manifested in poetry. This correlation then leads him to conclude 
that “an action, like a text, is an open work, addressed to an indefinite series of possible 
‘readers.’”1430 An action, Ricoeur argues, has meaning only when interpreted, that is, when 
the human work is worked on in interpretation. 
Put differently, Ricoeur transposes the theme of explanation-understanding to 
the human order of living. For this reason I cannot agree with Margit Eckholt that “poetics 
and praxis stand in a dialectical relationship in Ricoeur’s cultural understanding.”1431 In 
contrast to Eckholt’s reading, Ricoeur already maintains in his first preface to History and 
Truth that “saying and doing, signifying and making are intermingled to such an extent that it 
is impossible to set up a lasting and deep opposition between ‘theoria’ and ‘praxis.’”1432 
Ricoeur’s conclusion in the essay “Work and Word” (Travail et parole) in History and Truth is 
also unmistakably clear: “every human civilization will be both a civilization of work AND a 
civilization of the word.”1433 According to the later Ricoeur, then, the practical extension of 
the explanation-understanding model of hermeneutics is necessitated by the fact that despite 
the connections at the level of poetic discourse, the linguistic approach proves to be 
insufficient for the full analysis of human situatedness, or for the “reflection on the 
                                               
1428 Ricoeur 1986a, 175. (138). – Even though it could be expected, Ricoeur does not discuss speech acts in 
this context. One possible mediation between utterances and practical action is, however, performative 
discourse that is briefly analyzed in Oneself as Another. Ricoeur 1990, 56-60. (41-44).  
1429 Ricoeur 1986a, 176. (138). 
1430 Ricoeur 1986a, 175. (138). 
1431 Eckholt 2002, 16. 
1432 Ricoeur 1967a, 9. (5). 
1433 Ricoeur 1967a, 233. (219). 
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ontological conditions of the dialectic between explanation and understanding.”1434 The 
linguistic approach, in its limitedness, however, points to this level of “living experience” of 
a subject, at which the dialectic of explanation and understanding is encountered again: 
“Linguistic analysis quickly uncovers much more radical questions; what is the being that 
makes possible the double allegiance of motive to force and to sense, to nature and to 
culture, to βίος and λόγος? […] Human being is as it is precisely because it belongs both to 
the domain of causation and to that of motivation, hence to explanation and to 
understanding.”1435 The notion of human reality as “in-between” life and its poetico-practical 
articulation shows the limits of linguistic approach by revealing a more foundational aspect 
of articulation as practical culture in general.  
Even though Ricoeur makes this shift from the interpretation of texts to the 
interpretation of human action, he also argues that a connection remains when texts are 
approached from the side of action: “human action is in many respects a quasi-text; it is 
externalized in a manner comparable to the fixation characteristic of writing.”1436 In addition, 
such externalized action has characteristics similar to a text: “In separating itself from its 
agent, action acquires an autonomy similar to the semantic autonomy of a text; it leaves a 
trace, a mark; it is inscribed in the course of things and becomes an archive, a document.”1437 
In short, Ricoeur maintains that the hermeneutics of a living human subject, in his or her 
condition of being “in-between,” or being in the “mixed” quasi-discourse of life and its 
                                               
1434 Ricoeur 1986a, 181. (143). 
1435 Ricoeur 1986a, 169-172. (133-135). – Ricoeur’s rare essay on human sexuality, “Sexualité: la marveille, 
l’errance, l’énigme” (1960), equates sexuality with non-lingual expressivity and claims that this practical action 
facilitates mutual recognition: “The essential conquest of this [contemporary] ethic [of marriage] is to have put 
into the forefront the value of sexuality as a language without words (comme langage sans parole), as an organ of 
mutual recognition (comme organe de reconnaissance mutuelle), and of mutual personalization – in brief, as expression.” 
Ricoeur 1967a, 201. (Ricoeur 1964, 135.) 
1436 Ricoeur 1986a, 175. (137-138). 
1437 Ricoeur 1986a, 175. (138). 
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articulation as action (in other words, belonging and distanciation) utilizes the explanation-
understanding model in clarifying his or her own situation. The critical model of 
interpretation remains the same, whether one focuses on texts or actions.  
 This correlation between text and action is further clarified in “The Model of 
the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text.” The subtitle is misleading, as Ricoeur 
argues that all human action can be conceived as meaningful when it meets the condition of 
objectification that he correlates with “the fixing that occurs in writing”1438 – this enables the 
readability of action. Like discourse that, according to Ricoeur, is 1) situated as an “instant of 
discourse,” 2) is self-referential, 3) actualizes the symbolic function of language, and in which 
4) the exchange of messages, or communication, takes place,1439 human action is a) an event 
that leaves a “trace,” b) ascribable to an agent or agents, c) can have (symbolic) importance 
beyond mere action-event and the social conditions of its production, and d) is “open” to 
constant reinterpretation and re-evaluation at the level of human praxis.1440 In short, an 
action is also an appropriable “Aus-sage,” a “speaking out,” or an utterance of a human 
agent.1441 In addition, a subject understands him or herself, therefore, in the action that arises 
from the motivational basis that is construed and “distanced” in that same event of action: 
What seems to legitimate this extension of understanding the meaning of a 
text to understanding the meaning of an action is that in arguing about the 
meaning of an action I put my wants and my beliefs at a distance and submit 
them to a concrete dialectic of confrontation with opposite [sociocultural] 
points of view. This way of putting my action at a distance in order to make 
sense of my own motives paves the way for the kind of distanciation which 
occurs with what we called the social inscription of human action and to which 
we applied the metaphor of the “record.” The same actions that may be put 
into “records” and henceforth “recorded” may also be explained in different 
                                               
1438 Ricoeur 1986a, 191. (151). 
1439 Ricoeur 1986a, 184-185. (145-146). 
1440 Ricoeur 1986a, 190-197. (150-156). 
1441 Ricoeur 1986a, 185-186. (146-147). 
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ways according to the plurivocity of the arguments applied to their 
motivational background.1442 
 
All human action, in other words, becomes meaningful in objectifying the acting person’s 
wants and beliefs and giving them a shape of a “record” that can then be explained (in a 
sociocultural sphere) as a correlate of this motivational basis: “the texture of action is 
transposed into a cultural text.”1443 Through this “putting at distance” as the very “fixing that 
occurs in writing,” and its corresponding modes of explaining, action also enables self-
understanding. Ricoeur maintains that appropriation is self-interpretation, or understanding 
one’s self better.1444 
 Such a personal “reading” of one’s action is, however, always cultural; Ricoeur 
already reminds us of this condition of appropriative interpretation in the essay “What is a 
Text?”. Even though the idea is implied by Ricoeur’s conceptions of Aus-sage, of fixing, and 
of record, the essay brings the content of these concepts explicitly in connection with the 
“concrete reflection” that is at once about appropriation enabled by distanciation:  
On the one hand, self-understanding passes through the detour of 
understanding the cultural signs in which the self documents and forms itself. 
On the other hand, understanding the text is not an end in itself; it mediates 
the relation to himself of a subject who, in the short circuit of immediate 
reflection, does not find the meaning of his own life. Thus it must be said, 
with equal force, that reflection is nothing without the mediation of signs and 
works, and that explanation is nothing if it is not incorporated as an 
intermediary stage in the process of self-understanding.1445 
 
The explication of being situated in a culture is a condition for self-understanding; the work 
of human works as action-discourse is the mediation of self-understanding. As Ricoeur 
summarizes elsewhere in From Text to Action, “we understand ourselves only by the long 
                                               
1442 Ricoeur 1986a, 204. (161). 
1443 Ricoeur 1986a, 245. (195). 
1444 Cf. Ricoeur 1986a, 152. (118). 
1445 Ricoeur 1986a, 119. (118-119). 
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detour of the signs of humanity deposited in cultural works.”1446 The “reading” of one’s 
action is grounded in this cultural distanciation.  
 The hermeneutical function of distanciation as practical action that objectifies 
itself in works is the externalizing part of mediation by which one begins to understand 
oneself differently. The mediation that deepens self-understanding relies, however, on the re-
internalizing appropriation of the world – or, rather, its re-appropriation – that is disclosed 
by action-discourse, that is, of that “world of the work” in the light of which the seeing-
oneself-differently, or the constitutive birth of the self, becomes possible.1447 What is 
reappropriated is a proposed world or action that is revealed or discovered by the work. “To 
interpret is to explicate the type of being-in-the-world unfolded in front of the text [as a 
work],”1448 Ricoeur argues, drawing us again close to comparing Ricoeur’s appropriative 
hermeneutics of human works – grounded in the model of explanation-understanding – to 
Heidegger’s hermeneutics. Despite the moment of distanciation, the self that is constituted 
by the disclosed world finds him or herself in this moment of reappropriation as being-in-
that-proposed-world-of-possibilities. 
The poetic function of human works correlates with the redescription and re-
creation of reality pertaining to the linguistic works; Ricoeur calls this a mode of 
distanciation that is the counterpart of reappropriation.1449 As with fictional narratives and 
poetic language par excellence, “new possibilities of being-in-the-world are opened up within 
everyday reality.”1450 In reappropriation, or “understanding at and through distance,”1451 the 
everyday reality in its givenness is transfigured, so that the “modality of being-given” is 
                                               
1446 Ricoeur 1986a, 116. (87). 
1447 Ricoeur 1986a, 117. (88). 
1448 Ricoeur 1986a, 114. (86). 
1449 Ricoeur 1986a, 115-116. (86-87). 
1450 Ricoeur 1986a, 115. (86). 
1451 Ricoeur 1986a, 116. (87). 
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transposed or metamorphosed to that of “power-to-be.”1452 As Ricoeur maintains in his 
discussion with Charles E. Reagan, he keeps insisting that “what is ultimately important in 
the text and in the work of art in general is not the object which it depicts but the world that 
it generates.”1453 Heidegger expresses this unconcealment in The Origin of the Work of Art in a 
manner that seemingly resembles that of Ricoeur: “It is due to art’s poetic nature that, in the 
midst of what is, art breaks open an open place, in whose openness everything is other than 
usual.”1454 Heidegger, however, discusses “the unconcealedness of what is, and that means, 
of Being,”1455 whereas Ricoeur focuses on the human subject who faces the task of 
understanding him or herself in the world lit up by the cultural work.  
                                               
1452 Ricoeur 1986a, 115. (86). 
1453 Ricoeur & Reagan 1996, 107. 
1454 Heidegger 1977a, 59. (Heidegger 2001b, 70.) 
1455 Heidegger 1977a, 59-60. (Heidegger 2001b, 70.) – Pol Vandevelde argues that in the Origin “the world 
of things is the starting point of the investigation; […] things no longer represent an inauthentic background 
against which Dasein can understand itself, as was the case in Being and Time.” (Vandevelde 2012, 129.) I 
maintain, however, that Heidegger explicitly renounces the level of things in the Origin in order to highlight 
alethic Dichtung as art’s poetizing “work.” 
In the 1956 Addendum to the Origin, Heidegger insists that the work moves deliberately “on the path of 
the question of the nature of Being.” Heidegger maintains that the Origin concerns the Being-question rather 
than aesthetics in its modern sense that presupposes subject–object dichotomy: “Reflection on what art may be 
is completely and decidedly determined only in regard to the question of Being.” This Frage nach dem Sein 
overcasts all other explications of the Origin – it is the very origin of the work of art and not a work of art which 
Heidegger is interested in. Still, the Origin is also a reflection on what art is, even though this reflection remains 
open-ended; “what art may be is one of the questions to which no answers are given in the essay,” the 
Addendum states bluntly. 
The earlier-written Epilogue that was added to the original 1935/36 lectures softens, however, the 
impression of Heidegger’s disinterest in the question of art itself. Even if the puzzle pertaining to art is far from 
resolved in the Origin, Heidegger’s work has to do with “the riddle of art, the riddle that art itself is.” The 
question of the nature of art, Heidegger claims, is part of that puzzle. Consequently, Heidegger’s response to 
Hegel’s proposition that art remains for us “something past”—that art does not vividly speak of the formation 
of the Spirit anymore in the age of philosophy—is that the final judgment of the truth of Hegel’s claim will 
have to be postponed; art can perhaps still invigorate our existence. For all those who are influenced by Greek 
philosophy “there is concealed a peculiar confluence of beauty with truth,” Heidegger argues. For this reason, 
as Heidegger maintains elsewhere in the Origin, “art lets truth originate.” Beauty, in other words, is not 
conceivable apart from the a-lethic notion of truth, or truth as the dis-closure of what is. The truth Heidegger 
discusses in the Origin is not adequatio—the correspondence between mind and the objects of reality—but die 
Wahrheit des Seins, “the truth of Being.” The riddle, again, pertains to art that is, but according to Heidegger’s 
Epilogue it is not wholly insignificant that it is art that is. 
Even though The Origin of the Work of Art examines the notions of thing, work, truth, and art, it invites to 
recognize the poetic nature of all works of art. Heidegger’s distinction in the Origin between poetry (Dichtung) 
and poesy (Poesie) even calls into question an affiliation between the poetics of being and a poetic work of art; 
Heidegger indicates that even art as a whole could not possibly exhaust the essence of poetry (Dichtung) in the 
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Ricoeur could well agree with Heidegger’s statement that “production is 
possible only in objectification,” but not fully with Heidegger’s objection that 
“objectification, however, blocks us off against the Open.”1456 For Ricoeur, the self, or the 
capable human being, is unreachable to the very end, but the process of beginning to 
understand the human condition rests on distanciation in the openness of otherness, that is, 
in the concomitant critical objectification and poetic disclosure in the mediations that are 
cultural works. “The metamorphosis of the world in the play [of la lecture or “reading”] is also 
the playful metamorphosis of the ego,” Ricoeur maintains, but “the metamorphosis of the 
ego implies a moment of distanciation in the relation of self to itself; hence understanding is 
as much disappropriation as appropriation.”1457 In sum, therefore, the moment of cultural 
distanciation in works is a necessary condition for the understanding of one’s self, that is, for 
the birth of a self-accountable living subject.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
manner in which he had defined it. Heidegger 1977a, 22-23, 61-62, 65, 67, 69, 73. (Heidegger 2001b, 36-37, 71-
72, 75, 77, 79, 85.)  
1456 Heidegger 1977a, 293-294. (Heidegger 2001d, 113.) – Heidegger also argues in his 1946 essay “What 
are poets for?” that a “self-assertive” human being is the “functionary of technology.” Heidegger criticizes the 
modern condition for closing the paths of disclosing the relation of Being to human (“By building the world up 
technologically as an object, man deliberately and completely blocks his path, already obstructed, into the 
Open.”), and conjoins objectification and production as a plague of the age of technology: “Not only does [a 
self-assertive subject] face the Open from outside it; he even turns his back upon the ‘pure draft’ by 
objectifying the world. Man sets himself apart from the pure draft. The man of the age of technology, by this 
parting, opposes himself to the Open. […] What is deadly is not the much-discussed atomic bomb as rthis 
particular dead-dealing machine. […] What threatens man in his very nature is the view that technological 
production puts the world in order, while in fact this prdering is precisely what levels every ordo, every rank, 
down to the uniformity of production, and thus from the outset destroys the realm from which any rank and 
recognition could possibly arise.” Heidegger 1977a, 293-295. (Heidegger 2001d, 113-115.) 
1457 Ricoeur 1986a, 117. (88). Cf. Ricoeur 1986a, 370. (301). 
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14.3 Toward the Poetics of Sociocultural Action 
In contrast to Heidegger’s suspicion of culture – explicated in his criticism of Machenschaft or 
modern technological production1458 – we have seen that the notion of cultural work is 
crucial for Ricoeur’s philosophy of the poetic. Even though the discussion in this 
dissertation has seemingly moved away from the “signs of being human” to the question of 
language, and from the “highly expressive” works of art and literature to the dialectic of 
“mixed discourses,” the notion of les oeuvres de l’esprit is now even more relevant than in the 
previous chapters of this work. As seen above, articulation extends from texts to human 
action. In short, then: the human works are meaningful objects necessary for a subject’s 
constitution in reflection. “I find myself only by losing myself,” Ricoeur summarizes this 
necessity of objectification for subjectification.1459  
The works of art and literature, for example, as (quasi-)material works in the 
world of objects function as indications of human capabilities. The earlier discussion of λόγος 
and the universality of meaning, as well as the recent discussion of reappropriation, point 
out, however, that the capability to signify, or to give a personally pertinent existential 
meaning to these works in their “reading,” is even more significant. As Ricoeur puts it in 
“What is a Text?”: “In hermeneutical reflection – or in reflective hermeneutics – the 
constitution of the self is contemporaneous with the constitution of meaning.”1460 This 
opening has led us to the realm of the proper works of the mind: to the realm of 
                                               
1458 Heidegger 2002, 116.; Heidegger 1977a, 292-296. (Heidegger 2001d, 112-116.) Cf. Vandevelde 2012, 
146-149. 
1459 Ricoeur 1986a, 117. (88). 
1460 Ricoeur 1986a, 152. (119). 
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communication, discursive action, the poetic discovery of the possible, and finally to 
reflection, or to “reappropriating the act of existing” that we deploy in works.1461  
Admittedly, the works of human esprit are poetic because they create the 
possible by discovering it in the dual act of distanciation-appropriation. “To understand a 
poem,” or to reflect the richness of a poem’s meanings, is to “rediscover the spirit of the 
song beneath the text which leads divination from here to there.”1462 According to Ricoeur, 
however, this revealing rediscovery is only possible in interpretation lit up by the speculative, 
and only as such roots a person to being by articulating this belongingness: “reflection must 
become [poetico-speculative] interpretation because I cannot grasp the act of existing except 
in signs scattered in the world.”1463 Ricoeur maintains that human understanding is always 
necessarily mediated in the human works as signs. 
A cultural sign – a poem, an institution, or a cellphone1464 – that conveys a 
meaning as based on human work is enriched by another work of the human mind that 
enlivens it by articulating its significance to a person’s existence in his or her hereness and to 
his or her self-understanding as a capable human being; this is the essence of appropriation 
for Ricoeur. Heidegger, in contrast, holds another opinion. All the merits due to cultural 
building (bauen), “all the works made by man’s hands and through his arrangements,” can, 
                                               
1461 Ricoeur 1965a, 54. (46). 
1462 Ricoeur 1949, 380-381. (405). – Ricoeur’s essay “The Nuptial Metaphor” in Thinking Biblically is also 
worth reading for; it analyzes the Song of Songs as a metaphorical interplay in which the figures of love, both 
immanent and transcendent, refer to one another. Cf. Ricoeur & LaCocque 1998, 411-457. (265-303). 
1463 Ricoeur 1965a, 54. (46). Italics added. 
1464 A quite recent work Evocative Objects: Things We Think With, edited by Sherry Turkle, is an unusual but 
illuminating approach to the notion of objects: it is a series of studies from the point of view of active 
partership with everyday objects. (Cf. Turkle 2007.) Although stressing the side of technology, David M. 
Kaplan’s essay “Thing Hermeneutics” refers to Evocative Objects, and discusses whether Ricoeur’s hermeneutics 
could be expanded to cover the human-techology relations from the viewpoint of (technological) artifacts. 
From my own viewpoint that emphasizes cultural objectivity this “extension” is most certainly possible. Kaplan 
2011, 234-240. 
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according to him, “never fill out the nature of [poetic] dwelling (wohnen).”1465 Ricoeur, for his 
part, argues that “dwelling” in the Open of saying and naming is not a level of being that is 
in any way separable from “building”; building is the struggle of dwelling. There is no “real 
sense of bauen, namely dwelling,” as Heidegger claims, that would have “fallen into 
oblivion.”1466 Following Ricoeur, building is dwelling, but not in a manner Heidegger 
proposes when he empties building “in its original sense” into more foundational dwelling. 
“We are dwellers,”1467 Heidegger maintains, but Ricoeur could respond by using Heidegger’s 
own words: we are builders who “must ever learn to dwell,” who must ever search anew the 
meaning of their building.1468  
Retrieving meaning, Ricoeur points out, is a struggle, it remains a task: “One 
of the aims of all hermeneutics is to struggle against cultural distance, […] making one’s own 
what was initially alienated.”1469 The moment of disappropriation accompanies 
reappropriation, and it is a task for a human subject to “gather” him or herself again, to put 
him or herself together again, to be born again as a renewed self, amidst of all cultural 
objects with and among which a subject lives his or her life.  
In sum, then, I argue that the unceasing art of interpreting the cultural signs is 
the ultimate work of the mind that continuously knits together the internal and the external, 
the speculative and the poetic, and the meaning and the world, while delicately voicing a 
person’s existence to him or herself as being-in-the-world, and communicating the mode of 
his or her existence as a capable human being. This poetico-speculative disclosure, I 
maintain, is the most authentic oeuvre de l’esprit that Ricoeur’s philosophy brings forth: 
                                               
1465 Heidegger 2000, 193-196, 206. (Heidegger 2001c, 213-216, 225.) 
1466 Heidegger 2000, 148-150. (Heidegger 2001a, 144-146.) 
1467 Heidegger 2000, 150. (Heidegger 2001a, 146.) 
1468 Heidegger 2000, 163. (Heidegger 2001a, 159.) 
1469 Ricoeur 1986a, 153. (119). 
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Revelation in Interpretation, or, put differently, the work of reappropriating a world of 
action in the appropriative “reading” of cultural works as “texts.” In contrast to Heidegger’s 
ontological conception of έργον, in which Being is at its poetic work, and which portrays 
cultural objectivity and “building” as a threat for comprehending poetic “dwelling” as the 
disclosure of the truth of be-ing,1470 the reflective work of interpretation Ricoeur describes – 
                                               
1470 Heidegger’s definition of work in The Origin of the Work of Art, for example, is rooted in his conception 
of the advent (or be-coming, ad-ventus) of the truth of Being. The mediating term between this be-coming as 
alethic appearing - in which the beautiful lies according to Heidegger - and actuality understood as reality, and 
furthermore as experienced objectivity, is ἔργον, work, which is. The work, in other words, dwells between 
Being and beings. The work, “in the manner of ἐνέργεια,” or efficient activity, is the appearance of truth as 
aletheia in the mode of truth setting itself into the work. “Appearance (das Erscheinen) - as this being of truth in 
the work and as work - is beauty,” Heidegger summarizes. 
Put differently, beauty is the appearance of truth setting itself into the work. In this sense, Heidegger 
argues in the Epilogue, “the beautiful belongs to the advent of truth.” To analyze this becoming (das 
Sichereignen) of the truth of Being as his grounding question, Heidegger’s leading problem is therefore “to bring 
to view this work-character of the work.” The Epilogue argues that the Origin concerns not only an origin, but 
in particular the origin of the work of art.  
Heidegger’s journey in the Origin through the notions of thing, work, truth, and art invites us to notice the 
poetic nature of all works of art. It is feasible to maintain that the Origin is more poetics than aesthetics of 
being, that is, it concerns more expressing Being than art and beauty. In the end, therefore, I argue that 
Heidegger’s conception of the work of art as work remains trivial. Instead of ἔργον, the essence of Heidegger’s 
thoughts on work lays in ἐνέργεια, or the effectuous mode of presence. As Michail Pantoulias also points out, it 
is “the ἐνέργεια of ἔργον” that is in Heidegger’s focus: “Das aristotelische Wort ἐνέργεια bezeichnet eben diesen 
aktivischen Zustand: dass man am Werk ist, weswegen es am häufigsten im Dativ vorkommt (ἐνέργεια).” 
According to Heidegger, “to be a work means to set up a world,” and “the work as work, in its presencing, is a 
setting forth.” Heidegger’s interest is directed to the duality of aufstellen and herstellen, in the light of which the 
notion of work as a work loses its imminent value. The secondariness of the notion is also indicated in that the 
notion of striving (Streit) - which arises from this duality of setting up and setting forth - replaces the notion of 
work; the work is “striving the strife” (Bestreitung des Streites) to set up and set forth, that is, to let truth happen in 
this striving “in which the unconcealedness of beings as a whole, or truth, is won.” (Heidegger 1977a, 30, 31, 
36, 42, 69. (Heidegger 2001b, 43-44, 48, 54, 79.); Pantoulias 2011, 154-158.) 
In sum, I maintain that Heidegger does not fully elaborate the notion of work as a work, because he 
understands, for example, an art work to be at work only when it maintains the function of dis-closing the 
becoming of the truth of Being as essentially onto-poetic dwelling (3οίησις); it is not the thingly character of a 
work but dwelling as precensing  that Heidegger stresses. I admit, however, that Pol Vandevelde, for example, 
complements this remark by pointing out in his own analysis that Heidegger was not completely dismissive of 
labor (Arbeit). In his 1933 address to German students (“Der deutsche Student als Arbeiter”) Heidegger defines 
labor as a determination of the “happening” of becoming a self: “As worker the human being is brought out 
and set in the manifestness of beings and of their joinings.” According to Vandevelde’s analysis, labor is thus a 
mode of social articulation: “The labor we perform decides the manner in which we assume our being as a 
people. Labor is the setting into work of a people through which we resolve ourselves toward our identity.” 
Labor, therefore, has its main function as revealing the historicality of being-here; it is the “setting into work of 
the happening” that as “an articulating comportment brings together the [historically manifested (Überlieferung) 
ontological] situatedness and the understanding.”  
As Vandevelde then argues, “although history is made through the labor of human beings, history is not in 
their hands, for human beings are only one of the parameters of the happening.” Moreover, Heidegger shifts 
his position when turning to his 1934-1935 lecture course on Hölderlin – poetry “takes over the role of labor.” 
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a true έργον τού άνθρώ3ου1471 – grounds the person as a capable human being in giving him or 
her in poetico-speculative articulation a cultural horizon of humanity within which existential 
reappropriation exults. 
 To restate, after Time and Narrative, Ricoeur emphasizes the role of the active 
“reader,” or the role of an experiencing subject, who interprets his own being while 
expressing it in action – actions are “interpreters of conduct”1472 – and consequently 
considers the subject’s own life as a text that opens a redescribed world.1473 The extended 
analyzes of human action in The Voluntary and the Involuntary that include a discussion of 
understanding and explanation of action – as a subject’s action “in the world ‘through’ his 
body”1474 – are then reformulated in Ricoeur’s later philosophy.1475 “It is to the extent to 
which the entire world [of action] is a vast extension of our body as pure fact that it is itself 
the terminus of our consent,”1476 Ricoeur argues in The Voluntary and the Involuntary, implying 
that self-recognition and self-understanding become possible only if one acts and brings his 
or her “project” to the world while confronting it at the same time. “Moving and consenting 
means confronting reality with the entire body to seek expression and realization in it; […] 
this is an engagement in being.”1477 Only in this dialectic of effort and consent that is 
manifested in practical action and then reappropriated, does a subject gain a notion of him 
                                                                                                                                            
It is now a poetic work that articulates, but as Vandevelde maintains, “in an indirect way by being itself a 
setting-into-work, which translates the Greek en-ergon or energeia.” As I have also maintained elsewhere, again, 
the notion of work applied in the Origin loses its imminent value in the face of onto-poetic dwelling, precisely 
because ἔργον, work, dwells “in the manner of ἐνέργεια.” Vandevelde 2012, 112-114, 119-120. 
1471 Cf. Aristotle 1984. 1097b22-28, 1177a18-24, 1179a24-25. (NE). 
1472 Ricoeur 1986a, 244-245. (194-195). 
1473 Ricoeur 1990, 180-193. (152-163). 
1474 Ricoeur 1949, 212. (226). 
1475 Ricoeur admits the connection between The Voluntary and the Involuntary and From Text to Action in his 
1990 interview with Charles E. Reagan: “If I [in From Text to Action] extend linguistics from the theory of the 
text, written language, to the problem of action, in a sense, it comes full circle, since I started with The Voluntary 
and the Involuntary, which was already a kind of theory of action in a phenomenological mode. So I return to my 
starting point.” Ricoeur & Reagan 1996, 117. 
1476 Ricoeur 1949, 321. (343). 
1477 Ricoeur 1949, 323. (345). 
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or herself as a person capable of action in this engagement in being – my self, my 
personhood, is available to me only in the reflective “reading” of it in a concrete situation. 
 This poetic aspect of human 3ράξις is what From Text to Action discusses and 
clarifies to a greater extent. Taking further distance from Heidegger’s poetics of being, 
Ricoeur argues in “Imagination in Discourse and in Action” that “a step is taken in the 
direction of the poetics of the will; [namely,] the step from theory to practice.”1478 The essay 
does not, however, restrict itself only to the question of applying semantic innovation to 
action that redescribes reality and in turn gives the “I can,” as it extends to the field of 
intersubjective action and social imaginary. As later in his reply to Joseph Bien, Ricoeur 
maintains that the “point-source of all the resources of a capable human being” is the public 
space; these resources “can be realized only within the 3όλις.”1479 By now stressing the social 
sphere, Ricoeur does not, however, cut himself off from his earlier arguments.  
Ricoeur’s reply to Charles E. Reagan confirms that the inclusion of social 
sphere of action is in a direct continuity with his early poetics of will: “Charles Reagan has 
no difficulty showing that what is involved is less a change of front than a shift of emphasis, 
to the extent that the philosophy of will was already at its inception a philosophy of action, 
with the twofold stipulation that the role of social institutions was not considered and, by the 
same token, the public character of action was not stressed.”1480 This later extension to social 
                                               
1478 Ricoeur 1986a, 213. (168). – In contrast to Ricoeur, Heidegger holds poetic language always as primary 
articulation. For example, in his 1936 essay Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry Heidegger argues that the priority 
given to language rests on its task of making beings manifest and preserving them: “language (Sprache) [as 
conversation (Gespräch)] first grants the possibility of standing in the midst of the openness of beings.” For 
Heidegger, language is thus “the highest event of human existence” as “human existence is ‘poetic’ (dichterisch) 
in its ground.” Heidegger points out, therefore, that for the above reason a mere cultural approach to poetics is 
undeniably insufficient - even though “poetry is the primal language of a historical people,” the poetic dwelling 
is the most grounding, and not cultural “building” or appearing; “poetry is the sustaining ground of history, and 
therefore not just an appearance of culture (eine Erscheinung der Kultur), above all not the mere ‘expression’ of the 
‘soul of a culture.’” Heidegger 1981, 38-40, 42. (56-58, 60). Cf. Heidegger 1981, 95, 106-107. (118, 130).  
1479 Ricoeur 1995i, 307. 
1480 Ricoeur 1995f, 346. 
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imagery through its criticism is unavoidable in terms of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic of culture as it 
finds the constituting role of social practices in questioning them.1481 Heidegger, in contrast, 
does not hold the socio-practical aspect as central to his conception of the poetics of being. 
Arguing further in “Hegel and Husserl on Intersubjectivity” that empathy 
(Einfühlung) grounded in the productive imagination results in “pairing” (Paarung) of a 
subject’s field of historical existence with those fields that belong to other selves similar to 
the first person experience, Ricoeur maintains that this “transfer through imagination of my 
‘here’ into ‘there’” constitutes intersubjectivity as analogical apperception.1482 As Ricoeur 
maintains in “Imagination in Discourse and in Action,” an understanding of this “analogical 
tie that makes every human being like myself” is, however, only enabled by the critical 
detour of certain “imaginative practices” such as ideology and utopia.1483 Following 
                                               
1481 Even though I maintain that Ricoeur’s focus is on cultural imagination that is discussed in the following 
pages in this dissertation, let me briefly clarify the notion of social imagination by using Charles Taylor’s essay 
“What Is a ‘Social Imaginary’?” Taylor maintains, much like Ricoeur, that poetic forces, in the social mode, 
guide human operation even before any theorizing about it, because social imagery functions as the common 
platform that facilitates common practices and the shared sense of their legitimacy. In addition, Taylor’s essay 
clarifies why the etho-poetic nucleus, of which Ricoeur discusses, remains hidden: “By social imaginary, I mean 
something much broader and deeper than the intellectual schemes people may entertain when they think about 
social reality in a disengaged mode. I am thinking, rather, of the ways people imagine their social existence, how 
they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are 
normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations. […] Our social 
imaginary at any given time is complex. It incorporates a sense of the normal expectations we have of each 
other, the kind of common understanding that enables us to carry out the collective practices that make up our 
social life. This incorporates some sense of how we all fit together in carrying out the common practice. Such 
understanding is both factual and normative; that is, we have a sense of how things usually go, but this is 
interwoven with an idea of how they ought to go, of what missteps would invalidate the practice. […] What I’m 
calling the social imaginary extends beyond the immediate background understanding that makes sense of our 
particular practices. This is not an arbitrary extension of the concept, because just as the practice without the 
understanding wouldn’t make sense for us and this wouldn’t be possible, so this understanding supposes, if it is 
to make sense, a wider grasp of our whole predicament.: how we stand to each other, how we got to where we 
are, how we relate to other groups, and so on. This wider grasp has no clear limits. That’s the very nature of 
what contemporary philosophers [such as Hubert Dreyfus and John Searle] have described as the ‘background.’ 
It is in fact that largely unstructured and inarticulate understanding of our whole situation, within which 
particular features of our world show up for us in the form of explicit doctrines because of its unlimited and 
indefinite nature. That is another reason for speaking here of an imaginary and not a theory.” C. Taylor 2004, 
23-25. 
1482 Ricoeur 1986a, 226-228. (179-180). Cf. Ricoeur’s essay “Hegel and Husserl on Intersubjectivity”; 
Ricoeur 1986a, 288-296. (233-240). 
1483 Ricoeur 1986a, 228-229. (181). 
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Cornelius Castoriadis,1484 Ricoeur maintains that social imagery is a part of the function of 
productive imagination, but recognizing its “pairing function” requires critical evaluation 
that is possible only in form of ideology critique – by which he means an interpretation that 
admits of cultural and historical situatedness in the reinterpretation of one’s cultural 
heritage.1485  
Ricoeur holds that social imagery itself is mediated, but recognizing its 
pertinence requires another, critical mediation that is based on the Cassirerian notion that 
“society is an effect of symbolism.”1486 Any social group, Ricoeur maintains in “Imagination 
in Discourse and in Action,” forms itself or gathers itself around an ideological image it has 
given as a constantly re-interpretable and thus self-maintaining representation of itself:  
The emerging pathology of the phenomenon of ideology comes from its very 
function of reinforcing and repeating the social tie in situations that are after-
the-fact. Simplification, schematization, stereotyping, and ritualization arise out 
of a distance that never ceases to grow between real practice and the 
interpretations through which the group becomes conscious of its existence 
and its practice. A certain lack of transparence of our cultural codes indeed 
seems to be the condition for the production of social messages.1487 
 
                                               
1484 Ricoeur & Kemp 1981, 163-164. 
1485 Cf. Ricoeur 1986a, 306. (248). – Despite utilizing the term “critique of ideology” that is commonly 
related to the Frankfurt school, Ricoeur refers to Karl Mannheim’s 1929 work Ideologie und Utopie. George H. 
Taylor, in his introduction to Ricoeur’s Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, maintains that Ricoeur critically expounds 
Mannheim’s idea that ideology and utopia belong to a common conceptual framework. (G. H. Taylor 1986, xv-
xvi, xx-xxiii.). Ricoeur, who in his own introduction in Lectures on Ideology and Utopia acknowledges his 
indebtedness to Mannheim (Ricoeur 1986b, 2-3, 8-9, 312-314.), both refers and alludes to the Frankfurt school 
(that remained critical of Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge as a science with its own presuppositions, i.e., its 
own ideology) in many of his essays in From Text to Action. The most concise discussion of it can be found in 
the essay “Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology” that models and also surpasses the Gadamer-Habermas 
debate. (Ricoeur 1986a, 333-377. (270-307)). Cf. Ricoeur’s essays on Mannheim and Habermas in Lectures on 
Ideology and Utopia, as well as Ricoeur’s “Note on the History of Philosophy and the Sociology of Knowledge” 
in History and Truth that discusses the legitimacy and the limitations of the sociology of knowledge in general. 
(Ricoeur 1986b, 159-180, 216-253, 269-284.; Ricoeur 1967a, 60-65. (57-62)). Ricoeur’s late presentation at the 
Pontifical Academy of Sciences (2002), and the subsequent essay “Que la science s’inscrit dans la culture 
comme ‘pratique théorique’” relates to these other texts as it discusses “the cultural values of science,” and 
especially science as an epistemic project in the Western culture (or “the project of the instauration of the 
epistème”) that has been affected and has had an effect on other cultural practices, such as politics and ethics. 
Cf. Ricoeur 2003.; Brown 1978, 56-57. 
1486 Ricoeur 1986a, 230. (182). 
1487 Ricoeur 1986a, 230. (182). Cf. Ricoeur 1986a, 309. (251). 
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Put differently, Ricoeur argues that the ideology of a social group as its lived identity is 
constantly formed in a “reading” of it in social practices in such a manner that enforces this 
adopted social coherence “in which men live and think.”1488 Culture, yet another mediation 
in itself, is the contextual platform of these practices that are then uncritically interpreted 
from an ideological point of view.  
 Ricoeur complexifies this analysis of the culturally situated social bond, 
however, by contrasting ideology with utopia, thus reformulating the idea of “tensional” 
poetics. Utopia, as “the imaginary project of another society, of another reality,”1489 has the 
function of contesting the experienced and lived social reality, that is, of introducing 
possibility into social imagery. In contrast to an ideology, or integration, that “operates 
behind our backs, rather than appearing as a theme before our eyes,”1490 a utopia, or 
otherness, unveils the social condition from the point of view of “a hermeneutics of the 
being-able-to-be (pouvoir-être)”1491 – for this reason Ricoeur places the dialectics of ideology 
and utopia in the realm of cultural imagination: “the labyrinth of [social] relations [through 
cultural expressions] is cultural imagination.”1492 
Following Ricoeur, a utopia is then not pure otherness but a mode of 
rethinking and redescribing social relations; it is “the exact counterpart of our initial concept 
of ideology, considered a function of social integration; […] it performs the function of 
                                               
1488 Ricoeur 1986a, 308-309. (251). 
1489 Ricoeur 1986a, 231. (183). 
1490 Ricoeur 1986a, 309. (251). 
1491 Ricoeur 1986a, 369. (300). 
1492 Ricoeur 1976c, 51. – Ricoeur is very explicit in his use of the term “cultural imagination”: “Je voudrais 
placer cette dialectique [de l’idéologie et de l’utopie] dans le cadre conceptuel d’une théorie de l’imagination 
culturelle, dont la tâche serait de render compte aussi bien de la polarité entre utopie et idéologie que des 
ambiquïtés propres à chacun des termes. Le paradoxe du problem est en effet que chaque terme déploie un 
éventail de fonctions et de roles, s’étendant d’un pole constituent à un pole quasi pathologique. C’est la tâche 
d’une herméneutique de l’imagination dans ses expressions culturelles de débrouiller les fils qui relient les 
expressions constituantes et les expressions déformantes de l’une avec les forms constituantes et déformantes 
de l’autre. Ce labyrinthe de relations est l’imagination culturelle.” Cf. Ricoeur 1986a, 379. (308).; Ricoeur 1986b, 
1, 3, 323.n1. 
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social subversion.”1493 In contrast to instrumentalized ideologies for the sake of maintaining 
social coherence and structure, these are comparable to the “is” of a poetic image, utopias 
maintain the social imagery open to an “other” that introduces a possible variation and 
redescription of social reality; they function as the “is not” of social images. This social 
transfiguration in the dialectic of adopted ideology and proposed utopia (as a critique of 
ideology),1494 or the dialectic of “is” and “is not,” I conclude, restates the tensional poétique de 
l’être et de la volonté dans l’être1495 at the level of sociocultural practices.  
 This sociocultural poetics reiterates the tensions between the lived life and 
critical thought, βίος and λόγος, or necessity and possibility, but one of its major results is, 
again, to open up the notion of belonging. The sense of belonging is achievable only through 
the critical detour in which a utopia points out the condition of being situated in a history, a 
tradition, an ideology, or, in a word, in culture. This knowledge of belonging, that cannot be 
totally reflected – it is not completely comprehensible at the level of description – remains 
utterly mute and silent unless an opening to the other is first made under the notion of 
“other.”1496 Still, following Ricoeur’s essay “Science and Ideology,” I argue that the ultimate 
function of sociocultural poetics, which includes the moments of contestation and 
redescription, is to reveal this condition of belonging in distanciation: 
All objectifying knowledge about our position is society, in a social class, in a 
cultural tradition, and in history is preceded by a relation of belonging upon 
which we can never entirely reflect. Before any critical distance, we belong to a 
history, to a class, to a nation, to a culture, to one or several traditions. In 
accepting this belonging that precedes and supports us, we accept the very first 
role of ideology, that which we have described as the mediating function of 
the image, the self-representation. Through the mediating function, we also 
participate in the other functions of ideology, those of dissimulation and 
                                               
1493 Ricoeur 1986a, 232. (184).; Ricoeur 1986b, 16-17. 
1494 Cf. Ricoeur 1986a, 233-236. (185-187). 
1495 Ricoeur 1949, 443. (471). Cf. G. H. Taylor 1986, xxxi-xxxii. 
1496 Cf. G. H. Taylor 1986, xxv-xxvi. 
366 
distortion. But we now know that the ontological condition of 
preunderstanding excludes the total reflection that would put us in the 
advantageous position of nonideological knowledge.1497 
 
The muteness of ideological preunderstanding can be surpassed in the critical distance of 
utopia, Ricoeur maintains, but the very condition of cultural belonging is what is revealed by 
this distance. In fact, Ricoeur speaks of this opening up of a cultural world of belonging as 
the “correct usage” of the critique of ideology; it is as necessary as it is an unceasing task, a 
process that will always have to begin anew.1498  
This constant beginning anew of cultural hermeneutics is not trivial in any 
respect; it is the most grounding task one could think of in the modern context of thought. 
“Nothing is more necessary today than to renounce the arrogance of critique,” Ricoeur 
insists elsewhere in From Text to Action; “to carry on with patience the endless work of 
distancing and renewing our [ethico-]historical substance.”1499 Understanding the Da of 
Dasein is, as I have already stressed, enabled only indirectly in the postcritical 
reappropriation. Heidegger’s fault, Ricoeur restates, was to commit to a “forestructure of 
understanding” (Vorstruktur des Verstehens)1500 so completely that he did not consider the 
options that would be opened by this postcritical moment; Heidegger emphasized the 
movement from epistemology to the ontological forestructure of understanding, and not the 
way back to the level of epistemology. “This is unfortunate,” Ricoeur maintains, “since it is 
on the return route that hermeneutics is likely to encounter critique, in particular the critique 
of ideology.”1501 Only the route of postcritical hermeneutics, Ricoeur holds, gives a full 
understanding of Da or belongingness. Following the critical moment of de-construction, 
                                               
1497 Ricoeur 1986a, 328. (267). 
1498 Ricoeur 1986a, 330-331. (269). 
1499 Ricoeur 1986a, 331. (269). 
1500 Heidegger 1967, 148-153. (139-144). Cf. Vandevelde 2012, 86-87. 
1501 Ricoeur 1986a, 341-342. (276-277). Cf. Ricoeur 1986a, 363-364. (295-296). 
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“re-construction is the path of understanding,”1502 Ricoeur maintains – all this is summed up 
in Ricoeur’s concept of “cultural imagination.”1503 In short, l’imaginaire culturel as the basis for 
a sociocultural poetics of practical action is a condition for the birth of a situated subject in 
the fullness of Da.1504 
                                               
1502 Ricoeur 1986a, 368. (299). 
1503 Ricoeur 1986a, 379. (308). Cf. Ricoeur 1986b, 1, 3, 323.n1. 
1504 Cf. G. H. Taylor 1986, xxv. – In contrast to many Ricoeur scholars, Jean-Luc Amalric stresses the 
presence of the pragmatic in his discussion of the “poetico-pragmatic constitution of the self” in his 2011 
article: “Pour le dire en un mot, les concepts d’attestation et de reconnaissance représentent selon nous deux 
efforts successifs de Ricoeur pour articuler une philosophie de l’imagination déjà largement esquissée dans les 
ouvrages précédents avec une philosophie du témoignage inspirée de Nabert et capable de poser la question de la 
vérité d’une herméneutique du soi. On peut considérer en ce sens les deux dernières étapes du projet 
anthropologique ricoeurien [Soi-même comme un autre et Parcours de la reconnaissance] comme une tentative pour 
penser une articulation du poétique et du pratique susceptible de nous conduire à l’idée d’une constitution poético-
pratique du soi dans l’horizon d’une ontologie de l’acte et de la puissance.” Amalric 2011, 19. 
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15. ETHO-POETICS: THE ESSENCE OF CULTURAL EXISTENCE 
15.1 Appropriated Identity and the Ethics of Narrations 
As argued in the previous chapter, the poetic pertains to social action. This expansion to the 
social realm is, however, only an intermediate phase of Ricoeur’s cultural hermeneutics that 
ultimately assumes a particularly ethico-political sense. As for Kant and Hegel, there is for 
Ricoeur a continuity from “individual capacities for action to social capacities for collective 
action,” but also from social agency to social responsibility.1505 To use Ricoeur’s words from 
Time and Narrative I, “poetics does not stop borrowing from ethics.”1506 Action, Ricoeur 
argues, is not only always symbolically mediated, but also originally ethical.  
Put differently, the foundational nucleus of culture is both mytho-poetic and 
ethical as Ricoeur maintains in “Universal Civilization and National Cultures”: “what I shall 
call for the time being the creative nucleus of great civilizations and great cultures, that 
nucleus on the basis of which we interpret life, I shall call in advance the ethical and mythical 
nucleus of humanity.”1507 This “nucleus,” however, has to be understood in a broad etho-
poetic sense. Ricoeur’s another essay from the 1960s, “The Tasks of the Political Educator,” 
emphasizes that this “ethical singularity which is a power of creation linked to a tradition, to 
a memory, to an archaic rooting” is best described as “an ήθος” that is “the concrete heart of 
civilization.”1508 Poetics, according to Ricoeur, therefore includes an originating ethotic (ήθος) 
                                               
1505 Kaplan 2010, 112. – Later in the same article Kaplan rephrases his position: “In The Course of 
Recognition, Ricoeur uses the idea of social capabilities as a transitional concept to link the epistemological sense 
of recognition to its moral-political sense.” (Kaplan 2010, 117.) Kaplan is correct in his reading, but a 
reservation will have to be made in terms of understanding the role of a society. As Ricoeur argues in Oneself as 
Another, “society is always more than the sum of its members,” by which he means that the societal structuring 
or institution surpasses individuals as a condition of their individuality. Ricoeur affirms, however, continuity 
between individual, interpersonal, and societal levels of life. Ricoeur 1990, 233-234. (200-201). 
1506 Ricoeur 1983, 94. (59). Cf. Kearney 2004, 171-175.; Ricoeur & Kearney 2004, 140. 
1507 Ricoeur 1961, 445. (276). Cf. Ricoeur & Kearney 2004, 117-118. 
1508 Ricoeur 1965c, 85. (Ricoeur 1974, 281.) 
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perspective.1509 This foundational etho-poetic “nucleus,” however, will have to be 
distinguished from the social and practical “ethico-political horizon” that, according to 
Johann Michel, remains the ultimate end of Ricoeur’s practical philosophy.1510 To reiterate, 
the distinction that I will hold in this chapter differentiates between the hidden etho-poetic 
nucleus and its ethico-political manifestations in a culture. 
 My intention, I should point out, is not to discuss Ricoeur’s ethics, but its 
cultural hermeneutic presuppositions and implications instead; my interest is in clarifying the 
conditions of the “ethico-cultural order” Ricoeur already mentions in History and Truth.1511 As 
this part four has approached the issue at the level of poetics, using Martin Heidegger’s 
hermeneutics as a point of contrast, I will follow this path to its end. This decision will, 
nevertheless, eventually lead us to open the question of Ricoeur’s political thought as well. 
The political renewal of society was not a foreign idea to him as demonstrated, for example, 
by his co-signing the pamphlet “Faire une nouvelle société” in May 22, 1968 at the heat of 
the student revolts and workers’ strikes.1512 Ricoeur’s texts witness, Adriaan Peperzak points 
out, that for Ricoeur ethics is “never isolated from the basic questions of society and 
politics.”1513 Ricoeur does not, therefore, consider ethics as a secluded realm of life, but 
connects it with “the existential, social, political, cultural, religious, and historical conditions” 
of the “actual situation” of a living, acting, and suffering subject.1514 The human utopias are 
                                               
1509 Cf. my explanation of the adjective “ethotic” in the beginning of part four of this dissertation. 
1510 Michel 2006, 285, 295-296, 351, 353. – Michel’s comprehensive analysis of Ricoeur’s understanding of 
tensive ethico-political practices focuses on “the moral dilemmas,” “the political paradoxes,” “the conflicts of 
justice,” and “the ambivalences of law.” Michel calls these the “normative philosophy of Paul Ricoeur,” and 
maintains that this philosophy mediates between Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology and his hermeneutic of 
social sciences. Michel 2006, 289-467. 
1511 Cf. Ricoeur 1967a, 15-16. (11). 
1512 Ricoeur & alii 1968. 
1513 Peperzak 2010, 18. – Of Ricoeur’s political engagements and of his interest in “Christian socialism,” cf. 
Dosse 2010. 
1514 Peperzak 2010, 18. 
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brought about by cultural-political means, Mauricio Beuchot summarizes Ricoeur’s line of 
thought.1515 Ricoeur’s inclusion of these practical aspects of 3οίησις, or his etho-poetics as I call 
it,1516 further distances Ricoeur from Heidegger, who does not insist on the importance of 
ethical or political aspects but criticizes them instead – as he did with regard to the notion of 
culture.  
After already being suspicious about ethics in Being and Time,1517 the end of 
Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism (1946) – in which he presents poetic dwelling by using the 
metaphor of “the house of Being in whose home man dwells”1518 – addresses the question of 
possibly writing “an ethics” as Heidegger was asked to do by his “young friend.”1519 
Heidegger maintains that ethics, as all disciplined modes of thought such as logic, physics, 
and ontology, is a waned and withered mode of thinking.1520 The more foundational thinking 
Heidegger himself is after “inquires into the truth of Being,” and is therefore “neither ethics 
nor ontology; thus the question about the relation of each to the other no longer has any 
basis in this sphere.”1521 Put differently, Heidegger argues that ethics, even as ήθος, is not 
                                               
1515 Cf. Beuchot 1992, 137-141. 
1516 The term “etho-poetics” converges but is not equivalent with Michel Foucault’s similar term that finds 
its first expression in the analysis of sexual experience. Even though Micheł Paweł Markowski states that 
Ricoeur and Foucault theorized against each other (Markowski 2003.), both Ricoeur and Foucault, however, 
ground subjectivity in the ήθος of human 3ραξις that also finds a firm connection between ethics and politics. 
(Cf. Rajchman 1986, 167-170.) I should mention, in addition, that Kelton Cobb opens the question of ethics 
with the notion of ήθος when applying Ricoeur’s hermeneutics in his analysis of a theology of culture. Cobb 
draws this notion from Paul Tillich, however, thus limiting the scope of analysis to the ethical and does not, 
therefore, consider the political: “Ethics is the science of ethos.” According to Cobb, Ricoeur’s contribution 
was to clarify this ethical expression of ήθος. Cobb 1994, 52-58, 348-350, 358, 441-442, 449-450, 463. 
1517 Heidegger 1967, 16. (14).  
1518 Heidegger 1976, 313, 358-362. (Heidegger 1977b, 193, 236-239.) 
1519 Heidegger 1976, 353. (Heidegger 1977b, 231.) 
1520 Heidegger 1976, 353-357. (Heidegger 1977b, 232-235.) 
1521 Heidegger 1976, 357-358. (Heidegger 1977b, 235-236.) 
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rigorous enough for him as thinking that thinks be-ing; instead, ethics leads to ontic error.1522 
Ricoeur, on the other hand, could not disagree more. 
 Ricoeur’s etho-poetic understanding leads me to argue that his poetics is post-
Heideggerian in the sense Ricoeur himself describes it in the essay “Phenomenology and 
Hermeneutics”; even though it is a philosophy “with” Heidegger, it is still pursued in the 
mode of “after” him.1523 Ricoeur’s notion of originating poetics correlates with that of 
Heidegger, but its essential extension to ethico-practically expressed ήθος shows the limit of 
Heidegger’s project. In contrast to Ricoeur’s poetics that includes ethics, it is indeed a too 
“short path” to be-ing as it dismisses the concrete human experience of social existence that 
reflects ethicality and politicality already in the form of living under social commandments.  
The inclusion of this ethico-practical ήθος, which also includes the political 
aspect of 3ραξις, not only directs Ricoeur’s poetics to another course compared with 
Heidegger’s, but also clarifies the importance of cultural hermeneutics. As Ricoeur holds 
already in The Voluntary and the Involuntary, a society, or our primordial “with-being,” has a 
function only if it has a presence in the individual consciousness through social imperatives, 
which are impressed in it “in an original affectivity” (une affectivité originale). Ricoeur mentions 
that there is “a specific fear or respect” which guides us towards “a sense of 
                                               
1522 The closest Heidegger comes to ethics in the realm of poetics is in the 1951 text “…Poetically Man 
Dwells…,” at the end of which he alludes to “kindness” (die Freundlichkeit) which, however, is not ethical but 
concerns the poetic becoming of be-ing. As long as the arrival of this kindness “stays with man’s heart,” a 
human being is able to “measure himself not unhappily against the godhead.” Heidegger means that a human 
being dwells authentically, or “humanly on this earth,” only if he remains “heedful” of the poetic, that is, the 
poetic is appropriated according to its measure as the “original admission of dwelling.” Heidegger’s interests 
lay, therefore, firmly in the being-question as indicated by his earlier texts; ethics, in other words, is not a 
question in his poetics of being. Heidegger 2000, 206-208. (Heidegger 2001c, 225-227.) 
1523 Ricoeur 1986a, 39. (25). 
372 
commandments.”1524 The main idea here is that this original affectivity relates to the Other, 
that is, to a presence that surpasses my individual being: 
What, then, is the affectivity in terms of which consciousness becomes 
sensitive to social imperatives? The great affective transformation is the 
encounter with something superior, with a transcendence, not only in the 
improper, horizontal sense of an alternative alongside me, but also in the 
proper, vertical sense of an authority above me.1525  
 
The social requires an ideal transcendence as its governing force; the notion of authority 
surpasses that of the lived social reality. The notion of justice, for example, arises from the 
“principle of a decentering of perspective by which the perspective of the other – the need, 
the claim, of the other – balances my perspective.”1526 The Other, Ricoeur argues, in the 
form of an Other that exceeds the level of horizontal or socio-temporal perspectives, 
grounds ήθος and orients a person’s social existence. 
Prefiguring the ethics of Oneself as Another, Ricoeur affirms in The Voluntary and 
the Involuntary that the Other is represented, however, in everyone other than me: L’autre est 
un toi, “the other is a you.”1527 As later on, Ricoeur maintains that this representation has its 
full validity only when recognized in social institutions: “in practice my own life is humbled 
by the values put into action by institutions and structures jointly constituted by the diverse 
demands of individual men.”1528 Justice and equality as ideal dispositions are not “dead 
abstractions” but have a necessary connection to institutionalized intersubjectivity; they are, 
even when presented as formally as Kant’s categorical imperative, “living rules of the 
integration of persons into a ‘we’.”1529 Making a strongly anti-Cartesian claim, Ricoeur then 
                                               
1524 Ricoeur 1949, 118. (123). 
1525 Ricoeur 1949, 120. (125-126). – Ricoeur rediscusses the theme of transcendental encounter in Oneself as 
Another by analyzing Descartes’ Third Meditation. Cf. Ricoeur 1990, 18-22. (8-11). 
1526 Ricoeur 1949, 120. (126). 
1527 Ricoeur 1949, 121. (126). 
1528 Ricoeur 1949, 121. (126). 
1529 Ricoeur 1949, 122. (127-128). 
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affirms the fundamental social character of the human mode of being: “The being of the 
subject is not solipsistic, it is being-in-common (être-en-commun).”1530 According to the early 
Ricoeur, I become “me” only within a “we,” that is, only in a cultural community that 
materializes and preserves the transcendental Other.  
The sense of a certain nearness with Aristotle – openly acknowledged in Oneself 
as Another1531 – gets stronger as Ricoeur considers in The Voluntary and the Involuntary the 
practical limits of this social mode of being. According to Ricoeur, “the zone of social,” or 
the level of civic intersubjective relations, has its “lower limit” in slavery which has lost the 
notion of just, and its “upper limit” in friendship. Like Aristotle, Ricoeur argues that 
friendship is not a public relation but a private one, in which the notion of justice is not 
applicable, because friendship creates and manifests freedom in a full poetic mode that 
ultimately remains unreachable for a social whole: 
There are some encounters which do not simply present me with reasons for 
living which I can evaluate and approve but which truly function as a 
conversion of the heart of willing and have the force of a genuine spiritual 
begetting. Such encounters create freedom. They are liberating. Friendship or 
love between two people can do that. Thereafter, the very nature of the bond 
between myself and yourself is profoundly changed: it is no longer a social, 
public relation, but an essentially private relation which exceeds the rule of 
justice. […] The effect of a friend on the very heart of willing, which is in a 
sense a “seminal” action, belongs already to the order of the “poetics” which 
we are at present holding in suspension. […] Undoubtedly it is the essence of 
intersubjectivity to be an unstable tension between the relation of master and 
slave and the relation of communion. [Such socio-]political responsibility, 
however, is the zone in which freedom can never have an alibi, either in the 
tyranny of [Machiavelli’s] prince or in the dictatorship of the [Heidegger’s] 
They, and in which the transformation of all civic bonds into friendship is a 
Utopia.1532 
 
                                               
1530 Ricoeur 1949, 122. (128). 
1531 Ricoeur 1990, 213-220, 351-357. (181-188, 303-308). 
1532 Ricoeur 1949, 123. (128-129). 
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The full transcendence of the Other would be materialized socially if a person’s relations all 
could be characterizable as friendships. This ultimate goal or possibility is, however, 
unattainable as it remains a horizon that always retreats in an ever expanding social 
consciousness.  
Just as in explaining the necessity of an indirect approach to the poetic nucleus 
of a society,1533 Ricoeur maintains that the ήθος aspect of this nucleus can be recognized only 
indirectly: “We can, to be sure, state it radically, that the other is what counts, but this value 
of the other is always seen indirectly, through a labyrinth of social situations in which it 
becomes fragmented into incommensurable values: equality and hierarchy, justice and order, 
and so on.”1534 Put differently, The Voluntary and the Involuntary argues – as History and Truth, 
Oneself as Another, and The Just later – that the idea of the other as “a you,” or a friend, is 
conceivable only through the reality of le concitoyen, that is, a fellow citizen who is both a 
neighbor and a socius.1535 Consequently, the process of becoming “I” is dependent on the 
institutionalized “being-in-common” in a cultural and ethico-political community. By justice, 
Ricoeur argues in an interview with Yvanka Raynova, “politics can be strictly connected to 
ethics, because politics is strictly concerned with institutions that connect individuals who 
will never become friends.”1536 Only by taking the institutionally mediated sociability, or the 
“institutional frame,” into account, one can reach the idea of being ethical. “We dream of 
the reconciliation between politics and friendship,” Ricoeur maintains in History and Truth.1537 
The ethotic nucleus of culture is, likewise, approachable only through its institution. 
                                               
1533 Ricoeur & Kearney 2004, 117-118. 
1534 Ricoeur 1949, 123. (129). 
1535 Ricoeur 1949, 122-123. (128-129). Cf. Ricoeur 1967a, 102-111, 114-116, 263-264. (101-109, 112-114, 
250-251).; Ricoeur 1990, 220. (188).; Ricoeur 1995d, 39-40. (10). 
1536 Ricoeur & Raynova 2003, 674. 
1537 Ricoeur 1967a, 126. (123). 
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 Ultimately, Ricoeur clarifies, the ethotic and the poetic are fundamentally 
intertwined with each other. The “key point” in the recognition of social responsibility, 
Ricoeur argues later in Course of Recognition, “is located at the juncture between the instituting 
of the social bond, understood as what is at stake in social practices, and the collective 
representations that constitute its symbolic mediations.”1538 The social bond is formed 
symbolically through the mediation of shared representations that instil an ethico-political 
aspect into “being-in-common,” in which one is able to recognize him- or herself. This con-
joining symbolism is not utopian in the sense of a “pure” or an unattainable reality but in the 
Ricoeurian sense of “opening up the possible” that is the very condition for ethico-political 
being-with. “These representations symbolize the identities by which the social ties being 
instituted are knotted together,” he insists.1539  
The poetic making of the social bond is ethico-political in its essence, but its 
formation, however, takes place in a narrative mode, in which the ethotic and the poetic are 
found through each other. As Ricoeur also maintains in Course of Recognition, only a “narrative 
unity of life” is able to ground the notion of a “good life.” Put differently, an ethico-political 
qualification is attributable to a subject’s life only if it is held together across a time sequence 
in a narrative form.1540 The cultural hermeneutic relevance of this assertion becomes 
apparent, if moving into the discussion of Ricoeur’s “little ethics” in Oneself as Another is 
approached from the viewpoint of Time and Narrative III, in which the notion of narrative 
identity is introduced.  
The narrative identity – or ipse identity, that is, “ipseity” – Ricoeur discusses in 
Time and Narrative III is, according to him, the assignment of a specific practical identity that 
                                               
1538 Ricoeur 2004b, 206. (139). 
1539 Ricoeur 2004b, 206. (139). 
1540 Ricoeur 2004b, 154-155. (103). Cf. Ricoeur 1990, 186-198. (157-168). 
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is the “fragile offshoot issuing from the unity of history and fiction.”1541 This narrative can 
change over time, but it is, nevertheless, capable of designating an agent, both at the level of 
individuals and at the level of human communities, since it provides self-constancy in form 
of the story of a life. This story of a life, Ricoeur maintains, implies that the self and one’s 
understanding of it are attainable only through cultural “examinations of life” as he calls 
these identity-forming narrations: 
The self of the self-knowledge is the fruit of an examined life, to recall 
Socrates’ phrase in the Apology. And an examined life is, in large part, one 
purged, one clarified by the cathartic effects of the narratives, be they historical 
or fictional, conveyed by our culture. So ipseity refers to a self instructed by 
the works of the culture that it has applied to itself (par les oeuvres de la culture 
qu’il s’est appliquées à lui-même).1542 
 
Ricoeur affirms, in other words, that an articulation or examination of life will have to 
pertain to a narrative that holds the identity of a person together under the symbolic mode 
of expression. Ricoeur claims, second, that this identity-formation is thoroughly circular: a 
self is “both a reader and the writer of its life” as he also maintains in Time and Narrative 
III.1543 Third, Ricoeur confirms, again, the necessity of cultural objectification that enables 
the interpretative act of reading as the process of appropriative self-recognition. In brief, un 
sujet se reconnaît dans l’histoire qu’il se raconte à lui-même sur lui-même; “a subject recognizes himself 
in the story he tells about himself.”1544 Again, the self is not attainable directly, but only 
indirectly through those “readable” objectifications that as cultural works are clues for the 
narration of a person’s existence. 
                                               
1541 Ricoeur 1985, 355. (246). Cf. Ricoeur 1990, 12-15, 29, 137-198. (2-4, 17-18, 113-168). 
1542 Ricoeur 1985, 356. (247). – Ricoeur repeats in his 1991 essay “Life in Quest of Narrative” his 
conviction of the unsurpassable role of culture: “We never cease to reinterpret the narrative identity that 
constitutes us, in the light of the narratives proposed to us by our culture. […] In place of an ego enamoured of 
itself arises a self instructed by cultural symbols, the first among which are the narratives handed down in our 
literary tradition.” Ricoeur 1991b, 32-33. 
1543 Ricoeur 1985, 355-356. (246). 
1544 Ricoeur 1985, 357. (247). 
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 As I have already intimated, however, Ricoeur extends the scope of narrative 
identities from the level of individuals to that of social collectives. As individuals, human 
collectives also require the support of narrative identities that maintain social coherence: 
The notion of narrative identity also indicates its fruitfulness in that it can be 
applied to a community as well as to an individual. We can speak of the ipseity 
of a community, just as we spoke of it as applied to an individual subject. 
Individual and community are constituted in their identity by taking up 
narratives that effectively become for them their history.1545 
 
Both an individual and a community, Ricoeur argues, gain an understanding of their 
respective identities by taking a detour through culture in which their identities are 
manifested and objectified in such a way that a person’s or a community’s existence can be 
appropriated in reflecting upon those cultural works that narrate the mute but experienced 
life. Ricoeur already maintains in 1981 that “there is no knowledge of the self that does not 
make itself through the detour of signs, symbols, and cultural works; the stories (les histoires) 
that are being told, and the histories that a historian writes, are the most continuous 
(permanentes) of these cultural expressions.”1546 Just as individuals, Ricoeur then maintains in 
Time and Narrative III, historical communities draw their respective identities from the 
                                               
1545 Ricoeur 1985, 356. (247). 
1546 Ricoeur & Kemp 1981, 155. – Ricoeur is very explicit about the connection between the (quasi-
)historical narrations and self-identity or self-recognition: “Notre propre existence est inséparable du récit que 
nous pouvons faire de nous-même. C’est en nous racontant que nous nous donnons une identité. Nous nous 
reconnaissons nous-mêmes dans les histoires que nous racontons sur nous-mêmes: les histoires, vraies ou 
fausses d’ailleurs – peu importe! – les fictions aussi bien que les histoires exactes, disons vérifiables, ont cette 
valeur de nous donner une identité.” (Ricoeur & Kemp 1981, 156-157.) Silvia Pierosara, in his essay on 
Ricoeur, pays attention to this implicit relation between narratives and self-recognition as mediated by histories: 
“When a group [or a culture] asks for recognition, it asks that its own way of looking for significance be given 
space and accepted as a site of meaning. Recognition, for this reason, is more than a recognition of mere 
existence; it is a recognition of value, expressed in the significance of a [historical] narrative. In other words, in 
order to gather the moral implications of recognition, it is necessary to presuppose that the object of 
recognition is a narrative, both in individual and in collective cases.” (Pierosara 2011, 81.) In brief, Pierosara 
argues that besides “linguistic hospitality” outlined by Ricoeur, there must be “narrative hospitality” which 
makes an inter-cultural dialogue possible. Cf. Cassirer 1974, 206. 
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reception of those narratives they had produced – as can be seen, for example, in the case of 
biblical Israel.1547  
 But as biblical Israel was not only a particular community but a full and 
effective culture, Ricoeur repeatedly maintains that also “cultures create themselves by telling 
stories of their own past.”1548 Time and Narrative II supports this further extension and 
circularity by admitting that “we have no idea of what a culture would be where no one any 
longer knew what it meant to narrate things.”1549 A culture, Ricoeur maintains, is also 
constituted by narrations, that is, by cultural works. The circularity of Ricoeur’s argument is 
therefore as overwhelming as it is complete. Narratives, however, are “never ethically 
neutral,” as Ricoeur argues in Oneself as Another,1550 and they therefore have the double 
function of both constituting a culture and representing its Other. The foundational nucleus 
of a culture, constitutive of it before its expression, is etho-poetic. 
 
15.2 The Birth of an Ethico-Political Self: Cultural Recognition  
In contrast to Heidegger’s dismissive attitude toward ethics, Ricoeur emphasizes that an 
appropriate philosophical examination of the dialectics of the same and the other, or of βίος 
and 3ραξις (as an extension of λόγος in the mode of φρόνησις), is achievable only with the 
inclusion of the ethical.1551 Ricoeur’s so-called little ethics (la petite éthique), that is, studies 
seven to nine in Oneself as Another, provide a dialectic, “the richest of all,” that undertakes its 
“fullest development.”1552 By closing off our own analysis of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic of 
                                               
1547 Ricoeur 1985, 357. (247-248).  
1548 Ricoeur & Kearney 2004, 138.; Ricoeur & Kemp 1981, 165. 
1549 Ricoeur 1984, 48. (28). 
1550 Ricoeur 1990, 167. (140). 
1551 Ricoeur 1995d, 16-18. (xiv-xvi). 
1552 Ricoeur 1990, 30. (18). 
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culture with this ethico-political dialectics – summarized with his definition of ethical 
intention as “aiming at the good life with and for others in just institutions”1553 – we comply 
with Ricoeur’s thesis that narratives have a transitional or mediating function between 
description and prescription.1554 Prefigured earlier in chapter 7 in our discussion of Sittlichkeit, 
the final opposition between Ricoeur and Heidegger will be a result of this inclusion that 
concludes with the idea of l’homme capable as having the capability to recognize oneself as an 
ethico-political – that is, a narrated and a narrating – character in an essentially etho-poetic 
culture.1555 
 The key moment of Oneself as Another lies in its study seven, which connects 
the levels of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and institutions wherein human subjects live. 
After having argued that the first of the three “components” of ethical intention is the 
Aristotelian – ethico-cultural rather than biological – “good life” as the long-term practical 
object of this aim,1556 and that the second component is solicitude, as reflectively given self-
esteem and consciousness of life in “living together” (or “with and for others”) that leads to 
                                               
1553 Ricoeur 1990, 202, 211, 278, 279, 335, 381, 405-406. (172, 180, 239, 240, 288-289, 330, 351-352).; 
Ricoeur 1995d, 17. (xv). Italics added. 
1554 Ricoeur 1990, 32, 167, 180-199. (20, 140, 152-169). – Arguing against David Hume’s proposition that 
description and prescription are entirely different, Ricoeur maintains that the narrative approach moves us into 
the proper realm of cultural existence by incorporating the ethical dimension to meaning-creating human 
action; description and prescription are suffused with each other. Ricoeur is explicit about intentionally 
breaking Hume’s law, according to which normative claims cannot be drawn from descriptive statements. (Cf. 
Ricoeur 1990, 200-202. (169-171).) Hume presents his law or his “guillotine,” generally summarized as “no 
‘ought’ from ‘is’,” in the Treatise of Human Nature (book III, part I, section 1): “In every system of morality 
which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary 
way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when 
of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet 
with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, 
however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is 
necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for 
what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely 
different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the 
readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us 
see that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by 
reason.” Hume 1995, 469. 
1555 Cf. Ricoeur 1990, 34. (22). 
1556 Ricoeur 1990, 202-203, 208-211. (172, 177-180). 
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similitude between myself and another “as myself,”1557 Ricoeur moves into analyzing the 
third component, emphatically just institutions. As Ricoeur argues later in his preface to The 
Just, this schematization places the question of justice philosophically in a modern sense, but 
as Reflections on the Just clarifies, the idea of justice as a moral rule and as an institution should 
to be read in the light of δίκαιον – what is right and righteous.1558 Institutions not only 
function technically by exercising justice in judicial sense, but they bring about and maintain 
the state of right by framing practical action; this function of institutionalized imperative that 
imposes rules on 3ραξις, as well as the duty to follow them, is the Kantian element in 
Ricoeur’s ethics.1559 Living well, Oneself as Another insists, is obviously not limited to 
subjectivity, nor to interpersonal relations, but necessarily extends to the level of social 
                                               
1557 Ricoeur 1990, 211-212, 218-220, 225-226. (180-181, 186-188, 193-194). 
1558 Ricoeur 1995d, 13-14. (xii).; Ricoeur 2001c, 7, 10. (1, 4).; "The Classic Greek Dictionary"  1951. – The 
essays included in Political and Social Essays (Ricoeur 1974.), Lectures on Ideology and Utopia (Ricoeur 1986b.), 
Lectures 1: autour du politique (Ricoeur 1991a.), Le juste (Ricoeur 1995d.), and Le juste 2 (Ricoeur 2001c.) 
demonstrate Ricoeur’s growing interest in the political philosophy, especially from the 1980s onwards. Even 
though Johann Michel, for example, is correct in pointing out that from very early on Ricoeur wrote essays in 
political philosophy, I maintain that Ricoeur becomes more elaborate in his political thought only after the shift 
of emphasis from critical Marxism to Rawlsian liberalism (cf. Michel 2006, 383.). In short, in the wake of 
Rawls-Nozick debate, Ricoeur also engages critically with the political theories of such prolific thinkers as 
Hobbes, Kant, Hegel, Weber, Arendt, Weil, Patočka, Rawls, Habermas, and Taylor. As the “placing” of justice 
in the preface to The Just, and Ricoeur’s earlier analyses in Fallible Man and in On Interpretation (which locate the 
political quest in contrast with the economic one, neither of which reach the proper level of esteem and 
mutuality) suggest, however, Ricoeur’s political philosophy is a clarificatory extension (in the mode of Arendt’s 
inter homines esse as constitution by the public space of common interests) to the hermeneutics of the capable 
human, l’homme capable, who reaches a notion of him or herself as a “real citizen” in and through cultural 
mediation. Ricoeur maintains, in the opening pages of The Just, that the question “who is the subject of rights?” 
is a necessary subquestion of “who?” is a capable human worthy of respect and esteem. I will, therefore, by-
pass Ricoeur’s political philosophy for the most part, but do so only for the purposes of delimiting the scope of 
examination. I emphasize, nevertheless, the importance of political institution in Ricoeur’s cultural 
hermeneutics. According to Ricoeur, there is no culture without institution that is also political in nature; it is a 
necessary “order of recognition” without which “individuals are only the initial drafts of human persons.” Cf. 
sections 10.3 and 11.3 of this dissertation; Ricoeur 1995d, 29-40, 151-161. (1-10, 100-108).; Ricoeur 2001c, 33-
34. (25).; Ricoeur 1991a, 15-92. 
1559 Cf. Ricoeur 1987, 104-108. – Ricoeur admits in the same essay, “The Teleological and Deontological 
Structures of Action: Aristotle and/or Kant?,” that even though the realm of practical action, or 3ραξις, “may 
provide the appropriate framework of thought within which justice can be done to both the Aristotelian and 
Kantian, the teleological and deontological moments of morality,” it is “presumptuous to aim at a kind of 
conciliation between Aristotle and Kant, namely between an ethics of virtues linked to the qualitative plurality 
of the goods themselves, and an ethics of moral obligation which reduces the good to the right and the roght to 
the dutiful because of violence.” Ricoeur’s final words are, therefore, cautiously suggestive and definitely 
inconclusive: “If this presumption should be given up, how could we avoid becoming schizophrenic with one 
Aristotelian half-brain and another Kantian half-brain?” Ricoeur 1987, 99, 111. 
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institutions that provide the possibility of fair ethical structures such as justice and 
equality.1560  
An institution, according to Ricoeur, is “the structure of living together as this 
belongs to a historical community.”1561 Institution, as structuring the ήθος of living with 
others, is therefore irreducible to interpersonal relations, or to living with. The sense of 
(in)justice, for example, is enabled by this institutionalization of the ήθος of the good, and it 
is, in turn, represented by the judicial system, or “the legal” as Ricoeur calls it.1562 
                                               
1560 I would like to emphasize here the notion of social institution, as it is distinguishable from cultural 
formation. In Time and Narrative I, for example, Ricoeur distinguishes between human collectives and culture. 
The term “society” refers to a particular organized community, whereas culture “covers all of the achievements 
stemming from social creations and implicated in individual use that are transmitted by a tradition: language, 
techniques, arts, philosophical or religious attitudes and beliefs, insofar as these diverse functions are included 
in the social heritage of the various individuals living within a particular society.” Culture, Ricoeur maintains in 
Time and Narrative I, concerns these general functions that resemble Cassirer’s understanding of the same issue, 
whereas the notion of society includes practical institution. The notion of institution becomes then 
problematic, as Ricoeur seems to understand it as societal structuring rather than cultural figuration or 
formation. This puzzling distinction becomes less enigmatic as soon as it is noticed that Ricoeur opens an 
extended discussion with this idea presented in Maurice Mandelbaum’s work on historical knowledge, and 
claims that historiography concerns societal orders: “General history takes as its theme particular societies, such 
as peoples and nations, whose existence is continuous; special histories take as their theme abstract aspects of 
culture such as technology, art, science, religion, which lack continuous existence and which are linked together 
only through the initiative of the historian who is responsible for defining what counts as art, as science, as 
religion.” In the end, therefore, it is “Mandelbaum’s notion of society in its opposition to that of culture” that 
Ricoeur discusses. As Ricoeur later clarifies, the cultural forms have no significance without reference to a 
particular historical and social entity “which are bearers of these functions.” Cultural functions do not have an 
existence of their own but they can be found only in “first-order entities, to which acting individuals have 
belonged and in which they have participated through their actions and interactions.” This idea in no way 
contradicts the thesis that cultural mediation, irreducible to particular societies, is a necessary condition of 
becoming an ethical subject. Ricoeur 1983, 272-274, 284-285. (195-197, 204-205). Cf. Ricoeur 1990, 332. (286). 
1561 Ricoeur 1990, 194. (194). 
1562 Ricoeur 1990, 231. (197-198). Cf. Ricoeur 1991a, 176-195. – Although related to the approach that has 
been adopted in this dissertation, the extension of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics to the legal framework is not in my 
explicit focus. I base this decision to Ricoeur’s own conviction that culture cannot be reduced to “its explicit 
functions – political, economic and legal, and so on,” even though culture as an unavoidable condition and 
context is manifested through them in institution (Ricoeur & Kearney 2004, 117-118.). I would like to point 
out, however, that the legal or judicial hermeneutics is not an unconnected and separate field of critical 
thought, but a specific explication of Ricoeur’s overall cultural hermeneutics. As Johann Michel maintains, this 
judicial approach – that as a particular science constitutes an important viewpoint to the sociocultural whole – 
allows, for example, a philosophical discussion between Ricoeur and Ronald Dworkin (Michel 2006, 432-438.). 
In addition, the question of recognition through exercised justice includes a legal framework. Michel argues, 
nevertheless, that this legal or judicial approach rests on the sociocultural conditions, on which this dissertation 
work focuses in particular: “Cet acte de reconnaissance mutuelle [à savoir, une reconnaissance de l’autre 
comme sujet de droit,] suppose en outre des conditions sociales et culturelles pour être pleinement réalisé. C’est 
là, peut-être où la portée de l’idéal de Ricoeur peut décevoir: la reconnaissance entre des parties en conflit 
supposerait le partage de valeurs communes, des liens socioculturels plus forts que le conflit entre 
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“Institutional mediation,” Ricoeur insists, “is indispensable,” as communal sharing or 
distribution of any kind “cannot but help pass through the institution.”1563 Ethical intention, 
in other words, requires the support of institution that – thanks to the notion of belonging 
and the correlating ethical idea of mutual indebtedness – extends from the interpersonal 
solicitude or care for the equality of “each.”1564 
 Ricoeur points out, however, that when discussing the relations between the 
universal self, the plurality of persons, and the institutional environment, it would be 
pretentious not to pay attention to the “tragic” character of situated human action and the 
resulting conflictual confusion that is also of a moral nature. The complexity and diversity of 
life, Ricoeur argues, contest moral principles that are based on institution; the inevitable 
confusion relates to 3ραξις that takes into account the human situatedness in the various 
institutional mediations.1565 Even though Oneself as Another does not want to “add a political 
philosophy to moral philosophy,” political practices, therefore, still belong to the same 
problematics that is discussed under the notions of ήθος and of morality as its institution. As 
The Just also clarifies, these polit-ical aspects (3όλις) belong to ipseity understood as the 
concrete identity of “a real citizen” as narrated through cultural figuration and formation.1566  
Again, then, the idea of just distribution that pertains to both ethical and 
political realms, for example, faces the conflictual reality of the diversity of life – “the 
conflict here is between the universalist claim and the contextualist limits of the rule of 
                                                                                                                                            
particulieres.” (Michel 2006, 447.). Of this legal or judicial hermeneutics as a largely unscouted application of 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, cf. Michel 2006, 421-448.; Garapon 2006, 241-242, 244-245, 248.; G. H. Taylor 2010b.;  
Honneth 1995, 107-121. 
1563 Ricoeur 1990, 233. (199-200).; Ricoeur 1995d, 39-40. (10). 
1564 Ricoeur 1990, 235-236, 342. (202, 295). – Ricoeur extends the discussion of equality and distributive 
justice under the phrase “from the sense of justice to the ‘principles of justice’” in the study eight of Oneself as 
Another. Cf. Ricoeur 1990, 264-278. (227-239).; Fraser & Honneth 2003. 
1565 Ricoeur 1990, 290-291, 295. (249-250, 253). 
1566 Ricoeur 1990, 291. (250).; Ricoeur 1995d, 39-40, 152. (10, 101). Cf. Ricoeur 1991a, 15-19, 61-65, 162. 
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justice.”1567 According to Ricoeur, the dialectic of this ethico-political situatedness results in a 
paradox of form and force, by which he means the dynamics between the controlling drive 
of institution or political structures (viz. form) that delimits the domination of political 
agency (viz. force).1568 It is this “paradox” that explains the reason why Ricoeur has to seek 
the “sunny breaks” or l’éclaircies later in Course of Recognition. In such a conflictual ethico-
political reality, mutual recognition never finds itself as pure: “Whereas form finds its 
expression in the constitution’s approximation of the relation of mutual recognition 
(reconnaissance mutuelle) between individuals and between the latter and the higher agency, 
force finds its mark in all the scars left by the violent birth of all states that have become 
states of law.”1569 Form is contested by force, and vice versa, but the very structuring, the 
institution, is already a step away from mutual recognition that is only “approximated” in a 
state’s constitution that institutes its political structure. Still, only this formation enables 
recognition, albeit in a distanced or indirect mode that replays the conflict between the 
universal claim of mutuality and the contextual limits of structured life. 
This conflictual reality of sociopolitical life is inevitable, but it is balanced by 
the paradox that is as much part of the problem as it is part of the solution – it points to the 
necessity of practical action. As Ricoeur puts it in Oneself as Another, “political discussion is 
without conclusion, although it is not without decision. […] The debate over ‘good’ 
government is an integral part of the political mediation through which we aspire to a full 
life, to the ‘good life.’”1570 The conflict represented by the inconclusiveness of the debate is 
countered by the necessity of practical action, 3ραξις, that, by the support of institutionally 
                                               
1567 Ricoeur 1990, 293. (251-252). 
1568 Ricoeur 1990, 299. (257). 
1569 Ricoeur 1990, 299. (257). 
1570 Ricoeur 1990, 300-301. (258). 
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exercised practical wisdom, φρόνησις, seeking just behavior suited to each particular case, 
pertains to both politics and ethics in situation.1571 Although not using the word Sittlichkeit 
explicitly, Ricoeur concludes that this ethical life in just institutions is “critical solicitude” 
tested by the conflicts of living together.1572 Solicitude remains abstract and detached if not 
exercised in practical action that faces the reality of a structured life. 
These considerations have led us to the culmination point of this analysis, 
namely, to the idea of naissance, or the birth of l’homme capable/faillible as an authentic ethico-
political self. The “complementing and correcting” deontological amendment Ricoeur makes 
in Reflections on the Just to his more teleological “little ethics” of Oneself as Another sharpens the 
idea of imputability, or of holding oneself accountable. This “capacity” that “passes through 
moral obligation” – or that is given by the anterior “fundamental” reality of ethical 
imposition, and tested in applying it in the “posterior” field of practical wisdom and action – 
ultimately defines the capable human being.1573 The fragile “affirmation-attestation” of the 
self is formed as this fundamentally received ethico-political “I can”: “I can take myself to be the 
true author of acts assigned to my [narrative] account.”1574 Put differently, the self is given in 
the conflictual affirmation and attestation of the fundamental imputation. The conflict, or 
the reality of conflicts, is in turn encountered in the contextual actualization of living 
together, that is, in the “practical mediation capable of surmounting the antinomy [between 
universalism and contextuality].”1575 This argument, however, leads Ricoeur to maintain 
moral autonomy as a task rather than a given. In spite of his stronger emphasis on Kantian 
                                               
1571 Ricoeur 1990, 302, 312-313, 318. (259-260, 268-269, 273). – Referring to political and judicial 
institutions, Ricoeur points out that “the φρόνιµος is not necessarily one individual alone.” Cf. G. H. Taylor 
2010a, 5-6.; Fisher 2011, 158-163. 
1572 Ricoeur 1990, 318. (273). 
1573 Ricoeur 2001c, 8-9, 55-68. (1-3, 45-57). 
1574 Ricoeur 2001c, 25-26, 289-297. (17-18, 249-256). 
1575 Ricoeur 1990, 318-319. (274). 
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deontology in Reflections on the Just, Ricoeur sets aside the notion of agent’s autonomy in the 
manner that, for example, Kant’s moral philosophy proposes.1576 In brief, there is no 
autonomous subject without cultural labor pains. 
As I have demonstrated throughout this dissertation, Ricoeur emphasizes that 
ipseity as well as autonomy have to be approached en fin de parcours, “at the end of the 
course,” instead of assuming the place of beginning in (moral) selfhood.1577 Ricoeur’s 1991 
essay “Life in Quest of Narrative” stresses that poetically grounded narrations, which 
“teach” a subject of the connection between the ideas of ethical conduct and human 
happiness, belong to the realm of “phronetic understanding” instead of a theoretical or 
universal one.1578 Ricoeur maintains, therefore, in Oneself as Another that human autonomy, 
which “in the final analysis defines moral selfhood,”1579 has to be approached “through the 
rule of justice on the plane of institutions and the rule of reciprocity on the interpersonal 
plane.”1580 It is only in the given “framework of a culture of consideration,” as Ricoeur 
phrases it in Memory, History, Forgetting, that – also environmentally conscious – moral 
responsibility and goodwill emerge.1581 This autonomy, Ricoeur stresses, “can no longer be a 
self-sufficient autonomy,” since it is dependent on the dialogical and cultural exteriority that 
is the very condition of an autonomous ipse-self.1582 The moral selfhood, or ethical ipseity, is 
a task that emerges in the conflicts of actual socio-practical, that is, cultural life; it is best 
manifested “in interpersonal relations governed by the principle of respect owed to persons 
                                               
1576 Cf. Ricoeur 2001c, 85-86, 98. (72, 83). 
1577 Ricoeur 1990, 319. (274-275). 
1578 Ricoeur 1991b, 23. 
1579 Ricoeur 1990, 331. (285). 
1580 Ricoeur 1990, 319. (274-275). 
1581 Ricoeur 2000b, 616-619. (476-478).; Ricoeur 1991a, 270-293.; Ricoeur 2001c, 9, 64. (3, 53). 
1582 Ricoeur 1990, 320. (275). 
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and in institutions governed by the rule of justice.”1583 Put differently, an ethico-political self, 
capable of mutual recognition, is born in the unavoidable concrete contestations of a 
situated living together. This cultural condition of contextual mediations in instituted human 
3ραξις is the universal condition of becoming l’homme capable de faillir.1584 
 
* 
Though a long and arduous argument has just reached its major culmination point, that is, 
having reached an explication of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic of culture in the form of describing 
the cultural condition for the becoming of an authentic human being who is capable of 
failing as an ethico-political subject, we must extend this analysis further and draw out the 
related idea that has also been examined at length in this dissertation: recognition and, in 
particular, cultural recognition. Borrowing the words of Margit Eckholt, I maintain that 
Ricoeur’s work as a whole can be described as being auf dem Weg zu einer Kultur der 
Anerkennung, “on the way to a culture of recognition.”1585 
In his final remarks to the question “how a living subject or a self comes to 
be?,” Ricoeur re-examines the notion of narrative identity in the light of the term 
responsibility that repeats the idea of “reading” oneself in one’s practical acts, or “assuming 
the consequences of one’s actions, that is, holding certain events to come as delegates of 
oneself, despite the fact that they have not been expressly foreseen and intended.”1586 
Ricoeur’s point is made quickly, but for us the statement that follows is invaluable: “These 
                                               
1583 Ricoeur 1990, 331. (285). 
1584 Ricoeur 1990, 326, 330-331, 332-336, 338. (280-281, 284-285, 286-290, 293-294). Cf. Ricoeur 1960a, 
161. (145). 
1585 Eckholt 1999, 110. – Eckholt discusses “the culture of recognition” in the context of the study nine in 
Oneself as Another.  
1586 Ricoeur 1990, 341. (294). 
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events are her work, in spite of herself.”1587 As Ted Klein cites, Ricoeur understands ethics as 
an “odyssey of freedom across the world of works.”1588 These cultural works get their 
meaning “within the framework of civil law and penal law,” as Ricoeur maintains, since “the 
bearing of our acts […] extends beyond that of our projects.”1589 In other words, the 
meanings of our “works,” and the possibility of attributing our acts as works, is culturally 
mediated.  
The cultural framework – in this case judicial – also leads Ricoeur, however, to 
consider the relating idea of indebtedness that contributes to understanding responsibility as 
“recognizing one’s own indebtedness (reconnaître son propre être en dette) with respect to that 
which has made one what one is, which is to hold oneself responsible.”1590 Introducing this 
retrospective element and combining it with the previous prospective element of 
responsibility results in an examination of the notion of present, since “holding oneself 
responsible is […] accepting to be held to be the same today as the one who acted yesterday 
and who will act tomorrow.”1591 Put differently, Ricoeur returns to the question of narrative 
identity, but in form of a narrative identity that assumes responsibility, that is, as a moral 
identity.  
One’s recognition of this moral identity, or, in other words, one’s recognition 
of oneself as a moral subject, is enabled by cultural objectification as the movement of 
institution. The end of Ricoeur’s study nine in Oneself as Another testifies to this cultural 
condition, but also fleshes out the idea that the notion of narrative identity is fully 
understood only in connection with mutual recognition: 
                                               
1587 Ricoeur 1990, 341. (294). 
1588 Klein 1995, 358. – Klein cites Ricoeur’s 1978 essay “The Problem of the Foundation of Moral 
Philosophy,” published in Philosophy Today (3-4/22). 
1589 Ricoeur 1990, 341-342. (294-295). 
1590 Ricoeur 1990, 342. (295). Cf. Hénaff 2010, 202-241. 
1591 Ricoeur 1990, 342. (295). 
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There are limit cases, comparable to the puzzling cases of narrative identity, 
where identification in terms of the usual corporeal or psychological criteria 
becomes doubtful, to the point at which one says that the defendant in 
criminal law has become unrecognizable. In these limit cases, self-constancy, a 
synonym for ipse-identity, is assumed by a moral subject who demands to be 
considered the same as the other than he or she appears to have become. But 
this responsibility in the present assumes that the responsibility of the 
consequences to come and that of a past with respect to which the self 
recognizes its indebtedness are integrated in this nonpointlike present and in a 
sense recapitulated in it. 
This self-constancy, irreducible to any empirical persistence, 
perhaps contains the key to the phenomenon that we skirted above and then 
set aside, although it is incorporated in a common definition of imputation, 
namely that to impute is to place something “on someone’s account.” It is as 
though our acts were inscribed in a great book of accounts, registered there, 
preserved there. Perhaps this metaphor of inscription and registration 
expresses the objectification of what we just called the recapitulation in the 
present of the responsibility for consequences and of the responsibility for 
indebtedness. Self-constancy, objectified in this way, in the image of an 
interlinking of all of our acts outside of us, has the appearance of a fate that 
makes the Self its own enemy. […] 
If I nevertheless had to name a category that corresponded to 
the categories of imputability and responsibility […], I would choose the term 
recognition (reconnaissance), so dear to Hegel in the Jena period and throughout 
the subsequent course of his work. Recognition is a structure of the self 
reflecting on the movement [of institution] that carries self-esteem toward 
solicitude and solicitude toward justice. Recognition introduces the dyad and 
plurality in the very constitution of the self. Mutuality (la mutualité) in 
friendship and proportional equality in justice, when they are reflected in self-
consciousness, make self-esteem a figure of recognition (une figure de la 
reconnaissance).1592 
 
To restate Ricoeur’s emphasis, ipse-identity, or selfhood, is attainable only through cultural 
objectification (viz. Entäußerung) in the appropriation of which the self refigures itself as an ethico-
political subject by recognizing its responsibility in the instituting of it, that is, in the movement 
of ascribing one’s cultural acts to oneself (viz. Erinnerung) that opens the course of 
recognition going from self-esteem to justice and mutuality. 
                                               
1592 Ricoeur 1990, 343-344. (295-296). 
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The primordial quest for “esteem in another’s opinion”1593 or for “received 
recognition”1594 – also defined in Fallible Man and On Interpretation as the grounding human 
Suchen – extends to culturally objectified mutuality that is the mediation for the constitution 
of selfhood.1595 The culturally mediated movement of “recognition of the self in another self 
(reconnaissance du soi dans un autre soi),”1596 as On Interpretation phrases it, is explicated in Oneself 
as Another and in The Just to be ethico-political that despite its tensional lineament is still 
characterizable as the sunny break or clearance of mutuality. Culture, necessarily shared as an 
unsurpassable condition, is therefore definable as based on its etho-poetic nucleus that is 
objectified or expressed in ethico-political institution, that is, as the situated realm of 
mediated mutual recognition that manifests the idea of humanity, and constitutes human 
dignity.  
When Course of Recognition readdresses – after Memory, History, Forgetting1597 – the 
question of recognition and mutuality, it is thus only an exclamation point in a long series of 
works that in itself, as Ricoeur’s works indirectly disclosing the etho-poetic, is a course of cultural 
recognition in and through which a reader is able to “find” him or herself as an ethico-political 
subject – or to “receive” this identity through narrative understanding. This receiving is the 
birth, naissance, of the self as a concrete “real citizen.” Applied to this dissertation, having 
begun in part two with an analysis of Ricoeur’s Course of Recognition and having then traversed 
a full cycle that has examined the course of a Ricoeurian An-erkennung as cultural recognition 
and ethical life, the now regained notion of recognition has become that of Sittlichkeit, or 
ethico-political situatedness in living history, stripped of unnecessary Spiritualism. This full 
                                               
1593 Ricoeur 1960a, 136. (120). 
1594 Ricoeur 1960a, 137-138. (121-122).; Ricoeur 1965a, 502. (523). 
1595 Ricoeur 1960a, 127-128, 137. (111, 121).; Ricoeur 1965a, 487-488, 490, 502-503. (507, 509-510, 523). 
1596 Ricoeur 1965a, 503. (523). 
1597 Cf. Ricoeur 2000b, 554-574. (427-443). 
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course of analysis has then become the “Hegelian concept of Sittlichkeit in its broadest 
sense”1598 as Ricoeur defines it in Course of Recognition. Only in this figuration that includes the 
ethical, is a path opened for Ricoeur to philosophically emphasize the possibility of agapeic 
“clearings” of freedom and good will – the metaethical “poetics of αγά3η” belonging to an 
economy of the gift, recognized, but left bracketed in Oneself as Another. 
 
15.3 The Limit: le Tout Autre 
We have almost completed the analytical task set for this dissertation work. The theme of 
αγά3η leads us, however, to the final stage of examining Ricoeur’s cultural hermeneutics, 
namely, to finding its proper limit. Αγά3η, or generous giving without expecting anything in 
return, ruins the idea of reciprocity. Ricoeur emphasized this already in The Voluntary and the 
Involuntary in terms of love and friendship as “an essentially private relation which exceeds 
the rule of justice.”1599 As Ricoeur argues in Course of Recognition, however, as soon as aγά3η is 
not taken as illusory or hypocritical but as “a construct allowing description of actions 
carried out by persons in reality, or a partially realizable ideal, a utopia, or a deception,” it 
faces the challenge or the test of credilibity in the dialectics of love and justice.1600 In the reality of 
cultural mediation, interpersonal relations are not fully characterizable in terms of pure 
                                               
1598 Ricoeur 2004b, 294. (201). – Oneself as Another expresses this affinity directly: “We then admitted [in the 
seventh study] that it was only in a specific institutional milieu that the capacities and predispositions that 
distinguish human action can blossom; the individual, we said then, becomes human only under the condition 
of certain institutions; and we added: if this is so, the obligation to serve these institutions is itself a condition 
for the human agent to continue to develop. These are all reasons to feel indebted to Hegel’s work of 
hierarchizing the modalities of the actualization of freedom in the Philosophy of Right [that is, family, civil society, 
and state]. To this extent, and to this extent alone, the notion of Sittlichkeit […] has never ceased to instruct us.” 
Ricoeur 1990, 296-297. (254-255). Cf. Ricoeur 1990, 396-397. n3. (344-345. n51). 
1599 Ricoeur 1949, 123. (128). 
1600 Ricoeur 2004b, 323. (221). – Ricoeur quotes Luc Boltanski. 
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mutuality, that is, exclusively understood from the point of view of love that does not expect 
anything reciprocal in return.  
 
The Otherness of Heidegger 
The reality of human relations is dialectical. In the end, the distance between my self and the 
others, or the fundamental dissymmetry between subjects in the form of the otherness of 
other people, does not remain unendurable but dialectical as Ricoeur proposes in the 
concluding study ten of Oneself as Another. This particular dialectic of the self and its other, 
however, constitutes only an aspect of a larger dialectic that takes place between the Same 
and the Other. The “philosophy of the Same” includes a “philosophy of the Other,” and 
vice versa; “the movement from the Same toward the Other and that from the Other toward 
the Same are dialectically complementary.”1601 The other, who understands my experience of 
flesh (Leib) as an objectified body (Körper) – as Ricoeur states by resorting to Husserl’s 
terminology – can nevertheless, by analogy, become to me my “kind,” mon semblable, that is, 
not me but someone like me as a living, desiring, and suffering subject. This “marvel of 
analogical transfer” from one’s self to the other is a “pairing” (Paarung), however; a 
movement that acknowledges, by analogy, the flesh of another.1602 Put differently, without 
losing sight of the notion of dissymmetry, the “same” of the self reaches out to the 
otherness of the “other.”  
The “other,” in turn, reaches out to the “same,” Ricoeur argues, as he criticizes 
the philosophy of the Other by Emmanuel Lévinas. For Lévinas the Other, as radical 
exteriority, is diametrically opposed to the Same: “when the face of the other (le visage 
                                               
1601 Ricoeur 1990, 393. (340). 
1602 Ricoeur 1990, 380-387. (329-335). Cf. Ricoeur 2004b, 228-232. (154-157). 
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d’autrui) elevates itself to face me (s’élève face à moi), above me, it is not an appearance that I 
can include within the sphere of my own representations.”1603 This Other commands, 
because it is the epiphany of absolute exteriority that places it above any mode of relation. 
The radicality of the Other, then, becomes the source of one’s ethical comportment, that is, 
the origin of one’s response in the form of responsibility, implying a subject capable of 
assuming this responsibility of substituting the I for the Other, and, therefore, also a 
reception on the part of the one responding to the call of the Other. The radical exteriority 
of the Other, Ricoeur argues in Oneself as Another, will have to be interiorized; the Other, put 
differently, includes the possibility of an opening toward the Same.1604 
 Ricoeur brings together these two complementary dialectics of the Same and 
the Other in his analysis of conscience, which is “at once inside me and higher than me.”1605 
It is this analysis that concludes our discussion of the relation between Ricoeur and 
Heidegger, but it also leads us to the threshold of the “other” of cultural hermeneutics. First, 
we are called to recognize the limitedness of Heidegger’s ontologically oriented 
hermeneutics, and second, to conceive Ricoeur’s tensional hermeneutics as the dialectics of 
the Same and the Wholly Other. 
Let us focus on Heidegger first. Drawing from Heidegger’s ontological analysis 
of conscience in sections §54-§60 of Being and Time, Ricoeur maintains in Oneself as Another 
that Heidegger offers a good description of the otherness in form of conscience (Gewissen) 
                                               
1603 Ricoeur 1990, 388. (336). 
1604 Ricoeur 1990, 387-393. (336-340). Cf. Ricoeur 1994, 96-105. (Ricoeur 1995a, 119-126.); Ricoeur 2004b, 
232-238. (157-161). – Even though Ricoeur does not discuss Lévinas’ philosophy of the Other in his essay “A 
Loving Obedience” (in his 1998 work Thinking Biblically), it still complements the argument Ricoeur pursues in 
Oneself as Another by explicating the structures of ethical response. Cf. Ricoeur & LaCocque 1998, 157-189. 
(111-138). Of the broader discussion between Ricoeur and Lévinas, cf. Peperzak 2010, 22-28. 
1605 Ricoeur 1990, 394. (342). 
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that is at both internal and external to a living subject.1606 Dasein calls itself in conscience, so 
“the call comes from me,” and still “from beyond and over me”: Der Ruf kommt aus mir und 
doch über mich.1607 Put differently, Dasein finds, in the mode of conscience, the other that is 
Dasein itself; “Es” ruft, “‘It’ calls,” yet without words.1608 The silent call indicates uncanniness 
in the face of be-ing, that is, an ontological “being-in-debt” or “being-guilty,” Schuldigsein.1609 
Phrased differently, Dasein, as being thrown to existence, finds itself as being in debt when 
facing its being in be-ing. In Heidegger’s words, dieses “schuldig” als Prädikat des “ich bin” 
auftaucht, “this ‘guilt’ appears as a predicate of ‘I am.’”1610 The call “from me and over me,” 
even though exemplary in this duality, is for Heidegger only an onto-existential indicative. 
This direct onto-existential approach to conscience is too hasty a move for 
Ricoeur; it leads him to emphasize that “there is no clearer way of abolishing the primacy of 
ethics.”1611 The total annulment of ethical being-with and being-among exemplifies 
Heidegger’s ultimate failure in describing Dasein’s fundamental constitution: “unfortunately, 
Heidegger does not show how one could travel the opposite path (parcourir le chemin inverse) 
from ontology toward ethics.”1612 Instead of his hasty ontologization of conscience that 
results in its “demoralization” as well as undermines the notion of one’s ownmost 
possibilities and concrete authenticity as an ethical subject, Ricoeur proposes that conscience 
signifies “being-enjoined by the Other.”1613 This “Other,” Ricoeur stresses, manifests itself as 
the culturally conditioned situation – requiring practical wisdom – in which the subject finds 
him or herself: 
                                               
1606 Ricoeur 1990, 394. (342).; Heidegger 1967, 267-301. (247-277). 
1607 Ricoeur 1990, 401. (348).; Heidegger 1967, 275. (254). Cf. Ricoeur 2008, 102-110. 
1608 Heidegger 1967, 275. (254). 
1609 Ricoeur 1990, 402. (349).; Heidegger 1967, 281. (259). 
1610 Heidegger 1967, 281. (259). 
1611 Ricoeur 1990, 403. (349). 
1612 Ricoeur 1990, 403. (349). 
1613 Ricoeur 1990, 404-405. (351). 
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Conscience, as attestation-injunction, signifies that the “ownmost possibilities” 
of Dasein are primordially structured by the optative mood of living well, 
which mood governs in a secondary fashion the imperative of respect and 
links up with the conviction belonging to moral judgment in situation. If this is 
so, the passivity of being-enjoined consist in the situation of listening in which 
the ethical subject is placed in relation to the voice addressed to it in the 
second person. To find oneself called upon in the second person at the very 
core of the optative of living well, then of the prohibition to kill, then of the 
search for the choice appropriate to the situation, is to recognize oneself as 
being enjoined to live well with and for others in just institutions and to esteem oneself as 
the bearer of this wish. The otherness of the Other is then the counterpart, on the 
dialectical level of the “great kinds,” to this passivity specific to being-
enjoined.1614 
 
Put differently, without the otherness of the culturally manifesting Other, a subject cannot 
find him or herself as an authentic subject – that is, as an ethical subject who faces the need 
of utilizing practical wisdom and making decisions in that situation. “Being-enjoined,” 
Ricoeur maintains, is “the structure of ipseity.”1615 The situation imposes the subject as a 
φρόνιµος, born to oneself as a conscience that reflects the unavoidable need to decide 
according to the ethical intention of living well with and for others in just institutions. 
Heidegger’s failure was to too lightly dismiss this very structure that manifests the Other, 
and through which one becomes an authentic subject in the concreteness of living and 
suffering. 
 As to the nature of this Other, or “the source of injunction,”1616 Ricoeur 
openly admits in the very last pages of Oneself as Another that a philosopher has no tools 
beyond the transgenerational extension of the Other as the “other people.” As explained in 
section 7.3 of this dissertation, Ricoeur maintains that synchronic being-with extends to 
diachronic being-with – that is, the past and also future generations – but he also points out 
                                               
1614 Ricoeur 1990, 406. (352). – Frederick Lawrence discusses briefly Ricoeur’s notion of conviction as an 
internal sense of culture; cf. Lawrence 2003, 511-512. 
1615 Ricoeur 1990, 409. (354). 
1616 Ricoeur 1990, 409. (355). 
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that philosophical open-mindedness requires that the imposing Other is by no means limited 
to such a historical condition. The Other, as a condition, is not only transgenerational but 
also transcultural; a living God, perhaps, as Ricoeur mentions.1617 In the end, therefore, a 
philosopher encounters the mystery and not the problem of the Other.1618 “With this aporia 
of the Other,” Ricoeur writes in Oneself as Another, “philosophical discourse comes to an 
end.”1619 A discourse other than one of speculation, Ricoeur maintains by thus carrying out 
the same hope of discovering a new kind of search as the poetic Heidegger did, would be 
required for understanding this “metacategory” of otherness.1620 
 
Reversal: Retrospection to the Essential 
After having now settled the reasons for which Ricoeur philosophizes “after” Heidegger and 
yet “with” him, I am contested – as Kelton Cobb and, in particular, Marcel Madila-
Basanguka in his Poétique de la culture: imagination, éthique et religion chez Paul Ricoeur (1996)1621 – 
to take into account the possibility of “the Wholly Other,” le Tout Autre, or the transcending 
element that surpasses the horizontal and establishes the expectation of the transcendent 
vertical dimension of authority.1622 Unlike Cobb and Madila-Basanguka, and unlike David E. 
Klemm and William Schweiker,1623 however, I won’t extend my own analysis into the 
theology of culture that could well be construable on the basis of Ricoeur’s philosophical 
                                               
1617 Ricoeur 1990, 409. (355).  
1618 Cf. Ricoeur 1992, 74-75. 
1619 Ricoeur 1990, 409. (355). 
1620 Ricoeur 1990, 410. (356). – On Ricoeur’s critique of Heidegger’s criticism of ontotheology, however, 
cf. Ricoeur & LaCocque 1998, 362-371. (353-361).; Ricoeur 1994, 84-89. (Ricoeur 1995a, 109-113.) 
1621 Cf. Appendix 2. 
1622 Cf. Ricoeur 1990, 299-300, 366, 394. (257, 316, 342).; Ricoeur 2001c, 71-75. (60-63). – Ricoeur argues 
in “The Paradox of Authority” that the modern crisis of political authority and political recognition (properly: 
the lack of it) is rooted in the loss of the legitimating foundation drawn from the vertical dimension. A 
functional institutional authority, Ricoeur maintains, is both vertical and horizontal. Ricoeur 2001c, 109-123. 
(92-105). 
1623 Klemm 1993.; Schweiker 1993. 
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work that clearly manifests the fruitful encounter between Jerusalem and Athens, to which 
Ricoeur repeatedly alludes in his texts.1624 Even though Ricoeur’s “double life” (as Boyd 
Blundell calls the philosopher Ricoeur’s religiosity1625) – or his “well-installed bipolarity” as 
Ricoeur himself calls it in Critique and Conviction1626 – more than indicates openness to such an 
investigation, Ricoeur remains a philosopher to the very end despite also having written 
extensively on biblical hermeneutics, the hermeneutics of the sacred, and the limits of 
philosophy.1627 In his philosophical work, Jean-Luc Amalric comments, Ricoeur adopts 
agnosticism and suspends responding, (I emphasize,) to the question of the absolute.1628 In 
                                               
1624 Ricoeur 1957, 246.; Ricoeur 1960b, 26-30. (20-23).; Ricoeur & LaCocque 1998, 16-17, 336. (xvii-xviii, 
331-332). 
1625 Blundell 2010, 51-52. Cf. Ricoeur & Raynova 2003, 683-689. 
1626 Ricoeur, Azouvi, & de Launay 1995, 15-17, 211-256. (5-6, 139-170). 
1627 Cf. Ricoeur 1975a.; Ricoeur 1995h, 71-72.; Helenius 2012a, 162-163. – Besides the early The Symbolism 
of Evil and On Interpretation, Ricoeur focuses on questions pertaining to the sacred, religion, and religious 
language in the essays included in Essays on Biblical Interpretation (Ricoeur 1980.), Lectures 3 (Ricoeur 1994.), 
Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination (Ricoeur 1995a.), Penser la Bible (Ricoeur & LaCocque 1998.), 
L’herméneutique biblique (Ricoeur 2001a.), and Amour et justice (Ricoeur 2008.). Ricoeur’s preface to the anthology 
in the honor of a catholic exegete Paul Beauchamp S.J., Testament biblique, testifies to a close personal relation 
with theologians (cf. Ricoeur 2001d.). The trajectory of Ricoeur’s work implies that in the grand scheme of 
things his emphasis shifts from the symbolisms of the sacred to biblical hermeneutics. On the vast secondary 
literature covering this field of thought in Ricoeur’s work as well as of its application in theology, cf. e.g. 
Albano 1987., Vanhoozer 1990., Stiver 2001., Amherdt 2004., Vincent 2008., Orth & Reifenberg 2009., 
Blundell 2010., and Stiver 2012. 
1628 Amalric 2011, 23. – Even though Ricoeur’s work includes, for example, extensive analyses on biblical 
hermeneutics, he maintains, nevertheless, that his aim and style of analysis has always been strictly 
philosophical. As Ricoeur emphasizes in his 1995 reply to David Stewart, the problem of the interpretation of 
religious language is a task for philosophy, and it should therefore not be excluded from the field of 
investigation: “Religious language, carried in this way to the level of speculative thought, places itself among the 
objects of philosophy, under the category of the philosophy of religion. And it is in this sense that I speak of it 
in my essays on the philosophy of religion of Kant, of Hegel, of Rosenzweig, and of Lévinas. My episodic 
discussions concerning Karl Barth, Bultmann, Tillich, and Bonhoeffer are therefore to be situated entirely on 
the periphery of my philosophical field of investigation of religious thematics.” (Ricoeur 1995g, 445-446.)  
This emphasis does not prevent Ricoeur from maintaining elsewhere that his philosophical position at 
points intersects with a religious worldview: “In the final pages of Oneself as Another, I risk the formulation of a 
philosophical agnosticism concerning the radical origin of the injunction speaking through the voice of 
consciousness. I do not try to conceal the fact that there is an affinity between my hermeneutic philosophy and 
a determined religious position. I have explained elsewhere the difference between the nonphilosophical 
sources of philosophy and philosophical arguments. But this horizon must not be perceived as a ‘place’ that 
religion itself would occupy and permeate. Religion, too, has its horizon: Love and Hope. In this sense, it is the 
horizon common to philosophy and religion. But they speak of it in each case differently.” (Ricoeur 1995l, 569-
570.)  
The posthumously published Fragments confirm this “double life.” Even though Ricoeur mentions that he 
is “a Christian who expresses himself philosophically,” he also insists that he maintains these two realms of life 
separate (quite literally as life and thought): “I am not a Christian philosopher, as rumor would have it, in a 
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addition, Ricoeur’s religiosity could be described as an “anatheistic post-religious faith” 
invigorated by a “Eucharistic hope” as Richard Kearney proposes.1629 In the view of this 
suspension that also distinguishes Ricoeur from Hegel in openly recognizing the question of 
the absolute but consistently refraining from giving a final response (as demonstrated with 
the last remarks of this section),1630 I confine my task to show the ultimate limit of cultural 
                                                                                                                                            
deliberately pejorative, even discriminatory sense. I am, on one side, a philosopher, nothing more, even a 
philosopher without an absolute, concerned about, devoted to, immersed in philosophical anthropology, whose 
general theme can be placed under the heading of a fundamental anthropology. And, on the other, a Christian 
who expresses himself philosophically, as Rembrandt is a painter, nothing more, and a Christian who expresses 
himself through pictures, and Bach a musician, nothing more, and a Christian who expresses himself through 
music.” (Ricoeur, Abel, & Goldenstein 2007, 107, 110. (69, 72). Cf. Ricoeur 1994, 247-256.) On this basis I do 
not agree with David Kaplan’s depiction of Ricoeur as “a French hermeneutic philosopher and theologian.” 
(Kaplan 2010, 112.) Even though the Golden Rule, for example, extends to both realms (cf. Ricoeur 1994, 273-
279.; Ricoeur 1995a, 293-302.), Ricoeur maintains that la philosophie reste philosophie, “philosophy remains 
philosophy,” as he states in a 1948 essay; “philosophy remains therefore free to the extent that neither this nor 
that philosophy can ever call itself Christian; there is no orthodoxy in philosophy.” (Ricoeur 1994, 240.) 
As to Ricoeur’s self-description as “immersed in philosophical anthropology,” I am not denying that 
Ricoeur’s philosophy is, at large, anthropologically oriented. I maintain, however, that this anthropology 
necessitates a philosophy of culture. Even though Ricoeur utilizes French phraseology, in Fragments he also 
refers to himself as “le philosophe de métier et de culture, le penseur de culture philosophique.” (Ricoeur, Abel, 
& Goldenstein 2007, 108.) In good faith one can read this as Ricoeur’s own confirmation of the thesis I am 
pursuing, namely, that Ricoeur was also a philosopher of culture. 
To return to Oneself as Another, in the light of Ricoeur’s worry concerning the study 10 (cf. above), it 
becomes even more interesting that the last two Gifford Lectures delivered by Ricoeur in 1985-86 included two 
studies on biblical hermeneutics. Even though the lectures formed the basis of the 1990 work, these two 
lectures were not included in it as Ricoeur notes himself in the introduction to Oneself as Another: “The primary 
reason for excluding them, which may be debatable and even perhaps regrettable, has to do with my concern to 
pursue, to the very last line, an autonomous, philosophical discourse.” (Ricoeur 1990, 35-38. (23-25).) These 
two lectures on biblical hermeneutics were published separately in Amour et justice (2008). 
1629 Kearney 2010b, 30-40.; Kearney 2010a, 71-76. – Cf. Kearney’s discussion of the anatheist 
transreligiosity. Even though Ricoeur, a devout Christian, would probably not be willing to infer a full relativist 
position out from his own position, Kearney develops – referring to Ricoeur later in the section – this outcome 
under the thematics of “interconfessional hospitality” that is a result of religious self-criticism. Kearney 2010a, 
166-181. 
1630 Ricoeur criticizes Hegel in his 1963 essay “Philosopher après Kierkegaard” for restricting religion to a 
pre-philosophical stage in the systemic becoming of the Spirit that is ultimately defined as absolute reflection 
(in its concreteness), whereas Kierkegaard should be criticized for his emphasis on the religious phase that does 
not give credit to the necessity of structure and mediation. Ricoeur places himself as a philosopher, critically, 
between these antagonistic positions by maintaining that 1) philosophy is always in relation to non-philosophy 
in the Kierkegaardian sense of irrational experience, 2) it should concern a subject’s concrete existence at the 
level of personal decisions, but 3) it should also view itself in the light of the paradox arising from the conflict 
between Hegelian absolutism and Kierkegaardian existentialism: “La science n’est pas tout. Mais, outre la 
science, il y a encore la pensée. La question de l’existence humaine ne signifie pas la mort du langage et de la 
logique; au contraire, elle requient une surcroît de lucidité et de rigueur. La question: ‘Qu’est-ce qu’exister?’ ne 
peut être séparée de cette autre question: ‘Qu’est-ce que penser?’ La philosophie vit de l’unité de ces deux 
questions et meurt de leur separation.” Ricoeur 1992, 43-45. 
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hermeneutics, or the threshold of the Wholly Other, that is explicitly drawn by Ricoeur 
himself. 
 Locating the limit of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic of culture as the question of the 
Wholly Other provides a brief complementing retrospection to Ricoeur’s work, reading it 
“backwards” from the end to the beginning. Unlike what we did in part three and in the 
preceding chapters of this part four, generally following the chronological order of Ricoeur’s 
works, I commit a double reversal. Instead of following Ricoeur’s works in a chronological 
order, I move into reading them with the understanding of what has already been said above. 
Second, instead of reading Ricoeur as a philosopher of culture – taking into account 
Ricoeur’s “double life” – I move into reading Ricoeur as a philosopher of the Wholly Other. 
David Stewart, for example, argues that it is the question of religious language that is at the 
heart of Ricoeur’s work,1631 and in his reply to Stewart, Ricoeur admits that “there is no 
doubt that the religious experience expressed in stories, symbols, and figures is a major source 
of my taste for philosophy.”1632 I will show that this second reversal, which re-enacts the 
tension between the hermeneutic of the sacred and the hermeneutic of culture that I 
introduced in section 3.1, puts our previous reading to a test, which, in the end, will 
paradoxically confirm the value of our first reading.  
To truly begin from the “other side,” I start this reading “in reverse” beyond 
the end, beyond Ricoeur’s physical life, with the posthumously published sketch of Vivant 
jusqu’à la mort.1633 Even though this scattered and incomplete draft could be read as an 
indication of finally giving in to Heidegger’s fundamental ontology under the thematics of 
                                               
1631 Stewart 1995, 423-424. 
1632 Ricoeur 1995g, 443. 
1633 Trans. Living Up to Death (by David Pellauer, 2009). From hereon the English title is used. 
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being-unto-death – since “death is truly the end of life in time; survival is the others”1634 – it 
testifies more convincingly of “the Essential (l’Essentiel) common to every religion” that 
guides Ricoeur “throughout this mediation.”1635 In the face of death, he maintains in a 
Jaspersian manner, the transreligious “Essential” reveals itself as immanent transcendence.  
This “Essential” is silently present in Ricoeur’s pamphlet Sur la traduction,1636 
that is, in Ricoeur’s last published work while he was still alive. Following the opening 
problematics of his essay “From Interpretation to Translation” in Penser la Bible,1637 Ricoeur 
repeatedly declares in Sur la traduction that “after Babel, ‘to understand is to translate.’”1638 As 
Richard Kearney mentions in his introduction to its English translation, however, Ricoeur 
has in mind not only translation from one language to another, but also the condition of 
acquiring one’s self in the “translation” from facing its Other.1639 The ultimate question of 
translating the onto-existential untranslatable, such as the unknown Name of God,1640 
therefore deepens these discussions of overcoming cultural-linguistic borders in spite of 
linguistic strangeness or cultural otherness,1641 but also refers to the realm of mysteries and of 
the ontological “Concealed” as the incommunicable and as the untranslatable par excellence.1642 
As further examined in the essay “Naming God” included in Lectures 3: aux 
frontières de la philosophie – which covers many of Ricoeur’s texts from philosophy of religion 
                                               
1634 Ricoeur, Abel, & Goldenstein 2007, 76. (41). Cf. Ricoeur’s 1951 and 1983 essays on death; Ricoeur 
1992, 191-194, 195-202. 
1635 Ricoeur, Abel, & Goldenstein 2007, 43. (14). Cf. Ricoeur 2010b, 37. 
1636 Trans. On Translation (by Eileen Brennan, 2006). From hereon the English title is used. 
1637 Trans. Thinking Biblically (by David Pellauer, 1998). From hereon the English title is used. – On the 
relation between interpretation and translation, cf. Ricoeur & LaCocque 1998, 335-336, 370-371. (331-332, 360-
361). 
1638 Ricoeur 2004c, 44, 50-51, 59. (24, 28, 33). – Ricoeur adopts the phrase from George Steiner. 
1639 Kearney 2006, xii-xx. 
1640 Cf. Ricoeur & LaCocque 1998, 335-337. (331-332).; Hengel 2003, 249-257, 265. 
1641 Ricoeur uses translation between languages as the model of crosscultural communication already in his 
earlier texts such as his 1965 essay “The Tasks of the Political Educator.” Cf. Ricoeur 1965c, 85-86. (Ricoeur 
1974, 282.). 
1642 Ricoeur 2004c, 59. Cf. Ricoeur 1949, 445. (473).; Ricoeur & Tóth 2003, 650-651. 
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to biblical hermeneutics – this “untranslatable” or “unnameable” is the Sacred that surpasses 
reflective comprehension and is approximable only in poetic expression.1643 This 
Unnameable, put diffently, is the awful and yet awesome Wholly Other, or the noumenal 
mysterium tremendum et fascinosum, as Rudolf Otto writes,1644 that defines the realm of faith and 
necessitates polyvocal discourses as interpretations explaining the sublime that breaks into 
human experience. These founding events of encounter, Ricoeur maintains, establish a 
“community of interpretation,” which then “recognizes itself as enrooted” through the very 
“naming of God” that remains a symbolic response.1645 
 Passing now over Time and Narrative and The Living Metaphor, these quick steps 
allow us to move further back into Ricoeur’s long 1975 essay “Biblical Hermeneutics” that 
shows “that the limit-expressions of religious language are appropriated in the redescription 
of that which we might correlatively call the limit-experiences of man, and that these limit-
experiences, redescribed by the limit-expressions of religious language, constitute the 
appropriate referent of this language [that is, the Wholly Other].”1646 The idea of Wholly Other 
that enters into language as a transgressing redescription then moves us into the final 
sections of On Interpretation, which takes up, again, the symbolism of the sacred. “It must be 
confessed,” Ricoeur admits, “that out method of thought does not enable us to capture the 
depth (le fond) of religious symbolism, but only allows us to have a frontier view of it.”1647 
The question of the origin of faith resides outside the scope of philosophical inquiry. As this 
Source is, nevertheless, indicated by expressions in culture, it becomes a limit problem, a 
question that represents the Wholly Other in cultural examination. The “dialectics of 
                                               
1643 Ricoeur 1994, 281-305. (Ricoeur 1995a, 217-235.) 
1644 Otto 1936, 42-43. Cf. Ricoeur 1995a, 49.; Éliade 1968, 8-13. 
1645 Ricoeur 1994, 290-291. (Ricoeur 1995a, 224-225.) 
1646 Ricoeur 1975a, 107-108, 121-122, 127-128. 
1647 Ricoeur 1965a, 504. (425). 
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recognition” (la dialectique de la reconnaissance)1648 that holds “the mytho-poetic formations of 
culture” at its epicenter1649 – analyzed in section 11.3 of this dissertation – is subject to a 
greater dialectics of the cultural Same and the sacred Wholly Other. 
 The dialectic between cultural άρχή and cultural τέλος that constituted the 
“properly dialectical” level of the philosophical interpretation for Ricoeur,1650 functions at the 
level of the “Same” in terms of cultural being-here. The “archeology” and “teleology” of a 
subject as culturally situated are still focused on the human condition as coming from and 
going to somewhere. Although Ricoeur asserts that he is not able and not even willing to 
directly extrapolate reflective thought to its radical origins in being, he still maintains that the 
question of faith – which, according to On Interpretation, belongs to the “Poetics of the Will” 
– “points to” the Wholly Other (le Tout-Autre) that is examined in the theological realm of 
the Beginning and the End: 
Compared to this archeology of myself and to this teleology of myself, genesis 
and eschatology are Wholly Other. To be sure, I speak of the Wholly Other 
only insofar as it addresses itself to me; and the kerygma, the glad tidings, is 
precisely that it addresses itself to me and ceases to be the Wholly Other. Of 
an absolute Wholly Other I know nothing at all. But by its very manner of 
approaching, of coming, it announces itself as the Wholly Other than the άρχή 
and the τέλος which I can conceptualize in reflective thought. It announces 
itself as Wholly Other by annihilating its radical otherness. […] This is where 
the question of faith becomes a hermeneutic question, for what annihilates 
itself in our flesh is the Wholly Other as λόγος.1651 
 
The dialectical hermeneutic of culture itself is, according to Ricoeur, fully understandable 
only in relation to a dialectics of Genesis and of the Eschaton, that is, in a dramatization of 
human condition such that it surpasses it altogether.1652 This dramatization, or this 
                                               
1648 Cf. Ricoeur 1965a, 453, 458, 466, 473, 474-475. (469, 474, 483, 490, 492-493). 
1649 Ricoeur 1965a, 334, 445. (342, 460). 
1650 Ricoeur 1965a, 444. (459). 
1651 Ricoeur 1965a, 504-505. – Of Ricoeur’s analysis on Jewish, Christian, and Greek time conceptions, cf. 
Ricoeur 1975c, 25-28. 
1652 Ricoeur 1957a, 250-251.; Ricoeur, Azouvi, & de Launay 1995, 253-254. (168-169).; Ricoeur 1946, 27. 
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invocation of human speech as interpretation, is where the Wholly Other manifests itself 
culturally. As Ricoeur’s predecessor at the University of Chicago, Paul Tillich, phrased it: der 
tragende Gehalt der Kultur ist Religion und die notwendige Form der Religion ist die Kultur, “religion is 
the supporting substance of culture, and culture is the necessary form of religion.”1653 The 
radical Origin and the radical End become discernible through the archeology and the 
teleology of a human subject, which, in turn, become comprehensible by finding their 
ultimate limit in the radical Beginning and End.  
If not totally graspable, the totality of being – approximated in the fullness of 
symbolic language – can be approached by means of dialectical hermeneutics: “Creation and 
eschatology present themselves as the horizon of my archeology and the horizon of my 
teleology.”1654 Unlike cultural creations, the horizons of radical Beginning and of radical End 
cannot become possessed objects; they are, nevertheless, approachable through the symbols 
of the sacred that objectify the sense of the transcendent Other by utilizing equivocal and yet 
contextualized expressions:  
                                               
1653 Tillich 1924, 17. – Even though Ricoeur utilizes Tillich’s conceptions, he emphasizes that he still 
remains on the side of philosophy, and more precisely in the Kantian sphere of thought: “These last remarks 
[concerning the extension of the philosophy of action beyond the overly narrow limits of Kant’s practical 
philosophy] lead me to the question of the extension of my theory of symbolism in the sphere of the sacred. I 
will say first of all that this vocabulary is not mine but that of the philosophy of religion of Mircea Éliade and, 
up to a certain point, that of Paul Tillich. I assume it myself as one of the ‘places’ where the symbol exceeds the 
linguistic and semantic structure that ties it to metaphor. But, for me, this ‘place’ does not occupy some 
intellectual or spiritual intuition that would actually violate the Kantian asceticism of a philosophy of limits.” 
Ricoeur 1995l, 569. 
1654 Ricoeur 1965a, 505. (526). – One mediation between these two realms, immanent and transcendent, is 
prophecy; a prophet is an archetypal figure of a “responsive self,” as Ricoeur maintains in the final 1986 
Gifford lecture. Just as in On Interpretation, Ricoeur examines this theme sporadically in long texts such as The 
Symbolism of Evil, but his essay “Sentinel of Imminence” in Thinking Biblically offers a more thorough study of it. 
As the final appeal at the very end of the essay implies, the text demonstrates that even though philosophy 
always remains at the side of immanence, it becomes a part of this prophecy through the hermeneutics of its 
symbolic meaning. Ricoeur also argues this in his 1972 essay L’herméneutique du témoignage, which is included in 
Lectures 3. The two gems of Lectures 3 are, however, his two essays on the scope of philosophy as possible 
prophecy: Philosophie et prophétisme I & II were originally published already in the 1950s. Ricoeur & LaCocque 
1998, 223-245. (165-183).; Ricoeur 1965a, 478, 508. (496-497, 528-529).; Ricoeur 1994, 118-122, 129-139, 153-
185.; Ricoeur 2008, 78-85. (Ricoeur 1995a, 262-267.) Cf. Kearney 2010a, 78-80. 
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From the viewpoint of the philosophy of reflection, which is a philosophy of 
immanence, the symbols of the sacred appear only as cultural factors mixed in 
with the figures of spirit. But at the same time these symbols designate the 
impact on culture of a reality that the movement of culture does not contain; 
they speak of the Wholly Other, of the Wholly Other than all history; in this 
way they exercise an attraction and a call upon the entire series of the figures 
of culture.1655 
 
Put differently, Ricoeur maintains in the final sections of On Interpretation that the dialectics 
of the cultural Same and the sacred Wholly Other locates the human cultural understanding 
by showing its limits, and therefore also enables comprehension of the human condition: 
“The Cogito’s dependence on the ultimate, just as its dependence on its birth, its nature, its 
desire, is revealed only through symbols [… that function as] sacred [or supracultural] 
objects in addition to the world of culture.”1656 The culturally conditioned mode of being 
becomes relative to the Whole that encompasses and overwhelms the human 
comprehension; the cultural world is not the totality of being, but it is necessary for the 
human understanding of being. Just as the symbols of the sacred are not Being but “the 
symbolic exploration of our relationship to beings and to Being (notre rapport aux êtres et à 
l’Être),”1657 it is in this cultural exercise of mytho-poetic expressivity that the birth of the 
meaning and the birth of an ethico-political self as having-also-encountered-the-Wholly-
Other take place. 
As On Interpretation clarifies, Ricoeur’s earlier work on religious symbolism – 
The Symbolism of Evil in particular – examined the “excess” of poetic expression that 
surpasses rational speculation and philosophical reflection. “A philosophical interpretation 
                                               
1655 Ricoeur 1965a, 508. (529). – Ricoeur stresses, again, in the same context that he remains within the 
limits of philosophical reflection: “It is solely through its relation to the immanent teleology of the figures of 
culture that the sacred concerns this philosophy; the sacred is its eschatology; it is the horizon that reflection 
does not comprehend, does not encompass, but can only salute as that which quietly presents itself from afar.” 
1656 Ricoeur 1965a, 508-510. (529-531). – Richard J. Bernstein discusses, in his very recent essay, Ricoeur’s 
conviction that “there is a pernicious cultural tendency to reify the Wholly Other - to make the sacred into 
some sort of divine object.” Bernstein 2013, 134-135. 
1657 Ricoeur 1965a, 529. (551). 
404 
of symbols will never become absolute knowledge,” Ricoeur maintains; “the symbols of evil 
show in an exemplary way that there is always more in myths and symbols than in all of our 
philosophy.”1658 These “privileged symbols,” Ricoeur emphasizes in On Interpretation, again, 
“teach us something decisive about the passage from a phenomenology of spirit to a 
phenomenology of the sacred,”1659 that is, of the dialectic between the cultural Same and the 
sacred Wholly Other. The inverted symbolism of the sacred in The Symbolism of Evil 
approaches the question of the totality of being in the form of fallen being or experienced 
evil – that is, from the viewpoint of having always already fallen.1660 This symbolism of evil 
is, nevertheless, as much a primordial expression of the metaphysical “excess,” or the Wholly 
Other, as the symbolism of the sacred. 
 The narrative character of myths, Ricoeur argues in The Symbolism of Evil, 
points beyond itself to the mythical structure of an indivisible plenitude, or to a “cosmic 
whole” that is indicated in a “fundamental History” – historial, geschichtlich, but not historical, 
historisch1661 – concerning the Beginning and the End.1662 This is the kerygmatic “primordial 
drama” from which the narrative form of one’s understanding of the world and the self 
originates: 
The myths concerning the origin and the end of evil […] give us direct access 
to the primordially dramatic structure of the world of myths. We recall three 
fundamental characteristics ascribed above to the myths of evil: the concrete 
universality conferred upon human experience by means of archetypal 
                                               
1658 Ricoeur 1965a, 506. (527). 
1659 Ricoeur 1965a, 506. (527). 
1660 Ricoeur 1960b, 13-16, 154-155, 158-159. (6-8, 163, 167-168). – The Symbolism of Evil clarifies that in 
contrast to confession, for example, the mode of discourse pertinent to this condition of “experienced fall” is 
avowal (Ricoeur 1960b, 15, 46, 289-292, 325. (8, 42, 311-314, 350).) Ricoeur’s essay “Lamentation as Prayer” 
(in Thinking Biblically) deepens these analyses by re-examining them under the notion of being “abandoned by 
God,” which, paradoxically, leads the suffering subject to a “questioning mode” of prayer that seeks God’s 
compassion in the face of evil, that is, “being with God” in the very act of lamentation. Cf. Ricoeur & 
LaCocque 1998, 279-304. (211-232). 
1661 Cf. Ricoeur 1965a, 518-519. (540). 
1662 Ricoeur 1960b, 157-161. (166-167, 169-170). 
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personages, the tension of an ideal history oriented from a Beginning toward 
an End, and finally the transition from an essential nature to an alienated 
history; these three functions of the myths of evil are three aspects of one and 
the same dramatic structure. Hence, the narrative form is neither secondary 
nor accidental, but primitive and essential. The myth performs its symbolic 
function by the specific means of narration because what it wants to express is 
already a drama. It is this primordial drama that opens up and discloses the 
hidden meaning of human experience; and so the myth that recounts it 
assumes the irreplaceable function of narration.1663 
 
Just as a culture or a civilization has a “founding narration,”1664 the transhistorical (or 
historial) mythical structure of the Beginning (Genesis) and the End (Eschaton) is the 
founding narration for the cultural condition. The “cosmic whole,” however, is discernible 
only through this narrated mythical structure that renders the concrete experience of being a 
living, acting, and suffering subject meaningful by placing it “into relation with the totality of 
meaning.”1665  
Even David Stewart has to admit that it is “only through the mediation of these 
texts that we can have knowledge of God.”1666 In spite the fact that it is plausible to insist 
that the question of religious language is at the heart of Ricoeur’s work, as Stewart does, 
there is no direct access to the sacred but only a distanciated, cultural one. As Ricoeur 
maintains in his 1957 essay “Faith and Culture,” the modern faith is that of a “third man,” or 
of a “cultivated Christian, believing Greek.”1667 This faith of a secular age resides therefore in 
the dialectics of utopia and ideology that utilizes cultural imagination, Ricoeur argued in his 
1969 colloquium presentation “L’herméneutique de la secularization: foi, idéologie, 
utopie.”1668 The myths of evil as the inverted symbolism of the sacred, for example, re-
                                               
1663 Ricoeur 1960b, 161. (170). Cf. Ricoeur 1983, 133-135. (91-93).; Ricoeur 2000b, 172-174. (138-140). 
1664 Ricoeur & Kearney 2004, 149. 
1665 Ricoeur 1960b, 160, 162. (169, 171). 
1666 Stewart 1995, 438. 
1667 Ricoeur 1957a, 246-247. 
1668 Ricoeur 1976c, 50-51, 60-68. – Ricoeur argues in a 1967 essay “Urbanization and Secularization” that 
secularization is a cultural process that coincides with urbanization (whose essence is “a dense ramified network 
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enforce the limit between the cultural and its Other, but they also deepen the primordial 
dialectic of the cultural Same and the sacred Wholly Other.  
 Even though this level of analysis – culture and its other – has been achieved 
only at this point, this dissertation has already referred to The Symbolism of Evil and its 
dialectical conceptions of the Other. Section 6.2 of this dissertation discussed this in 
connection with “being recognized” as being, through symbols, “before an other,” or being 
“before God” who loved us first.1669 As I argued earlier, symbolic language in interpretation 
makes us recognize ourselves, while revealing aspects of our being that are not directly 
accessible to us.1670 The dialectic of the Same and the Other, however, is unavoidable as I 
maintained in section 3.1. The “first innocence,” or the ontological innocence of 
experiencing the Covenant of the “cosmic whole,” is lost in the critical distanciation – in 
“oblivion” or “forgetfulness” – endemic to culture and the cultural mode of being. The 
“situation of modern culture” is de-centering and de-sacralizing, that is, the forgetfulness 
(l’oubli) and “the loss of man himself insofar as he belongs to the sacred.”1671 The sacred is 
                                                                                                                                            
of interhuman relations”), the correlating technological organization (“the ‘metropolis’ is a ‘technopolis’”), and 
the resulting laicization (that strips off the “mystical origins in the depth of the past” of human institutions). 
The modern phenomenon of the city is, therefore, the venue for the “third man,” or for being secular, but it is 
also his image or his face: “There is always an image of the city. Visualize the mythical images of the ‘civitas’; 
the visible face of a heavenly patron (Babylon, Jerusalem, actually all of the civitates dei); and visualize also the 
Greek identification of the city and the political unit (polis). But we have another and more modern image for 
ourselves, a perception of the city which makes it the major witness to human energy: […] the city is the 
complete artifact, the realized human project. This sign of human power is at the same time a sign of a force 
essentially directed toward future. The city is always building, looking to its own future. The city is where man 
perceives change as a human project, the place where man perceives his proper ‘modernity.’ […] The city is 
truly the world which the gods have fled and where man is delivered unto himself, to the responsibility of total 
expediency.” (Ricoeur 1974, 179-180, 184.) Following Ricoeur, the modern faith is the faith in the city instead 
of the sacred. Instead of Imago Dei extended to the city as the “face of a heavenly patron,” the city has become 
imago hominis, the face of a “capable human being,” l’homme capable. Cf. Paquot 2007. 
1669 Ricoeur 1960b, 55, 63-64. n15. (51-52, 61). 
1670 Ricoeur 1960b, 325-326. (350-351). 
1671 Ricoeur 1960b, 324. (348-349).; Ricoeur 1986b, 259.; Ricoeur 1991a, 302-311.; Ricoeur 1995a, 61-63. 
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therefore the Wholly Other whose radical otherness is revealed only after the loss of the 
primordial innocence, the loss of the Covenant.1672  
This radicalizing loss is not, however, as Ricoeur maintains in The Symbolism of 
Evil, fully irreparable. “We moderns,” Ricoeur states, “aim at a second naïveté in and 
through criticism.”1673 The ontological richness of “the first innocence” and the state of 
forgetfulness form a dialectic pair that calls for “understanding interpretation,”1674 that is, 
they call for a second innocence as the postcritical wondering of the “ciphers” that disclose 
the fullness of cultural being in its limitedness.1675 Put differently, cultural being as the 
modern mode of being encounters its limits in the dialectics of the cultural Same and the 
sacred Wholly Other. This is the message of the image Ricoeur reminds his readers of in The 
Symbolism of Evil as well as later in Thinking Biblically: the encounter between Athens and 
Jerusalem. This encounter, discussed in section 7.3 of this dissertation, not only “constitutes 
the first stratum of our philosophical memory,” but it has become “the constitutive destiny 
of our culture.”1676 As Emmanuel Gabellieri also notices,1677 the conflict between Athens and 
Jerusalem is not a struggle unto death but a symbol of a fruitful dialectic between the cultural 
Same and the sacred Wholly Other that are recognized as cultural and as its Wholly Other 
only in that critical dialectics. 
 
                                               
1672 Ricoeur 1960b, 12-13, 54, 61, 65, 71, 82. (5, 50, 58, 62, 69, 81). 
1673 Ricoeur 1960b, 326. (351). 
1674 Ricoeur 1960b, 26-28, 325-326. (20-21, 349-350). 
1675 Ricoeur 1960b, 25-26, 326-328. (19, 350-353). 
1676 Ricoeur 1960b, 26-30. (20-23).; Ricoeur & LaCocque 1998, 16-17, 336. (xvii-xviii, 331-332). 
1677 Cf. Gabellieri 1998, 15-19, 22. 
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Hope: the Prime Wager 
We have responded above to the need of defining the ultimate limit of Ricoeur’s cultural 
hermeneutics by outlining the dialectics of the Same and the Wholly Other. Yet again, I 
should note, we have reached a major culmination point in this lengthy discussion that has 
already gone way past the point of merely confirming the working theses set for this part in 
this dissertation. The idea of an indirectly recognizable etho-poetic nucleus of human culture 
that is a necessary condition for the possibility of an ethico-political self (theses 6-8) was 
discussed at length, and the latest examination served as an additional clarification of the 
general theme of the dissertation by pointing out its scope of application: even though 
culture functions as the means of self-understanding and recognition, that is, as the necessary 
historical condition of human self-consciousness, it by no means encompasses the total 
sphere of being.1678 An ineffable element also remains in the human experience of being a 
                                               
1678 The limitedness of culture also becomes apparent in the light of “vertical recognition,” a theme to 
which I have subtly alluded in this chapter 15 of this dissertation. George H. Taylor has, in a recent essay, 
pointed out that before Course of Recognition (cf. Ricoeur 2004b, 307-310. (210-212).), Ricoeur examines the 
problem of political recognition in his 1996 essay “The Paradox of Authority.” The essay was later 
incorporated in Reflections on the Just (2001). Taylor emphasizes that Ricoeur’s continuing interest in the 
“paradox” or “enigma” of authority as both vertical and horizontal leads him to admit in Course of Recognition 
that “the vertical relation of authority […] constitutes a thorn in the flesh of an enterprise like my own, 
deliberately limited to reciprocal forms of mutual recognition.” (G. H. Taylor 2013, 173. Cf. Ricoeur 2004b, 310. 
(212).) Ricoeur’s essay explains in more detail why the “vertical relation” is such a “thorn” for his philosophy. 
Ricoeur maintains that political authority and recognition between a citizen and a state translates to the 
question of “vertical asymmetry,” that is, to the command-obey relation between the superior and the 
subordinate that, according to Ricoeur, in a modern context connects with the “crisis of legitimation.” 
Referring to Hannah Arendt’s essay “What is Authority?,” Ricoeur contests her claim that authority “has 
vanished from the modern world” by proposing that the “original” enunciative authority has always taken use 
of institutional authority, and that the modern conception of authority is “rather the replacement of one 
historical configuration [namely the theological-political one] determined by a pairing of enunciation and 
institution by another configuration of the same two terms [that is, the rational-political one].” In order to 
preserve its “vertical” hierarchy and authority a state would have to lend support from the former religious 
paradigm, but the modern paradigm that rests on reason and publicity functions only at the horizontal level “of 
living together.” The diminution or removal of the vertical dimension results in, at the cultural level, the 
problem of the legitimation of political power – the religious authority cannot be converted to a secular one.  
In terms of the theme of recognition, however, I would like to point out that this paradox or crisis of the 
foundation of political authority is a second order problematization of political recognition, as it approaches the 
required recognition between a citizen and a state from a metaperspective; Ricoeur asks if we ought, “taking 
advantage of the very idea of credit, like the later Rawls, admit a multiple foundation, a diversity of religious 
and secular, rational and Romantic traditions, that mutually recognize one another as cofoundational under the 
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living and suffering subject. This unnameable, incommunicable, or “untranslatable” points to 
some reality as the Wholly Other that remains a mystery for a reflecting human being.  
Since our discussion has come to the last stance in this “post-Hegelian 
Kantian” understanding of the relation between the human mode of being and the totality of 
being, however, the question of the task of Ricoeur’s poetics now re-emerges. Not merely to 
complete this retrospective re-reading of Ricoeur’s work, but to reconnect with the 
beginning of this part four, which began as an examination of the poetic, let me add this last 
piece of the puzzle by concluding this retrospective analysis back to The Voluntary and the 
Involuntary, in which Ricoeur originally presents the task of finding the poetic resolution for 
understanding the human condition and revealing the fundamental human possibilities.1679 
Such a poetics would unconceal “the new realities that need to be discovered” of the 
“mysterious relation of participation in the Whole,”1680 or in “the order of creation.”1681 
Ultimately, Ricoeur argues, poetics would reveal the mystery of life:  
Life (la vie) has an ambiguous meaning: it designates at the same time the 
animal order which is beneath and the whole surge coming from that which is 
higher than life. It is that which carries but also that which inspires [viz. Latin 
in-spirare]. In relation to the order of capabilities, it pertains at the same time to 
the order of limits and to the order of sources or creation. In this new sense 
life brings up a new method, namely, a “poetics” of will which we are here 
abstracting. One of the crucial, difficult problems posed by such “poetics” of 
                                                                                                                                            
double auspices of the principle of ‘overlapping concensus’ and the ‘recognition of reasonable 
disagreements.’?” According to Ricoeur, “within such a [cofoundational] framework with this double principle 
a role may be found for the authority of the Bible and that of ecclesiastical institutions – but not in such a way 
as to give rebirth to the lost paradigm of Christendom” (Ricoeur 2001c, 109-123. (93-105).)  
Generally, then, Ricoeur’s aim is post-critical or “anatheistic” as Richard Kearney would comment on this 
issue. This post-critical approach that allows or recognizes the cultural is, in fact, explicitly admitted in Course of 
Recognition. Ricoeur states that he won’t examine the theme of proper vertical, that is, religious authority “in its 
full scope,” but instead “shall limit [him]self to the cultural aspect of authority (l’aspect culturel de l’autorité)” that 
brings about the whole paradox of institutionalized command-obey relations (Ricoeur 2004b, 308. (211).) 
Again, therefore, even though culture functions as the means of self-understanding and recognition, it by no 
means encompasses the total sphere of being, and this limitedness is indicated, for example, in the “paradox” 
or “enigma” that the legitimacy of political authority constitutes. 
1679 Ricoeur 1949, 7, 443. (3, 471). 
1680 Ricoeur 1949, 32, 445. (30, 472-473). 
1681 Ricoeur 1949, 32-33. (30). 
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the will will be to know why the spontaneity of life from below (la vie d’en-bas) 
serves in turn as a metaphor for life from above (la vie d’en-haut), and what 
secret affinity unites those two meanings of the word “life.”1682 
 
The duality of life, at once carrying and inspiring – to rephrase the dialectic of the Same and 
the Other – remains an ambiguous mystery, but in spite of its ineffability it is not completely 
enclosed from human questioning.  
The aspired poetics, however, would even reveal the “secret affinity” that 
connects the lower and the higher. The “spontaneity of life from below,” or βίος, as Ricoeur 
states, is a “clearing” in the sense of “a metaphor for life from above,” that is, of 3οίησις that 
refigures and transfigures the experienced reality and provides a meaning for that mute life. 
Ultimately, the forms and the elements of life function as metaphors that enable symbolic 
reflection of the Whole surpassing individual existence. In contrast to such reflection that 
utilizes mytho-symbolic expressivity in taking nature as a clue for the “higher,” The Voluntary 
and the Involuntary maintains, however, that the full poetic approach would already “see the 
open,” or the presence of freedom, in myths:  
A “poetics” of the will always finds the myth of the animal as the myth of 
innocence and freedom from care: “We’re not at one”, says Rilke in the 
Fourth Elegy, “we’ve no instinctive knowledge, like migratory birds.” The 
myth of the animal which “sees the open,” of the birds who neither sow nor 
reap, the myth of the lilies of the field, the myth of the child to which we 
cannot literally return – all these myths are parables, similes, in which the 
presence of freedom points through ciphers (par chiffre) to a certain beyond-
the-self.1683 
 
Put differently, Ricoeur states in a Jaspersian manner1684 that the self is found in the poetic 
constitution, but only indirectly; it is only through the ciphers from beyond-the-self (au-delà 
                                               
1682 Ricoeur 1949, 390. n1. (415). – The English translation leaves these words untranslated: “[…] l’ordre 
animal qui est en-dessous de moi et tout l’élan venu de plus haut que la vie; elle est ce qui porte, mais aussi ce 
qui inspire; par rapport à l’ordre des pouvoirs, elle appartient à la fois à [l’ordre de limites].” 
1683 Ricoeur 1949, 393. n1. (419). 
1684 The “Note about Cosmology” Ricoeur includes in The Voluntary and the Involuntary reaffirms his 
affiliation with Jaspers: “The unity of creation might bring together all the forms of being beyond all 
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du Soi) that this can be done. This is why Ricoeur maintains that “a philosophy of the subject 
and a philosophy of Transcendence – which is what a philosophy of man’s limitations is in 
the last resort – are both determined in one and the same movement.”1685 The self (the 
Same) and the beyond-the-self (the Other), in other words, would be found in each other in 
the poetics of being, because that poetics would altogether abolish the need for any 
philosophy of Transcendence since it already is in the full presence of this Trancendence: “A 
genuine Transcendence is more than a limit concept: it is a presence which brings about a true 
revolution in the theory of subjectivity. It introduces into it a radically new dimension, the 
poetic dimension.”1686 The poetics of being is, in sum, undivided participation with the 
beyond-the-self, in the full spontaneity of “life from above.” 
 It is apparent, however, that Ricoeur’s methodological capacities are far more 
limited. Even though from the poetic point of view “the leap from the self to existence and 
the leap to the being of Transcendence are but one and the same philosophical act,”1687 he 
has to acknowledge – in a distinctly Kierkegaardian tone of voice1688 – that philosophy does 
                                                                                                                                            
fragmenting knowledge. A unity of creation might be discovered by an entirely different dimension of 
consciousness than that which proceeds to ‘regional eidetics’ of the Cogito and of nature. I, too, am a reader of 
ciphers, as Jaspers puts it. It is not accidental that a unity of inspiration animates the great medieval 
cosmologies: it is a unique desire which starts with God and returns to God through all the degrees of being. 
This unity, lost as knowledge, must be rediscovered in some other way in the ‘poetics’ of the will.” Ricoeur 
1949, 399. (425). 
1685 Ricoeur 1949, 440. (468). 
1686 Ricoeur 1949, 456. (486). 
1687 Ricoeur 1949, 440. (468). 
1688 In his Concluding Scientific Postscript Kierkegaard discusses the need for ceacelessly repeated transition 
from ethical to religious subjectivity by using the famous notion of a “leap.”  The term, however, should not 
cloud Kierkegaard’s actual point that concerns the unceasing becoming a self, or an authentic subject, by 
constantly placing, as if breaking from thinking that is mediated, one’s faith or interest in the actuality of life 
that realizes one’s ultimate potentialities: “To ask aesthetically and intellectually about actuality is a 
misunderstanding; asking ethically about another person’s actuality is a misunderstanding, since only one’s own 
is to be asked about. Here that in which faith (sensu strictissimo, which refers to something historical) differs from 
the aesthetic, the intellectual, the ethical, comes to light. To ask with infinite interest about an actuality that is 
not one’s own is to want to believe, and expresses, the paradoxical relation to the paradox. To ask aesthetically 
in this way cannot be done except thoughtlessly since, aesthetically, possibility is higher than reality; nor 
intellectually since, intellectually, possibility is higher than actuality; nor even ethically, since the individual has 
an infinite interest solely in his own actuality. – Faith’s analogy to the ethical is the infinite interestedness, 
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not reach this level but falls short in gaining such ontological fullness of the Whole. “From 
the point of view of a [phenomenological] doctrine of subjectivity,” Ricoeur admits in The 
Voluntary and the Involuntary, “the movement of deepening and reflection remains another 
leap, the leap towards the Wholly Other.”1689 The indirect reflection, even as allowing certain 
“clearings,” can not avoid the struggle of interpreting the ciphers that first of all need to be 
conveived as the ciphers of the “higher” that always remains in the mode of otherness. 
Reflection, in other words, does not reach the onto-existential fullness but the threshold of 
that which is beyond full comprehension as it is the possible. The only option left for 
Ricoeur to use is to hold fast to the notion that “the spontaneity of life below serves as a 
metaphor for higher life,” even without fully knowing the reasons for their affinity.1690  
Ricoeur’s prime wager, I propose, is therefore to maintain that philosophical 
reflection moves “from the lower to the higher,” that is, from the concrete, culturally 
mediated experience of a living and suffering subject to the threshold of the Wholly Other, 
or of making all that is possible real in the Other. Ricoeur’s philosophy of the Wholly Other, 
inasmuch as it exists, is “reversed” in its reading the ciphers from subjectivity to 
Transcendence as he himself characterizes it: 
                                                                                                                                            
something in which the believer differs absolutely from an aesthete, but in which he differs in turn from an 
ethicist through being infinitely interested in the actuality of another. [...] If existing cannot be thought and the 
one who exists nevertheless thinks, [however,] what does this mean? It means that he thinks intermittently; he 
thinks before and he thinks after. Absolute continuity in thought is beyond him. [...] God does not think, he 
creates; God does not exist, he is eternal. Human beings think and exist, and existence separates thought and 
being, holds them apart from each other in succession. [...] The transition from possibility to actuality is, as 
Aristotle rightly says, κίνησις, a movement. This just cannot be said in the language of abstraction, or 
understood in it, for that language cannot give to movement either time or space, which presuppose it, or 
which it presupposes. There is a coming to a stop, a leap. If someone says that this is only because I am 
thinking of something definite and not abstracting, for otherwise I would see that there was no break, my 
repeated answer is: Quite right, considered abstractly there is no break, but then no transition either, for 
considered abstractly, everything is. On the other hand when time is given to movement by existence and I 
follow suit, then the leap appears in the way that a leap can appear: that it might come or it has been. [...] Faith 
is said to be the immediate; thinking [that is unavoidable] cancels the immediate.” Kierkegaard 2009, 271, 275, 
278, 287, 291. Cf. Adams 2006. 
1689 Ricoeur 1949, 440. (468).  
1690 Ricoeur 1949, 390. n1. (415). Cf. Ricoeur 1949, 381. (405-406).; Ricoeur & LaCocque 1998, 411-457. 
(265-303). 
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We clearly reject the pretension of an overly zealous apologetics which would 
pretend to derive God from nature [like Thomism] or from subjectivity [like 
Cartesianism] by a simple rational implication. Thus we shall show rather the 
reverse impact of a philosophy of Transcendence (whose development we 
shall reserve for another[, that is, some later] work) on a philosophy of 
subjectivity. Our plan is limited to showing how, by starting with such a 
philosophy of Transcendence, philosophy of subjectivity is completed as a 
doctrine of conciliation. But by showing – rather than demonstrating – this 
completion, we are reading this philosophy of Transcendence, which erupts 
from above downward, in reverse. In reading it thus from the lower to the 
higher we shall discover the response of subjectivity [as in Marcel] to an appeal 
or a grasp which surpasses it.1691 
 
The reversal, in other words, is to consent to the limits of human comprehension and 
freedom,1692 and admit the possibilities given in the cultural movement towards but not into 
Transcendence; these possibilities as “responses” from “lower to the higher,” or human 
reactions to being recognized by the Essential, are, nevertheless, the fundamental human 
possibilities Ricoeur has set to analyze.1693 
 The fundamental human possibilities as “responses” or reactions to “being 
recognized” highlight the primordial human passivity which Ricoeur also discusses in the 
very end of his own “course” of recognition.1694 Put differently, Ricoeur does not argue for 
pure activity void of institution but for the permanence of the task that is the response to 
being situated in a culture.1695 Consciousness and self-understanding are not immediate but 
reflective, that is, they are received: “I am not the center of being. I myself am only one 
being among beings. The whole which includes me is the parabole of being which I am not. I 
                                               
1691 Ricoeur 1949, 440-441. (468-469). Cf. Marcel 1991, 38. – Gallagher summarizes Marcel’s notion of 
“response” in connection to another key term Marcel uses, namely, “creative fidelity”; the self-creation of the 
human self “is only conceivable in terms of a response to an invocation.” Gallagher 1962, 71. 
1692 Cf. Ricoeur 1949, 454-456. (484-486). 
1693 Ricoeur 1949, 7, 180-186. (3, 190-197). 
1694 Cf. Ricoeur 2004b, 10, 35, 359. (x, 19, 248). 
1695 Cf. Marcelo 2011. – I respond to Marcelo’s proposed reading of Ricoeur in chapter 5. 
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come from all to myself as from Transcendence to existence.”1696 Consenting to this first 
truth of being recognized, and responding to this recognition means – I emphasize – 
consenting to one’s human condition as “after.” Even if one would not agree with Ricoeur’s 
thesis in the penultimate 1986 Gifford lecture that the self is refigurated in the mirror of the 
Scriptures and is therefore a “responsive self,”1697 it is still the case that experienced life, in its 
duality of carrying and inspiring, precedes and surpasses me: “I experience life as having 
begun before I began anything whatever. Anything I can decide comes after the beginning – 
and before the end.”1698 Consenting to one’s human condition, in other words, is at least 
consenting to the necessity of being born. As Ricoeur summarizes: comme la naissance, toute 
nécessité est antérieure à l’acte meme du “je” qui se réfléchit soi-même – “like birth, all necessity is prior 
to any actual act of the ‘I’ which reflects on itself.”1699 The necessity of being born “from all 
to myself” is nothing else but the culturally mediated becoming a self who is always “in the 
process of beginning to be free,”1700 or in the process of “becoming what you are,”1701 that is, 
in realizing one’s self as l’homme capable de faillir.  
 This consenting of the self, Ricoeur maintains, is therefore the counterpart of 
the admiration of the whole that is “the incantation of poetry which delivers me from myself 
                                               
1696 Ricoeur 1949, 444. (472). – Ricoeur maintains that the “coming from all to myself as from 
Transcendence to existence” is total and includes all epistemological and metaphysical levels (such as the ones 
explicated by Berkeley’s subjective idealism, Platon’s rationalist idealism, Kant’s transcendental idealism, and 
religion): “The world itself is ‘perfect’ until I think and wish, for it was there before I became aware of myself 
as perceiving. Innateness of knowledge, according to Plato, is attested in the myth of prior life, of reminiscence. 
The non-temporal nature of the intelligible character according to Kant expresses itself as a [transcendental] 
choice of myself prior to my life; finally, Divine Omnipotence (la Toute-Puissance divine), which is like a 
transcendent beginning, is the primordial past of predestination. This will be one of the themes of the Poetics of 
the Will.” Ricoeur 1949, 415. n1. (441). 
1697 Ricoeur 2008, 45-74. Cf. Ricoeur 2008, 86-100. (Ricoeur 1995a, 267-275.) 
1698 Ricoeur 1949, 415. (441). 
1699 Ricoeur 1949, 415. (441). 
1700 Ricoeur 1949, 415. (441). 
1701 Ricoeur 1949, 450. (479). 
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and purifies me.”1702 The dialectical circularity of consent and this admiration – the dialectics 
of the Same and the Wholly Other fully replayed at the level of culture – leads us to 
understand why Ricoeur stated in Oneself as Another that “philosophical discourse comes to 
an end” with the “aporia of the Other”:1703 
Consent by itself remains on an ethical and prosaic level; admiration is the 
cutting edge of the soul, lyric and poetic. This then is how incantation aids the 
will. It delivers it in the first place from its own refusal [of the illusion of 
sovereignty and of the denial of being conditioned] by humbling it. At the core 
of refusal is defiance and defiance is the fault. To refuse necessity from below 
is to defy Transcendence. I have to discover the Wholly Other which at first 
repels me [viz. Otto’s tremendum]. Here lies the most fundamental choice of 
philosophy: either God or I. Either philosophy begins with the fundamental 
contrast between the Cogito and Being in itself (l’Être en soi), or it begins with 
the self-positing of consciousness whose corollary is scorn of empirical being. 
But poetry does not think in concepts: it does not posit God as a limiting 
concept but veils him in myths.1704 
 
Philosophy thinks in concepts, and this “self-positing” that easily leads to “conceptual 
hybris” is its ultimate failure.1705 La philosophie arrive toujours trop tard, Ricoeur maintains; 
“Philosophy always comes on the scene too late.”1706 Poetry and mytho-symbolic language 
do not do so; as interpretations calling for interpretation, they indirectly reveal for a 
reflective mind the threshold of the Wholly Other as the unsurpassable contrast and dialectic 
“between the Cogito and Being in itself.” This is why the preface to Thinking Biblically states 
that the pre-dogmatic forms of discourse, or such religious modes of thought “where the 
metaphorical language of poetry is the closest secular equivalent [to religious expressions], 
                                               
1702 Ricoeur 1949, 448. (476-477). 
1703 Ricoeur 1990, 409. (355). 
1704 Ricoeur 1949, 449. (477). 
1705 Ricoeur & LaCocque 1998, 14-15, 18. (xvi, xix). 
1706 Ricoeur 2001a, 118. (Ricoeur 1995a, 208.) 
416 
[…] give rise to philosophical thinking.”1707 Philosophy, Ricoeur maintains, is a response too, 
albeit a secondary and a limited one.  
The metaphysical limitedness of thought, that becomes a struggle, does not 
have to imply that meaning is not achievable. Even though la philosophie reste philosophie, 
“philosophy remains philosophy,” Ricoeur states in his 1948 essay “La condition du 
philosophe chretien” (included in Lectures 3: aux frontières de la philosophie) that “philosophy 
remains therefore free to the extent that neither this nor that philosophy can ever call itself 
Christian; there is no orthodoxy in philosophy.”1708 This conviction – or, rather, his “subtle 
blending of conviction and critique”1709 – is restated in The Voluntary and the Involuntary by 
maintaining that “in myth a philosophy of man and a philosophy of the Whole encounter 
each other in symbolization.”1710 This gift of etho-poetic understanding is given in and through the 
continuous interpretation of the symbols of consent and admiration, that is, through cultural 
mediation that, nevertheless, has confronted the hyperethical Wholly Other in its 
superabundance.1711 Besides their struggle, there is a horizon that is common to philosophy 
and religion: love and hope.1712 Culture is not, therefore, only “the other” to the Wholly 
Other, or the “loss” of being in being; as Course of Recognition also affirms, there is hope 
because of the struggle.1713 
                                               
1707 Ricoeur & LaCocque 1998, 14-15. (xvi). Cf. Ricoeur 1994, 286-289, 300-302. (Ricoeur 1995a, 221-223, 
232-234.) 
1708 Ricoeur 1994, 240. 
1709 Ricoeur, Azouvi, & de Launay 1995, 11. (2). 
1710 Ricoeur 1949, 449. (478). 
1711 Cf. Ricoeur 2008, 33-35. (Ricoeur 1995a, 324-326.) 
1712 Ricoeur 1995l, 570. Cf. Ricoeur 1967a, 95-98. (94-97). 
1713 Ricoeur 2004b, 354. (245). Cf. Madison 1995, 89. – In contrast to Marcelo, who, in accordance with his 
proposition of “pure ethics,” claims that Ricoeur’s “ethical utopia of recognition” is “driven by hope,” I merely 
point out that the struggle implies hope that, perhaps, can not be found as “pure” either but only indirectly in 
terms of “resistance” (as The Symbolism of Evil analyzes, not the sacred that is not directly approachable or 
expressible, but the evil that is experienced and then symbolized). Cf. Marcelo 2011, 124. 
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In a short passage in The Voluntary and the Involuntary, that for some reason was 
left untranslated in English, Ricoeur puts this conviction in other words: “The mythics of 
the [origin of the] world lends to the doctrine of man the great metaphor of quasi-consent. 
That is why it isn’t futile to invoke the inhuman to achieve the human.”1714 Put differently, 
the human is achievable only in the invocation or admiration of the inhuman, or the Wholly 
Other that is enunciated in the myths of the origin of the world – the myths themselves 
function as if (that is, quasi) metaphors of consent. This invocation, in the final analysis, adds 
hope to consent, since “admiration is possible because the world is an analogy of 
Transcendence, but hope is necessary because the world is quite other than 
Transcendence.”1715 Facing the “loss” of being and meaning, the truly human response has 
to imply hope. 
Consent, Ricoeur argues in The Voluntary and the Involuntary, does have “its 
‘poetic’ root in hope,” just as “decision [has its root] in love, and effort in the gift of 
power.”1716 Ricoeur’s final perspective on the human world is, therefore, a hope – if not 
purely agapeic, still loving – that waits for the less constrained realization of possibilities:  
Hope which awaits deliverance is consent put to the test. Immanent patience – 
which lives in the running – is a manifestation of transcending hope. […] 
Though a fleeting distance always separates freedom from necessity, at least 
hope wills to convert all hostility into a fraternal tension within the unity of 
creation.1717 
 
As also argued by Course of Recognition, in the reality of the multifaceted dialectics of life, 
between love and justice, hope is the poetic thrust of cultural existence; there is freedom 
                                               
1714 Ricoeur 1949, 450. (The text should be on the page 478 of English translation). “La mythique du 
monde prête à la doctrine de l’homme la grande métaphore d’un quasi-consentement. C’est pourquoi il n’est 
pas vain de chanter l’inhumain pour achever l’homme.” Cf. Ricoeur’s essay “Thinking Creation”; Ricoeur & 
LaCocque 1998, 57-102. (31-67). 
1715 Ricoeur 1949, 451. (480). Cf. Ricoeur 2001a, 111-128. (Ricoeur 1995a, 203-216.) 
1716 Ricoeur 1949, 439. (467). 
1717 Ricoeur 1949, 452. (480-481). 
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only in the view of hope.1718 This hope that “awaits deliverance” is the transcultural element 
that overcomes alienation by reassuring that aspects of a tolerating and sustainable world are 
already, in “fraternal tension,” being experienced in cultural life.1719 A culture that has not 
consented to the Wholly Other, or a culture without hope, is therefore unthinkable, because 
it is meaningless. Just as lamentation, culture is a prayer seeking compassion in the face of 
struggle for agapeic generosity, that is, in the face of being capable of falling. 
                                               
1718 Ricoeur 2004b, 354. (245). Cf. Ricoeur 1969, 393-415. (402-424). 
1719 Cf. Gueye 2006, 81, 92. 
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16. REFLECTIONS ON RE-CON-NAISSANCE 
As a response to the puzzlement at the end of part three regarding the poetic constitution of 
culture, this current part focused on the gift of etho-poetic understanding that is given in and 
through culture. Widening the scope of the triad of knowing, acting, and cultural affections 
analyzed in chapter 10, this part four examined the poetics of meaning/being (chapter 13), 
the poetics of action (chapter 14), and the “poetics of the good” (chapter 15) that, as 
manifested in cultural ήθος, is not reducible to a pure “poetics of αγά3η.”1720 To summarize, 
Ricoeur maintains, first, that poetic redescription as the birth of meaning is the becoming of 
our being in the refigurative merging of interpretation and reflection. Second, this critical 
model of interpretation as explanation-understanding extends from linguistic discourses to 
social human action that in the final analysis is always cultural. Third, social agency brings 
about the social responsibility of a “real citizen” as concitoyen, or the recognizing of one’s self 
as ethico-political through the cultural context in which the self is situated. Culture, 
therefore, has a dual meaning as both the unsurpassable condition (viz. Cassirer’s symbolic 
forms) and as the context of experienced life (viz. Geertz’s “thick” description of culture). 
The course of this analysis has thus enabled us to notice the culturally 
facilitated birth (naissance) of an ethico-political self that is capable of recognizing him or 
herself as such. For this reason, this part has concluded our analytic reading of Ricoeur. 
After having progressed in parts three and four chronologically, in order to demonstrate 
(and not merely assert as in parts one and two) that Ricoeur’s philosophy constitutes a 
hermeneutic of culture, the end of chapter 15 confirmed the results of this analysis by 
making a double reversal: that of the question of culture to that of its “other” as well as that 
                                               
1720 Ricoeur 1990, 37. (25).; Ricoeur 2001b, 471. (Ricoeur 2010b, 37.). 
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of the direction of reading Ricoeur’s work in retrospection. The result of this two-sided 
double reading – both chronological and retrospective, both “cultural” and “other” – can be 
summarized by focusing on the question that remains after examining the necessary 
preserved of the Wholly Other: is it not the case that the Poetic as an opening toward the 
Wholly Other indeed surpasses the hermeneutic of culture in Ricoeur’s philosophy? 
It could well be argued that the thesis of Ricoeur’s philosophy as a philosophy 
of culture loses its value in the face of the Wholly Other and the turn to a poetic expression 
of the Wholly Other. Indeed, a culture without a notion of the Wholly Other is a culture 
without the means of survival; this notion is the ground for the transcending hope that “wills 
to convert all hostility into a fraternal tension within the unity of creation.”1721 The Wholly 
Other, therefore, seems to be the one Ricoeur is seeking as the ultimate ground of 
fundamental human possibilities. I am certain that scholars focusing on Ricoeur’s philosophy 
of religion, for example, would not only agree but insist that this indeed is the case. I 
maintain, however, that it would be too hasty a conclusion to refute Ricoeur’s work as a 
hermeneutic of culture. Instead, I argue, the notion of the Wholly Other reaffirms the 
necessity of such a hermeneutic; the Wholly Other, or “the Essential,” is not directly 
perceivable but only in a culture. 
Ricoeur stresses in a Tillichian manner that even though the Wholly Other, as 
the source of etho-poetics, is the grounding of culture, culture is still the necessary form of 
any expressivity, including one of religion: “Just as everyone is born into a language (chacun 
naît dans une langue) and accedes to other languages only by a second apprenticeship, and 
most often, only through translation,” in Living up to Death he maintains that “the religious 
                                               
1721 Ricoeur 1949, 452. (480-481). 
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exists culturally only as articulated in the language and code of a historical religion.”1722 
Echoing the conviction already expressed in the 1966 essay “The Problem of Double 
Meaning,” namely, that “the most poetic, the most ‘sacred,’ symbolism works with the same 
semic variables as the most banal word in the dictionary,”1723 Ricoeur disputes the possibility 
of any a-cultural expressivity. “Theology,” Ricoeur thus maintains in History and Truth, “is of 
necessity a cultural act which interferes with the whole cultural life of a nation or a 
civilization.”1724 Arguing this, Ricoeur reiterates the claim we have seen in the closing of 
chapter 15: the necessity of culture as the condition for the approximating expression of the 
Wholly Other. 
Emmanuel Gabellieri maintains, therefore, that Ricoeur’s hermeneutic 
principle seems to be la présence cachée du Verbe présent en toute culture, “the concealed presence 
of the Word in all culture.”1725 The Wholly Other can only be presented as “concealed” in 
culture, as the culturally incarnated Word. “The path of the religious” – to borrow the 
subtitle of Ricoeur’s lecture published in Qu’est-ce que la culture? (2001) – is therefore, indeed, a 
“difficult” one: 
                                               
1722 Ricoeur, Abel, & Goldenstein 2007, 44. (15). Cf. Ricoeur 1994, 35-40, 42-45, 60-62, 64-67, 235-243. – 
Ricoeur clarifies in his 1975 essay “Biblical Hermeneutics” that the poetic function of language facilitates 
religious expressions: “[I] might have left the impression that religious language is a variety of poetic language 
and I will assume that characterization up to a certain point, on the condition that we do not identify ‘poetic’ 
and ‘aesthetic’ and that we respect the scope of the poetic function such as I have defined it, namely, as the 
power of making the redescription of reality correspond with the power of bringing the fictions of the 
imagination to speech. Because the poetic function of discourse was conceived in this way, the religious 
language of the parables is an instance of poetic language. However it is precisely on the basis of poetics that 
religious language reveals its specific character to the extent that the poetic function can appear, in an inverse 
sense, as the medium or the Organum of religious language.” Ricoeur 1975a, 107. 
1723 Ricoeur 1969, 79. (77).  
1724 Ricoeur 1967a, 178. (177).; Ricoeur 1975a, 129-145. – The fact that theology is a cultural expression of 
religious truth, however, does not have to mean that theology or religion could not function as a cultural 
critique that opposes itself to the immanent human pursuits; they are secondary in the light of the transcendent 
authority of theology that promotes a supracultural communal existence. Cf. Ricoeur 1967a, 179-180. (178-
179). 
1725 Gabellieri 1998, 19. 
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The idea of the groundless ground (l’idée de fond sans fond), the foundation in 
abyss, remains a limit-idea for the understanding. And the feelings themselves 
relative to the foundation go on to take shape within a framework of high 
culture (dans un cadre de haute culture), there to be articulated, each time 
differently, in what I would call a poetics of the good. The verdict must be 
accepted: the forms of the religious share the same state of dispersion and 
confusion as languages and cultures, the state recognized in the Babel myth.1726 
 
As the human comprehension is limited, just as Kant argued, it is not possible to have direct 
intellectual intuition of the “Essential” that remains Wholly Other. The connection 
established at the level of affection, too, requires articulation as culture as well as its 
reappropriation – in Kantian terms, empirically grounded intuition. The notion of the 
Wholly Other, or the Limit, therefore reaffirms the necessity of a hermeneutic of culture. 
For philosophy, the question of foundational appropriation that always remains cultural is 
unavoidable.  
 Ricoeur’s terminology of the “groundless ground” brings us to a brief closing 
evaluation of his relation to Martin Heidegger. As we have seen, in their respective attempts 
to philosophically clarify this “groundless ground,” both thinkers make conceptual use of 
3οίησις. Heidegger’s notion of the poetic, however, does not match up with that of Ricoeur. 
In contrast to Ricoeur who adopts an indirect path in acquiring quasi-poetic comprehension 
– a hermeneutic of culture that takes the cultural realm of objects as the symbol of the 
“Essential” – Heidegger remains critical of such an effort. The regained naïveté, Ricoeur 
maintains, can only be secondary or postcritical, and not original. Ricoeur’s critical 
hermeneutics, therefore, functions only at the cultural level, whereas Heidegger’s ontological 
hermeneutics pushes for more than just “seeing the Open.” The search for the birth of 
meaning, however, unites the two thinkers, and for this reason Ricoeur admits that despite 
                                               
1726 Ricoeur 2001b, 471. (Ricoeur 2010b, 37.). Cf. Ricoeur 1946, 32-36. – Johann Michel discusses the term 
“fond d’être” in connection with Spinoza’s term “Conatus,” and also responds to Robert Midrashi’s critical 
objections to Ricoeur. Michel 2006, 106-119. 
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all criticism he philosophizes “with” Heidegger, albeit “after” him. The philosophy “after 
Heidegger,” proposed by Ricoeur, includes the “movement of return” that – in contrast to 
Heidegger’s suspicion of culture and his neglect of ethics – comprises a hermeneutic of 
ethico-political culture that is the only possible means for examining the becoming of an 
authentic subject in the concreteness of living, acting, and suffering.1727 
 In terms of the nine theses argued at the end of part one, it has then become 
possible to maintain that Ricoeur’s hermeneutic of culture not only recasts his relations to 
Hegel and Kant, but also to Heidegger (thesis 4). In addition, this current part allows us to 
uphold that the foundational etho-poetic nucleus of human culture can be found (only) indirectly 
in and by culture as an objectified reality (thesis 6). As I argued in thesis 7, this poetic 
nucleus, as an opening up of language to a possible ήθος, is therefore a necessary condition 
for the possibility of an ethico-political self-understanding. Put differently, the actualization 
of this ethico-political understanding is the mutualizing “course of recognition” for all living, 
acting, and suffering subjects, and Ricoeur’s term “reconnaissance” should therefore be 
literally understood as recon-naissance, that is, as “having-been-born-as-an-ethico-political-
subject” (thesis 8). The hermeneutical task of achieving a self in interpretative appropriation 
is facilitated only by cultural “naissance” over and above one’s natural birth. It is only in such 
cultural dwelling that self-recognition is possible for a human being.  
 
 
                                               
1727 I should note that the current part four, therefore, also affirms Richard Kearney’s reading of narrative 
self-identity. In his own analysis of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, Kearney maintains that there are “fundamental 
socialization processes through which a person acquires a self-identity capable of projecting a narrative into the 
world in which it is both an author and an actor.” This leads him to recognize that the “critical application of a 
self’s cultural figures to itself is a necessary moment in the hermeneutics of identity,” and that “narrative 
understanding is ethical because it is answerable to something beyond itself, so that even where it knows no 
censure (within the text), it knows responsibility.” Kearney 2004, 109, 112. 
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* 
Culture, as a condition and as a context of dwelling, should be understood as the condition 
for the birth (naissance) of an ethico-political self in the reappropriation of laborious cultural 
formation or figuration. Culture, in brief, is the condition and the context of the 
fundamental human possibilities;1728 the figure of being human is painted on the canvas of 
culture. 
Culture is a condition: comme la naissance, toute nécessité est antérieure à l’acte meme du 
“je” qui se réfléchit soi-même – “as birth, all necessity is prior to any actual act of the ‘I’ which 
reflects on itself.”1729  
Culture is a context of dwelling: the necessity of being born “from all to 
myself” is the culturally mediated becoming to a self who is always “in the process of 
beginning to be free,”1730 or in the process of “becoming what you are.”1731 This unceasing 
becoming is the process of realizing oneself as l’homme capable de faillir in the reappropriation 
of one’s cultural world through the appropriation of one’s cultural works.  
 
                                               
1728 Ricoeur 1949, 7. (3). 
1729 Ricoeur 1949, 415. (441). 
1730 Ricoeur 1949, 415. (441). 












The Fifth Act: Re-con-naissance 
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The aim of this fifth part differs from the introductory purpose of the first, the assertoric 
function of the second, and the analytic reading in the third and fourth parts of this 
dissertation (which responded to the claims made in the first two parts). In a way, the 
current part is distinct from, albeit still rooted in the whole previous discussion. This part, as 
I proposed in part one, argues that the critical moments of reconfiguration – propaedeutically 
explained in section 3.3 – are readable as the postcritical moments of re-, con-, and naissance. The 
current part five, put differently, rests on Ricoeur’s cultural hermeneutics but it also takes 
distance from it as its application, since, paradoxically, it reveals at the same time the depth 
structure of that very same hermeneutics.  
In order to explain myself, let me adopt a peculiar “dramatic” point of view. 
First, there has been a train of thought running through the dissertation that so far has not 
been developed in our discussion – this path is indicated in the title of this part five as the 
“fifth act.” When focusing on action in modern dramatic poetry, Hegel claims in his 
Aesthetics that “the English, the French, and the Germans in the main generally divide a 
drama into five acts, where exposition falls into the first, while the three intervening acts 
detail the quarrels and reactions, complications, and struggles of the opposing parties, so that 
finally the fifth alone brings the confrontation to a complete conclusion.”1732 Following 
Hegel’s insight, I have structured this dissertation to reflect the five-part exposition of a 
dramatic narrative. Instead of merely concluding, this last part functions “epilogically” as the 
fifth act of a play – written for English-speaking readers, but elaborating the thoughts of 
French and German philosophers. The decision to structure this work in this manner 
follows not only from respect for the shared conventions of the cultural-linguistic realms 
Hegel mentions, but also adds the hope that in this manner a poetic interplay, which places us 
                                               
1732 Hegel 2000, 1170. 
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at the origin of our cultural being, is set free to “re-co-ignite”1733 itself at the core of this 
academic work. 
Second, I find strong indications in Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics that support, 
and even firmly suggest, the adoption of this kind of dramatic structure. Let us think, for 
example, of the way Ricoeur structures his own works. As I have argued elsewhere,1734 the 
surprise Ricoeur provides for his readers in the postscript (rather than conclusion, he 
insists1735) of the whole of Time and Narrative relates to pointing out the “hermeneutic gaps” 
in the course of the foregone discussion. Both the different levels of the aporetics of time 
and the replies of the poetics of narrative “constitute a meaningful constellation,” Ricoeur 
admits, but they do not form “a binding chain.”1736 Ricoeur is clear in stating that the move 
from one level of argumentation to another is something that is not propelled by the text 
itself.  
Ricoeur’s remark in Time and Narrative III pointing to the hermeneutic action of the 
present reader provides the grande finale in the search not only for Ricoeur’s conception of 
temporality, but also that of narrative interpretation. Even though the text includes hundreds 
of pages of analysis of different time conceptions, there is no traditional scholarly definition 
of time to be found at the end of the long text itself. Instead, the time conception set down 
by Ricoeur to demonstrate his conception of time is refigured by the reader with Ricoeur’s 
lengthy and multifarious argument, that is, in the act of appropriative reading of the work 
itself. The whole of Ricoeur’s investigation, in fact, has been guided by the process of 
                                               
1733 I thank Professor Oliva Blanchette for suggesting this coinage as an attempt to express the key term 
“re-con-naissance” in English language in such a manner that would avoid reverting to the overtly cognitive 
connotation of the term “re-cognition.”  
1734 Helenius 2012b, 335-342. 
1735 Ricoeur 1985, 349. (331. n1). 
1736 Ricoeur 1985, 391. (274). 
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reconfiguration, or the “threefold mimesis” – the “action [of the reader] is represented in the 
play by the plot,”1737 as Ricoeur’s interpretation of Aristotle’s Poetics could be formulated. 
Ricoeur alerts his own readers at the outset, in the very first pages of Time and 
Narrative I, that his aim is to dwell dramatically “in the field of action and of its temporal 
values.”1738 This means, effectively, that he grafts a long and harduous argument with a 
notable amount of detours just to emphasize the experience that reading as action is 
interpretation: “I see in the plots we invent the privileged means by which we re-configure our 
confused, unformed, and at the limit mute temporal experience.”1739 As if this instruction 
were not enough, Ricoeur emphasizes in his propaedeutic analysis of mimesis3, or of re-
figuration, that written works consist “of holes, lacunae, zones of indetermination,” and that 
“it is the reader, almost abandoned by the work, who carries the burden of emplotment.”1740 
These notifications or refined warnings of textual “lacunae” are then cashed out at the end 
of Time and Narrative III when explaining the trick in the postscript that Ricoeur adds to his 
almost published trilogy: 
Let us cast one final glance over the path we have covered. […] Indeed, 
nothing obliges us [as the readers of this work] to pass from the notion of 
narrative identity to that of the idea of the unity of history, then to the confession 
of the limits of narrative in the face of the mystery of time that envelops us. In 
one sense, the pertinence of the reply of narrative to the aporias of time 
diminishes as we move from one stage to the next, to the point where time 
seems to emerge victorious from the struggle, after having been held captive in 
the lines of the plot. It is good that it should be so.1741 
 
Put differently, what a reader of Ricoeur’s voluminous Time and Narrative has at the end of 
the completed whole is the hermeneutic action of the reader himself that provides both a resolution 
                                               
1737 Aristotle 1984, 1449b-1450a.14. (Poetics). 
1738 Ricoeur 1983, 13. (xi). 
1739 Ricoeur 1983, 13. (xi). Italics added. 
1740 Ricoeur 1983, 117. (77). Cf. Ricoeur 1983, 120-122. (80-81). 
1741 Ricoeur 1985, 391-392. (273-274). 
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to the aporias and some adequacy to the inquiry: a κάθαρσις in the very basic sense of the 
term as Ricoeur maintains.1742 Although cast in the form of a philosophical work, Ricoeur 
actually presents in Time and Narrative – with the generous aid of his reader-participants – the 
reduplication of a tragedy, in which the reader has played the role of a tragic hero.1743 The 
actual hermeneutic process of reconfiguration that is brought to a semi-closure in the 
reader’s act of refiguration, in other words, is the “poetic solution” Ricoeur repeatedly 
purpots to be seeking in this highly intelligent drama.1744 
It is a hermeneutic task that a reader faces with Time and Narrative, although the 
text itself seems to chain its reader mostly to the rigorous examination at the analytical level 
of the work. “Let us leave the scholarly exegetes to their scholarly naivety,” Ricoeur 
proclaims in Critique and Conviction, however.1745 The positive result is gained, paradoxically, in 
the following of the argument that ends up with the frustration of the “inscrutability of 
time.”1746 The Gadamerian play of being played,1747 or the author-text-reader interaction in 
the reading of Time and Narrative, however, is the positive outcome Ricoeur has sought: it is 
the manifestation of the human capacity for interpretative, creative action that is itself both 
narrative and temporal. The reader has been played poetically by the horizon of expectation 
arising from the text, but the same reader has been playing poetically in the space of his or 
her own unique experience that is opened up by his own interpretation. The work was 
designed, as a poetic demonstration, to bring out in the Open the creative human refiguration of 
the world of living, acting and suffering through the appropriation of the text. 
                                               
1742 Ricoeur 1983, 82-83. (50). Cf. Aristotle 1984, 1449b.22-31. (Poetics).; Kaelin 1995, 239-240, 249-251. 
1743 Cf. Kaelin 1995, 239-240. – Eugene Kaelin analyzes the cathartic aspect of Ricoeur’s philosophy, but 
remains in a scholarly mode without being explicit that he too is a reader of Ricoeur’s work, and therefore 
undergoing the same cathartic process of which he writes. 
1744 Ricoeur 1983, 11-13, 103-105, 110, 128-129. (ix-xi, 66-67, 71, 86).; Ricoeur 1985, 10. (4). 
1745 Ricoeur, Azouvi, & de Launay 1995, 278. (186). 
1746 Ricoeur 1985, 374. (261). 
1747 Cf. Ricoeur 1995j, 284.; Valdes 1995, 275-276. 
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Getting back to this dissertation, then, I maintain that Ricoeur’s poetic 
demonstration of reconfiguration is also our 3ερι3έτεια and αναγνώρισις, a reversal and a 
discovery, for “readers” in general, and for those of this work on cultural re-con-naissance in 
particular.1748 Following Ricoeur’s ingenious plan of letting the reader provide the unity of 
µύθος or emplotment,1749 I have also tried to demonstrate the unending process of 
reconfiguration and “reading” as our interpretative action, which necessarily requires the help 
of culture both as a condition and as a context. I have maintained that Ricoeur ultimately 
argues that culture is both the “horizon of expectation” and the “space of experience,” to 
borrow Reinhart Koselleck’s terms, as Ricoeur does.1750 Because of this given cultural 
horizon for our experience, without which there are no means for human comprehension, 
“it is by interpreting that we can hear anew.”1751 As Ricoeur argues in The Symbolism of Evil, the 
primitive naïveté, or “the sunken Atlantides,” has been lost, but through critical 
hermeneutics – that is, in interpretation – a second immediacy, “the postcritical equivalent of 
the precritical hierophany,” is within our reach.1752 This interpretative appropriation, as 
detached from any a-cultural experience of being (which is impossible), cannot in turn 
detach itself from its cultural mode of being-here, and return to the pure immediacy of some 
Wholly Other, but it can begin to understand this necessary condition in the hermeneutic of 
culture as cathartic re-con-naissance. 
 As I maintained in chapter 3, appropriative interpretation, or reconfiguration, 
is always bound to culture as indicated by the “anchorages” of mimesis1, the demand for both 
schematization and traditionality of mimesis2, and the moment of refiguration of mimesis3. For 
                                               
1748 Cf. Aristotle 1984, 1452.a22-b9. (Poetics). 
1749 Cf. Aristotle 1984, 1449b-1450a.14. (Poetics).  
1750 Ricoeur 1985, 301-313. (208-216). Cf. Ricoeur 2000b, 388-400. (296-305). 
1751 Ricoeur 1960b, 326. (351). 
1752 Ricoeur 1960b, 325, 327. (349, 352). 
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this reason, I argued that Ricoeur’s model of threefold mimesis, or reconfiguration, serves us as 
a clue for the critical analysis of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic of culture. Following Dan Stiver’s 
synthetizing explication of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics (that I have explained in section 3.3 of 
this dissertation), part two of this dissertation was to schematize the prefigurative critical 
moment, part three the configurative critical moment, and part four the refigurative critical 
moment as readings of Ricoeur’s work. In each of these parts, however, subtle allusions to the 
moments of re-, con-, and naissance were made. The purpose of the current part, I have 
indicated, is to make way for a postcritical hermeneutics of cultural recognition that maps the 
hermeneutics of re-con-naissance onto the critical reconfiguration.  
The spiraling towards the postcritical understanding of re-con-naissance is 
achievable only by appropriating a “text,” including this academic text, which in itself 
remains at the level of critical explanation.1753 Warning the reader of the limitation that the 
“mapping” can, therefore, only be suggestive (since “it is the reader who completes the work 
inasmuch as […] the written work is a sketch for reading”1754), I have argued that this “fifth 
act” of the dissertation not only draws together the three moments of re-, con-, and naissance, 
but also proposes that re-con-naissance is a postcritical hermeneutic model of culturally 
mediated self-identity and self-understanding. Before going on to this “concluding” 
problematics, however, let me first respond – out of respect for academic conventions – to 
the research objectives that were set for this work to justify its scholarly appearance.  
                                               
1753 Cf. Ricoeur & Fried 1991, 454.; Ricoeur & Roman 1991. 
1754 Ricoeur 1983, 117. (77). 
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17. A RESPONSIVE SELF: SUMMATION OF REPLIES TO RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
In this brief summing up of the scholarly results of this dissertation – most of which I have 
already explicated during the course of the analysis – I will focus first on the general research 
objectives, and then move into discussing the nine theses made at the end of part one. As 
already explained in the general introduction, I have had two kinds of objectives in this 
dissertation: historical and philosophical.  
The historical objective, I maintained, was to retrace the appearance of the notion 
of culture in the works of Paul Ricoeur, and to demonstrate that Ricoeur uses the term as 
part of his philosophical vocabulary. This objective was based on the assumption of a 
“resisting” attitude in French philosophy towards using the term “culture” or Kultur in its 
original German sense. According to Alfred L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, in the French 
context the words “la civilisation” and “social” were still preferred in the 1950s over “la culture” 
– for both historical and political reasons.1755 If Kroeber and Kluckhohn were correct in 
their assertion that such resistance took place, it could have indicated that there are no 
adequate conceptual grounds for examining the philosophy of culture of any French philosopher 
preceding the mid-twentieth century or shortly after, that is, at the time Ricoeur’s career was 
taking off. The two questions that I proposed in chapter 1 were, therefore, 1) does Ricoeur 
                                               
1755 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 28-29, 147. Cf. Appendix 1. – The predominance of the words “la 
civilization” and “social” can be affirmed on the basis of the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908-2009), a French 
anthropologist to whom Kroeber and Kluckhohn also refer in their critical review (Kroeber & Kluckhohn 
1952, 124, 163, 167-168.) Although his 1951 article “Language and the Analysis of Social Laws” in American 
Anthropologist is esteemed as “one of the most arresting statements on language and culture ever published” 
(Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 124.), this statement is misleading. Despite the fact that Lévi-Strauss had already 
been ten years in the United States, he still himself uses the word “culture” only incidentally (cf. Lévi-Strauss 
1951, 156, 160.) but gives, actually twice, the definition of language as “a social phenomenon” (Lévi-Strauss 
1951, 156.). Besides this, he frequently utilizes the word “social” in connection with “all social phenomena,” 
“the forms of social life” (which include art and religion), “socialized thought,” “social behavior,” “social 
organization,” “social group,” “social structures,” “social cohesion,” as well as “social existence.” In addition, 
Lévi-Strauss mentions “our contemporary civilization” in relation to “kinship systems” (Lévi-Strauss 1951, 
161.). 
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use the term throughout his career or can one detect a shift toward using the term “culture” 
in his philosophical vocabulary?, and 2) are Kroeber and Kluckhohn correct in their 
statement that “resistance” took place to the use if this term? Let me respond to each of 
these questions briefly.  
Even though Ricoeur’s early texts use the word “civilisation” quite infrequently 
(as is the case, for example, in “Le Chrétien et la civilisation occidentale,” 1946, that defines 
civilization and analyzes Western civilization from a Christian’s point of view,1756 and in 
“Pour une coexistence pacifique des civilisations,” 1951, in which Ricoeur does exercise, not 
a cultural critique, but a critique of political “civilizations”1757), his essays from the 1950s 
already use the term “culture” consistently, as we have seen. To mention only two in this 
context, “What does ‘Humanism’ Mean?” (1956) relates, in its gripping discussion, 
humanism with la vie de culture d’un people, or “the cultural life of a people,”1758 and “Place de 
l’oeuvre d’art dans notre culture” (1957) analyzes the role and function of art ultimately as 
cultural play, deliverance, and survival.1759 It has, therefore, become difficult to argue for a 
continued terminological “resistance” that would favor some other terms, such as 
“civilization,” instead of “culture.” 
It is true, however, that Ricoeur is vague in the use of his terms; this is already 
apparent on the basis of chapter 2 and Appendix 3 of this dissertation that examined 
Ricoeur’s “culture/civilization confusion.” Even though Ricoeur also differentiates 
“disinterested” leisurely culture from the “laborious” and technological civilization,1760 he 
does not maintain that distinction consistently. As our chapter 2 argues, Ricoeur simply 
                                               
1756 Ricoeur 1946. 
1757 Ricoeur 1951, 409, 414. 
1758 Ricoeur 1956, 84. (Ricoeur 1974, 68-69.) 
1759 Ricoeur 1957b, 9-11. 
1760 Ricoeur 1956, 85-90. (Ricoeur 1974, 71-81.) 
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announces in his 1965 essay, “The Task of the Political Educator,” that he “will not engage 
in the debate – as academic as sterile – on ‘civilization and culture.’”1761 The later Ricoeur, as 
I pointed out, follows this decision in Course of Recognition by maintaining that there are no 
reasons for opposing the word culture to that of civilization.1762 Kroeber and Kluckhohn 
could be right, therefore, to the extent that even though the precise German meaning of 
“Kultur” was known to Ricoeur at the latest in 1965,1763 it did not fully eradicate the concept 
of “civilisation” from Ricoeur’s philosophical vocabulary. Ricoeur’s later essays – such as “Le 
dialogue des cultures: la confrontation des héritages culturels” (1997) that discusses 
intercultural tolerance, and “Cultures, du deuil à la traduction” (2004) that focuses on 
cultural pluralism and the possibility of cross-cultural understanding – demonstrate, 
however, that the term “culture” continued to have a firmer role in his terminology.1764 
 This seems to be a suitable moment for us to turn to the proper philosophical 
objective of this dissertation, namely, to the question of reconstructing Paul Ricoeur’s cultural 
theory in the form of the hermeneutics of cultural recognition. I have proposed that such a 
theory is necessary relative to Ricoeur’s more openly-argued and anthropologically oriented 
“phenomenology of being able.” On that basis I have claimed that this dissertation 1) 
demonstrates that Paul Ricoeur’s work includes a cultural hermeneutics, and that 2) a 
philosophy of culture is not only relevant but necessary for the understanding of both 
philosophical and cultural anthropology. Put differently, I have stated that all 
anthropological thought requires the support of cultural understanding, as no 
comprehensive anthropology is possible without the philosophical elaboration of the cultural 
                                               
1761 Ricoeur 1965c, 79. (Ricoeur 1973b, 142.) Cf. Appendix 1. 
1762 Ricoeur 2004b, 201. (135-136). Cf. Ricoeur 1965a, 243-244. (248-249). 
1763 Ricoeur 1965c, 79. (Ricoeur 1973b, 142-143.) 
1764 Cf. Ricoeur 1997.; Ricoeur 2004a. 
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condition that concerns human situatedness. The reception of a cultural heritage is 
reaffirmed in the task of acquiring a notion of a human self, or, as a human task of freedom 
and the fulfillment of fundamental possibilities. 
I will restate the previous in the form of a response to the nine theses that 
were laid out at the end of part one in this dissertation.1765 As my intention was not to 
examine these theses one by one, but rather to demonstrate their validity in the course of my 
argument, I will not break from this pattern and turn the discussion into an analytical re-
examination of each thesis, as that fragmentation or disconnecting would result in the loss of 
the ultimate aim of this dissertation. Instead, let me follow the flow of the argument within 
which each of the theses was shown to hold. I will return to the two questions proposed just 
above after having reinstated the nine working theses that have guided the academic task in 
this dissertation. 
 Instead of beginning directly with the first thesis, our part two began by 
grounding theses two to five. Our analysis of Ricoeur’s Course of Recognition (2004) made it 
apparent that we had a need to return to Ricoeur’s earlier texts. We read this need as an 
indication that Ricoeur develops his conception of recognition before the work that places the 
                                               
1765 At the end of part one I proposed nine working theses that would guide the process of responding to 
the philosophical objectives of this dissertation. I maintained that: 1) The theme of recognition is developed 
and discussed by Ricoeur well before the 2004 work Parcours de la reconnaissance, translated as The Course of 
Recognition. 2) Although the subject-centered progress from identity to self-recognition and furthermore to 
mutual recognition is important (cf. Course of Recognition), the “course” of recognition should be approached at 
the level of Ricoeur’s work as a whole, and consequently at the level of cultural formation or figuration. 3) 
Ricoeur’s “phenomenology of being able” – which culminates in the notion of l’homme capable – necessarily 
requires the support of a cultural hermeneutics. 4) This hermeneutic of culture recasts Ricoeur’s relations to 
such thinkers as Hegel, Kant, and Heidegger. 5) The notions of “cultural objectivity” and “cultural objects” 
have a major role for both Ricoeur’s hermeneutic of culture and his anthropological phenomenology, since the 
possibility of recognition is fundamentally grounded in them. 6) The foundational etho-poetic nucleus of human 
culture, which Ricoeur mentions in his texts, is found only indirectly in and by these cultural objects. 7) This 
poetic nucleus, as an opening up of a language of the possible ήθος, is a necessary condition for the possibility 
of an ethico-political self-understanding. 8) In summing up the course of recognition (which results from 
poetic expressions conceived as objects of culture), the term “reconnaissance” should be understood as “re-
con-naissance,” that is, as “having-been-born-as-an-ethico-political-subject.” 9) The term “re-con-naissance” 
should be understood as a model of the hermeneutic of culture. 
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question under a sharpened focus, but also as a sign that instead of taking Ricoeur’s 
“phenomenology of being able” as a place to begin with, his “course” of recognition is 
better approached at the theoretical level of cultural figuration as objectifying formation 
(theses 2 and 3). For this reason it was necessary to undertake a discussion of Ricoeur’s 
relation to Hegel’s philosophy. Part two of this dissertation then revealed that Hegel is an 
essential prefigure for Ricoeur’s conception of culture (thesis 4a). This theoretical 
connection was in the end established in the notion of les objectivations culturelles, or the idea of 
“cultural objectification,” and its corollary concept of “cultural objects” (thesis 5). The part 
concluded with a restriction, however, that a further examination is needed for the proper 
conjoining of Ricoeur’s anthropological phenomenology and his hermeneutic of culture. For 
this reason it was argued that an analysis of Ricoeur’s earlier texts could potentially provide 
some clarity on the necessity of cultural hermeneutics. 
 Responding to the need of providing another reading of Ricoeur’s work, part 
three, which discussed the theses 1-5, and opened up the possibility of theses 6-7, took us 
from the end of Ricoeur’s philosophical career to its early phases. Beginning with The 
Voluntary and the Involuntary (1949), part three was able to demonstrate continuity from 
objectively grounded philosophical anthropology to a discussion of cultural objects and 
cultural objectification in Fallible Man (1960), and furthermore to a cultural hermeneutics in 
On Interpretation (1965). This confirms theses 3 and 5. In addition, part three not only 
responded to the first thesis argued at the end of part one, namely, that the theme of 
recognition is developed and discussed by Ricoeur well before Course of Recognition, but also 
strengthened the idea that the “course” of recognition should be approached as pertaining to 
Ricoeur’s work as a whole (thesis 2). As placing the “phenomenology of being able” and the 
“hermeneutic of culture” onto the same continuum of thought in part two, the same 
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reading, however, also took into account Ricoeur’s assertion that his philosophy is not only 
post-Hegelian but also influenced by Immanuel Kant. The idea of a synthesis between a 
subject and his or her cultural objects confirmed Ricoeur’s “post-Hegelian Kantianism,” but 
also revealed Ricoeur’s stance as post-Kantian (thesis 4b). Ricoeur transcends Kant’s 
position by insisting that a subject’s full understanding of his or her situated condition is not 
only rational-epistemological but also onto-existential in same the manner Martin Heidegger 
maintains in his Kantbuch. This conviction led Ricoeur to argue for the grounding poetic nucleus 
of human culture that is found in and by the cultural objects. This invites reflection open to 
this alethic truth as proposed in theses 6 and 7. 
 Part four continued the reading of Ricoeur’s work, therefore, by focusing first 
on the analysis of semantic innovation as well as on the poetic “surplus” of meaning and 
being Ricoeur argues for in The Living Metaphor (1975). After this poetic grounding of our 
analysis in part four, the discussion moved into the practical expansion of hermeneutics, or 
the poetics of action, in From Text to Action (1986), and further into the poetics of the good 
in Oneself as Another (1990). Focusing on the ethico-political aspects of Ricoeur’s poetics in 
Oneself as Another, the extended reading of Ricoeur’s works was brought to completion by 
bringing it, through The Just (1995) and Reflections on the Just (2001), to the threshold of the 
“gifts” of Memory, History, Forgetting (2000) and of Course of Recognition (2004) discussed at 
some length in part two of this dissertation. In addition, the last analytic chapter of part four, 
chapter 15, provided a retrospective re-reading that began with the posthumously published 
Living Up to Death (2007) and ended back with The Voluntary and the Involuntary (1949). 
Confirming the thesis that the “course” of recognition should be approached at the level of 
Ricoeur’s work as a whole (thesis 2), part four therefore also responded to the poetic 
challenge set by part three.  
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In analyzing the foundational poetic nucleus of human culture that is found only 
indirectly in and by cultural objects (thesis 6), part four explained why Ricoeur’s stance is 
both post-Hegelian and post-Kantian by showing the poetic affinities between Ricoeur and 
Heidegger, who in the later phase of his philosophical career also esteemed poetics as means 
of onto-existential disclosure. Part four explained, in particular, that the “poetic nucleus,” as 
the opening up of a language of the possible, is a necessary condition for the possibility of an 
adequate self-understanding (thesis 7). As an opening up of the possible, however, the part 
pointed out that, according to Ricoeur, the poetic also reveals the ethotic (ήθος) as co-
constitutive for a culture. This differentiates Ricoeur’s critical poetics from Heidegger’s 
onto-poetics (thesis 4c). Part four concluded, therefore, with the notion of essentially etho-
poetic culture that is manifested in ethico-political institutions as human responses. It 
thereby closes off Ricoeur’s hermeneutic of culture in the appearing of a cultural and ethical 
subject, the “real citizen,” or, as the thesis 8 asserted, in the moment of “having-been-born-
as-an-ethico-political-subject.” 
 These brief scholarly summaries of parts two, three, and four already respond 
to the questions proposed above: First, this dissertation does demonstrate that Paul 
Ricoeur’s work includes a cultural hermeneutics from its beginning to its end, and clarifies 
the reasons why Ricoeur has a need to include such a hermeneutics in his project of l’homme 
capable de faillir. These reasons point out the limited scope of an anthropological inquiry that, 
by focusing only on the question of the human subject, will paradoxically lose the very 
notion of it. A human subject, in brief, is in a state of “after” or “having received”; this 
already applies to the bio-physical condition of being born, as Ricoeur maintains in The 
Voluntary and the Involuntary. But it applies all the more to his or her diachronically and 
synchronically received heritage and cultural tradition.  
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Put differently, to reply to the second question concerning the necessity of a 
cultural hermeneutics, this dissertation also shows forth in its very “working out” the 
argument that a philosophy of culture is not only relevant but necessary for the 
understanding of both philosophical and cultural anthropology. Again, any anthropological 
question remains incomprehensible without the support of a cultural philosophy. The 
elaboration of cultural condition that concerns human situatedness as the reception of a 
cultural heritage – reaffirmed through the acquiring of a selfhood – is the only framework in 
which such a question can be asked; it concerns the human task of freedom and the 
fulfillment of fundamental human possibilities. The recognition of one’s self as ethico-
political is enabled by the cultural context in which the self is situated. Culture, as I have 
maintained above, has a dual meaning: it is both a condition comparable to Ernst Cassirer’s 
symbolic forms, and also the context of experienced life as Clifford Geertz’s “thick” 
description of culture defines. These anthropologies utilize a conception of culture as well. 
The recurring birth of an ethico-political self is culturally facilitated. 
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18. RECONFIGURATION AND RE-CON-NAISSANCE 
Even though the summing up of the scholarly results of this dissertation seems to close the 
circle of this text as an academic work by responding to and confirming the working theses I 
proposed at the end of part one, an attentive reader will notice that, in fact, only theses 1 
through 7 have been dealt with above. I do mention thesis 8 as the high point of part four, 
but I do not, however, comment on the assertoric part of that thesis, namely, the claim that 
the term “reconnaissance” should literally be understood as “re-con-naissance.” Thesis 8 was only 
partially examined in the analytic reading of Ricoeur’s work, that is, by compressing it to the 
point of an analysis of “having-been-born-as-an-ethico-political-subject.” In addition, thesis 
9 has not been dealt with at all. Put differently, I have for so far not commented on the idea 
that the term “re-con-naissance” can be understood as a postcritical model of the hermeneutic 
of culture. It appears that our summing up this dissertation work in a form of confirming its 
working theses is not yet complete. Besides being a condition and a context, culture also has 
to be seen an achievement.  
 I have repeatedly argued in this dissertation that the hermeneutic “spiraling” 
toward the postcritical understanding of re-con-naissance is achievable only by the critical 
appropriation of a “text.” These “texts,” as we have seen, have to include all cultural 
phenomena and human action. The same necessity of appropriation applies, therefore, for 
the readers of this text, which, as an academic dissertation, most clearly remains at the level of 
critical explanation, as, in fact, all cultural phenomena do. For this reason, I have insisted 
that this part, as the “fifth act” of this dissertation, can only be “suggestive” when drawing 
together the three moments of re-con-naissance as a postcritical hermeneutic model of 
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culturally mediated self-identity and self-understanding, that is, as a culturally facilitated 
postcritical hermeneutics of recognition.  
When I argue that the critical moments of reconfiguration are readable as the 
postcritical moments of re-, con-, and naissance, I refer to those moments of this lengthy 
analysis that conform to this tripartite structure. Following Hegel’s suggestion in Aesthetics 
that the first act of a play is an exposition, the three “intervening ones” complicate the issue, 
and the fifth act then steps above the quarrels, reactions, “and struggles of the opposing 
parties,”1766 I have proposed that this dissertation can be read in the light of this dramatic 
structure. Parts two, three, and four of this dissertation form a whole that surpasses the most 
apparent structure of “asserting” Ricoeur’s cultural hermeneutics in parts one and two, and 
of “confirming” this hermeneutics with the analytical reading of Ricoeur’s work in parts 
three and four. Besides this academic structure of assertion (with some educated hypotheses) 
and confirmation (through a repeatable analysis), I am proposing a poetic structure that takes us 
to the threshold of postcritical re-con-naissance. 
Without having constantly reminded the reader about it, I have maintained 
that the most foundational structure of this dissertation is as follows: Part one, as an 
extended introduction, alerts the reader of the postcritical aim of this dissertation (this is 
done especially in chapters 3 and 4). Parts two, three, and four – respectively – follow the 
analytics of the critical process of re-con-figuration (explained in section 3.3), while at the same 
time elaborating on the notion of re-con-naissance. The aim of the current part, or the “fifth 
act,” is to remind the reader of the culturally facilitated hermeneutics that takes place in and 
with this structure of this dissertation work, and so opens up the possibility of postcritical 
appropriation. This is why I have maintained above that the current part reveals the depth 
                                               
1766 Hegel 2000, 1170. 
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structure of Ricoeur’s cultural hermeneutics, but only from the point of view of “reading” 
this work as a “text.” The current part can in the end only suggest or point to such a 
postcritical depth structure that takes place in the reader’s own reconfigurative process as culturally 
enabled re-con-naissance. 
Based on what I have just restated of the ultimate purpose of this dissertation, 
allow me, therefore, to briefly recall the hermeneutic process of reconfiguration that Ricoeur 
argues in the whole context of Time and Narrative as its poetic demonstration. Again, as I 
already summarized in chapter 3, a subject discovers him- or herself as a creative interpreter 
in the open-ended and recurring process of reconfiguration, or in the threefold mimetic 
process that begins with pre-figuration as the stage for prevalent practical experience, meets 
its demands in a con-figuration that takes place in the “emplotment,” or synthesis, and results 
in the re-figuration that returns to the thus enriched practical experience. This explication of 
a hermeneutic process, we may recall, focuses on the different aspects of µίµησις 3ράξεως. It 
draws together and oscillates between the practical ethico-political world and the poetic 
imaginary world:  
That the praxis belongs at the same time to the real domain, covered by ethics, 
and the imaginary one, covered by poetics, suggests that mimesis functions not 
just as a break but also as a connection, one which establishes precisely the 
status of the “metaphorical” transposition of the practical field by the µυθος.1767 
 
Put differently, the etho-poetic nucleus of culture is manifested in this hermeneutic process 
that retains a reference to the experienced and conditioning ethico-political world of a 
subject (mimesis1) in the opening up of it in its explication (mimesis2) that, then, in the 
appropriation of the explication, or in the “text,” enables the reappropriation of the ethico-
political world of experience and action in the interpretative “reading” of this explication 
                                               
1767 Ricoeur 1983, 76. (46). 
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(mimesis3). As I have already maintained in chapter 3, this process that emphasizes the 
receptive-creative moment of mimesis3 is facilitated by culture, since the refigurative reception 
of a “text” or a “work” – that is, its appropriation – is the reappropriation of a world that “is 
a cultural world,” as Ricoeur also maintains.1768 The process of reconfiguration, or the 
threefold mimesis, represents not only the hermeneutic act of combining different worlds, the 
ethico-political and the poetic, but also the processual mediation in culture in the moments 
of pre-con-figuration.  
To explain the connection of these three moments of reconfiguration to the 
asserted postcritical moments of re-con-naissance, that is, to confirm the yet unconfirmed 
theses 8 and 9 of this dissertation, I will next focus briefly on each of these moments by 
leveling them with each other. Before beginning this new re-reading of the dissertation, let 
me remind the reader again that what I am about to propose remains fully at the critical level 
of reconfiguration as I have explained in section 3.3, by applying Dan Stiver’s synthesizing 
account of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics. The postcritical re-con-naissance as the birth of a cultural 
subject remains in suspension in the lines of this academic work that still, critically, facilitates 
such a becoming. 
 
Re-membering the Prefiguration 
Let me begin by anchoring this discussion in prefiguration. It will be recalled that, according 
to Time and Narrative I, prefiguration, or the “preunderstanding” of the ethico-political world 
of action, has three “anchorages.” Ricoeur emphasizes that understanding requires cultural 
structures that allow it. If something is left radically external, it will remain unknown for 
                                               
1768 Ricoeur 1983, 83-84. (50-51). 
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us.1769 The necessity of having a meaningful structure of action, symbolic structures as both 
conditions and contexts of that action, and the temporal character of the world of action 
warrant the comprehension of the world of practical action by “anchoring” it culturally.1770 
In short, the prefigured world of action consists of the necessary prestructure of meaning, or 
of “[formal] cultural processes that articulate experience”1771 as required by those symbolic 
wholes that, in turn, are equally needed as “descriptive contexts for particular actions.”1772 
The “prenarrative” structure of human experience as intratemporality (Innerzeitlichkeit) 
complements these traits of the prefigured world of action, as both spatial and temporal 
manifold of action, by acknowledging the temporal requisite of cultural contextuality.1773 In 
brief, Ricoeur argues that a preunderstanding of the world of human action that is “common 
to both poets and their readers”1774 is necessary if one is to argue for the possibility of a 
shared life. The question of l’homme capable de faillir, in other words, will also have to be traced 
back to these prefigurative beginnings, if the enigma of the fundamental human possibilities 
is to be resolved.  
 The notion of prefiguration as a necessary condition or as the beginning for 
the possibility of a “capable human” reconnects us with the idea of re-connaissance. As I 
explained in chapter 6, Ricoeur maintains that in the age of “modern forgetfulness” the 
human task is “to remember with a view to beginning.”1775 Remembering, however, is 
enabled by the very same beginning: chapter 6 also reveals Ricoeur’s “legitimate 
supposition” that “it is always in historically limited cultural forms that the capacity to remember 
                                               
1769 Cf. Ricoeur 1990, 387-393. (336-340). 
1770 Ricoeur 1983, 87-88, 100. (54, 64). 
1771 Ricoeur 1983, 91. (57). 
1772 Ricoeur 1983, 92-93. (57-58). 
1773 Ricoeur 1983, 95, 97, 124-129. (59, 61-62, 82-87). Cf. Ricoeur 2000b, 455-503. (348-385). 
1774 Ricoeur 1983, 100. (64). 
1775 Ricoeur 1960b, 324. (349). 
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can be apprehended.”1776 Again, there is no capacity to remember without a socio-cultural-
linguistic situation as a condition and as a context that has a self-affirmed historical 
trajectory. These “multiple orders of belonging or respective orders of standing”1777 are 
therefore also as much necessary forms of self-recognition as they are of remembering. They 
are the structure of cultural mediation.  
To expand Ricoeur’s characterization of the task for moderns to remember 
“fully,” I maintain that the task is to gain a self-understanding by recognizing oneself 
through the act of acknowledging these necessary cultural conditions as the prefigured 
beginning of one’s comprehension and comportment. Remembering the prefiguration, put 
differently, is foundational cultural re-discovering; it is re-cognizing the state of being 
conditioned and contextualized – re-connaissance. As chapter 6 of this dissertation 
maintained, Ricoeur stresses that “memory is re-presentation, in the twofold sense of re-: 
turning back, anew.”1778 In this re-discovery, I argued, a human subject “finds anew,” and 
even “recharges” himself again, as Ricoeur also insists.1779 In this re-membering a human 
subject recollects himself as being situated to situated being; it is re-connaissance. Re-
membering is therefore “finding anew” the cultural condition and context as the possibility 
of becoming a self. This conditioned becoming, however, is only the first opening to the 
foundational re-discovering.  
Re-membering applies to all subjects claiming to live in a meaningful world of 
action as being conditioned and contextualized, that is, necessarily prefigured. Pointing to 
the necessary conditions for a human subject’s meaningful action, to its prestructure, re-
                                               
1776 Ricoeur 2000b, 511. (392). Italics added. 
1777 Ricoeur 2000b, 162. (132). 
1778 Ricoeur 2000b, 47. (39). Cf. Ricoeur 2004b, 100, 184. (65, 124). 
1779 Ricoeur 1960b, 325. (349). 
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membering ultimately also reconnects all the fellow members of this cultural world of action. 
Re-membering is putting oneself back as a member of a whole culture. The most 
foundational re-discovering, I argue, is to re-member with this view to our sociocultural 
beginning that is facilitated and mediated by the “orders of belonging.”1780 Just as the 
argument in chapter 6 from memory to the language of others does, our re-examination of 
prefiguration as re-connaissance leads us again to the dia- and syn-chronic “close ones” (les 
proches) or “those close by.” Re-membering, as foundational re-discovering, is both re-
membering the state of being conditioned, and re-membering with all those being conditioned. 
This duality of re-membering, I maintain, is the foundational re-connaissance to which part 
two, working at the critical level of prefiguration, alludes.  
 
Con-joining as Configuration 
Even though prefiguration/re-connaissance provides a firm anchoring for us, it still focuses 
on the necessary prestructure of meaning. An explication of how re-membering comes about 
is therefore needed. I have argued that the moment of configuration responds to that 
challenge. Configuration, or the moment of “grasping together” that connects the moments 
of “preunderstanding” (prefiguration) and “postunderstanding” (refiguration),1781 means 
emplotment in the manner of Aristotelian poetics,1782 but it also has the Kantian meaning of 
a “function of unity among our representations.”1783 Again, Ricoeur unites these two aspects 
of configuration by claiming that “we may speak of a schematism of the narrative 
                                               
1780 Ricoeur 2000b, 162. (132). 
1781 Ricoeur 1983, 102. (65). 
1782 Ricoeur 1983, 101-103. (64-66). 
1783 Ricoeur 1983, 103-104. (66).; Kant 1999, III.A69/B94. (KrV). 
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function.”1784 But he also maintains that this peculiar schematism is “constituted within a 
history that has all the characteristics of a tradition.”1785 Configuration, in sum, is a cultural 
function of unity that enables the actualization of the intratemporal condition of 
prefiguration as the creation of those narratives or “texts” through which a subject 
understands his or her situatedness within a historical tradition. 
Part three led us to consider this cultural function of unity as synthesis that 
overcomes the fundamental polarity between subjectivity and objectivity by requiring a 
necessary correlation between the objectivity of an object and the subjectivity of a subject. 
As we were able to notice, however, Ricoeur also maintains that the cultural synthesis 
warrants com-munication as discourse which con-joins. Even if the cultural function of unity 
rests on the transcendental synthesis between a cultural subject and a cultural object – in the 
necessary synthetic com-bination (con-junctio) of the subject and the object1786 – cultural 
function of unity as synthesis also necessitates com-munication between the elements of 
which it consists.  
To re-emphasize the importance of cultural objectivity that facilitates 
recognition as re-con-naissance, let me briefly restate its relation to the function of unity that 
con-joins. As chapter 10 stressed, distinguishing an individual self and articulating the 
relationship between individual selves requires the support of cultural objectivity that 
functions as the universal ground of self-affirmation. The human subject, first of all, “is 
constituted only in connection with things that themselves belong to the economic, political, 
and cultural dimensions.”1787 Drawing from Ricoeur’s analysis of this objectivity, which is 
                                               
1784 Ricoeur 1983, 106. (68). 
1785 Ricoeur 1983, 106. (68). 
1786 Kant 1999, III.B129-131. (KrV). 
1787 Ricoeur 1960a, 129. (113). 
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properly executed only at the cultural level,1788 I maintained that a human subject recognizes 
himself as a self only in and through the cultural forms his being assumes and the 
“monuments” he has produced, monuments which stand over and against himself as 
objectifying the experience of his or her being as a cultural discourse that captures the “idea 
of humanity” as Ricoeur stated. This objective “standing over and against” applies, however, 
to all productive agents seeking to be recognized as estimable human subjects.  
The “formal objectivity” in the idea of humanity, as part three of this 
dissertation argued, has to be complemented with the “material objectivity” of cultural 
objects that mediate the notion of esteem as the genuine “signs of being human.”1789 The 
works of art and literature, along with all the other works that manifest animated human 
creativity, and through which the human possibilities are sought, are “the true ‘objects’ that 
manifest the abstract universality of the idea of humanity through their concrete 
universality.”1790 The notion of humanity is manifested in these works that Ricoeur called 
“highly expressive”;1791 these works as instances of cultural discourse reveal a creative subject 
to him or herself, as I maintained, but also mediate – or, com-municate – the idea of 
humanity to other like agents, who, through this cultural objectivity, are able to find esteem 
as human subjects, that is, as subjects standing under the formal condition of being ends-in-
themselves.  
The formal objectivity of a subject’s being-an-end-in-himself is materialized in 
cultural works that are intersubjectively constitutive in their concrete universality; this 
concrete universality is the cultural discourse as com-munication that unifies or “grasps 
                                               
1788 Cf. Ricoeur 1965a, 490, 502. (509, 523). 
1789 Ricoeur 1960a, 85. (67-68).; Ricoeur 1965a, 8, 54. (xii, 46-47). 
1790 Ricoeur 1960a, 139. (123). 
1791 Ricoeur 1960a, 76-77. (59-60). 
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together.” As we saw in chapter 10, quoting Ricoeur, “cultural objectivity (l’objectivité culturelle) 
is the very relation of man to man represented in the idea of humanity; only cultural 
testimonies endow it with the density of things, in the form of monuments existing in the 
world: but these things are ‘works.’”1792 The unity in the culturally facilitated idea of 
humanity that is manifested in human works as cultural objects – through which a subject 
receives an understanding of being a human self as “being esteemed” – is, in other words, 
the material con-joining of the cultural subjects under the formality of cultural objectivity.  
 This cultural configuration as the foundational function of unity that com-
municates the con-joining of human subjects under the idea of humanity clarifies why 
recognition should be depicted as re-con-naissance. The cultural recognition as “being 
esteemed” is the mutual recognition of “being recognized”; cultural objectivity mutualizes by 
con-joining, and only this con-joining allows the sociocultural re-membering that has been 
proposed above. As I maintained in chapter 11, the foundational synthetic moment of “con” 
under cultural objectivity is literally com-munication in its radical meanings of making 
common, sharing, and mutual participation. In short, it brings about the fundamental 
concrete unity of humanity in the cultural objects as symbols of concordance in the living 
experience of primordial discordance.  
 Culture, I have summarized, configures the human experience of being alive, 
mediates the notion of being capable of failing, and thus renders this experience of being 
alive appropriable for a human subject. In its “concrete universality,” however, culture as 
configuration also necessitates the unification of all subjects under the same “figuring” – the 
cultural condition – that is manifested in the cultural contexts by which the human reality is 
mediated, and in which recognition takes place. This universal con-joining to the mutuality 
                                               
1792 Ricoeur 1960a, 140. (123-124).  
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of this condition is the necessary moment of re-con-naissance, to the recognition of which 
part three has invited us. 
 
Being Born with Refiguration: Naissance 
We could rephrase the moment of configuration/re-con-naissance by stating that culture, as 
objectified subjectivity, is a symbol of humanity. Put differently, the cultural function of 
unity applies poetic expressivity; that is, cultural objects gain their objectivity only through 
symbolization. As implied above, this objectivity does not complete the task of human 
“Suchen,” but enables it instead by giving a formulation under which the primordial task of 
searching for one’s self can be executed. The hermeneutic task of acquiring a human self is 
possible only under the objectifying condition of a cultural “con” that renders the experience 
of being alive, appropriable for a human subject in the mode represented by the worked out 
idea of humanity. The correlating moment of subjectified objectivity, however, brings the 
recurring process into a (semi)closure as a re-internalizing “retrieval”; the movement of re-
subjectification is as much Er-innerung as it is Wiederholung.1793 Culture, as the symbol of 
humanity, only becomes the authentic symbol of humanity in its appropriation. Only if “the 
symbol gives the gift of thought”1794 – donne à penser – that is, only if culture gives rise to 
reflection, it can fulfill its function of opening up a world of fundamental human 
possibilities. 
 The moment of refiguration, or “reading,” is the interpretive application of 
configured prefiguration, that is, the placing of oneself into the cultural world of action as its 
restitution. As Ricoeur clarifies in his 1991 essay “Life in Quest of Narrative,” configuration 
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1794 Ricoeur 1960b, 324, 330. (348, 355). 
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is “not completed in the text but in the reader and, under this condition, makes possible the 
reconfiguration of life by narrative.”1795 Refiguration, in other words, is the appropriation of 
the world proposed by the configured “text,” through which the “reader’s” situation in a 
cultural world is reappropriated. The “reader” recreates the cultural world of action, and 
makes it his own – subjectifies it – in the act of interpretation that is bound to the objectivity 
of the “text.” As I have maintained, for Ricoeur this world of the “reader” – the one “in 
front of the text” – is far more important than any of those that could be assumed “behind 
the text.” Refiguration is both re-description and re-signification in the sense of subjective 
re-institution; refiguration as “reading” is therefore ultimately about the unending and 
recurring human creativity. 
Refiguration, in short, is “making” as much as it is “remaking” in a cultural 
tradition, and as such it is also an increase or enrichment of being. The world deployed by 
this poetic work as work is a cultural world that describes at the same time “my ownmost 
powers” as a creative “reader.”1796 As I have emphasized, this is the “poetic solution” 
Ricoeur was after in Time and Narrative; the hermeneutic action of the reader himself is the 
very κάθαρσις or the purgation, in which “the dialectic of inside and outside reaches its 
culmination point.”1797 Refiguration depicted as such “poetic solution,” the aspects of which 
were examined in part four, explains Ricoeur’s statement in The Living Metaphor that clarifies 
this duality of making and remaking: 
The referential movement is inseparable from the creative dimension; µίµησις is 
3οίησις, and 3οίησις is µίµησις. […] So, µίµησις is the restitution of the human, not 
only essentially, but in a way that makes it greater and nobler. There is thus a 
double tension proper to µίµησις: on the one hand, the imitation is at once a 
                                               
1795 Ricoeur 1991b, 26. 
1796 Ricoeur 1983, 83, 122. (50, 81). 
1797 Ricoeur 1983, 82-83. (50). Cf. Aristotle 1984, 1449b.22-31. (Poetics). 
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portrayal of the human and an original creation; on the other, it comprises a 
restitution and a deplacement toward the high.1798  
 
The purifying poetic solution is to recognize, or to figure out, the figure of being human in 
the very figuring of it; µίµησις is 3οίησις, and 3οίησις is µίµησις. The appropriation of this “poetic 
image,” Ricoeur maintains, “places us at the origin of our speaking being, [in] expressing us 
by making us what it expresses.”1799 The culturally manifesting poetic activity as its own 
image – or as its icon, or Bild1800 – opens up a path into the depths of human existence. It is 
the refigurative making and remaking of culture in the culture that is our cultural 
achievement. 
 As I argued in chapter 13, the question of the “very birth (naissance) of 
discourse (parole)”1801 is indeed not separable from becoming human; poetic expressivity that 
is essentially etho-poetic cultural discourse manifested in ethico-political institution, “makes 
us” as being the “becoming of our being.”1802 Put differentely, the essentially etho-poetic 
culture gives birth to a cultured ethico-political human subject by enabling recognition of 
this very becoming in refiguration or reappropriating reflection – this is what I have called 
recon-naissance. The idea of naissance, or birth of l’homme capable de faillir as an authentic ethico-
political self that I presented in part four, is the refigurative consenting to the necessity of 
one’s culturally conditioned existence that at the same time, nevertheless, is “the incantation 
of poetry which delivers me from myself and purifies me.”1803 The dialectical circularity of 
consent and this admiration of “the high” in interpretative reflection is the birth “from all to 
                                               
1798 Ricoeur 1975d, 56-57. (39-40). 
1799 Ricoeur 1975d, 272. (214-215). 
1800 Cf. Ricoeur 1975d, 283. (224-225).; Ricoeur 1983, 121-122. (80-81). 
1801 Ricoeur 1965a, 334. (343). 
1802 Ricoeur 1975d, 272. (215). Cf. Ricoeur 1960b, 20. (13).; Ricoeur 1965a, 24. (15-16). 
1803 Ricoeur 1949, 448. (476-477). 
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myself” – or, refiguration/recon-naissance – that also completes the whole cultural dialectic of 
being culturally bound and beginning to be free. 
Ultimately, it is to this completion as the birth of the “reader” that part four, 
while only working at the critical level of refiguration, was inviting you as the reader of this 
work. As Ricoeur maintains in “Life in Quest of Narrative,” it is “the act of reading” that 
“becomes the critical moment of this entire analysis; on it rests the narrative’s capacity to 
transfigure the experience of the reader.”1804 While arguing the critical moments of cultural re-
con-figuration, this dissertation is largely readable as an invitation to a reflective achieving of 
the postcritical moments of re-, con-, and naissance. The critical reading of Ricoeur’s work in parts 
two, three, and four of this dissertation conveys an opening to the poetic free play of placing 
the reader of this work at the origin of our shared cultural being, that is, for “re-co-igniting” your 
creative capacities free in the midst of repeated re-readings in this academic work.1805 The 
“dramatic” re-reading of the three middle parts in this “fifth act” of the dissertation reveals 
this work as merely critical exposition of a hermeneutic of culture, but it also suggests, as a 
yet another re-reading, that this work is being read as a work in a culture. Consequently, the 
very act of reading this work is to pursue the hermeneutic task of re-con-naissance as the 
recurring birth of a cultural subject. The act of reading this work that already reads and re-
reads (and even re-reads itself), is, put differently, also the “reading” of this culture that 
                                               
1804 Ricoeur 1991b, 26. 
1805 Leaving aside the whole dissertation that is a reading of Ricoeur’s work, part two is the first reading of 
his work in the light of Course of Recognition. This first reading, is, however, contested in the second reading that 
consists of parts three and four that are readings of Ricoeur’s works in their own right. At the end of part four 
I committed a “double reversal,” and proposed to re-read Ricoeur retrospectively as a philosopher of the 
Wholly Other. All of this was re-read in this current part twice. First, in chapter 17, I summarized parts two, 
three, and four by responding to the academic working theses proposed at the end of part one. Second, this 
“academic” re-reading was surpassed in a “dramatic” re-reading that is the theme of the current chapter 18 of 
this dissertation. Finally, it is the current reader who yet again re-reads all of this as I try to demonstrate in the 
current section; this re-reading done by the current reader is ultimately the “another reading of Ricoeur’s work” 
that is indicated by the title of this dissertation. 
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allows the act of factual reading itself: this is the recurring naissance or birth of a cultural 
subject.  
Following Ricoeur’s own re-reading of his Time and Narrative, this current work 
was also designed to bring out in the Open the human refiguration of the cultural world in 
which a human subject comes to him or herself. Even though this current chapter makes 
way for such a postcritical hermeneutics of cultural recognition by “suggesting” it and “pointing” to 
it, it too can merely repeat the conviction that the critical moments of pre-, con-, and 
refiguration are “readable” as the postcritical moments of re-con-naissance. The suggestive re-
reading in this chapter, in other words, also remains at the critical level – not only because of 
being an academic work, but because of being a work in academic culture. The work of this 
“objectival” work, however, is to facilitate the spiraling toward the postcritical understanding 
of re-con-naissance in the appropriation of this text as a cultural “text.” Such an appropriation, 
I have maintained, is the reader’s own reversal and discovery – 3ερι3έτεια and αναγνώρισις – as 
a “reader” in a culture. Above and beyond any a-cultural experience of being, the reader of 
this work has to be an appropriative “reader” of a cultural “text,” in whose critical realm the 
reader can begin to understand this critical hermeneutic of culture as personal and cathartic 
re-con-naissance. 
 In conclusion, the culturally enabled “becoming what you are,”1806 or the 
figuring of oneself as l’homme capable de faillir, I maintain, is the course of recognizing the 
fundamental human possibilities. For this reason, the self-same becoming is best understood 
as the full cycle of re-con-naissance. Becoming human is the process of interpretative reflection 
that in itself also models the hermeneutic of culture; both of them are the very same 
unending becoming as re-con-naissance. The refigurative birth of the self in interpretative 
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reflection is bound to and liberated by the configurative cultural con-joining that allows 
sociocultural re-membering in its dual sense of 1) re-membering the foundational human 
condition as situated in the cultural order of belonging, and 2) re-membering to the instituted 
sociocultural context in which a person – capable of failing as a real ethico-political citizen – 
aims to live well with others. 
 Having now grounded theses 8 and 9 of this dissertation in a hermeneutic of 
culture, let me recall, again, that this text remains fully at the critical level of reconfiguration 
as already explained in section 3.3. Even though I have maintained that literature belongs to 
those “highly expressive” works that manifest the idea of creative humanity, this work, this 
dissertation, is and remains a cultural object.1807 The postcritical re-con-naissance, or the birth of 
a cultural subject, cannot take place in the lines of this work except insofar as these lines are 
understood as symbols of creative action that – in the mediation of these lines – calls for 
interpretation and reflection. Only this interpretative action, or the act of “reading,” gives 
birth to a cultural subject.  
Although I have “pointed to” re-con-naissance as “having-been-born-as-an-
ethico-political-subject,” and claimed, therefore, that the term re-con-naissance should be 
understood as a hermeneutic model of culture, this text is not able to rid itself of the critical, 
objectifying conditions to which it is bound. Even though “in the act of reading, the receiver 
plays with the narrative constraints,” the cultural subject is, nevertheless, not born in the 
“text” but “in front of the text” instead, actualizing the “text” by “reading” it.1808 The proper 
level of re-con-naissance is the creative subject’s level, that is, the cultural “reader’s” level. 
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 To make my point clear, I will end this whole process of elaborating a cultural 
hermeneutic by returning to the critical. Based on reading Paul Ricoeur’s work, this 
dissertation was drawn up to function both at the level of historical and philosophical 
scholarly objectives, and also at the “dramatic” level of an actual hermeneutics that is 
cultural. Without losing the grip of the scholarly appearance that safeguards against any 
transgression contesting the critical, that is, against forgetting the condition of cultural 
objectivity, I will re-emphasize the critical and cultural guise by reminding us – also in 
appendix 4 that makes a conceptual comparison with re-con-naissance and Paul Claudel’s term 
co-naissance – of the contrast between reconnaissance and connaissance, that is, between 
recognition and mere cognition. This is our final “reversal”; it places us again firmly in the 
critical by leaving the “dramatic” suggestion behind us in this text.  
 It is not by accident that I have been emphasizing the notion of interpretative 
reflection when pointing to the postcritical. “It is by interpreting,” Ricoeur argues, “that we 
can hear anew.”1809 Only interpretation can deliver us from the critical to the postcritical. At 
the same time, however, interpretation requires – as a token of its internal tension or conflict 
– the aid of reflection through which the explication of the possible transference from the 
critical to the postcritical is made. Seuls des êtres de connaissance sont des êtres de reconnaissance, 
Ricoeur insists in Fallible Man; “only knowing beings are recognizing beings.”1810 It is not, 
therefore, by chance that “recognition derives from cognition.”1811 This movement from 
cognition to recognition is the most apparent meaning for us human subjects, Ricoeur 
maintains in Course of Recognition.1812 Still, Ricoeur argues, “to recognize” is not the same as 
                                               
1809 Ricoeur 1960b, 326. (351). 
1810 Ricoeur 1960a, 138. (122). 
1811 Ricoeur 1960a, 138. (122). 
1812 Ricoeur 2004b, 18. (5-6). 
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“to cognize” – reconnaissance differs from connaissance.1813 This ambiguous duality of 




Having now affirmed, in this philosophical analysis of birth-giving meanings, the notion of 
re-con-naissance as a model of cultural hermeneutics, let me close off this dissertation with Paul 
Ricoeur’s own words. His commencement address at Boston College in 1975 invites us to a 
final wordplay that cultures us as “readers.” Even though these speeches are given in 
ceremonies that conclude a period of a person’s academic journey – very much as my own 
case right now – the word “commencement” means, in both English and French languages, 
a beginning or a start.  
Discussing the creative and founding function of cultural objects as symbols, 
as we have, Ricoeur addressed his audience – also preparing themselves for the then coming 
bicentennial of the American declaration of independence – by maintaining that it is in the 
re-enactment of “the symbolic existence of you as a nation that the memory of your 
foundation belongs.”1814 The repeating of a nation’s imagery that sums up its cultural values, 
beliefs, and self-identity, confirms the nation in the present moment, Ricoeur maintained.  
The recurring re-enactment Ricoeur speaks of can be summed up as re-con-
naissance. Shifting from the level of nations to the level of citizens, and finally to that of the 
graduates, Ricoeur states, accordingly, that “the founding of an inner democracy remains a 
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task as much as a conquest of the past.”1815 The “inner democracy” of a nation is a symbol, 
also as a verbal image, that bespeaks of the inner task of freedom of each and every human 
subject. “Life is memory and project,” Ricoeur tells the graduates.1816 Human life, as based 
on re-con-naissance, is a project of re-membering, I have maintained. “Creative projects,” 
Ricoeur concludes, “emerge from a faithful memory.”1817 Creative projects, I have 
maintained, emerge from cultural hermeneutics that re-members. 
Am I, therefore, having been instructed by Ricoeur’s commencement speech, 
about to be faithful to the memory of this completed whole? Do I cherish this conquest that 
is now in the past? Do I retake the task of making manifest my own reflective capability, that 
is, my inner cultured freedom? As a token of my own, unceasing task of founding inner 
freedom, do I, out of respect for Ricoeur’s address at Boston College – my alma mater –  
provide, for example, another set of reflections as in the previous parts? My reply is 
justifiably ambiguous: no, but yes. Such reflections are for the reader to make, each in his or 
her own project of “inner democracy” and freedom. The reflections are for the cultured 
reader to make, “almost abandoned by this work” as Ricoeur maintains.1818 This cultural 
facilitation, or benevolent abandonment, is your commencement and re-con-naissance. 
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APPENDIX 1 – THE CONCEPT OF CULTURE AND ITS CONTENTS 
The concept of “culture” is one of the key terms in this dissertation. I would have to 
acknowledge at the outset of this clarifying appendix, however, that there is no coherent or 
precise understanding of this term. As part of their own analysis of cultural construction, 
Scott Atran and Douglas Medin, for example, provide a recent discussion of the 
contemporary approaches to culture.1819 Their somewhat disturbing conclusion – with which, 
however, I would have to agree – is that “there are no absolute standards for evaluating 
different notions about what constitutes relevant cultural contents or processes and how 
they should be studied.”1820 There is no general definition of culture on the basis of which we 
would have the possibility of examining “a Ricoeurian variation” of it. To set the stage for 
this brief clarifying examination of the term “culture,” it is, therefore, useful to turn to 
Alfred L. Kroeber (1876-1960) and Clyde Kluckhohn’s (1905-1960) classical exposition 
Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions. Not only was it published almost 
concomitantly (1952) with Paul Ricoeur’s first major work Le volontaire et l’involontaire (1949), 
but it also includes 164 definitions and hundreds of descriptions that can be subsumed under 
these definitions of culture.1821  
Although adopting a sociological and cultural-anthropological approach 
instead of particularly a philosophical one, Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s work still provides a 
broad variety of attempts to clarify the concept, and also a general discussion of how the 
concept of culture was and can be understood. We will, therefore, turn next to this analysis 
of the general features of a culture. To balance some of the temporal distance, however, 
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Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s comments will be supplemented with those of Clifford Geertz 
(1926-2006) in his seminal work The Interpretation of Cultures (1973, republished in 2000). I will 
use Geertz’s work as a corrective simply because it was also well-known for Paul Ricoeur. 
 
The General Features of Culture 
Kroeber and Kluckhohn, both distinguished American anthropologists, “do not propose to 
add a one hundred and sixty-fifth formal definition,” but take their work instead as “a critical 
review of definitions and a general discussion of culture theory.”1822 They cannot help, 
however, pointing out the most legitimate and important features of culture in a form of a 
summary: “we think culture is a product; is historical; includes ideas, patterns, and values; is 
selective; is learned; is based upon symbols; and is an abstraction from behavior and the 
products of behavior.”1823 Also, on the basis of examining formal definitions1824 and “less 
                                               
1822 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 157. 
1823 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 157. 
1824 Kroeber and Kluckhohn classify the 164 definitions they examine as descriptive, historical, normative, 
psychological, structural, or genetic. Each of these groups has its distinctive set of characteristics. Descriptive 
definitions take culture as a comprehensive totality and enumerate different cultural aspects – customs and 
habits are mentioned in most of them. Edward Tylor’s 1871 definition belongs to this class. (Kroeber & 
Kluckhohn 1952, 44-45.) The definitions classified as historical place emphasis on social heritage or tradition. 
Heritage focuses on the product(s) received, and tradition to the affirmative process of receiving. (Kroeber & 
Kluckhohn 1952, 48-49.) Normative definitions divide into two subclasses and they emphasize – on the basis of 
the concept of ‘customs’ – either a) rule, mode or way, or b) material and social ideals or values as reflected in 
behavior. Definitions thus imply “organicism” in the form of shared patterns, sanctioning control, a set of 
conventions, and “social ‘blueprints’ for action.” (Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 51-54.) In contrast to the 
previous class, psychological definitions – which are also subdivided – focus either to a) adjustment, b) inter-
human learning, c) habit, or d) impulses and attitudes. These definitions aim specifically to relate culture and the 
individual. (Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 56-60.) Structural definitions focus on implicit rather than explicit 
culture by stressing the patterning or organization of culture. They thus also take the notion of culture to be an 
abstraction, “a conceptual model” or “a system of designs for living.” These type of definitions bring forth the 
theme of an end or an aim which is implicitly manifested in the organizational structure. (Kroeber & 
Kluckhohn 1952, 61-63.) In contrast to the previous category, genetic definitions emphasize culture as a) 
products or artifacts, b) ideas, or c) symbols. Genetic definitions – overlapping with the historical ones – 
revolve around the question “how has culture come to be?,” or “what are the factors that have made culture 
possible or caused it to come into existence?” As such, the notion of (“non-genetic,” i.e., not biologically 
transmitted) communicability is inherent to many of the definitions of this group. (Kroeber & Kluckhohn 
1952, 65-70.) As can easily be understood, besides Tylor’s classical attempt (insufficient in itself but valued by 
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concentrated” statements1825 about culture, Kroeber and Kluckhohn offer a prolonged 
discussion of “certain general features or broad aspects of culture.” These features can be 
“conveniently grouped” and analyzed as a) integration, b) historicity, c) uniformity, d) 
causality, e) significance and values, as well as f) relativism.1826  
 
Integration 
With “integration” Kroeber and Kluckhohn mean a feature which is “more or less parallel to 
the tendency toward solidarity possessed by societies.” A need of sociocultural adaptation, 
that is, the multidimensional process of enculturation is thus highlighted first. Kroeber and 
Kluckhohn, however, emphasize – explicitly against Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942) and 
the functionalist view of cultural anthropology – that “integration is never perfect or 
complete, […] institutions can certainly clash as well as the interests of individuals.”1827 The 
term “integration” must, therefore, be further clarified.  
Drawing from the theories of Pitirim Sorokin (1889-1968), Geertz clarifies the 
meaning of “intergration” by pointing out that it is possible to distinguish between two types 
of integration that are not identical with each other. The “logico-meaningful integration,” 
characteristic to culture, means “a unity of style, of logical implication, of meaning and 
value.” The “causal-functional integration,” characteristic of the social system, means in turn 
“the kind of integration one finds in an organism, where all the parts are united in a single 
causal web.” Failure to distinguish between these two will result in being not able to properly 
                                                                                                                                            
its “establishing function” in terms of cultural sciences), there is no single definition that would have been 
accepted by all. 
1825 Statements are grouped under headings of The nature of culture, The components of culture, The 
distinctive properties of culture, Culture and psychology, Culture and language, and Relation of culture to 
society, individuals, environment and artifacts. 
1826 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 159. 
1827 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 159. 
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distinguish between culture and a social system. Geertz thus stresses that “cultural structure 




The fact that Kroeber and Kluckhohn disregard the functionalist view in favor of a historical 
approach is understandable, as Kroeber’s theoretical assumption is that “cultural phenomena 
were on the whole more amenable to historical than to strictly scientific treatment.” Kroeber 
and Kluckhohn, then, discuss Heinrich Rickert’s (1863-1936) qualitative distinction between 
sciences (whose subject is nature) and history (whose subject is culture). Even though 
Kroeber “modified the Rickert position” by rejecting the strict dichotomy between the two 
and by adopting a “gradualist view,” Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s work affirms the emphasis 
on historicity – as well as social complexity – by stating that “culture is not a point but a 
complex of [temporally] interrelated things.”1829  
Geertz also takes historicity into account but discusses rather of “cultural 
patterns” than phenomena. He defines these patterns as “historically created systems of 
meaning in terms of which we give form, order, point, and direction to our lives.”1830 One of 
the definitions of culture that Geertz gives, emphasizes this historicity: “the culture concept 
[…] denotes an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system 
of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, 
                                               
1828 Geertz 2000, 145-146, 164-169. 
1829 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 160-162. 
1830 Geertz 2000, 52. 
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perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.”1831 In short, 
according to Geertz, cultural interrelatedness is diachronic but also synchronic. 
 
Uniformity 
The temporal, social and structural complexity amounts to the difficulty of affirming that 
there are basic structural principles common to all cultures. In other words, it is difficult to 
argue that there are basic transcultural elements that result in phenomenal uniformities. 
Kroeber and Kluckhohn acknowledge that they have different understandings of this issue. 
While uniformities in culture seem to be attainable only by generalizing social phenomena – 
and thus a direct relation to the content of a particular culture is lost – it could be stated that 
there are “constant elemental units of form” such as “moral axioms.” Kroeber and 
Kluckhohn admit, however, that “many would insist that within one aspect of culture, 
namely language, such constant elemental units have been isolated: phonemes, and 
morphemes.”1832  
An obvious limitation of Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s analysis is that this 
“automatic” – by which they seem to mean “self-evident” – aspect of culture, that is, 
language, is not further examined.1833 In a sharp contrast to Kroeber and Kluckhohn, Geertz 
and his “symbolic anthropology” stresses the importance of signs and symbols precisely as 
these “constant elemental units.” Besides Geertz’s definition that emphasizes the 
“transmitted pattern of meanings,” Geertz’s turn to symbolic anthropology is well 
                                               
1831 Geertz 2000, 89. Cf. 363-364. 
1832 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 162-164. 
1833 A brief and philosophically unpleasing discussion of the relationship between culture and language is 
included in the comment section of the statement group titled as “culture and language.” (Cf. Kroeber & 
Kluckhohn 1952, 123-124.) Wagner, in contrast, provides a longer discussion of “the invention of language.” 
Cf. Wagner 1981, 106-115. 
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Affirming both cultural complexity and the difficulty to recognize cultural uniformities leads 
us to the assertion that insofar as cultural phenomena are understood as “emergents,” they 
arise from a number of causes – both cultural and non-cultural. The non-cultural causes, that 
Kroeber and Kluckhohn mention, relate to the natural environment (inorganic, organic, 
genetic), but also include the influence of “gifted individuals” as well as “strictly social 
factors” (such as the size and location of a given society). Although culture is not unrelated 
to these conditions and socio-biological necessities, Kroeber and Kluckhohn maintain that in 
trying to explain “any particular cultural situation,” the preceding conditions “must always 
necessarily be viewed as impinging on an already existing cultural condition.” According to 
their view, any culture has thus antecedent cultural-historical conditions that lead one to 
describe cultures as “adaptive, selective, and accumulative.”1835  
Clifford Geertz affirms the ideas of cultural accumulation and causality: 
“Undirected by culture patterns – organized systems of significant symbols – man’s behavior 
would be virtually ungovernable, a mere chaos of pointless acts and exploding emotions, his 
experience virtually shapeless. Culture, the accumulated totality of such patterns, is not just 
an ornament of human existence but – the principal basis of its specificity – an essential 
condition for it.”1836 It appears that not only Kroeber and Kluckhohn, but Geertz also 
                                               
1834 Geertz 2000, 5. 
1835 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 165-166. 
1836 Geertz 2000, 46. Cf. 46-49, 67, 69, 363. 
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supports the idea of “circular causality.” This support is most evident when Geertz considers 
the interaction between a culture and the people influenced by it.  
Let me approach Geertz’s discussion of culturally facilitated interaction with 
the remarks Kroeber and Kluckhohn make of the same issue: “It is people that produce or 
establish culture; but they establish it partly in perpetuation and partly in modification of a 
form of existing culture which has made them what they are.” Put differently, psychology 
also contributes to the “causes” of cultural phenomena. This inclusion of psychic processes, 
however, complexifies the question of defining culture even more. Kroeber and Kluckhohn 
do not, therefore, seek to discover “cultural laws that will conform to the type of those of 
classical mechanics” but instead “cultural forms and processes” as generalizations and 
regularities that bring forth the “implicit culture” as the basis of human interaction in a 
culture. Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s assumption is that “every culture is a structure,” that is, a 
system of high complexity that has its own “ethos.”1837  
Geertz follows this line of thought except for one clear difference: he does not 
mention “implicit culture” in the wake of Clyde Kluckhohn, but “a web of signification” 
instead. Geertz points out that “cultural systems must have a minimal degree of coherence, 
else we would not call them systems.” This inner coherence of a cultural system, however, 
does not justify understanding cultures as governed by cultural “laws” that would resemble 
the laws of nature: “Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of 
significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis on it to be 
therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretative one in search of 
                                               
1837 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 166-171. 
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meaning.”1838 According to Geertz, the systemic element in culture is dependent of the 
structure, or a “web”, of meaning. 
 
Significance and values 
Kroeber and Kluckhohn maintain that the notion of ethos opens up the field “of those 
properties of culture which seem most distinctive of it and most important: its significance 
and its values.” Among the properties of culture, in other words, it is especially values that 
Kroeber and Kluckhohn emphasize: “they are the products of men, of men having bodies 
and living in societies, and are the structural essence of the culture of these societies of 
men.” What should be noted – with curiosity – is that according to Kroeber and Kluckhohn 
“values are part of nature, not outside it,” and that values and significances are not only 
subjective but also “objective in their expressions, embodiments, or results.” As such, values 
are also culturally transmitted. Even though there is a difference between an actual and an 
ideal culture as well as another difference between alternating value systems, Kroeber and 
Kluckhohn argue that “values provide the only basis for the fully intelligible comprehension 
of culture, because the actual organization of all cultures is primarily in terms of their 
values.” Kroeber and Kluckhohn then conclude that “if the essence of cultures be their 
patterned selectivity, the essence of this selectivity inheres in the cultural value system.”1839  
 It is rather apparent that, in contrast to Kroeber and Kluckhohn, Geertz 
stresses not so much values but significations. He understands the analysis of significations – 
or the “search of meaning” – as the core of cultural analysis that is, basically, its 
interpretation. Geertz, nevertheless, warns of “purifying” significations of their material 
                                               
1838 Geertz 2000, 5, 17. 
1839 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 171-174. 
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complexity: “Cultural analysis is (or should be) guessing at meanings, assessing the guesses, 
and drawing explanatory conclusions from the better guesses, not discovering the Continent 
of Meaning and mapping out its bodiless landscape.”1840 Geertz’s position could thus be 
summarized in that any ethnography is interpretative in relation to the social discourse of 
which it is about. 
 
Relativism 
The notion of cultural selectivity, discussed above, leads Kroeber and Kluckhohn to the 
problem of relativism: “true understanding of cultures therefore involves recognition of their 
particular value systems.” According to Kroeber and Kluckhohn, each particular culture has 
“its own idiosyncratic structure.” This peculiar structure of a culture does not mean, 
however, that cultural value systems would not overlap in a manner that retains the 
possibility that particular cultures are not “utterly disparate monads.” This transcultural 
overlapping is feasible also in the light of the structures for the satisfaction of basic 
necessities that are common to all human cultures. Kroeber and Kluckhohn point out that 
there are socio-biological necessities that by themselves already provide a framework for all 
cultures and guide the selection of cultural patterns – most evident in value contents. “The 
astonishing variety of cultural detail over the world” should thus not lead one to conclude 
that there are not “universalities [or ‘virtual universals’] in culture content” generally 
understood. Kroeber and Kluckhohn maintain that “cultural differences, real and important 
though they are, are still so many variations on themes supplied by raw human nature and by 
the limits and conditions of social life.”1841 
                                               
1840 Geertz 2000, 20. 
1841 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 174-179. 
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 This intriguing problem of relativism is taken up by Geertz when he mentions 
that anthropological analysis is “microscopic.” Geertz, nevertheless, warns against of 
committing oneself “to say that there are no large-scale anthropological interpretations of 
whole societies, civilizations, world events, and so on.”1842 He only wishes to point out that 
“the anthropologist characteristically approaches such broader interpretations and more 
abstract analyses from the direction of exceedingly extended acquaintances with extremely 
small matters.”1843 Geertz also problematizes, however, the question by contrasting biological 
unity with cultural variety: “The great natural variation of the cultural forms is, of course, not 
only anthropology’s great (and wasting) resource, but the ground of its deepest theoretical 
dilemma: how is such variation to be squared with the biological unity of human species?”1844 
Geertz’s honest problematization not only summarizes the issue of relativism, but also 
questions the basis of all empirical cultural studies. 
 
* 
Despite the fundamental confusion at the very root of cultural studies, there is a need to 
briefly conclude the discussion concerning general cultural features. Not extending this 
discussion any further, I will give this conclusion in the form of the “summarizing 
approximation” proposed by Kroeber and Kluckhohn. Although having pledged not to do 
so, they actually do give “the one hundred and sixty-fifth formal definition.”1845 At the same 
                                               
1842 Geertz 2000, 21. 
1843 Geertz 2000, 21. 
1844 Geertz 2000, 22. 
1845 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 157. 
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time, however, they admit that there is “no full theory of culture”1846 within which to apply 
their educated proposal: 
Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired 
and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of 
human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of 
culture consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and 
especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be 
considered as products of action, and on the other as conditioning elements of 
further action.1847 
 
After having followed Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s exposition of the general features of 
culture, and Clifford Geertz’s extracted comments on these, I would have to affirm that this 
brief sketch is not philosophically pleasing. Having only described – from anthropologists’ 
points of view – certain broad, although frequently named features of culture, have we now 
understood the substance and significance of culture? Asked “why” and “how” rather than 
“what”? Brought forth the notion of cultural situation, situatedness, as a key to existential 
hermeneutics?  
 Instead of enumerating cultural aspects or features, I claim that we should be 
looking for the essence or the basic function of culture. This is what Ernst Cassirer also 
suggests: “A philosophy of culture begins with the assumption that the world of human 
culture is not a mere aggregate of loose and detached facts. It seeks to understand these facts 
as a system, as an organic whole.”1848 In contrast to an empirical or a historical approach, for 
a philosophical analysis of culture “its starting point and its working hypothesis are 
embodied in the conviction that the varied and seemingly dispersed rays may be gathered 
                                               
1846 Of the problem of providing such a general theory of culture, cf. Geertz 2000, 24-28. 
1847 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 181.  
1848 Cassirer 1974, 222. 
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together and brought into a common focus.”1849 Cassirer, in other words, challenges us to 
look at the problem of culture in a different light. In order to see things clearly, a brief 
excursion to the genealogy of the concept of culture could, therefore, be useful. If Kroeber 
and Kluckhohn’s approximating definition above is insufficient, because it only enumerates 
general features of culture, maybe following the history of the concept – in a way the original 
task set by Kroeber and Kluckhohn1850 – is more rewarding.  
 
A Brief History of the Culture Concept 
The concept of “culture” (lat. colere > cultus > cultura)1851 as distinguished from “civilization” 
(lat. civis > civicus > civitas)1852 is indisputably of German origin as well as relatively new in its 
modern meaning. The Latin cultura agri, a function of human societies, was semantically 
broadened first by Cicero when he wrote about cultura animi,1853 and later by medievals when 
forming an idea of cultura mentis. The notion of “geistige” as well as “materielle Kultur” in the 
modern sense, however, can be traced back to the German language.1854 I should 
acknowledge at the outset that the long dispute over the dichotomy between “Geist” (spirit) 
and “Natur” (nature) is not unrelated to the emergence of the distinction between “Kultur” 
and “Zivilisation,” but it contributed significantly to the modern formulation of the concept 
of culture.1855  
                                               
1849 Cassirer 1974, 222. 
1850 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 4. 
1851 Vaan 2008, 125. “to take care of, honour > habitation, cultivation > cultivation, care.” 
1852 Vaan 2008, 116. “citizen (of one’s town) > pertaining to society/the civic order > an organized 
community, state” 
1853 Cf. Tusculanae Disputationes, II.5. 
1854 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 9-11, 18.  
1855 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 16-17. 
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Kroeber and Kluckhohn recognize three main phases in this German 
development: 1) culture as a concept of eighteenth-century general history, which regarded 
culture as “progress in cultivation, towards enlightenment,” 2) a period from Kant to Hegel 
during which the concept of the Spirit outshone that of culture, and 3) the development 
after 1850 that finally led to the modern conception.1856 Although it is the last phase which 
will get most of the attention in this context, it serves our purpose to briefly sketch each of 
these. 
 1) In discussing the impact of the general, or “universal,” histories of 
humankind to the formation of the modern concept of culture, Kroeber and Kluckhohn 
maintain that it was the work of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) that was the most 
influential. Despite acknowledging the groundwork done by Voltaire (1694-1778) with his 
Essai sur les Moeurs et l’Esprit des Nations (1769) and by Isaac Iselin (1728-1782) with his 
Philosophische Muthmassungen über die Geschichte der Menschheit (1768), as well as the contributions 
by Karl Franz von Irwing (1728-1801) and Johann Christoph Adelung (1732-1806) – who 
already utilized the word “Kultur” (or “Cultur”) in describing the idea of a historical 
perfection process, that is, cultivation – it was Herder’s voluminous Ideen zur Philosophie der 
Geschichte der Menschheit (1784-1791) that came to open the discussion of historical culture.1857  
The concept of “Cultur,” in the manner Herder used it, has already “a modern 
ring” for the anthropologists as the concept was understood in relation to “Humanität” and 
especially in relation to “Tradition.” The main meaning of Herder’s culture concept is, 
however, “a progressive cultivation or development of faculties.” Of the fourteen passages 
quoted by Kroeber and Kluckhohn, this one is the most descriptive one: “Let us not place a 
                                               
1856 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 18. 
1857 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 18-22. 
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firm difference between Culture and Enlightenment, neither of which, if they are proper 
kinds, can be without the other.” Some crucial depth is added to this passage with Herder’s 
notion that “the philosophy of history which follows the track of tradition is actually the real 
human history.”1858 It appears that for Herder the substance of the philosophy of history is 
culture as cultivation – but this is not so much a question of cultivating the faculties of 
individuals anymore but “Humanität” as a whole.1859 
 2) The second phase recognized by Kroeber and Kluckhohn focused more on 
the notion of spirit than revolved around the concept of culture. The current of thought 
running from Kant’s transcendental idealism to Hegel’s absolute idealism was almost 
contemporaneous with the first phase but it had an impact that was slightly more enduring. 
The earlier branch of philosophy of history, which culminated in the work of Herder, took 
the actual histories, institutions and customs as its point of interest. This other branch was, 
in contrast, more animated by the search of the supreme principle of such history. Although 
the concept of culture was not infrequently used by Kant, the pattern of thought was, 
according to Kroeber and Kluckhohn, in general terms “away from Cultur to Geist.” 
Without discussing in depth the impact and the ideas of the German idealism, Kroeber and 
Kluckhohn take it for granted that this shift culminated in Hegel’s notion of the absolute 
Spirit.1860 
If Kant still understood the concept of “Cultur” in terms of “Civilisierung” as 
well as contrasted the “cultural skills and arts” (Künste der Cultur) with the “roughness” 
(Rohigkeit) of human nature, in the work of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) culture 
                                               
1858 “Setzen wir gar noch willkührliche Unterschiede zwischen Cultur und Aufklärung fest, deren keine 
doch, wenn sie rechten Art ist, ohne die andere sein kann.” “Die Philosophie der Geschichte also, die die Kette 
der Tradition verfolgt, ist eigentlich die wahre Menschengeschichte.” Quoted by Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 
22. 
1859 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 22-23. 
1860 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 19, 23. 
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becomes “the employment of all abilities for the purpose of complete freedom, the complete 
independence from everything which is not part of us, [of] our pure Self.”1861 With Hegel 
this already explicit notion of autonomous freedom – and, in turn, historical determinism1862 
– achieves its climax in the process of the self-realization of the Spirit. Kroeber and 
Kluckhohn deplore that “it is significant that Hegel seems never to have used the word 
culture in his Philosophy of History, and civilization only once and incidentally.”1863 Kroeber and 
Kluckhohn do not take into account, however, the necessary process of Entäußerung and 
Erinnerung that Hegel explicated in his Encyclopedias under the notion of Objective Spirit. 
 3) Kroeber and Kluckhohn argue that the Hegelian emphasis came largely to 
its end by mid-nineteenth century. The following hundred years, in opposition to the 
previous phase, can, according to Kroeber and Kluckhohn, be then called the century of 
Kulturphilosophie. Kroeber and Kluckhohn name a German anthropologist Gustav Friedrich 
Klemm (1802-1867) first as an intermediating figure between the eighteenth-century 
historical and the late nineteenth-century modern usage of the concept of culture,1864 but also 
list Klemm’s voluminous Allgemeine Cultur-Geschichte der Menschheit (1843-1852) and Allgemeine 
Culturwissenshaft (1854-1855) as the works which opened this “third phase” of the German 
development. The change that took place is evident in Rickert’s 1899 thesis that 
“Naturwissenschaft” (natural sciences) is to be contrasted with “Kulturwissenschaft” 
(humanities and social sciences), in contrast to Wilhelm Dilthey’s (1833-1911) still idealistic 
suggestion of “Geisteswissenshaft.”1865 Although this discussion would clearly merit a 
                                               
1861 “die Übung aller Kräfte auf den Zweck der völligen Freiheit, der völligen Unabhängigkeit von allem, 
was nicht Wir selbst, unser reines Selbst ist.” Quoted by Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 24. 
1862 Geertz mentions that there is “terrible,” reductive historical determinism “with which we have been 
plagued from Hegel forward.” Geertz 2000, 37, 361. 
1863 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 19, 24. 
1864 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 24-25, 146. 
1865 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 26. 
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prolonged examination of its own, it should not be left unnoticed that the century of 
Kulturphilosophie can also be summarized as the century of culture-civilization dispute. It was 
this dispute whose outcome was the German scientific notion of “Kultur,” distinct from 
cultivation as well as from the English and French “civilisation.” 
 Drawing from a German philosopher and sociologist Paul Barth (1858-1922), 
Kroeber and Kluckhohn state that Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835) was the first – in his 
posthumously published three-volume work Über die Kawi-Sprache (1836-1839) – to propose a 
limitation to the concept of culture that had adopted “excessive breadth” as cultivation. Von 
Humboldt understood culture as “the control of nature by science and by “Kunst” (evidently 
in the sense of useful arts, viz. technology),” and civilization both as “qualitative 
improvement” and as “the increased control of elementary human impulses (Triebe) by 
society,” that is, as spiritual “ennoblement.” After also introducing the views of Albert 
Schaeffle (1831-1903) and Julius Lippert (1839-1909), Kroeber and Kluckhohn summarize 
that “culture refers to the sway of man over nature, civilization to his sway over himself.” In 
Schaeffle’s terms the first is thus “the material-factual content of all ‘mannerly-being’” (der 
sachliche Gehalt aller Gesittung), whereas the second is “the spiritual content” (der geistige 
Gehalt).1866 
Another way of relating the concepts of culture and civilization with each 
other, however, already prevailed. Ferdinand Tönnies (1855-1936) distinguished between 
Volkstum and Staatstum. The transition “from the culture of folk society to the civilization of 
state organization” then in a way inverses the meanings of the two concepts. Tönnies 
understood culture as “socially ‘organic’” (e.g. custom, religion, and art) and civilization as 
                                               
1866 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 15-17, 147. The word “Gesittung” is not an actual word in German 
language. It has been coined together from “Gesinnung” (ideology, convictions, world view) and “Sitte” 
(custom, tradition, manners, morality). 
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“mechanical” (e.g. law and science). Kroeber and Kluckhohn summarize his views by 
mentioning that “Kultur is what precedes and begets Zivilisation.”1867  
Oswald Spengler (1880-1936) approached then the issue rather similarly: 
culture is creative becoming whereas civilization is the final, unproductive stage of this 
vitality – “the old age or winter” – and therefore “all civilization is fundamentally alike.”1868 
According to Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s exposition on Spengler, civilization for him is 
“merely a stage which every culture reaches […] it is the death of the culture on which it 
settles.” Spengler expressed his indebtedness to Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) and took a 
culture to be distinctive and self-sufficient among other cultures – Nietzsche’s definition 
being in David Strauß, der Bekenner und der Schriftsteller (1873): “Culture is above all the unity of 
artistic style in all the expressions of the life of a people (eines Volkes).”1869 For Spengler, in a 
similar manner, culture has a unifying function. Spengler understands the essence of culture, 
however, constitutively as “something wholly irreducible and unrelatable.” Kroeber and 
Kluckhohn assert, therefore, that Spengler saw cultures as “monadal”; they are wholly 
intelligible only to those living in that particular culture.1870 
 A turn to yet another direction is suggested to have taken place with the work 
of Franz Oppenheimer (1864-1943) and Alfred Weber (1868-1958). In contrast to preceding 
philosopher-sociologists they both understood civilization as material-technological and 
culture as spiritual-idealistic. Weber, who reacted against Spengler, understood civilization as 
“the objective technological and informational activities of society” and thus “accumulative 
                                               
1867 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 16-17. 
1868 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 17, 26, 147. 
1869 “Kultur ist vor allem Einheit des künstlerischen Stiles in allen Lebensäußerungen eines Volkes.” 
(Nietzsche 1995, III-1.159.) Kroeber and Kluckhohn (p. 27 n.72) state incorrectly that the definition is from 
Nietzsche’s Geburt der Tragödie (1872). 
1870 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 26-27. 
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and irreversible.” Culture, in turn, is “non-additive” as well as subjective and unique.1871 
Kroeber and Kluckhohn depict especially Weber’s Kultursoziologie (1931) as a prevenient 
expression of modern cultural anthropology. For Weber the social structure (of religion, art, 
knowledge, etc.) is only an expression (Ausdrucksform) of “essential manner-content” 
(Wesensgehalt) which, in turn, is “Kultur.” It was on the basis of this kind of emerging thought 
that the word “Kultur” had finally gained a dictionary definition as “the mode of being of 
mankind (die Daseinsweise der Menschheit) […] as well as the result of this mode of being, 
namely, the stock of culture possessed (der Kulturbesitz) or cultural attainments (die 
Kulturerrungenschaften).”1872  
This “inclusive sense” of the concept – implicit in Klemm and applied, for 
example, by Burckhardt, Hellwald, Lippert, Rickert, Frobenius, Lamprecht, Vierkandt, and 
Simmel – means that “culture constitutes the topmost phenomenal level yet recognized […] 
in the realm of nature.” Kroeber and Kluckhohn are quick to point out, like Clifford Geertz 
later on, that this priority does not have to lead hypostasizing the concept, to seeing it “as a 
distinctive substance or actual superorganism, and then to assume that it moves through 
autonomous, immanent forces.” In other words, Kroeber and Kluckhohn maintain that 
acknowledging that culture can be construed “as the characteristic mode of human existence 
or manifestation, as life is of organisms and energy of matter,” and therefore from the point 
of view of “emergent levels,” does not need to carry an “ontological implication” but rather 
“an operational view.” As such, however, “Kultur,” or “the distinctive ‘higher’ values or 
                                               
1871 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 17, 148. 
1872 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 27. 
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enlightenment of a society,” was set against the French and the English term “civilization” as 
a novelty.1873 
 Despite the English and French “resistance,” Kroeber and Kluckhohn 
mention that the concept was adopted relatively quickly in the North and Latin America as 
well as in Italy, Scandinavia, and the Netherlands. In Russia, Nikolay Danilevsky (1822-1885) 
had employed the term “culture” in the modern German sense as early as 1869 in a text 
titled as “Russia and Europe” that introduced his theory of “historical-cultural types.”1874 
The standard definition is attributed to Edward B. Tylor (1832-1917), however, thanks to the 
opening lines of his – recently reissued – two-volume work Primitive Culture: Researches into the 
Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Art, and Custom (1871, 2010). What we should 
notice, however, is that “culture” is in Tylor’s context still paired with “civilization,” and that 
the definition is mostly descriptive as it enumerates different cultural aspects: “Culture or 
civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes 
knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by 
man as a member of society.”1875 Amid of all variations, this definition was, nevertheless, to 
become the most widely used one. 
Let me conclude this historical survey by mentioning that even though this 
brief excursion to the history of the culture concept does not grant us peace of mind – as we 
seem to be in a loop of enumerating features of culture, or adding that they compose a 
“complex whole” – I believe that a more profound understanding of what “culture” can 
                                               
1873 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 26-28, 35-36, 146, 148-149. – Clifford Geertz maintains the same tone of 
voice in his own criticism of metaphysicalizing, behavioralizing, or cognitivizing culture. The proper object of 
cultural analysis is “the informal logic of actual life.” (Cf. Geertz 2000, 10-12, 17.) In relation to the English use 
of the term ‘culture’, Roy Wagner points out that the Latin origin was maintained through Middle English in 
which ‘cultura’ meant “a plowed field” – and even later comprehended from the point of view of “agriculture.” 
Wagner 1981, 21. 
1874 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 18, 29, 146-147. 
1875 Tylor 1920, 1. Cf. Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 43, 45.; Geertz 2000, 4, 47. 
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possibly mean has been achieved in the last few pages. The fact of the matter that “Kultur” 
denotes the human spirit as well as its becoming is enough for the time being – it is the task 
of this dissertation then to explicate how “culture” can be understood, for example, from a 
hermeneutic point of view. 
 
Critical Application: the Case of French Resistance 
Allow me  to add a few critical remarks. It is not without significance that Tylor was English 
and his work was published in London. This may have contributed to the fact that, from the 
viewpoint of cultural studies, a relatively long silence followed Tylor’s definition. It was only 
after 1920 that there flourished a more broad variation of the definitions of the concept of 
culture.1876 As well demonstrated by Kroeber and Kluckhohn, by the time of the publication 
of their critical review of concepts and definitions, the concept of culture in its modern sense 
was almost universally adopted and employed – only France was still considered to be 
“resistive” in 1952. According to Kroeber and Kluckhohn, in the French context the words 
“la civilization” (“with its implications of advancement and urbanization”) and “social” were 
still predominant over that of “la culture.”1877 
It could well be that after having now outlined the modern, scientific use of 
the concept of culture, there is no adequate ground for examining the cultural philosophy of 
any French philosopher preceding the mid-twentieth century. As a concept that indisputably 
has a German origin and thus a peculiar meaning1878 – which somewhat parallels with the 
                                               
1876 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 149-152. 
1877 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 28-29, 147.  
1878 Geertz takes rather there to be a set of different overlapping meanings, which “obscures a good deal 
more than it reveals.” After having reviewed both the general cultural features and the brief history of the 
concept of culture it could be said that his observation is in the right direction. Geertz 2000, 4-5. 
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French “la civilisation” – it could seem desperate to attempt an analysis of the cultural 
hermeneutics of someone, say Paul Ricoeur, who is equipped with a different conceptual 
mindset. It seems as even Kroeber and Kluckhohn would be cautious in doing this.  
By adding a brief discussion of Lucien Febvre’s 1930 article “Civilisation: 
Évolution d’un mot et d’un groupe d’idées,” Kroeber and Kluckhohn emphasize the fact that since 
the work of Michel de Montagne (1533-1592) and René Descartes (1596-1650) – followed 
by Voltaire in 1740 and Jean-Jacques Rousseau in 1762 – the verb “civiliser” and the participle 
“civilise” were being used. The noun “la civilisation” then appeared in Nicolas Antoine 
Boulanger’s (1722-1759) posthumously published L'Antiquité devoilée par ses usages, ou Examen 
critique des principales opinions, cérémonies & institutions religieuses & politiques des différents peuples de 
la terre (1766), followed by Nicolas Baudeau (1730-1792) in his work Ephémérides du Citoyen 
(1767). Even the plural form, les civilisations, was explicitly used by Pierre-Simon Ballanche 
(1776-1847) in 1819. It is the case, however, that the notion “la civilisation des sauvages” (and 
thus the implicit idea of distinguishable civilizations), for example, already precedes his work. 
Despite the fact that the term “la culture” was known and used in the eighteenth century 
France “to denote ‘formation de l’esprit’,” it is therefore the word “la civilisation” that captures 
the most attention – for historical as well as political reasons.1879 
Supposing that in the early 1950s there was still hesitation and oscillation at 
best in the French context, it is still justifiable to claim that this resistance was about to fade 
away. In Paul Ricoeur’s case this can be seen, for example, in his later willingness to engage 
in the discussion concerning symbolic anthropology. His 1975 lecture on Clifford Geertz’s 
The Interpretation of Cultures – in which Geertz credits the work of Paul Ricoeur as a source of 
                                               
1879 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 28-29, 37-38. 
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inspiration1880 – leaves no room for doubt: the concept of culture is being used by them both 
extensively in its “modern” sense.1881 In his 1975 lecture on Geertz, Ricoeur not only shows 
profound interest in the work of the most influential contemporary cultural anthropologist, 
but also engages in the discussion and utilizes the concept of culture in a manner that most 
significantly differs from the “resistant” attitude described by Kroeber and Kluckhohn in 
1952. Ricoeur’s use of the concept of “culture,” in his earlier texts, however, indicates that the 
French context might not have been quite as resistive as Kroeber and Kluckhohn maintain. 
The question, then, whether it would be legitimate or relevant to ask the role of the concept 
of culture is, at least in Paul Ricoeur’s case, reduced to mere rhetorical gaucherie: most 
obviously it is more than acceptable. In terms of understanding Ricoeur’s work, asking the 
role of the concept of culture is necessary. 
                                               
1880 Geertz credits Ricoeur in providing an idea of “inscribing” action: “The ethnographer ‘inscribes’ social 
discourse; he writes it down.” It is Ricoeur “from whom this whole idea of the inscription of action is borrowed 
and somewhat twisted.” Geertz 2000, 19. 
1881 The most obvious objection – that Ricoeur’s lecture was given in English language and that it falls 
within Ricoeur’s years at the University of Chicago (1970-1991) and hence under the influence of less resistant 
“cultural understanding” – can be countered by the notion that Ricoeur never left France for good but held 
seminars and lectures, as well as published most his main works of this period in Paris (e.g. La métaphore vive, 
1975; Temps et récit I-III, 1983-1985; Soi-même comme un autre, 1990.) For example, in 1975 Ricoeur gave a seminar 
in Paris on the semantics of action, and in 1979 on the studies of narrative. It is also true, however, that he did 
not stay firmly in Paris either. During the years 1979-1985 “Ricoeur settled into an annual cadence: Christmas 
in Paris, lectures in Europe, spring term (March to May) in Chicago, late May and early June in Italy (Naples 
and Rome), July and August at his country home in Brittany, and a fall of intensive reading, writing, and 
lecturing in Europe.” Ricoeur’s “absence” from France does not thus straightforwardly mean “being present” 
in Chicago but should be seen merely as absence from the “media scene” as can be inferred on the basis of the 
description given by Charles Reagan: “The publication of this three-volume work [Temps et récit I-III] led to the 
‘rediscovery’ of Paul Ricoeur in France. He burst back on the intellectual scene, with interviews in print and on 
television.” Reagan 1996, 41-46, 48. 
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APPENDIX 2 – WORKS ON RICOEUR’S CULTURAL HERMENEUTICS 
According to Frans D. Vansina’s extensive 1935-2008 primary and secondary bibliography 
of Ricoeur texts, there are only two dissertations and three monographs which indicate by 
their titles that they deal with the question of culture.1882 Except for one, all of them were 
written before Ricoeur’s last works. The two dissertations are from the 1990s. Kelton Cobb’s 
Theology of Culture: Reflections on the Ethics of Tillich, Troeltsch and Ricoeur (The University of Iowa, 
1994) takes neither Ricoeur nor the philosophy of culture as its primary aim. Marcel Madila-
Basanguka’s Poétique de la culture: Imagination, éthique et religion chez Paul Ricoeur (Institute 
Catholique de Paris, 1996) is more focused on cultural hermeneutics, but in the end adopts 
philosophy of religion as its culmination point rather than that of the concept of culture.  
Two of the three monographs are, in turn, from the 1980s. The first, Pawel 
Ozdowski’s Teoria kultury wobec hermeneutyki Ricoeura (1984) has been published only in Polish, 
and it focuses on Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of symbols but from a very contextual point of 
view. Manuel Sumares’ O sujeito e a cultura na filosofia de Paul Ricoeur: para além da necessidade 
(1984/1987) is in Portuguese, and it balances between philosophical anthropology and 
cultural philosophy. In contrast to Sumares’ work, Jens Mattern’s rather recent Zwischen 
kultureller Symbolik und allgemeiner Wahrheit: Paul Ricoeur interkulturell gelesen (2008), in German, 
represents an applicative approach by focusing on the notion of interculturality.  
I will next introduce each of these five works in the order of their publication. 
Before doing so I should point out, however, that the seventeen secondary articles and 
sections in edited books that are mentioned in Vansina’s bibliography will not be discussed 
here. These essays represent a broad variety of languages as well as academic interests: six of 
                                               
1882 Vansina & Vandecasteele 2008, 343-431. 
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them were published in Spanish, five in English, two in French and in Portuguese, and one 
each in German and in Dutch.1883  
Not all the articles are relevant in terms of explicating Ricoeur’s cultural 
hermeneutics, but for example James F. Brown’s “Culture, Truth and Hermeneutics” 
(America: National Catholic weekly 138, 1978), José Gama’s “Hermenêutica da cultura e 
ontologia em Paul Ricoeur” (Revista Portuguesa da filosofia 52, 1996), and Margit Ekholt’s 
“Kultur – zwischen Universalität und Partikularität. Annäherung an eine 
kulturphilosophische interpretation Paul Ricoeurs” (Das Herausgeforderte Selbst: Perspektiven auf 
Paul Ricoeurs Ethik, 1999) provide stimulating insights. But let me now turn back to the 
monographs and dissertations. By analysing the five works I have mentioned above, we also 
have a possibility to preview some essential themes relating to Ricoeur’s conception of 
culture. 
 
Ozdowski: a Scientific-Marxist Approach 
Pawel Ozdowski’s Teoria kultury wobec hermeneutyki Ricoeura (1984) is probably best described 
as a unique approach to Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics. In its page and a half summary in 
English – that does not engage itself directly with the contents of the work but rather takes a 
bird’s eye of view to it – Ozdowski states that the monograph aims to “apply and develop 
the theory of culture and the research methodology of culture being elaborated in the 
Poznań circle under the leadership of prof. J. Kmila.” In so doing, Odzowski contrasts this 
                                               
1883 Vansina & Vandecasteele 2008, 343-409, 432-586. – The essays vary from Roberto J. Wallton’s 
“Cultura, existencia y logica transcendental: apofántica formal en la fenomenología” (ITA Humanidades 9, 1973) 
to Maria Teresa Amado’s “A historia, parabola humana e da cultura classico-cristã ocidental: o valor pelo 
sentido e aproproaçaõ” (A filosofia de Paul Ricoeur: Temas e percursos, 2006). 
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scientific-Marxist “sociopragmatic kulture theory” [sic!] with Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics.1884 
In the opening chapter, Ozdowski bases his exposition mostly on Ricoeur’s 1973 article 
“Creativity in Language: Word, Polysemy, Metaphor,” and subdivides his presentation of the 
Ricoeurian concept of symbolism to structuralism, phenomenology and transcendentalism, 
polysemy, eidetics of symbols, and erring in interpreting symbols.1885 Chapters two and three 
do not focus on Ricoeur but to the socio-pragmatic understanding of the concept of culture 
and to “conventional semantics.”1886  
In fourth chapter Ozdowski then in a way returns to Ricoeur and provides an 
interpretation of Ricoeur’s understanding of symbols by analyzing the ontological 
assumptions and the “grasp” of symbolic culture, metaphor as a foundation for 
conventionalism, metaphor in practice as well as its correspondence, polysemy, and finally 
Ricoeur’s conception of metaphor as fragmented reconstruction of symbolical experience. In 
this chapter Ozdowski does not, however, refer explicitly to any of Ricoeur’s works.1887 
Chapter five is, in turn, a presentation of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of symbols, and it gives an 
outline of this hermeneutics under the rubrics “from existentialism to hermeneutics,” 
“destructive hermeneutics and new philosophy,” and “amplificatory hermeneutics” 
(hermeneutyka amplifikująca). In this fifth chapter Ozdowski takes use of Ricoeur’s Philosophie de 
la volonté I and II (1949, 1960), of Histoire et vérité (first edition in 1955), of Ricoeur’s 1973 
                                               
1884 Ozdowski 1984, 150. – To place Ozdowski to his own context it suffices to quote Ozdowski himself: 
“I am particularly interested in the more and more common form of the legalization of class domination which 
is manifested in the possibility of mass realization of the entertaining-consumer values in exchange for the 
loyalty of the masses towards the dominating class. This form of legalization of property and authority, 
eliminating religious and totalitary-repressive legalizations spread the consumer philosophy of life. Many 
socially antifunctional dangers are the effects of this dissemination, to mention just for example the destruction 
of informal personal social ties which were originally based on non-consumer motivation.” Ozdowski 1984, 
151. 
1885 Ozdowski 1984, 6-25. 
1886 Ozdowski 1984, 26-54. 
1887 Ozdowski 1984, 55-71. 
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article “From Existentialism to the Philosophy of Language,” as well as of De l’interprétation: 
essai sur Freud (1965) and of Le conflit des interprétations (1969).1888 
Chapter six changes the key when outlining the hermeneutic tradition by 
summarizing the ideas of Dilthey, Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer and 
Habermas. This lengthy intermediating chapter concludes with a discussion that concerns 
the substance and functional uniformity of Heideggerian hermeneutics.1889 Ozdowski’s final 
chapter, chapter seven, then examines Paul Ricoeur’s understanding of hermeneutics, and its 
relationship to overall hermeneutical tradition. Drawing especially from Ricoeur’s essay 
“Existence et herméneutique” (1965/1969) Ozdowski examines first the polarity between 
the epistemology of interpreting and the ontology of understanding, then moves on to 
discuss the destructive hermeneutics and ideology criticism, contrasts Ricoeur’s 
“amplificatory hermeneutics” with hermeneutical tradition, and finally brings forth the 
question of a new implementation of Christian ethics. In this very last discussion the focus is 
on Ricoeur’s relation to Kant, Gadamer, Habermas, Heidegger and Sartre.1890 
What seems to be the most important achievement for the present inquiry in 
Ozdowski’s work is that he recognizes that “the function of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics is not 
limited to the cognitive-empirical application” but that it creates “a definite philosophy of 
life.” This definite “life philosophy,” in turn, is understood as “a standard or a proposal to 
the way and style of life referring to its specific highest values.” In terms of the scientific-
Marxist tradition Ozdowski follows, “these instructions are a complex of directives defining 
the way of implementing new philosophy of life into culture in place of the old life 
philosophy whose continued acceptance in unchanged form endangers the stability of the 
                                               
1888 Ozdowski 1984, 72-85. 
1889 Ozdowski 1984, 86-126. 
1890 Ozdowski 1984, 127-143. 
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functioning of social practice.” Of these Western “life philosophy proposals,” such as 
Ricoeur’s, Odzowski is then interested only as means, because “by restoring and persuading 
personal values [they] milden the above danger [of the dissemination of the consumer 
philosophy of life]” – even though they are not able to eliminate the source of their own 
“which is the class domination demanding legalization.”1891 Ozdowski’s work firmly testifies 
of cultural situatedness, but in a manner different from the task of this present dissertation. 
 
Sumares: a Socio-Political View on Culture 
Manuel Sumares’ Para além da necessidade: o sujeito e a cultura na filosofia de Paul Ricoeur 
(1984/1987),1892 in its turn, examines the theme of necessity in terms of culturally situated 
subject. Unfortunately, this highly interesting piece of philosophical work was published only 
in Portuguese and it doesn’t even contain the briefest summary in English. The work is more 
conventional, however, and clearly less ideological than that of Ozdowski’s – to whom 
Sumares unsurprisingly does not refer. Likewise, Sumares’ exposition is beautifully organized 
in six chapters that have an internal structure of their own. The chapters from one to three 
focus on Ricoeur’s pre-hermeneutical thought, whereas the chapters from four to six bring 
forth Ricoeur’s post-wager hermeneutical philosophy. Each of these two parts of Sumares’ 
analysis (pre-hermeneutical thought and hermeneutical thought) begins with a background 
chapter (chapters one and four), to be followed by a chapter focusing on the question of a 
subject (chapters two and five), and another chapter focusing on the question of culture 
                                               
1891 Ozdowski 1984, 150-151. 
1892 Sumares’ work was first introduced as his doctoral dissertation in 1984 (Faculdade de Filosofia de 
Braga, Universidade Católica Portuguesa) but it was supplemented with Ricoeur’s then forthcoming Temps et 
récit and subsequently published in 1987. Cf. Sumares 1987, 12. 
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(chapters three and six). Despite the structural neatness of this exposition, there still remain 
some disconcerting questions in relation to Sumares’ reading of Ricoeur. 
 Chapter one aims to introduce some of Ricoeur’s early works beginning with 
Le volontaire et l’involontaire and its dialectics of nature and freedom. Sumares is most interested 
in explicating Ricoeur’s dialectical understanding of philosophy as “liebenden Kampf” (in 
the wake of Karl Jaspers), the relation of philosophy to “non-philosophy” – such as 
mythico-poetically expressed experience of being human and methodologico-scientific 
thought – and the impossibility for the subject to subsist in herself because existing (be-ing) 
is something that cannot be conceived as a voluntary matter.1893 
 Chapter two then focuses on the question of the subject in Ricoeur’s pre-
hermeneutical philosophy. The most of chapter two explicates the early Ricoeur’s Marcelian 
application of Husserl’s eidetics, but Sumares also describes the Kantian trait in Ricoeur’s 
thought. In addition, Sumares points out the importance of intersubjectivity and “being-in-
communion” (l’être-en-commun) as well as that of “my body” (mon corps). Having introduced 
these notions, he examines in particular Kant’s influence on Ricoeur by discussing Ricoeur’s 
presumptions in relation to the transcendental imagination, but especially the role of Kant’s 
practical philosophy and the notion of “being-intermediary” (l’être-intermédiaire) as an 
ontological condition for human being. A human being mediates internally in between 
nature and freedom, and it is this mediating – which aims at objectifying – that brings forth 
the interhuman domain of economics (having), politics (power) and culture (esteem).1894 
 In chapter three Sumares tries to capture Ricoeur’s pre-hermeutical 
understanding of culture. In drawing especially from Histoire et vérité but surprisingly also 
                                               
1893 Sumares 1987, 13-26. 
1894 Sumares 1987, 27-77. 
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from some post-wager articles published in Political and Social Essays – that is, texts written 
after Ricoeur’s hermeneutical turn as declared in La symbolique du mal (1960) – Sumares 
subdivides this examination to three sections: “personal contextualization of the question,” 
“the cultural matrix and the universal destiny,” and lastly “responsibility and the utopian 
perspective.” With the first section Sumares wishes to make a case for the influence of the 
“personalist” philosophy of Emmanuel Mounier (1905-1950). The second section examines 
the concept of culture but unfortunately does so by using Ricoeur’s article “Civilisation 
universelle et cultures nationales.” The essay is hopelessly unclear, and it was originally a 
conference presentation held in 1960, that is, it temporally correlates with Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutical turn. Sumares’ confusion becomes understandable in the light of the fact that 
Sumares actually uses the third edition of Histoire et vérité (1967), and not the first one 
published in 1955. The third section of this chapter three then discusses the notions of work, 
industrial civilization, as well as violence and politics. Sumares ends up, however, using 
Ricoeur’s post-wager political philosophy in support of his argumentation – leaving also 
aside some texts, for example, in Le volontaire et l’involontaire and L’homme faillible, that would 
have substantially helped him in the development of his own argument.1895 
 Chapter four represents a change in Sumares’ perspective as it explicitly carries 
the reader to the realm of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of “critical participation” (particioação 
crítica). The analysis drawn from La symbolique du mal, Le conflit des interprétations (1969) and 
Interpretation Theory (1976) – and to a lesser extent also from La métaphore vive – is divided 
between the hermeneutics of symbols and the hermeneutics of texts (discourses). Sumares 
discusses Ricoeur’s critical stance to Martin Heidegger’s “direct” ontological hermeneutics, 
and Ricoeur’s critique of Wilhelm Dilthey’s distinction between explanation (Erklärung) and 
                                               
1895 Sumares 1987, 79-111. 
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understanding (Verstehen). Sumares also alludes to Ricoeur’s discussion of onto-semantic 
innovation and “extralinguistic” reference in relation to Ricoeur’s metaphor theory.1896  
 Chapter five brings forth, again, the question of the subject, but this time from 
the point of view of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics. The leading idea for Sumares is that the subject 
is a situated interpreter of his own life. This subject is distinct from ego cogito, because the 
interpreting subject is fundamentally “de-centralized” (fundamentalmente descentrado) in his own 
being. According to Sumares, this fundamental alienation leads Ricoeur to the idea of an 
“archaeology” of the subject and of its dialectical counterpart, a “teleology” of the subject. 
Freudian psychoanalysis represents the archaeological perspective, whereas Hegel’s 
phenomenology of the Spirit represents that of teleology. These two philosophies tackle the 
same issue by proposing different approaches. Sumares complements this analysis of the 
dialectics of arché and telos with a discussion of the eschatological horizon. It is Ricoeur’s 
conviction that an arché can only be set as against a genesis and a telos as against an 
eschatology. In terms of analysing Ricoeur’s hermeneutical conception of the subject, 
Sumares thus discusses the symbols and myths of evil and their relation to a servile will (servo 
arbítrio), but focuses also to the theme of freedom in the view of hope.1897 
 Chapter six then finally addresses the question of culture in the hermeneutics 
of Paul Ricoeur. Sumares subdivides his exposition to two discussions: he first focuses on 
Ricoeur’s interpretation of the Freudian hermeneutics of culture, and then on the cultural 
texture between ideology and utopia. It is both the theory of art – which Freud appreciated – 
and the notion of familial Sittlichkeit (biologically and religiously understood), which get the 
most attention in the first section of Sumares’ chapter six. De l’interprétation and Le conflit des 
                                               
1896 Sumares 1987, 113-160. 
1897 Sumares 1987, 161-207. 
490 
interprétations are the two main sources in this analysis. The second section then makes a 
drastic turn and focuses on semantic action as exteriorization and intentional intervention 
(and hence also on speech-acts), on action and narrative configuration (in terms of Ricoeur’s 
threefold mimēsis), on narrative configuration and the experience of time (and thus on the 
question of understanding history and tradition), and finally on practical imagination and the 
dialectics of ideology and utopia (in carrying tradition through time). Besides the trilogy 
Temps et récit and especially its first volume, Sumares uses some of Ricoeur’s articles (such as 
“The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action considered as a Text,” 1971) as his source 
material.1898 Although having been published a year before Sumares’ work, Sumares does not 
take use of a collection of Ricoeur’s lectures on socio-political philosophy, namely, Lectures on 
Ideology and Utopia. Considering the final theme of Sumares’ exposition, this must be 
considered as a substantial lack in his otherwise well-structured exposition. 
 In conclusion it should be said, therefore, that Sumares reaches the level of 
describing the socio-political mode of being human, but not necessarily that of culture per 
se.1899 Simply naming culture and its constitutive nucleus – values, symbolization, and 
creation of images1900 – does not quite reach the level of philosophical reflection. In short, 
Sumares does not provide an analysis of Ricoeur’s philosophy of culture but rather of 
different aspects of Ricoeur’s thought relating to such philosophy. Despite the fact that 
Sumares mentions, for example, that “practical imagination is constitutive for the cultural 
structuration,”1901 and that he discusses “the symbolical system of culture,”1902 he does not 
define or explain the very usage of the term “culture” itself. Also, although Sumares 
                                               
1898 Sumares 1987, 209-279. 
1899 Cf. Sumares 1987, 283, 294. 
1900 Sumares 1987, 289. 
1901 Sumares 1987, 278. “prática imaginária e factor constituinte da estruturação cultural” 
1902 Sumares 1987, 279. “o sistema simbólico da cultura” 
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explicitly wanted to postpone the publication of his work in order to include the trilogy 
Temps et récit in his own analysis, he has – rather surprisingly – almost completely neglected 
Ricoeur’s La métaphore vive, published a good twelve years before his own work. Considering 
Sumares’ argument, he would have benefited noticeably if he would have included this 
important work to his own analysis – not to mention the same of some later works as 
Parcours de la reconnaissance (2004). 
 
Cobb: Supplementing a Discussion of the Theology of Culture 
In contrast to both Ozdowski and Sumares, Kelton Cobb’s doctoral dissertation Theology of 
Culture: Reflections on the Ethics of Tillich, Troeltsch, and Ricoeur (1994) represents a theological 
rather than a philosophical approach. According to Cobb, his work investigates the “ways in 
which theology of culture might fortify theological ethics’ grasp of cultural particularity 
without surrendering the effort to assert such universals as justice, human rights, and 
convictions about the unity of creation.”1903 It should, therefore, be no surprise that Cobb 
refers neither to Ozdowski nor Sumares. Cobb’s work is also structured in a manner that, for 
us, it is reasonable to focus only on the last part of his work. Although Cobb’s discussion of 
Tillich’s and Troeltsch’s cultural views is interesting, all three parts of the work are semi-
independent and, according to Cobb, Tillich is the most prominent figure among the other 
philosophers.1904 From Ricoeur Cobb draws “an approach to interpreting cultural ‘texts’ by 
means of which the divergent values that compose a culture can, through recital, be 
coordinated into a narrative refiguring of one’s orientation to the world.”1905 In short, 
                                               
1903 Cobb 1994, xii-xiii. 
1904 Cobb 1994, 5, 43. 
1905 Cobb 1994, v. 
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Ricoeur’s role in the dissertation is that he helps “in retrieving the contributions of Tillich 
and Troeltsch and persuading us of their persisting viability.”1906 Cobb understands Ricoeur’s 
role only as a mediator. 
After having briefly reenvisioned the theology of culture as theological ethics 
(chapter one), and introduced Paul Tillich’s theologies of culture (chapter two) as well as 
Ernst Troeltsch’s understanding of the ethical dimension of culture (chapter three), Cobb 
turns to Ricoeur’s hermeneutics as a means of cultural interpretation (chapter four). Cobb 
maintains that Ricoeur helps “sharpen my account of how the interpretation of cultural 
products is a moral act – one that culminates in the narrative recital of the deepest longings 
and ultimate values of a people.”1907 Cobb’s chapter on Ricoeur begins with an introduction 
to the theme of “hermeneutical detour,” as well as with the idea of action as interpretative 
text, and then proceeds to formulate Ricoeur’s “systematic ethics,” before finally moving 
into discussing an ethical theology of culture in the consideration of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics. 
 Besides describing Ricoeur’s overall structure of a hermeneutical process 
(summarized by Cobb as “understanding → explanation → appropriation”) and its revision 
in Time and Narrative I (prefiguration/mimēsis1 → configuration/mimēsis2 → 
refiguration/mimēsis3), the key point of the first section of Cobb’s dissertation is that all 
cultural features, as based on actions, are interpretable texts: “When it is seen that values, 
institutions, customs, forms of political conduct, and even fashions function as cultural texts 
for Ricoeur, his reflections on the ‘reading’ and interpretation of these texts can be shown to 
be an especially useful tool for theology of culture.”1908 Ricoeur’s article “The Model of the 
                                               
1906 Cobb 1994, 384. 
1907 Cobb 1994, 329. 
1908 Cobb 1994, 336. 
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Text: Meaningful Action considered as a Text” (1971) holds a central place in Cobb’s 
argumentation.1909 
 The second section aims at giving an overview of Ricoeur’s ethics as well as of 
the origin of values. Cobb argues that in contrast to Kant, Ricoeur takes values and duties 
not as constitutive to morality but they “emerge only at a later stage of ethics when the 
freedom of the other is encountered, when it becomes necessary to mediate between 
conflicting efforts to exist” – and these efforts are fundamentally expressed “in the density” 
of the works of an existing self.1910 Cobb summarizes Ricoeur’s conception of the source of 
ethics as the freedom’s desire to be: it is this desire that produces ethos conceivable in 
cultural symbols, images and values (which as core cultural “realities” constitute the hidden 
mytho-poetic nucleus of culture). The three features of Ricoeur’s ethics that Cobb examines 
more closely are: 1) the primary affirmation of the value of existence (an act manifesting 
itself through the effort to exist), 2) the dyadic structure of the ethical consciousness 
(distinction between “absolutely desirable” and “relatively possible”), and 3) the concept of 
‘repetition’ (the “weight” of history, which leads one to recognize that he is morally 
responsible for his intended actions). The most significant primary sources in this second 
section are Ricoeur’s article “The Problem of the Foundation of Moral Philosophy” (1978), 
and the English translations of his works Time and Narrative III (1985) and Oneself as Another 
(1990).1911 
 In terms of the dissertation at hand, the third section of Cobb’s dissertation is 
the most interesting; in it Cobb analyzes Ricoeur’s theology of culture. Cobb does this by 
focusing, again, on three themes in particular: 1) Ricoeur’s notion of the “enlargement of 
                                               
1909 Cobb 1994, 329-342. 
1910 Cobb 1994, 344-345. 
1911 Cobb 1994, 342-383. 
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being” through interpretation, 2) the synthesis of acts of valuation in emplotment, and 3) the 
triad of description, narration, and prescription as a means for analysing human existence.1912 
The first of these three themes is best summarized in Cobb’s remark that for Ricoeur “the 
subject acquires its way of being in the world in the first place through the act of reading,” 
and that “one’s world is compiled from the texts of one’s culture.”1913 This reading is 
interpreting – as is especially in the case of mytho-poetic narrations – and as such 
approaching a more complete understanding of being. This is also why the importance of 
the theme of emplotment and the critical interpretation of narrations bearing the “ontology 
of care” becomes apparent for Cobb in his dissertation.  
The third theme, reconstruction of selfhood as teleologico-ethical existence – 
through describing the field of action, ascribing actions to characters in narration, and finally 
prescribing aim-carrying (such as “good life”) practices by these essentially mytho-poetic 
narrations – rests on the preceding themes but in a way also leads away from examining 
culture. According to Cobb, this third theme is best captured in Ricoeur’s famous “little 
ethics” (“petite éthique”): “to live the good life with and for others in just institutions.” This 
culmination point is justified in terms of Cobb’s own analysis, but it does not satisfy a need 
to analyze more deeply Ricoeur’s philosophy of culture. Cobb uses especially Ricoeur’s 
articles “Metaphor and the Main Problem of Hermeneutics” (1972/1974) and 
“Manifestation and Proclamation” (1974/1978), as well as Time and Narrative III and Oneself as 
Another as his textual sources.1914 
 As a brief evaluation of Cobb’s dissertation – from the point of view of 
explicating Ricoeur’s philosophy of culture – it should then be pointed out, again, that Cobb 
                                               
1912 Cobb 1994, 384-385. 
1913 Cobb 1994, 385-386. 
1914 Cobb 1994, 383-442. 
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does not provide a clear definition or comprehensive description of the concept of culture 
(other than the very general “cultivation of nature”1915). As the aim of Cobb’s dissertation is 
not primarily in the concept of culture or in the philosophy of culture per se but rather in the 
notion of “ethos,” it is understandable that the source material is not analyzed in a thorough 
manner, and that Ricoeur’s cultural understanding is summarized on the basis of some – 
although also important – texts. It should be acknowledged, however, that Cobb’s ethico-
theological interpretation and reflection on some key features of Ricoeur’s cultural 
understanding is, nevertheless, insightful. 
 
Madila-Basanguka: the Ethico-Religious Core of Cultural Poetics 
Marcel Madila-Basanguka’s dissertation Poétique de la culture: imagination, éthique et religion chez 
Paul Ricoeur (1996), unknowingly written as an archbishop-to-be, adopts the task of 
evaluating Ricoeur’s oeuvre quite exclusively through the idea of a philosophy of culture. As 
such, it clearly merits the highest place in an unofficial ranking of the works on Ricoeur’s 
cultural philosophy preceding the dissertation at hand – especially because it is able to draw 
out a “poetics of culture” from Ricoeur’s work. It is, therefore, quite unfortunate that it 
comprises only a very brief and a quite unpolished summary in English, since the work 
would clearly deserve – despite its limitations which relate to its affiliation with the 
philosophy of religion1916 as well as certain technical issues – a much wider audience than it 
has had as placed to the shelves of the library of L’Institute Catholique de Paris.1917  
                                               
1915 Cobb 1994, 464. 
1916 The very last chapter of the dissertation, which captures the high point of Madila-Basanguka’s analysis, 
is titled “La poetique de la religion.” 
1917 There is currently a microfiche copy of Madila-Basanguka’s dissertation at the Boston College O’Neill 
Library. Of that, I am very grateful to the extremely competent library staff. 
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The four hundred fifty page dissertation, that is also known to Margit 
Eckholt,1918 is well organized in three main parts. The first examines Ricoeur’s hermeneutical 
phenomenology, the second the hermeneutics of culture (especially from the points of view 
of W. Dilthey, E. Cassirer, and H-G Gadamer), and the third, the “heart” of the 
dissertation,1919 outlines an approach to a poetics of culture as found in the works of Paul 
Ricoeur.  
 The first part consists of two chapters: the first analyzes Ricoeur’s existential 
hermeneutics of symbols, the second his method of reflexive-hermeneutical 
phenomenology. Chapter one in a way sets a tone for the whole dissertation by opening a 
view to Ricoeur’s work from La symbolique du mal. The main point for Madila-Basanguka is 
not, however, the semi-theological approach, most strongly highlighted at the very end of his 
dissertation, but the notion that “the human universe is a world of significations,” and that 
an analysis of symbolic signification as well as of symbols themselves is therefore needed.1920 
Besides La symbolique du mal, Madila-Basanguka also uses De l’interprétation in capturing 
Ricoeur’s theory of symbols. He adds, however, an anthropological note as well: a human 
subject can never come to a direct self-understanding, whereas this takes place only 
indirectly through the “signs of man” that bear symbolic meanings.1921  
Chapter two continues to examine this condition by adopting a Cartesian point 
of view: that human existence is a “thinking being” (un être pensant). In opposition to 
Descartes, however, Madila-Basanguka maintains that Ricoeur demands the detour of 
reflection for the task of achieving self-identity and self-consciousness as being in between 
                                               
1918 Eckholt 1999, 100. 
1919 Madila-Basanguka 1996, 11. 
1920 Madila-Basanguka 1996, 15-16. – Madila-Basanguka refers to La symbolique du mal and asserts: “La 
symbole ouvre et découvre ‘la situation de l’être de l’homme dans l’être du monde’.” 
1921 Madila-Basanguka 1996, 66. 
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existence and thought.1922 After having described reflection as appropriation, ethics, and 
interpretation, the question of hermeneutics – as well as that of the conflict of hermeneutics 
– becomes relevant. It is in the view of this conflict that a culturally grounded “concrete 
reflection” (reflexion concrète) opens up itself.1923 Two the most used primary sources in this 
second chapter are De l’interprétation and Le conflit des interprétations. 
The second part of Madila-Basanguka’s dissertation, focusing on summarizing 
the cultural hermeneutics of W. Dilthey, E. Cassirer, and H-G Gadamer, covers the three 
consecutive chapters respectively. As the author does not aim to give a “panoramic view” to 
the history of the philosophy of culture, but merely to offer a suitable contrast for 
schematizing Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of it, Madila-Basanguka takes these three and explicates 
some of the key aspects of their cultural understanding.1924 Based mostly on the French 
translations of Dilthey’s Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften and Studien zur Geschichte des 
deutschen Geistes chapter three aims thus to draw out his notion of “objective Spirit” that, as in 
Hegel, intentionally retains a connection to the concrete life (der Realität des Lebens). Despite 
the opportunity, however, this notion is not directly compared to Ricoeur’s notion of 
“cultural objectivity” (l’objectivité culturelle) as presented in L’homme faillible, for example.  
Chapter four then moves on to Cassirer and his philosophy of symbolic 
forms. The key text Madila-Basanguka uses, however, is the French translation of Cassirer’s 
An Essay on Man.1925 Cassirer’s assertion that culture should be taken as a system of actions 
rather than exclusively as something speculative – since being is accessible only as 
                                               
1922 Madila-Basanguka 1996, 68-69. 
1923 Madila-Basanguka 1996, 145. 
1924 Madila-Basanguka 1996, 148-149. 
1925 Madila-Basanguka 1996, 194. 
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symbolically clothed action – seems to be at the core of Madila-Basanguka’s interest.1926 
Chapter five then examines Gadamer’s hermeneutics as presented in Wahrheit und Methode. 
Although Madila-Basanguka also discusses the questions of tradition and Dasein, his focus is 
on Gadamer’s notion of “play,” which he takes – guided by J. Huizinga – as the “paradigm 
of culture.”1927 Madila-Basanguka’s assertion, however, in the wake of Huizinga’s definition 
that culture is but the play of imagination,1928 then opens a question whether his reading on 
Gadamer is quite too “Huizingian,” or whether the Huizingian notion outcasts the 
Gadamerian one altogether. For Madila-Basanguka’s benefit it would have to be 
acknowledged that he is not unaware of this move as he admits that it is probably worthy to 
“risk” reading Gadamer’s notion of tradition as a Huizingian play.1929 
 The heart of Madila-Basanguka’s dissertation, the third part, consists of three 
chapters that focus on culture as praxis and representation, the poetics of ethics, and the 
poetics of religion. Madila-Basanguka’s aim is a comprehension of a such being-in-the-world 
that understands culture as a reality of “new possibilities.” Madila-Basanguka maintains that 
this forms the core and soul (l’âme) of each culture, which is then described as an “image of 
man.”1930 This idea leads Madila-Basanguka first to emphasize the role of imagination, but 
only in connection to action as mediated by symbols.1931 Madila-Basanguka presents, 
therefore, a strong Cassirerian style hypothesis: that all the spheres of human existence – 
including religion – are first and foremost symbolic systems.1932  
                                               
1926 Madila-Basanguka 1996, 196-197. 
1927 Madila-Basanguka 1996, 247, 286. 
1928 Madila-Basanguka 1996, 288. 
1929 Madila-Basanguka 1996, 282. 
1930 Madila-Basanguka 1996, 293. 
1931 Madila-Basanguka 1996, 294. 
1932 Madila-Basanguka 1996, 295-296. 
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Chapter six relies mostly on Temps et récit, Du texte à l’action and Soi-même comme 
un autre, and it analyzes both the hermeneutics of human action (its practical signification, 
symbolic structure, and temporal character),1933 and also – in the wake of Clifford Geertz – 
culture as representation.1934 The key question lies in their intersection, that is, in their 
relation. Madila-Basanguka explains how imagination and social life relate to each other by 
using Ricoeur’s and Karl Mannheim’s analysis of ideology and utopia, that is, the forms of 
“social imagination.” Culture, in conclusion, “is not only significant action, a system of 
symbolic actions and representations, but it should also be defined as a living reality and 
creative capability.”1935 Cultural reality is thus not only a condition but a process that 
connects the past values and symbols (tradition) to the present projects, which are in turn 
directed to future (innovation).1936 Culture is as much a dialectics as it is a drama. Madila-
Basanguka concludes that not having this tension signifies an end of a culture.1937 
Chapter seven, by drawing again mostly from Ricoeur’s Du texte à l’action and 
Soi-même comme un autre, but also from Ricoeur’s Lectures, turns to the poetics of ethics. 
Madila-Basanguka conceives ethics as the primary aspect of culture, thanks also to Ricoeur’s 
well-known definition of ethical intention as “aiming at the good life with and for others in 
just institutions.”1938 This ethical primacy in Madila-Basanguka’s dissertation is not only 
based on values and explicit moral norms, however, but also on an assertion that in ethics – 
and in politics – the productive role of imagination can be understood as a case par excellence 
in terms of evaluating human potentialities.1939 Despite recognizing this ethical core, Madila-
                                               
1933 Madila-Basanguka 1996, 298. 
1934 Madila-Basanguka 1996, 319-320. 
1935 Madila-Basanguka 1996, 340. 
1936 Madila-Basanguka 1996, 341-342. 
1937 Madila-Basanguka 1996, 344. 
1938 Ricoeur 1990, 202. (172). 
1939 Madila-Basanguka 1996, 346-347. 
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Basanguka extends the scope of his analysis and includes the political dimension of life 
under a certain “poetics.” It appears that this dimension of Ricoeur’s cultural hermeneutics 
attracts him the most, as it keeps a firm relation to institutions, economics, and other 
possible spheres of life pertaining to human praxis.1940 This attraction is probably best 
captured in Madila-Basanguka’s summary that “human reality is political.”1941  
As Ricoeur understands human freedom to be limited by transcendence, 
however, Madila-Basanguka argues that his political “poetics of ethics” has to be 
complemented with a “poetics of religion.” The final chapter, number eight, then examines 
religion, but not only from a cultural point of view. Despite alluding to Cassirer’s conviction 
that religion is at the root of cultural formation, and defining religion as “a cultural system 
that carries a particular vision of the world and orients individual’s behavior,” Madila-
Basanguka turns to the questions of a hermeneutics of biblical faith, and living in a world 
created by God (“habiter ce monde de Dieu”) – instead of living in a cultural world.1942 After 
outlining religion as a symbolic system, drawing heavily from the French translation of 
Clifford Geertz’s Religion as a Cultural System, Madila-Basanguka takes on a theological 
approach and analyzes the “Wholly Other” (le Tout Autre), which has been seen always to 
precede a human being, not as a linguistic-cultural condition but as a theological principle.1943 
In balancing between a philosophy of culture and a philosophy of religion,1944 Madila-
Basanguka then turns to an explicit examination of the relation between theology and 
politics, which finds its high point in the dialectics of love and justice.  
                                               
1940 Madila-Basanguka 1996, 385. 
1941 Madila-Basanguka 1996, 388. 
1942 Madila-Basanguka 1996, 392-394. 
1943 Madila-Basanguka 1996, 420-422. – Madila-Basanguka asserts that “La foi peut […] être considerée 
comme une expérience du langage, l’expérience d’être crée par le verbe,” but also that “la foi est un don ou une 
grâce.” 
1944 Cf. Madila-Basanguka 1996, 434-435. 
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 In his own conclusion, however, Madila-Basanguka hits a key note when 
headlining his final remarks as “for a critical theory of culture.” Defining culture as praxis 
(human action), imagination, play, and thus also as an invention, Madila-Basanguka rests 
quite surprisingly, however, on the comments by Hannah Arendt, Johan Huizinga, and Paul 
Rabinow rather than those of Dilthey, Cassirer, Gadamer, or Ricoeur.1945 Madila-Basanguka 
introduces, nevertheless, the idea of human capacity and capability (most intensively 
captured in Ricoeur’s phrase “l’homme capable”) as a résumé of the anthropology that has a 
necessary standing in relation to the “poetics of culture.” This poetics – pertaining most 
fundamentally to ethics but according to Madila-Basanguka also to politics and especially to 
religion – both reveals the various dimensions of human experience and transforms the 
subjects’ vision of the world.1946  
Let me add a few critical remarks. Adopting a strongly Kantian stance Madila-
Basanguka summarizes his own conviction that “culture should aim at human liberation.”1947 
Since this Kantian affiliation is not made explicit, however, a crucial limitation of Madila-
Basanguka’s dissertation becomes apparent. In the course of his analysis Madila-Basanguka 
has downplayed Kant’s importance quite drastically,1948 and yet the notion of culture as the 
“ultimate purpose of nature” (die letzte Zweck der Natur) that has a “view” to the final, 
rational-moral aim (Endzweck) – which does not reside in nature at all – is one of the most 
important phrases in the whole context of the third Critique.1949 Moreover, the whole 
problem of the concept of culture itself is set aside. Furthermore, the structure of the 
analysis does not enable describing the change in Ricoeur’s attitude in relation to the concept 
                                               
1945 Madila-Basanguka 1996, 445-447, 449. 
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1949 Kant 1999, V.431-433. (KdU). 
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of culture. In short, Madila-Basanguka’s dissertation is top of its class but not free from its 
own limitations. An important message, however, is also delivered for us with this ambitious 
piece of work. Madila-Basanguka mentions in the acknowledgements that “Professeur Paul 
Ricoeur” himself ratified the hypothesis of a strong cultural-philosophical reading of his 
work.1950 
 
Mattern: Linguistic Interculturality in the Light of Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics 
Lastly, Jens Mattern’s Zwischen kultureller Symbolik und allgemeiner Wahrheit: Paul Ricoeur 
interkulturell gelesen (2008), in German with no English summary, is based both on the views 
opened by a German translation of Ricoeur’s article “Civilisation universelle et cultures 
nationales” (1961/1974), and Ricoeur’s anthropological notion of “being-intermediary.” The 
aim of Mattern’s work is not to explicate Ricoeur’s cultural understanding but rather to 
highlight some essential features of multiculturality or, more precisely, “intercultural 
thought” (interkulturell oder interkulturelles Denken) as well as the necessity of understanding 
philosophy not as trans- but intercultural (interkulturellen Philosophie). As such it indirectly 
replies to the questions proposed by Margit Eckholt’s brief 2002 pamphlet that culminates in 
the question of cultural plurality and theological hermeneutics,1951 and especially by Marcel 
Madila-Basanguka in the end of his own dissertation: intercultural and interreligious 
dialogue, inculturation, and cultural development.1952  
                                               
1950 Madila-Basanguka 1996, 3, 8. Cf. Madila-Basanguka 1996, 6.: “L’objet de cette recherché est de 
proposer une ‘nouvelle compréhension’ de sa pensée, en l’abordant dans la perspective d’une philosophie de la 
culture.” 
1951 Eckholt 2002, 29-56. 
1952 Madila-Basanguka 1996, 450. 
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After alluding in the introductory chapter to the variety of Ricoeur’s interests 
and his Jaspersian-style “liebende Kampf” – or Ricoeur’s “polylogischen Denken” – Mattern 
divides his book into three main sections, each of which take one particular “in-between” 
(Zwischen) under examination. This choice is based on Mattern’s conviction that Ricoeur 
should be presented as a thinker of “in-between” (als einen Denker des Zwischen).1953 
The first, background section discusses 1) being in-between belongingness and 
differentiation (Zugehörigkeit und Distanzierung) from the point of view of the dynamical 
dialectics of self and its meaning (Jean Nabert’s influence), 2) centralization and 
decentralization of meaning and self (comparison of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics to those of 
Hand-Georg Gadamer and Martin Heidegger), as well as 3) being and speaking (Ricoeur’s 
critical relation to structuralism, Ricoeur’s notion of poetical mimesis). The main sources for 
this first section are the German translations of Le conflit des interprétations, La métaphore vive, 
Temps et récit I, and Du texte à l’action.1954  
The second section of Mattern’s work focuses on the “in-between” of identity 
and otherness (Identität und Alterität) by focusing on questions of 1) the dialectics of identity 
and ipseity (Ricoeur’s notion of narrative identity), 2) of ethical search for good life and 
normative morality (Ricoeur’s “little ethics” and his relation to Kant’s practical philosophy as 
well as John Rawl’s ethico-political philosophy), and also 3) that of phenomenology and 
metaphysics (Ricoeur’s relation to Aristotle, Spinoza, Husserl, Lévinas, and Heidegger). The 
main sources for this section are the German translations of Soi-même comme un autre and of 
the 1990 article “Éthique et morale.”1955  
                                               
1953 Mattern 2008, 9-30. 
1954 Mattern 2008, 31-71. 
1955 Mattern 2008, 73-126. 
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The third – and surprisingly also the briefest – section then opens the 
discussion of being in-between cultural recollection and universal truth (kulturellem Gedächtnis 
und allgemeiner Wahrheit) from the point of view of the conflict of interpretations. This third 
section is further subdivided to two “in-betweens”: 1) manifold of perspectives and the 
demand of universality in philosophy, and 2) cultural symbolics and its truth (kultureller 
Symbolik und der einen Wahrheit). The first of these “in-betweens” reflects a loan from Kant’s 
third Critique (§59) that captures the essence of Ricoeur’s “wager,” that is, Ricoeur’s turn to 
the hermeneutics of symbols at the last pages of La symbolique du mal.1956 Besides the German 
translation of this early work, Mattern also refers to the German translations of Le conflit des 
interpretations, La métaphore vive, and Temps et récit III.1957 
It is the very last subsection of Mattern’s book that directly addresses the 
theme of cultural symbolics and discusses intercultural understanding from a philosophical 
point of view. Mattern’s intention, however, is not to explicate Ricoeur’s cultural thought as 
such, but rather to take it as a philosophical examination of the possibility of intercultural 
dialogue. Mattern states that it is the fundamental heterogeneity of speech and especially its 
counterpart “linguistic hospitality” – which “welcomes” what remains foreign in translation 
and in communication generally speaking – that resides at the heart of his analysis. 
According to Mattern (who paraphrases Ricoeur), understanding transculturality is possible 
by taking into account the “cultural cores” (kulturellen Kerns) that ground ethnical groups 
through images, symbols, and myths (which, in turn, are seen as “the day dreams of a 
historical group”). 
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1957 Mattern 2008, 127-139. 
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It is cultural symbolism, therefore, that both alienates (from other cultures) 
and also makes it possible to be human (by making it possible to gain an identity). It should 
thus be summarized that although the relationship between the same and the different in 
cultural exchange remains inadequately explained, there still is a certain correspondence 
between cultures and cultural condition. In other words, despite the differentiation and the 
consequent conflict of interpretations, there still remains belongingness to, or the need of, 
some core symbols and values. Mattern’s key sources in this very last subsection of his work 
are a German translation of Ricoeur’s article “Civilisation universelle et cultures 
nationales” (1961/1974), Ricoeur’s festschrift article to Karl Jaspers titled as “Geschichte der 
Philosophie als kontinuierliche Schöpfung auf dem Wege der Kommunikation” (1953) as 
well as a brief collection of Ricoeur’s articles on the problem of translation Sur la traduction 
(2004).1958 
 As a brief assessment of Mattern’s work I should mention, again, that despite 
being curiously interesting, this piece of philosophical work does not directly examine 
Ricoeur’s cultural concept. Likewise, the source material is fairly limited, and it is not 
analyzed in a chronological order either to highlight any possible changes if they were to 
occur in the course of Ricoeur’s oeuvre. Mattern makes no references to previous works 
reflecting some cultural-philosophical issues in the light of Ricoeur’s works. Most 
importantly, although focusing on intercultural issues, the term “culture” is left, again, 
without a clear definition or some broader problematization. It is for these reasons – 
somewhat plaguing all the works discussed above – that achieving this description as well as 
showing its relevance in connection to Ricoeur’s broader cultural understanding is a task left 
for the current dissertation. It should be pointed out, however, that although having to some 
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extent used overlapping material, none of the writers above have explained their respective 
uses of primary sources in relation to Ricoeur’s philosophy of culture. This lack of systematic 
approach to Ricoeur’s work proposes a challenge to the whole of Ricoeur scholarship. 
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APPENDIX 3 – RICOEUR’S 1961 CULTURE/CIVILIZATION CONFUSION 
In spite of the awkward ambiguity in his 1961 essay “Universal Civilization and National 
Cultures,” Paul Ricoeur also manages to provide a few definitions that can be used as a 
propaedeutics to Ricoeur’s cultural philosophy. For this reason, many of Ricoeur’s critics 
have used it in their explications of Ricoeur’s conception of culture. In order to point out a 
certain confusion in the reception of Ricoeur’s works – also in those scholarly interpretations 
that are open to a hermeneutic of culture – let me provide a critical assessment of this widely 
used essay. This analysis will explain part of the confusion that this dissertation overcomes.  
First, Ricoeur mentions in his essay “the culture of consumption, from which 
we all benefit to some degree.”1959 He pairs this world-wide culture – which displays “a way 
of living that has a universal character”1960 – with the condition of contemporary cultures, 
and writes: “It is certain that a growing number of men are today approaching that 
elementary level of culture of which the most noteworthy aspect is the fight against illiteracy 
and the development of means of consuming and a basic culture.”1961 In sum, according to 
Ricoeur, there is first of all a “basic culture” (la culture de base) in relation to providing basic 
necessities to people. Besides this, there is also an “elementary level of culture” (la culture 
élémentaire) in connection with the structure of successful education.  
                                               
1959 Ricoeur 1961, 444. (276). 
1960 Ricoeur 1961, 442. (274). 
1961 Ricoeur 1961, 444. (276). – Ricoeur repeatedly refers to consumerism as a positive sign of this cultural 
progress in general. The “triumph of the culture of consumption,” however, is in the final analysis nothing but 
the “level zero” of the “culture of creation.” Consumer culture as consumerism represents a kind of cultural 
menace which, according to Ricoeur, can be likened to the peril caused by “nuclear destruction.” The first real 
step towards a culture, although still an elementary one, is therefore the ability to read and write. In a way the 
cultural threshold has then been achieved with these abilities which already differ from satisfying the immediate 
needs. (Ricoeur 1961, 442, 444, 447. (274, 276, 278).) It is noteworthy that Ricoeur repeats his criticism of the 
culture of consummation, or “vanity,” in his 1966 essay “Prévision économique et choix éthique” that is 
included in the third, enlarged edition of History and Truth: “Nous sommes de plus en plus dans la situation de 
consommateur qui consume, qui détruit les fruits de la créativité, laquelle se réfugie en quelques individus rares. 
[…] Nous sommes de plus en plus consommateurs, et de mois en moins créateurs. Il y a là un pèril très subtil 
et finalement mortel.” Ricoeur 1967a, 309-310. 
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 As already stressed in its title, however, the guiding thread of Ricoeur’s article 
is in a dialectics of real particular cultures and a utopian universal civilization. While 
describing the seemingly Kantian thought of progressive universalization – which for Kant 
means precisely an “advancement of mankind” by making society a “moral whole” through 
teleological reason1962 – Ricoeur brings forth the idea that there is a creative nucleus of great 
cultures that works as the fundamental hermeneutical lens for all human beings: 
The phenomenon of universalization, while being an advancement of 
mankind, at the same time constitutes [in the form of consumer culture] a sort 
of subtle destruction, not only of traditional cultures, which might not be an 
irreparable wrong, but also of what I shall call for the time being the creative 
nucleus of great civilizations and great cultures, that nucleus on the basis of 
which we interpret life, what I shall call in advance the ethical and mythical 
nucleus of humanity.1963 
 
In other words, Ricoeur argues that the core of being a human is both ethical and mythical, 
but also that this core is challenged by a bogus (pacotille) universalization such as the 
dissemination of Western consumerism.1964 
By insisting, however, that an ethico-mythical nucleus forms the core of all 
cultures, Ricoeur adopts an attitude similar to that of Alfred L. Kroeber and Clyde 
Kluckhohn, the authors of the classical exposition Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and 
Definitions (1952). They are convinced that “the actual organization of all cultures is primarily 
in terms of their values,”1965 and this is why “the study of culture must include the explicit 
and systematic study of values and value-systems.”1966 But Kroeber and Kluckhohn also 
point out that “sociologists have in general anticipated the anthropologists: recognition of 
                                               
1962 Kant 1999, VIII.17-19, 26. (Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte).; Kant 1999, V.435. (KdU). 
1963 Ricoeur 1961, 445. (276). Cf. Ricoeur & Kearney 2004, 117-118. 
1964 Ricoeur 1961, 445-446. (276-277). 
1965 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 171-174. 
1966 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 156. 
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values as an essential element, and of the crucial role of symbolism.”1967 Cultural values and 
cultural symbols are studied by sociologists and cultural anthropologists with whom Ricoeur, 
a philosopher, apparently shares the primary focus of interest. 
An imminent challenge seems to appear at the outset of this analysis: are we, 
when focusing on the ethico-mythical nucleus of great cultures – that is, onto values and 
symbolisms – silently uprooting Ricoeur from philosophy and planting him in sociology and 
cultural anthropology? As yet another cultural anthropologist Roy Wagner admits, “the 
concept of culture has come to be completely associated with anthropological thinking.”1968  
A philosopher’s position – asking about the conditions of phenomena rather than their 
common denominators – is then indirectly announced as problematic in Ricoeur’s allusion 
to Edward B. Tylor’s seminal 1871 definition of the concept of culture: “It is not easy to 
grasp what is meant by the definition of culture as a complex of values or, if you prefer, of 
evaluations.”1969 So far, Ricoeur’s idea of the creative nucleus of great cultures is 
philosophically speaking a mere assertion, and resorting to either sociology or cultural 
anthropology might make Ricoeur’s position even more debatable. 
Ricoeur begins, therefore, his own attempt at defining culture with some 
negations. First, the focus on cultural phenomena must be general enough: “We are too 
prone to look for the meaning of culture on an excessive rational or reflective level, for 
example, by starting with a written literature or an elaborated form of thought, as in the 
European tradition of philosophy.”1970 Although understanding culture in an “opera-house 
                                               
1967 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 156. 
1968 Wagner 1981, 1. 
1969 Ricoeur 1961, 447. (278). Cf. Appendix 1. 
1970 Ricoeur 1961, 447. (278). 
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sense” is possible – as Roy Wagner puts it while remaining critical of such a reduction1971 – 
for Ricoeur “the values of which we are speaking reside in the concrete attitude toward life, 
insofar as they form a system and are not radically called into question by influential and 
responsible people.”1972 Culture is not a particular manifestation or a tightly limited set of 
artifacts. It is a context and paradigm of meaning. In all this, however, the cultural 
anthropologists would probably agree. 
Ricoeur’s vagueness is disconcerting, but his intention is quite graspable. 
Instead of taking culture as a set of elevated cultural achievements – those of “high culture” 
– Ricoeur maintains that culture should be understood as the ethothic ground (ηθος) of the 
shared structures of living together. Secondly, then, it is in this commonly shared disposition 
that the cultural nucleus resides, and not in the outward expressions of it: 
It seems to me that if one wishes to attain the cultural nucleus, one has to cut 
through to that layer of images and symbols which make up the basic ideals of 
a people. […] Images and symbols constitute what might be called the 
awakened dream of a historical group. It is in this sense that I speak of the 
ethico-mythical nucleus which constitutes the cultural resources of a people.1973 
 
To attain the ethico-mythical nucleus, the cultural core of a people, “one has to cut through” 
images and symbols by which it is covered. The cultural nucleus is like subconsciousness 
which remains mute, only speaking in the images and symbols which call for 
interpretation.1974 The cultural content is not unrelated to these images, but the images are 
mere vestiges of it. 
                                               
1971 Wagner 1981, 21-22. 
1972 Ricoeur 1961, 447. (279). – Ricoeur, however, points out that he is not talking about homo faber but 
rather of homo ethicus: “Among the attitudes which interest us here, the most important are those concerning 
tradition, change, our behavior toward our fellow-citizens and foreigners, and more especially the use of 
available tools. Indeed, a set of tools, we said, is the sum total of all ways and means; consequently, we may 
immediately oppose it to value insofar as value represents the sum total of all goals.” Ricoeur 1961, 447. (279).  
1973 Ricoeur 1961, 449. (280). 
1974 Cf. Ricoeur 1961, 449. (280). 
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Here, then, we are able to find a possible difference between Ricoeur and an 
ethnographer. “All the phenomena directly accessible to immediate description,” in which 
cultural anthropologists are interested, “are like symptoms or a dream to be analyzed,” 
Ricoeur writes.1975 Instead of observing and “inventing a culture” by ethnographical 
methods,1976 Ricoeur argues that we need “an authentic deciphering, a methodological 
interpretation” in terms of human culture in general.1977 This concrete attitude toward life, 
silent in itself but clothed in symbols which speak of its very essence, is approachable in 
philosophical interpretation.  
Ricoeur, however, is far from out of the woods. The repeated notion of “a 
people” (un peuple), for example, is confusing. If I am correct in my reading, the “ethical and 
mythical nucleus,” somewhat comparable to Alfred Weber’s “Wesensgehalt,” essential 
content,1978 should take the first place in our thoughts instead of giving it to a particular 
culture or subculture. For certain, Ricoeur did not introduce the idea of a cultural nucleus in 
relation to a particular national culture or in relation to a nation, but in reference to 
humankind. Still, there is an apparent tension in Ricoeur’s text between following a cultural 
anthropologist in relation to a particular culture, and a philosopher in relation to a general 
notion of human culture. 
The question of the unity of humankind, for example, poses a problem for 
Ricoeur. He openly acknowledges that he is puzzled by this: “The strange thing, in fact, is 
                                               
1975 Ricoeur 1961, 449. (280). 
1976 Cf. Wagner 1981, 11. 
1977 Ricoeur 1961, 449. (280). 
1978 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 17, 27, 148. – Kroeber and Kluckhohn depict especially Alfred Weber’s 
Kultursoziologie (1931) as a prevenient expression of modern cultural anthropology. For Weber the social 
structure (of religion, art, knowledge, etc.) is only an expression (Ausdrucksform) of “essential manner-content” 
(Wesensgehalt) which, in turn, is “Kultur.” It was on the basis of this kind of emerging thought that the word 
Kultur finally gained a modern dictionary definition as “the mode of being of mankind (die Daseinsweise der 
Menschheit) … as well as the result of this mode of being, namely, the stock of culture possessed (der Kulturbesitz) 
or cultural attainments (die Kulturerrungenschaften).” 
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that there are many cultures and not a single humanity.”1979 Ricoeur points out that already 
the factuality of different languages indicates that there has always been “primitive 
incohesion” among human beings, that humanity “is not established in a single cultural style 
but has ‘congealed’ in coherent, closed historical shapes: the cultures.”1980 In brief, as also 
Gary B. Madison points out, Ricoeur is torn between the idea of a common cultural root of 
humanity and the reality of multiple cultures.1981 
Ricoeur’s struggle then shifts to the level of particular cultures. The cultures, in 
the plural, are first of all “coherent and closed, constituted cultural wholes.” Secondly, they 
are according to Ricoeur “different contexts of civilization.”1982 These self-standing contexts 
of civilization are constituted by images and symbols which are, however, external rather 
than internal to the nucleus. This matrix of images and symbols “does not make up the most 
radical phenomenon of creativity” but “merely constitutes the outermost layer of it.”1983 
Again, one could think of Alfred Weber’s “Ausdrucksform” – an expression of culture, or a 
cultural form of expression – in connection with Ricoeur’s explication.1984 The puzzle is 
encountered here again. Only by “cutting through” this layer of images and symbols can an 
understanding of a cultural whole be achieved, because “creativity eludes all planned 
anticipation.”1985 True creativity cannot be just repeating what has already been said and 
imagined, it is somehow deeper than that – and so is culture as a cultural whole. 
                                               
1979 Ricoeur 1961, 449. (280). 
1980 Ricoeur 1961, 449. (280). 
1981 Madison 2003, 481-487. Cf. Ricoeur & Tóth 2003, 657-659. 
1982 Ricoeur 1961, 449. (280). 
1983 Ricoeur 1961, 449. (280). 
1984 Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 17, 27, 148. 
1985 Ricoeur 1961, 450. (281). 
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 Ricoeur, however, refers to civilizations as well. He mentions that particular 
cultures are “different contexts of civilization,”1986 implying that there is a clear difference 
between a culture and civilization. Unlike civilization, which by depositing tools “fosters a 
certain sense of time which is composed of accumulation and progress,” Ricoeur asserts that 
national cultures are “based upon a law of fidelity and creation.”1987 Therefore, unlike 
civilization, “a culture dies as soon as it is no longer renewed and recreated.”1988 For Ricoeur, 
civilization seems to mean the universal accumulation of technological means – since a 
technological invention “rightfully belongs to humanity”1989 – whereas a culture must 
constantly be renewed by creative action. Here, then, the reader becomes puzzled. If 
civilization is a universal toolshed and culture is continuous recreation, why does Ricoeur 
then search for the “creative nucleus of a civilization,”1990 and wonder “what will become of 
our [European] civilization when it has really met different civilization by means other than 
the shock of conquest and domination”?1991 It appears that Ricoeur’s insight is severely 
limited by conceptual fog, and the distinction he would like to maintain between civilization 
and culture therefore falls apart. 
In brief, it is too difficult for Ricoeur to hold the culture/civilization 
distinction. In a similar manner, Ricoeur’s description of cultural dynamism fails. According 
to Ricoeur, sounding actually quite Nietzschean,1992 a culture is recharged by those 
                                               
1986 Ricoeur 1961, 449. (280). 
1987 Ricoeur 1961, 449. (281). 
1988 Ricoeur 1961, 449-450. (281). 
1989 Ricoeur 1961, 440. (272). Cf. Kaplan 2011, 226, 234-240. 
1990 Ricoeur 1961, 447. (278). 
1991 Ricoeur 1961, 453. (283). 
1992 Nietzsche 1995, III-1.159. – It should be pointed out, however, that Nietzsche defines culture in David 
Strauß, der Bekenner und der Schriftsteller (1873) not from the point of view of aesthetic individuality but in a 
manner that follows Herder’s aesthetic conception of “Geist des Volks”: “Culture is above all the unity of 
artistic style in all the expressions of the life of a people.” (“Kultur ist vor allem Einheit des künstlerischen 
Stiles in allen Lebensäußerungen eines Volkes.”) Kroeber and Kluckhohn state incorrectly that this definition is 
from Nietzsche’s Geburt der Tragödie (1872). Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, 27. n.72. 
514 
individuals who both apply and contest culturally adopted images and symbols in an artistic 
way. This, however, means scandalous deviation from “the language of everyday technical 
and political prose” in order to maintain novelty in creation1993 – and not everyone can fill 
this role. Ricoeur stresses the need for “a writer, a thinker, a sage or a religious man to rise 
up in order to start culture anew and to chance it again with venture and total risk.”1994 This 
is what Kelton Cobb describes as interpretative “enlargement of being” in Ricoeur’s cultural 
philosophy.1995 Ricoeur had insisted earlier in the same essay, however, that “the values of 
which we are speaking […] are not radically called into question by influential and 
responsible people.”1996 The question then remains, how to read Ricoeur when he now 
maintains that artists do call into question the “the stratum of fundamental images which 
have made the culture of his nation,”1997 thus calling into question his cultural nucleus as 
well. In sum, an artist is not a conformist, but it remains unclear if he should be.  
Artistic creation, however, is possible only within a cultural context, because 
the necessary “law of scandal,” creating previously unthought images, requires the artist to 
contest the ones portrayed at the most fundamental level of the artist’s culture. An artist’s 
task is to “bring about something which will be shocking and bewildering”1998 – this Ricoeur 
defines as “the tragic law of the creation of a culture.”1999 The law of a necessary dynamics of 
de- and re-construction within a cultural whole is thus “a law diametrically opposed to the 
steady accumulation of tools which make up the civilization.”2000 Culture must be unique and 
                                               
1993 Ricoeur 1961, 450. (281). 
1994 Ricoeur 1961, 450. (281). 
1995 Cobb 1994, 384-386. Cf. Appendix 2. 
1996 Ricoeur 1961, 447. (279).   
1997 Ricoeur 1961, 450. (281). 
1998 Ricoeur 1961, 450. (281). 
1999 Ricoeur 1961, 450. (281). 
2000 Ricoeur 1961, 450. (281). 
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subjective in contrast to civilization, which is gained through an accumulation of objects, 
tools, and techniques.  
A reader’s confusion in front of Ricoeur’s essay is already significant, but it is 
about to get even more severe. In an apparent contrast to the aesthetic dynamism proposed 
above, Ricoeur mentions an additional, Kantian-style condition. According to Ricoeur, this 
condition is even more important than the law of scandal, since “only a culture capable of 
assimilating scientific rationality will be able to survive and revive.”2001 This requirement of 
the modern conception of rationality is, however, quite incompatible with Ricoeur’s initial 
criticism that “we are too prone to look for the meaning of culture on an excessive rational 
or reflective level.”2002 Does Ricoeur then mean that this “scientific” rationality is an 
absolutely necessary condition for cultural continuity, but that it should not be taken to its 
extreme? This is not, however, what he seems to be arguing when he asks for “a faith which 
integrates a desacralization of nature and brings the sacred back to man,” and “a faith which 
values time and change and puts man in the position of a master before the world, history, 
and his own life.”2003 Instead of relativizing the notion of rationality, Ricoeur now underlines 
it. 
Ricoeur’s anthropocentric standpoint is not far from Kant’s declaration that a 
rational human being “holds the title of lord of nature,” because only a rational being is 
capable of giving the final, rational-moral purpose (Endzweck) to mechanistic nature.2004 For 
Kant, culture is defined by this capability to set purposes, it is “the creation (Hervorbringung) 
of capableness in a rational being to set purposes in general (thus resulting in its 
                                               
2001 Ricoeur 1961, 450. (282). Cf. Kant 1999, V.431. (KdU). 
2002 Ricoeur 1961, 447. (278). 
2003 Ricoeur 1961, 451. (282). 
2004 Kant 1999, V.431. (KdU). 
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freedom).”2005 This strong relation with rationality is the reason why Kant argues in the 
Critique of Judgment that only culture can therefore be the ultimate purpose of nature (der letzte 
Zweck der Natur), since only it is able to open for human beings a view to the final, rational-
moral end which resides totally outside of nature.2006  
Ricoeur, however, takes a step further when stating that faith in human and his 
intelligent capabilities is needed in order to “take up a technical exploitation of nature.”2007 
Here, Ricoeur does not sound like himself at all. What has happened to Ricoeur’s 
philosophy, whose holistic tendency appeals even to the most eccentric commentator such 
as Pawel Ozdowski? Ozdowski writes that “the function of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics is not 
limited to the cognitive-empirical application”; it creates “a definite philosophy of life.” This 
“life philosophy,” in turn, Ozdowski understands as “a standard or a proposal to the way 
and style of life referring to its specific highest values.”2008 In a stark contrast to Ozdowski’s 
reading, Ricoeur’s emphasis in the 1961 essay – that only faith in human rationality “seems 
fit to survive and endure”2009 – resembles the social Darwinist survival of the fittest and the 
correlating lack of values. 
Even though the confusion already appears as thorough, I will continue this 
reading of Ricoeur’s essay to its conclusion – only to drive us to the point of utter frustration 
at the outset of our long course of analysis. Another type of problem that the essay presents 
relates to Ricoeur’s remark that the “coherent and closed, constituted cultural wholes” are 
not incommunicable since “the strangeness of man to man is never total.”2010 Approached 
from the point of view of languages – in general, significations – it should be “voluntarily 
                                               
2005 Kant 1999, V.431. (KdU). 
2006 Kant 1999, V.431. (KdU). 
2007 Ricoeur 1961, 451. (282). 
2008 Ozdowski 1984, 150-151. Cf. Appendix 2. 
2009 Ricoeur 1961, 451. (282). 
2010 Ricoeur 1961, 449, 451. (280, 282). 
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affirmed” that “there is no reason or probability that a linguistic system is untranslatable.”2011 
In other words, Ricoeur argues in favor of intercultural communication. Sounding in turn 
quite Husserlian, Ricoeur maintains that it is possible to take a stranger to be similar to me in 
his or her human capacity by means of sympathy and imagination. Not only “man’s 
oneness” but also the human condition is brought about by being capable of adopting 
another’s point of view. Ricoeur writes: “To be a man is to be capable of this transference 
into another center of perspective.”2012 In the light of Ricoeur’s assertion of the closed 
cultural wholes, however, should we not infer that this transference is only possible between 
individuals who share a particular cultural context? If not, how exactly coherent and closed 
are the cultural wholes? Ricoeur argues in the same essay that what was said about language 
“is also valid for values and the basic images and symbols which make up the cultural 
resource of a people.”2013 Now, significations and values are limited to the cultural context of a 
people, and I assume that “man’s oneness” was to follow from that. Ricoeur maintains, in 
contrast, that the oneness follows from the human capability to self-alienate oneself.  
Intercultural communication between closed, constituted cultural wholes is 
then a genuine problem for Ricoeur. So far it has been understood that cultural images and 
symbols are only workable within a cultural context, by artistic reworking made possible by 
imagination – and it was affirmed at the outset that “there are many cultures and not a single 
humanity.”2014 Although Ricoeur argues that there is a “primitive incohesion” among 
humankind, he also seems to insist that it is possible to somehow overcome this rupture 
between human beings. In spite of “the cultures” as “coherent, closed historical shapes,” 
                                               
2011 Ricoeur 1961, 451. (282). 
2012 Ricoeur 1961, 451. (282). 
2013 Ricoeur 1961, 451. (282). Italics added. 
2014 Ricoeur 1961, 449. (280). 
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Ricoeur names sympathy and imagination (somewhat resembling then Husserl’s Einfühlung) 
as means for intercultural (in Husserl: intersubjective) communication.2015  
Moreover, sympathy and imagination are in connection with those cultural 
forms most commonly attributed to “high culture.” Even though Ricoeur begins with the 
idea of a silent cultural nucleus, he concludes by referring to the sublime forms of a culture: 
“only a living culture, at once faithful to its origins and ready for creativity on the levels of 
art, literature, philosophy and spirituality, is capable of sustaining the encounter of other 
cultures.”2016 The connection between the hidden “nucleus” and the apparent practical 
cultural forms, however, is not clear. In brief overall conclusion, therefore, all this leaves 
plenty of room to wonder what Ricoeur might have wanted to say about our cultural 
condition and its characteristics. For us, then, this utter confusion means that if we want to 
pursue the task of identifying Ricoeur’s cultural hermeneutics – to which the essay, 
nevertheless, invites us – we will have to, unlike some other Ricoeur scholars, resort to 
Ricoeur’s other texts and read them with critical open-mindedness. 
 
                                               
2015 Ricoeur 1961, 451. (282). Cf. Ricoeur 1967b, 64-68, 123-142. 
2016 Ricoeur 1961, 452. (283). 
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APPENDIX 4 – PAUL CLAUDEL AND THE QUESTION OF RE/CONNAISSANCE 
In our concluding analysis of re-con-naissance in this dissertation, I have alluded to the close 
(Kantian) connection between cognition and recognition. Let me adopt a standpoint that is, 
perhaps, able to shed light on this problematics of connaissance – this analysis will further 
explain why I have claimed that this dissertation remains at the critical level, but that we as 
cultural beings are born by reading it as a text in a culture. This complementing analysis is 
also necessitated by the terminological closeness that re-con-naissance has with some other 
similar kind of terms. 
Even though August Brunner’s 1943 work La connaissance humaine could invite 
us to reconsider reconnaissance in the light of connaissance as an analogy of being, and the 
implied limits of philosophy in the face of the mystery of being,2017 Ricoeur does not seem to 
have written on Brunner, a German Jesuit, at all. A more fruitful approach to this critical 
comparison, I would maintain, is provided by Paul Claudel, a philosopher, a poet, and a 
dramatist, whom Ricoeur at least mentions in his works.2018 Moreover, Ricoeur and Gabriel 
Marcel reportedly discussed Claudel’s influence on Marcel, especially in terms of co-
naissance.2019 Claudel’s insights could therefore help explain why this work as “pointing to” 
the postcritical always remains at the critical level. Claudel’s hyphenated notation of co-
naissance brings into question the notion of re-con-naissance that I have proposed in this 
dissertation. 
                                               
2017 Cf. Brunner 1943, 213-219, 403-409. 
2018 Ricoeur 1965a, 507. (528).; Ricoeur 1969, 310. (314). 
2019 Marcel & Ricoeur 1973, 222. 
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 Claudel’s philosophy seems to come close to my own project in more than one 
way. His enigmatic L’art poétique (1907),2020 for example, is describable as a “theocentric 
cosmic philosophy” that establishes “an indissoluble link between the cosmos, humanity and 
God.”2021 Instead of an ars poetica that would be interested in poetic art aesthetically, Claudel’s 
Poetic Art is an ars poetica mundi, since his “chief objective is to explain to his readers his 
viewpoint concerning the origin, purpose and structure of the universe and humanity’s 
position and role therein.”2022 Claudel’s commentator, Larissa Bibbee, points out, however, 
that this broad objective is merely a preparation for Claudel’s argument that there is “the 
possibility of a meaningful type of poetry that would exemplify its fundamental ideas in 
symbolic terms.”2023 According to Claudel, the mystery of the whole is resolvable in poetic 
action, just as his title suggests. 
 In addition, the main section in Poetic Art announces that Claudel aims to 
provide “a new Art of Poetry of the Universe, of a new Logic,” or, rather, to point such an 
art.2024 The title of this main section, “Traité de la co-naissance au monde et de soi-même,” is very 
instructive of Claudel’s thought, but it is also extremely difficult to translate, as Claudel’s 
translator Renée Spodheim admits. Despite her good intentions, Spodheim’s suggestion, 
“Discourse on the affinity with the world and on oneself,” undermines the essential idea that 
is expressed with the term co-naissance, or “together-coming-to-be.” Instead of Spodheim’s 
failed translation, Claudel’s intention would be better maintained in “Treatise on coming to 
birth with the world and with oneself.” Spodheim is well aware of this incongruity, and adds 
a separate translator’s note that explains the struggle in trying to coherently translate some of 
                                               
2020 Trans. Poetic Art (by Renée Spodheim, 1948). From hereon the English title is used. 
2021 Bibbee 2005, 19. 
2022 Bibbee 2005, 5. 
2023 Bibbee 2005, 19. 
2024 Claudel 1953, 35-36. 
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Claudel’s key terms and concepts: “In Indo-European, the root meaning to know (connaître) 
was homonymous with that meaning to be born (naître). The author makes use of this 
double meaning, further combined with that of the Latin ‘cognatus’ (related by blood) in 
devising the word ‘co-naitre,’ which will be translated in different ways, according to the 
context.”2025 Claudel’s poetic Art, or “new Logic,” in sum, is opened up to or “pointed at” 
his analyzes of the “kinship between the words naître and connaître,” as Claudel himself 
defines his task.2026  
 Claudel’s hermeneutics serves as a critical corrective for us by taking us to the 
root of my own thesis that argues for a naissance of a cultural subject. The word “naître” that 
forms the basis for “connaître” can be translated, as Renée Spodheim suggests, “to come into 
the world,” whereas the second translates as “to know.”2027 Is it not, therefore, with 
cognition that a human subject is “born into the world,” rather than through some 
interpretative re-membering in which one re-cognizes oneself as a cultural subject? Is it not a 
mere sophisticated phantasy that a person would come to be in a process difficult to 
describe, and yet would be unceasing as a merely external condition and context, rather than 
as an internal act and achievement? Is it not, ultimately, knowing that “I am,” as already 
forcefully argued by Descartes? Indeed, without this capacity of knowing, how could I ever 
claim that I am, and that the world is? Is not naissance as co-naissance, therefore, what I should 
have considered, instead of presenting a vague “dramatic” exposition of a subject’s 
intellectual activity as cultural re-con-naissance? 
 Instead of jumping to conclusions that would annul the aim set for this 
dissertation work, Claudel, in fact, reaffirms the validity of this work in his remarks. Despite 
                                               
2025 Claudel & Spodheim 1948, 39. 
2026 Claudel 1953, 43. 
2027 Claudel & Spodheim 1948, 39. 
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her good intentions, Spodheim’s translations are not always accurate in terms of Claudel’s 
overall approach. A path for the reaffirmation of the thesis of this dissertation is cleared in 
the opening remarks of Claudel’s analysis that focuses on the words naître and connaître: “We 
do not come into the world alone. To be born (naître), for everyone, is to be born together 
(conaître). All birth (naissance) is knowledge-of-being-born-together (connaissance).”2028 Instead 
of stressing the cognizing subject, Claudel opens up by affirming the necessity of “con,” or, 
being con-joined. The “knowledge” Claudel discusses, under its three modalities, concerns 
the explication of one’s relatedness:2029 1) Crude knowledge (la connaissance brute) is of the 
relationship between things.2030 2) Non-rational knowledge gained by continuous sensual 
observation (la connaissance de constatation) guides one toward to the objective recreation of 
one’s own existence.2031 Finally, 3) the intellectual knowledge (la connaissance intellectuelle) 
pertains to the creative word-images that evoke, or “call forth,” each object into being in 
relation to us.2032 For Claudel, it is especially this third mode of “knowledge,” which sums up 
and integrates lower forms of knowing, that a spirited human being – il possède, joint à son 
corps, un esprit – comes to know him- or herself reflectively in the cultural objects produced:2033 
“these objects [such as a mechanism or a painting] become a kind of imprint of his form, the 
sign of his effort, which provokes effective or ideal repetition; [these objects are] the 
condition of his sensitivity and of his action.”2034 Naissance, as in Claudel’s co-naissance, is 
therefore cultural re-con-naissance.  
                                               
2028 Claudel 1953, 44. 
2029 Claudel 1953, 44. 
2030 Claudel 1953, 43, 49. 
2031 Claudel 1953, 57-58, 64-65. 
2032 Claudel 1953, 71-72, 79-82. 
2033 Claudel 1953, 85-86, 94-96.  
2034 Claudel 1953, 96.  
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 The poetic art Claudel argues for is the art of creating cultural objects through 
which a human subject recognizes him or herself in self-creation or self-affirmation with 
others. All cultural objects fulfill this function, but the “master of all words,” the poet – 
according to Claudel – is the most befitted, however, to undertake the task of bringing the 
dynamically harmonious unity of being to our attention, and to bring about an understanding 
of our relation to ourselves and to the other.2035 Only in the afterlife, Claudel maintains, do 
we become such poets, or “the makers of ourselves,” who are capable of pursuing the task 
of self-recognition directly, “without the empirical and hazardous accompaniment of 
external language.”2036 The poetic art, in other words, is cultural activity in and through 
which a human subject is able to begin to understand him or herself. Only in the afterlife is 
this understanding direct and immediate. In cultural life such an understanding is always 
critical and mediated – postcritical at best, if it blooms as poetic creativity. 
To conclude, Claudel’s analysis of connaître as naître reaffirms the notion of re-
con-naissance rather than renders it untenable. It is Claudel and not us, therefore, who should 
be corrected by bringing in the prefix “re-,” rather than neglecting it, and by modifying the 
terminology he applies. Even though a lexical analysis maintains a difference between 
reconnaissance and connaissance,2037 Claudel’s depth analysis explains why connaissance is, in its 
                                               
2035 Claudel 1953, 111.  
2036 Claudel 1953, 111. – Larissa Bibbee explains how the theological aspect plays along with the question 
of human self-consciousness: “A very important assertion of the theoretical discourse of the Art poétique is that 
humanity is (must be) actively involved in discerning as well as actually helping to form the complex system of 
relationships between themselves, the world and God. Some of the art analogies thus also call attention to 
man’s privileged role as active reader, spectator and/or composer (co-creator) of the reality that he experiences. 
[…] It is the poet who, through his vision and intellect, determines that the scene before his eye is a tableau, that 
is, a work of art deliberately created by the Divine Artist to be a sign of his wisdom and creative power. The 
human observer thus becomes the cause of the conglomeration and organization of the elements of the tableau: 
although God ‘programs’ things to come together, by themselves they only form an unfinished composition 
which the human observer must ‘complete’ by serving as the organizing nexus or central point of convergence 
where all lines and angles of the universe can come together. Besides being a spectator of the tableau of the 
natural world, the human being is also a reader of the text of nature.” Bibbee 2005, 9, 11. 
2037 Cf. Ricoeur 2004b, 27-28. (12-13). 
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actual practice in culture, based on reconnaissance. Co-naissance, the way Claudel explicates it, is 
culturally facilitated re-con-naissance. Claudel’s analysis of co-naissance, with its reference to the 
“externality” of language and culture, reminds us of the necessity that re-con-naissance is never 
noncritical but always limited by the critical as rooted in re/connaissance. It is, in short, the 
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